Judgment : The accused who was tried before the learned VI Additional Special Judge, Madras Division, in C.C. No.21 of 1989 and convicted for the offences under Secs.7 and 13(1) (d)(ii) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year with a fine of Rs.500 in default to suffer rigorous imprisonment for a further period of two months by its judgment dated 211. 1990, has preferred this appeal challenging and assailing its correctness and validity. 2. The appellant/accused was employed as a Special Temporary Assistant in Mylapore Triplicane Taluk Office, Madras, during the month of September, 1988. In connection with the transfer of name in the patta register for a house bearing door number 5 situated in Adhikesavalu Street, Chintadripet, Madras, to one Sushen P.W.1, an application was stated to have been pending at the hands of the accused/appellant in his office. P.W.1 with his friend P.W.2 by name Prem Anand had been to the Taluk Office on 19. 1988 and approached the accused and for which, it was stated that the accused/ appellant had demanded a sum of Rs.300 by way of bribe from P.W.1 and also asked P.W.1 to come with money on the next Monday. Because of the demand of bribe by the accused, P.Ws.1 and 2 decided to report the matter to the Vigilance and Anticorruption Police. Accordingly, at about 10 a.m. on 19. 1988 both of them had been to the vigilance and Anti Corruption Office and lodged a complaint, which was registered by the Inspector of Police, which has been marked as Ex.P-4 and Ex.P-5 is the printed F.I.R. printed by him and sent to the court. Consequently, a trap was set up at the behest of P.W.17, the Inspector. At about 3.15 p.m. on 19. 1988 P.Ws.1 and 2 had been to the place of accused in his office and on verification by the accused/appellant as to whether they had brought the money, P.W.1 gave Rs.300 from his custody to the accused. On the receipt of the said money, accused had kept the same in his left side pant pocket. 1988 P.Ws.1 and 2 had been to the place of accused in his office and on verification by the accused/appellant as to whether they had brought the money, P.W.1 gave Rs.300 from his custody to the accused. On the receipt of the said money, accused had kept the same in his left side pant pocket. This was followed by P.W.1 coming out and signalling to the Vigilance Police party waiting outside and the Inspector along with the Police party and trap witnesses had been to the accused, recovered the said money and the accused/appellant confessed to the Inspector that he had received the bribe from P.W.1. Therefore, the accused was arrested. P.W.1 has claimed that he was employed in the Chief International Air Port at Mascot and his address in India was Door No. 17, Telugu Street, Virajpet, Karnataka and whenever he happened to come to Madras, he used to stay in the house of his relative Prem Anand P.W.2 and that on 37. 1986 he purchased a house bearing door number 5 situated in Adi-Kesavalu Street, Chintadripet, Madras and that on 8. 1988 he along with P.W.2 had been to the Mylapore Triplicane Taluk Office, in connection with the transfer of the patta of the house purchased by him and gave an application for the said purpose appending a copy of the sale deed and old patta and Ex.P-1 is the said "application given by him. He would claim further that as he was instructed to come after two days by the Clerk, he along with P.W.2 went to the Taluk Office on 8. 1988 and on his instruction, he remitted a sum of Rs.5 in the State Bank through a challan given by him Ex.P-2 and handed over the receipt and that he gave another petition Ex.P-3. Then, he had been to Coimbatore and returned on 19. 1988 and in the evening when he met the accused/ appellant in his office along with P.W.2, who was the section clerk, it was stated that the accused had replied that the Tahsildar had not yet signed and to get his signature some money has to be spent and by so saying the accused had demanded a sum of Rs.300. 1988 and in the evening when he met the accused/ appellant in his office along with P.W.2, who was the section clerk, it was stated that the accused had replied that the Tahsildar had not yet signed and to get his signature some money has to be spent and by so saying the accused had demanded a sum of Rs.300. The accused is also stated to have told P.W.1 and P.W.2 that if the said amount was paid, transfer order would be had within two days, if not, it would take a year. It was the case of the prosecution further that for the said demand, P.W.1 was not inclined to but however, he was replied that without the money nothing can be done. Therefore, both P.W.1 and P.W.2 had been to the office of the Vigilance and Anticorruption at about 10 a.m. On 19. 1988 and lodged complaint Ex.P-4 to the Deputy Superintendent which was handed over to P.W.17 for registration and further action. As instructed by P.W.17, P.W.1 and P.W.2 waited in his Office and P.W.3 Perumal and one Kumarasami, employees of the T.W.A.D. Board were brought and then M.O.1 series, three hundred rupees denomination currencies brought by P.W.1, was given to P.W.17 and in which phenolphthalein powder was smeared the handed over to P.W.1, followed by the preparation of the Sodium Carbonate solution in a glass of water and when the fingers of P.W.1 was dipped, the colour of the solution turned into pink as witnessed by P.W.2 and the two witnesses. For all the exercise done in the office of the Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Ex.P-6 mahazar was prepared. The said mahazar was attested by P.W.1 as well as the said witnesses. As was instructed, at about 3 p.m. both the witnesses P.Ws.1 and 2 went to the accused while the witness P.W.3 Perumal was standing two feet away from the accused. He was asked as to what happened to his transfer application, for which, the accused was stated to have replied as to whether they had brought the money and immediately P.W.1 took M.O.1 series, three hundred rupee denomination notes and gave it to the accused and the accused had received the same and kept it in his left side pant pocket M.O.5 and this was witnessed by P.W.3 and P.W.2. Thereafter the accused had been to P.W.5 Draftsman. Thereafter the accused had been to P.W.5 Draftsman. This was followed by P.W.1 coming outside and lit a cigarette as a signal to the waiting Police and consequently, P.W.17 came to the accused, introduced himself and as pointed out by P.W.1, he recovered the money in the presence of witnesses. To this extent, P.W.1 and P.W.2 were consistent in their testimony before the trial court. 3. Then in the presence of witnesses present there and the Tahsildar and the Deputy Tahsildar, the phenol-phthalein test was conducted and the fingers of the accused were dipped and change of colour of the sodium carbonate solution was noticed and the bottles were M.O.2 and M.O.3. The test was also conducted on the pant pocket M.O.5 and the solution turned pink and the bottle is M.O.4. On the information given by the accused, P.W.17 had seized from P.W.5 the file containing Ex.P-2, Ex.P-3 and Ex.P-13 under the cover of mahazar Ex. P-7 attested by the witnesses present. At about 5 p.m. the accused was arrested. P.W.3 Perumal a staff of the T.W.A.D. Board has corroborated the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2. To the same extent P.W.17, Inspector of Police has substantiated the prosecution case. He would claim further that after the trap was over and the accused was arrested, he searched the house of the accused at Mambalam and prepared a search list Ex.P-8 attested by the witnesses. He recorded the statement from the accused given voluntarily. Then he sent the case properties to the court with a request to sent the same for Chemical Analysis under Ex.P-18 and examined other witnesses subsequently. 4. Tmt.Banumathi examined as P.W.5 would claim that on the date of occurrence, the accused was working as patta clerk and that on 19. 1988 the file relating to P.W.1 came to her with the note Ex.P-12 for drafting a sketch on the reverse of the same and on 19. 1988 she got them map for the purpose of drawing the sketch and at about 3.30 p.m. on that day the accused came to her along with three others and asked whether the draft was ready but for which she replied that the job was not yet over and she would give it in a shortwhile after finishing the same and upon saying so, they had left and that thereafter the Vigilance Inspector came and seized Ex.P-12. P.W.4 the Revenue Inspector claims that the transfer application, of P.W.1 was received on 28. 1988 and entered in Ex.P-9 her personal register and the relevant entry is Ex.P-10 and submitted report Ex.P-11 that transfer could be effected. He would add further that there was an order received to implement the Teacher’s day Donation Collection in her office and that for her part a target of Rs.2,500 was fixed and for which, collection they would give the necessary receipt and that the said collection was over on 9. 1988. 5. P. W.6 has stated that he was the Assistant working in the Mylapore Triplicane Taluk Office and that on 19. 1988 itself, he prepared Ex.P-12 and placed for the perusal of the Tahsildar and that thereafter forwarded the same to the Survey section on that day itself. One Govindaraj examined as P.W.7 has spoken to the factum of the perusal of Ex.P-1 on 8. 1988 and forwarding of the same to P.W.4 to submit a report thereon. P.W.8 Padmanabhan has claimed that he had completed Ex.P-3 and submitted to the Tahsildar. P.W.10 Velayudha Perumal working as an Assistant in the Madras Collectorate, has claimed that on the report of the Vigilance Department, he pleaded everything before the District Collector and accordingly, it was verified and Ex.P-13 sanction to prosecute the accused for the offences above referred was accorded. 6. P.W.11 the Personal Assistant to the Madras District Education Officer has stated in his evidence that during the month of September every year on the 4th, 5th and 6th day Teachers’ day was being observed and with the permission of the District Collector donations were being collected, and for which, tickets were printed and that on 9. 1988 a sum of Rs.16,500 and a sum of Rs.3,500 on 9. 1988 were remitted by the Mylapore Triplicane Taluk Office under Ex.P-14 and Ex.P-15. P.W.12 Thirunavukkarasu the Junior Assistant looking after the collection of donations for Teachers’ Day and Flag Day would claim that the Tahsildar gave tickets of Rs.5, Rs.25, Rs.50 denominations to the extent of Rs. 1988 a sum of Rs.16,500 and a sum of Rs.3,500 on 9. 1988 were remitted by the Mylapore Triplicane Taluk Office under Ex.P-14 and Ex.P-15. P.W.12 Thirunavukkarasu the Junior Assistant looking after the collection of donations for Teachers’ Day and Flag Day would claim that the Tahsildar gave tickets of Rs.5, Rs.25, Rs.50 denominations to the extent of Rs. three lakhs for the purpose of collection towards Teachers’ Day which he distributed among four Revenue Inspectors and four Surveyors of his Office and that accordingly, amounts were collected and handed over to the Tahsildar under Ex.P-16 and that amount has been sent to the District Educational Officer under Ex.P-14 and Ex.P-15 and Ex.P-17 is the file relating to the same. 7. M.Os.1 to 5 sent by P.W.27 under Ex.P. 18 has been sent to Chemical Examination according to the evidence of P.W.13 Mr.Malaiappan, Head Clerk attached to the Judicial Magistrate’s Court. P.W.14, the Tahsildar, Triplicane has stated that he had recommended the transfer of the patta under Ex.P-1 and the order was passed by him on 19. 1988 itself. P.W.15, another Tahsildar would have it that at about 4 p.m. on 19. 1988, the accused/ appellant was brought before him by the Vigilance Police and has substantiated the case of P.Ws. 1 and 2 about the trap, phenolpthalein test conducted, the change of colour and so on and he has attested Ex.P-7 mahazar prepared thereon. He would further claim that the collections made with regard to Teachers’ Day at Rs. 16,500 on 9. 1988 and Rs.3,500 on 9. 1988 were sent to the District Educational Officer. 8. When the accused was examined under Sec.313(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure on the basis of the incriminating circumstances appearing against him in evidence, he had denied his complicity in the crime but however has admitted that M.O.1 series was given to him by P.W.1 but not as a bribe but towards the collection of the donation for Flag Day Celebration and by so saying he has stated that the case been foisted against him. 9. After recording the oral testimony from P.Ws.1 to 17 and the documentary evidence Ex.P-1 to Ex.P-20, marking material objects M.Os. 9. After recording the oral testimony from P.Ws.1 to 17 and the documentary evidence Ex.P-1 to Ex.P-20, marking material objects M.Os. 1 to 5 and considering the contentions raised on behalf of the respective parties herein, the learned Special Judge has held that the prosecution has succeeded in establishing the guilt of the accused beyond the realm of doubt for the offences charged and tried and accordingly convicted and sentenced him as above referred. Aggrieved at this accused/ appellant has come forward with this appeal. 10. I have heard the Bar against and for the impugned judgment. Mr.Rajkumar Roberts, learned counsel appearing for the appellant submitted the following contentions while assailing the impugned judgment, .(i) The evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2 coupled with P.Ws.3 and 4 is highly suspicious and unbelievable and as such, accepting the same by the learned trial Judge is erroneous and not correct in law; .(ii) The accounting of the trap witnesses were only tutored one and they were not present when the trap was set up and completed actually and a close scrutiny of their part of evidence would reveal the said fact and that therefore, the whole episode of setting the trap, roping in of the accused is false and the learned trial Judge has erred in believing and accepting the same; (iii) The motive and circumstances attributed by the prosecution to the accused in demanding the money is not at all probable for the reason that the accused alone has not been vested with the power of effecting the transfer of patta to the house of P.W.1 and that therefore, the version of P.Ws.1 and 2 in the context of the other Official witnesses of the Taluk Office would by itself betray the prosecution case; .(iv) The explanation given by the accused while he was examined under Sec.313(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure has been thoroughly misconstrued by the learned Sessions Judge; and lastly, .(v) There was no valid sanction and Ex.P-13 does not comply with the legal principle enunciated by this Court as well as by the Apex Court and more so, the evidence of P.W.10 while referring to Ex.P-13 did not render any help to im-prove the prosecution case and that therefore, the sanction accorded by the District Collector to prosecute the accused is totally void ab initio. By raising the said points, learned counsel also contended that in view of the interest failure by the prosecution to establish the complicity of the accused, no statutory presumption as provided under Secs.20 and 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, would arise in this case, with the result, the. impugned judgment of conviction and sentence is liable to be set aside. 11. Controverting every one of the said contentions, Mr. I. Subramaniam, learned Additional Public Prosecutor took every one of his nerve in persuading me to accept the verdict of the trial Judge based on the acceptable and convincing evidence adduced by the prosecution. He would contend that P.Ws.1 and 2 are absolute and total strangers to the accused and they have no axe to grind against him and that under the circumstances, their claim against the accused with regard to the demand of the bribe made by him and the bribe money given by them to him during the trap set up by P.W.17 has to be accepted and that was exactly done by the trial Judge and that there was no reason made available to discredit or eschew their version. So also, for P.W.3. the attestor of the recovery mahazar as well as the eye-witness for the trap set up and implementation of the same and the consequent phenolpthalein test and so on. P.W.4 to P.W.15 are the Official witnesses, according to the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, they had clearly spoken to the circumstances and state of affairs under which the accused was expected to work and the role played by him. He would further contend that the setting up the law in motion through the complaint Exs.P-4 to P-16 and the registering of the same by P.W.17 and the consequent trap has been clearly spoken to by P.W.17 supported by P.Ws. 1, 2 and 3 has been rightly accepted by the court below and that there was no reason made available to disbelieve or discredit or suspect their version. Lastly, learned Additional Public Prosecutor had contended that upon the due verification of all the records placed before him. the District Collector had on arriving at a full satisfaction accorded sanction to prosecute the accused for the offences charged under Ex.P-13 and that therefore, what has been contended on behalf of the appellant upon Ex.P-13 is not correct. Lastly, learned Additional Public Prosecutor had contended that upon the due verification of all the records placed before him. the District Collector had on arriving at a full satisfaction accorded sanction to prosecute the accused for the offences charged under Ex.P-13 and that therefore, what has been contended on behalf of the appellant upon Ex.P-13 is not correct. He would further contend that in the light of the admission made by the accused M.O.1 series was since recovered by P.W.17 on the day of occurrence and time from his pant pocket and custody, particularly, that money is the bribe money as claimed by P.Ws.1 and 2 and that under the circumstances, it was for the accused/ appellant to rebut the said presumption by means of acceptable legal evidence as provided under Sec. 19 on the amended Act. Thus, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor justified the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence recorded by the learned Special Judge. 12. In the light of the above contra position, I have carefully and meticulously gone through the entire case records and the recorded legal evidence. The only question that arises for consideration at this juncture, is whether the impugned judgment is vitiated with any erroneous or incorrect approach adopted by the learned trial Judge in holding that the prosecution had established the guilt of the accused/ appellant beyond all reasonable doubts. 13. With regard to the employment of the accused as Junior Assistant in Mylapore-Triplicane Office at Madras, working along with P.Ws.4 to P.W.15, who were also the staff of the said Taluk Office in various capacities during the month of September, 1988 and the submission of the application for the transfer of the patta for his newly purchased house by P.W.1 under Ex.P-1 on 8. 1988 and the subsequent change on 8. 1988 with the payment of challan for the fee for the consideration of the said application as evident from Exs.P-1, P-2 and P-3 as spoken to by the prosecution witnesses, particularly, P.Ws.1 and 5. 12, 13, 8 and 9 there is no controversy or dispute among the parties herein. 1988 and the subsequent change on 8. 1988 with the payment of challan for the fee for the consideration of the said application as evident from Exs.P-1, P-2 and P-3 as spoken to by the prosecution witnesses, particularly, P.Ws.1 and 5. 12, 13, 8 and 9 there is no controversy or dispute among the parties herein. It was the specific claim of P.W.1 that as he was instructed, he had gone to the Taluk Office where the accused/ appellant was working along with P.W.2 and enquired about the position of his transfer application and for which, it was his case that the accused/ appellant demanded a sum of Rs.300 as illegal gratification and told him without which nothing could be done for a period of about a year but if paid, could be done within two days. This demand according to P.W.1 said to have been made by the accused was also spoken to by P.W.2 who had accompanied P.W.1 although. It is seen further that pursuant thereto, they had decided not to give the money demanded as bribe but to lodge the complaint to the vigilance and anticorruption Police. It was the finding of the learned trial Judge, upon considering the above said portion of the evidence that the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2 seems to be natural, cogent, convincing and acceptable. If the isolated portion of the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2 irrespective of their conduct and other circumstances is taken into account, one could agree with the learned trial Judge. It is noticed at this stage that the accused was one of the staff of the Taluk Office working as Junior Assistant in patta transfer section among 30 others and he himself was not the only person solely responsible for effecting the transfer of the patta to the house property. P.Ws. 4, 5, 7, 8 and the Tahsildar P.W.15 and so many other persons working in the said Office are also responsible for effecting the transfer of patta and the ultimate authority to effect the transfer is the Tahsildar examined as P.W.14. It is thus seen, P.Ws.6 to P.W.13 are also expected to contribute their work in effecting the transfer in part or otherwise. It is thus seen, P.Ws.6 to P.W.13 are also expected to contribute their work in effecting the transfer in part or otherwise. It is also noted at this stage that P.W.1 and P.W.2 to take a decision not to pay the demanded bribe to the accused but however to report the concerned Police have taken nearly 3 days from the evening of 19. 1988 to 19. 1988. From the perusal of their evidence in the cross-examination, it is noticed that P.Ws.1 and 2 are not the total strangers or first time visitors of the Taluk Office concerned on 9. 1988. Though P.W.1 claims to have been an employee in one of the foreign countries, he is an Indian National, however, employed in Muscat, used to come, and purchased the house property sometime long back and after getting the full documents with the help of his friend P.W.2 had indulged in the effort in taking application for transfer of his name in the patta, of the revenue records, during the month of August, 1988. His admission that he had paid a sum of Rs. 100 towards the donation for the Teachers’ Day to P.W.4 for no receipt was given assumes the one fact that he was closely acquainted with every staff of the Taluk Office and had been a frequent visitor to and donated freely without any receipt. It was the admitted case of the Revenue Officials that every year for celebrating the Teachers’ Day and Flag Day, at the instructions of the District Collector, donation tickets in various denominations were supplied to them with particular target for collections and that collections were used to be made during the month of August 8, September three months prior to December every year. It is also admitted in evidence that for the year 1988, for the Teachers’ Day, donation collections were made and sums were collected and paid to the District Educational Officer through the Surveyors, Revenue Inspectors and other staff of the Taluk Office concerned. It was not in dispute that the concerned Taluk Office was also entrusted with the task of collecting the Teachers’ Day donations and Flag Day donations for the year 1988 with the permission of the authorities and accordingly it has been collected. The testimony of P.W.4, Revenue Inspector Tmt.Hasmath Sulthana is the direct illustration and her evidence clinches the whole matter in question. The testimony of P.W.4, Revenue Inspector Tmt.Hasmath Sulthana is the direct illustration and her evidence clinches the whole matter in question. It was the specific defence of the accused during examination under Sec.313(1)(b), Crl.P.C. that a sum of Rs.300 M.O.1 series was received by him from P.W.1 only towards the Flag Day collection and kept it in his pocket and within a short-while he was caught by P.W.16 and P.W.17 and follow up action was taken as if it was a bribe money. Thus, the admitted aspect of the defence taken by the accused provides sample support to the prosecution case that at about 3.30 p.m. on 19. 1988 he has received M.O.1 series the three hundred rupee denomination currency notes from P.W.1 and that was recovered from his custody by P.W.17 in the presence of P.Ws.1 to 3. But in the context of his specific plea that it was not the bribe money but however, the Flag Day collection and the case was foisted against him, it requires to be seen whether the prosecution has succeeded in its mission of establishing the guilt of the accused for the offences charged beyond the realm of doubt. 14. As I have already adverted to P.Ws.1 and 2 took three days to arrive at a decision to lodge the complaint against the accused for having demanded the illegal gratification. There is no explanation of any kind or reasonings given by P.W.2 for the delay to take a decision to lodge a complaint for about three days. It is not as if the accused was the sole authority to effect, the transfer. His part of the duty is expected to be a meager one in effecting the transfer of patta as the process of the same has to be completed by more than one staff of the Revenue Department as clinchingly reveals from the evidence of P.W.5 to P.Ws. 15, Secondly, if really P.Ws.1 and 2 were instructed by P.W.17 as a part of the trap formulated and consequently when it was implemented, one would normally expect P.Ws.1 and 2 should have given the money on completion of the object for which, they have to pay the money but that was not so in this case. 15, Secondly, if really P.Ws.1 and 2 were instructed by P.W.17 as a part of the trap formulated and consequently when it was implemented, one would normally expect P.Ws.1 and 2 should have given the money on completion of the object for which, they have to pay the money but that was not so in this case. P.Ws.1 to 3 consistently claim that at about 3.30 p.m. on 19.9,1988 then the bribe money, M.O.1 series was paid to the accused by P.W.1 in the presence of P.Ws.2 and 3, the accused took the prosecution witnesses to P.W.4, the draftsman, who was in a separate room nearly and asked something and something was replied and then returned. It is noted that it is not the specific case of P.W.2 and P.W.3 that they had not accompanied the accused to the room of P.W.4 but they were specific in claiming that they had not noted what transpired between them. P.W.3 was silentas to whether he accompanied P.W.1 and the accused to the room of the draftsman. There is a totally different version given by P.W.1 in this regard that when he was taken to the room of the draftsman P.W.4 by the accused, P.W.4 replied the accused that the draft sketch was not ready and that therefore, the accused asked her to finish the same shortly and he returned and that however, the accused had told him that he would bring the transfer order as he knew the house of P.W.1 already. This answer elicited in the chief examination assumes every significance and importance in this case for assuming that P.W.1 is not a total stranger but however had already acquaintance with the accused and that in this context, the accused and P.W.1 were already known to each other and had some dealings and that was the reason why the accused was said to have given the answer that he would bring the transfer order to his house as the same was not ready on the day and time when the bribe money was paid. Significant at this stage to note is that P.Ws.2 and P.W.3 claiming to be present although continuously were silent about these facts and did not speak a single word about this. Significant at this stage to note is that P.Ws.2 and P.W.3 claiming to be present although continuously were silent about these facts and did not speak a single word about this. Therefore, the omissions on the part of P.W.1 assumes a major important factor in this case touching their very attitude and conduct, certainly not in favour of the prosecution by giving some room for serious doubt about their testimony. The still worse part of the evidentiary value of their testimony is P.Ws.1 and P.W.2 admitted that they had not told the Investigating Officer the said fact at the earliest point of time but only have stated before the trial court. Having considered the above aspect, I am able to identify the basis and serious doubt in the so-called consistent claim of P.Ws. 1, 2 and 3. 15. It is also noticed that the accused is seem to have been working amidst 30 staff of the Taluk Office, sitting one behind the other in the tables and that was in two rows. If that was so, three days’ time consumed by P.Ws. 1 and 2 to lodge the complaint would have also made them to complain to the Tahsildar or the Deputy Tahsildar or other staff about the illegal demand made by the accused but nothing was admittedly done by them. 16. Of the two witnesses summoned for the trap in two instalments, one at the Office of the Vigilance and the letter at the scene of crime, in the Taluk Office, P.W.3 Perumal alone was examined and Kumaraswamy was not examined, both were the staff of the T.W.A.D. Board and whose services were requisitioned by P.W.17 on 19. 1988. Significant to note is that there is a direct conflict between the claim of P.W.17 and P.Ws.1 and 2 as to the person who was present along with P.Ws.1 and 2 during the implementation of the trap that was either P.W.3 or Kumarasamy. In the context of the other attestor of Ex.P-6 and Ex.P-7 has not been examined, P.W.17 claims only the reference of the attestation by Kumarasamy. Even P.W.3 Perumal has not stated at which place he was standingat the time when accused took P.W.1 and P.W.2 to the rooms of the draftsman. In the context of the other attestor of Ex.P-6 and Ex.P-7 has not been examined, P.W.17 claims only the reference of the attestation by Kumarasamy. Even P.W.3 Perumal has not stated at which place he was standingat the time when accused took P.W.1 and P.W.2 to the rooms of the draftsman. All the more the evidence given by P.W.4 during the reexamination voluntarily that she had sold out a ticket to P.W.1 and gave the collected amount to her husband to remit in his office account would throw every light that P.W.1 is not a stranger to every one of the staff of the Taluk Office and also used to donate by purchasing tickets either for Teacher’s Day or Flag Day. The evidence of P.W.5 is that at about 3.30 p.m. on 19. 1988 she stated to the accused that the draft for effecting the transfer was not ready and she promised to complete it shortly and hand over the same within a short time and within that time, the Vigilance Officers came and examined her. Under the above circumstances, it is also discernible or to comprehend whether it was prudent for a man to go and comply with the request of a Government servant to pay the bribe when his obligation had not been fulfilled or completed. To fill up this gap, it seems that P.W.1 was instructed to give in evidence that the accused had promised that he would bring the transfer order to his house. This embellishment however goes to the root of the prosecution case in creating a serious doubt about the conduct and attitude of P.W.1. Admittedly, he has not stated so when he was examined by the police. From the above, a serious doubt arises about the character and conduct of the consistent claim of P.Ws.1, 2 and 3. Significantly, P.W.2 was silent about the said facts but however conveniently avoided by stating that he had not taken note of. The doubts above referred inherent in the character and conduct in the oral testimony of P.Ws. 1 to 3 though was noted by the learned trial Judge, according to the Judge, they are only minor in nature and do not affect the case of the prosecution, in my respectful view, it is not so, but the fact is totally on the converse for the. 1 to 3 though was noted by the learned trial Judge, according to the Judge, they are only minor in nature and do not affect the case of the prosecution, in my respectful view, it is not so, but the fact is totally on the converse for the. very reasoning that the accused had admitted the recovery of M.O.1 series from his pocket by P.W.17 and submitted that a case was foisted subsequently the learned Judge has pertinently referred to. But however, for the inherent doubt pointed out above from the evidence of P.Ws.1 to 3, I am of the firm view that though the testimony of P.Ws. 1 to 3 are consistent in nature manifestly but in every breadth and depth it has become highly improbable, suspicious in nature and character and therefore, it is highly unsafe to accept and believe their version to place a conviction against the accused. 17. Having thus adverted to the prosecution case spoken to by P.Ws. 1 to 3, the defence of the accused seems to have been probabilised by the oral testimony of P.W.4, the Revenue Inspector. It is the common knowledge that the target amount of donations being collected by the Revenue authorities cannot be expected to be done always personally and directly but through their subordinate staff inclusive of the Junior Assistants, Clerks and Peons working under them in the same Office as well as from the customers and visitors to the Offices. The defence taken by the accused that M.O.1 series was recovered from him which was given by P.W.1 towards the Flag Day donations cannot be brushed aside in toto on the ground of mere technicality provided under Sec.20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. True, M.O.I series was admittedly recovered from the custody of the accused but to raise such presumption, the explanation on given by the accused coupled with the evidence of P.Ws.5, 6 to 15 render all corroboration to the inference that every staff and Officer of the Revenue Department would be engaged in the collection of donations for the Flag Day and Teachers’ Day celebrations every year and that can be taken judicial notice of. If that being so, the explanation given by the accused can be accepted safely and in such circumstances, it is for the prosecution to prove the guilt, of the accused that the accused had committed the offences for which he has charged and tried. 18. While the testimony, of P.Ws.1 and 2 the author of the complaint Ex.P.4 are suspected with every serious doubt, then whatever be the kind of investigation done, as spoken to by P.Ws.16 and 17, in the context of new circumstances claimed by P.Ws.4 to P.W.15, there arises a serious doubt about the possibility of the offence committed by the accused. The learned trial Judge, with great respect, has proceeded only on the basis of the admission and that therefore recorded the conviction without even adverting to the basic doubts inherent in the testimony of P. Ws. 1 to 3. which is clearly erroneous and improper in the eye of law. 19. While considering the evidence of P.W.5 and other official witnesses of the Revenue Department, learned trial Judge has apparently failed to take note of the fact that every one in the said office is to be engaged in collecting donations for the Teachers’ day and Flag day and that P.W.1 has also contributed towards the Teachers’ day donations to P.W.4 and the infirmities in her testimony has been clearly lost sight of, which goes to the root of the controversy in this case. Besides, as I have already adverted to, though three days’ time was taken by P.Ws.1 and 2 to lodge the complaint to the Vigilance Police Ex.P-4, it is significant to note that they did not think of complaining the matter to the Tahsildar or the higher authorities in the Revenue Department. To arrest a person or secure a staff of the Government Office, for having allegedly demanded the illegal gratification, it is hardly believable for a total stranger to become amenable to a trap set up by the Police Officials on a single isolated act and this factum cannot be ignored to be taken note of while considering the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2. No other witnesses had been cited on behalf of the prosecution for the trap set up by P.Ws.16 and 17 in this case in spite of the fact that several witnesses including P.Ws.4 to P.W.14 were working in the same premises. 1 and 2. No other witnesses had been cited on behalf of the prosecution for the trap set up by P.Ws.16 and 17 in this case in spite of the fact that several witnesses including P.Ws.4 to P.W.14 were working in the same premises. Learned trial Judge is not correct in believing the evidence of P.Ws. 1 to 3 on the one factor of the occurrence and the rest P.Ws.4 to P.W.15 as to the surrounding circumstances and that therefore, it is not possible for me to place any reliance upon their testimony and believe their version as true and acceptable. Having thus considered, I am of the firm view, that the oral testimony of P.Ws. 1 to 3 on the one hand for the occurrence proper is in direct conflict and improabilies the claim made by P.W.4 to 15 on the other hand in the context of the specific defence taken by the accused. 20. The last contention is with regard to the sanction accorded by the District Collector under Ex.P-13 as spoken to by P.W.10. P.W.10 is a staff employed in the District Collector’s Office he has spoken about Ex.P-13, the written sanction given by the District Collector on 6. 1989 according sanction to prosecute the accused for the offences above referred. It was the contention made by the Bar on behalf of the appellant/ accused that the sanctioning authority has not applied its mind with reference to any documents or materials placed before him to arrive at a full satisfaction that there appeared to be every prima facie and satisfactory case for according sanction for the prosecution of the accused, though it was controverted by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, to appreciate the said contention I have extracted the contents of Ex.P-13, as hereunder: "Proceedings of the Collector of Madras, Madras-5. Present Thiru Jor Singh Shiam, I.A.S. A.3/66147/88 dated 6. 1989 Sub: Public Servant - Madras District Revenue Unit - Thiru S.Krishnamoorthy, formerly Special Temporary Assistant - Mylapore - Triplicane Taluk - Demand and acceptance of bribe - Sanction of prosecution - Ordered. READ: Report dated 31. 1989 from the Director, Vigilance and Anti-Corruption, Madras and the connected records. Order: Whereas Thiru.S.Krishnamoorthy, Special Temporary Assistant, Office of the Tahsildar, Mylapore - Triplicane Taluk Office, Madras is a public servant. READ: Report dated 31. 1989 from the Director, Vigilance and Anti-Corruption, Madras and the connected records. Order: Whereas Thiru.S.Krishnamoorthy, Special Temporary Assistant, Office of the Tahsildar, Mylapore - Triplicane Taluk Office, Madras is a public servant. Whereas it is alleged that Thiru.S.Krishnamoorthy, pursuant to the demand made by him of a sum of Rs.300 from Thiru.P.M.Sushen of No.5, Adikesavelu Street, Chintadripet. Madras on 19. 1988 afternoon, at his Office, accepted the said sum of Rs.300 from the said Thiru.Sushen at his office on 19. 1988 at about 3.15 p.m. as gratification other than legal remuneration as motive or reward for expediting the application for transfer of patta in his name in respect of the house property at No.5, Adhikesavalu Street, Chintadripet, Madras then pending in the said Office. Whereas it is further alleged that at the same time, place and in the course of the same transaction, Thiru S. Krishnamoorthy, being a public servant as aforesaid by corrupt and illegal means, and by otherwise abusing his position as public servant, obtained for himself from the said P.M. Sushen, the said sum of Rs.300 as pecuniary advantage, in the circumstances stated above. Whereas the said acts of Thiru. S. Krishnamoorthy constitute offences under Secs.7 and 13(2) read with Sec.13(d)(i) and (ii) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. 1988 (Central Act 49 of 1988). And whereas, I Jor Singh Shiam, I.A.S., Collector of Madras being the authority competent to remove the said Thiru S. Krishnamoorthy from his office after fully and carefully examining the materials placed before me in regard to the said allegations and the circumstances of the case satisfied that the said Thiru S. Krishnamoorthy, should be prosecuted for the offences aforesaid. Now therefore, I do hereby accord sanction required under Sec. 19(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, (Central Act 49 of 1988) for the prosecution of Thiru. S.Krishnamoorthy, Special Temporary Assistant in the Mylapore -Triplicane Taluk Office, Madras for the said offences and for taking cognizance of the said offences by a court of competent jurisdiction. Sd......6. 1989 Collector of Madras. S.Krishnamoorthy, Special Temporary Assistant in the Mylapore -Triplicane Taluk Office, Madras for the said offences and for taking cognizance of the said offences by a court of competent jurisdiction. Sd......6. 1989 Collector of Madras. To The Director of Vigilance and Anti Corruption, Madras." This Court had the occasion to consider the sanction question as provided under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1954 under Secs.5(1), 5(2) read 5(1)(d) along with Sec. 161, I.P.C., in Charles Waker Devadass v. State, (1993)3) Crimes 926, and observe as follows, following the Supreme court judgment as hereunder: "In Mohd. Iqbal Ahmed v. State of A.P., A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 677: (1979)1 A.P.L.J.(S.C.)39: (1979)2 S.C.R. 1007 : (1979)4 S.C.C. 172 : 1979 S.C.C (Crl.) 926, the Supreme Court has laid down that it is incumbent on the prosecution to prove that a valid sanction has been granted by the sanctioning authority after it was satisfied that a case for sanction has been made out constituting the offence. This should be done in two ways: either (1) by producing the original sanction which itself contains the facts constituting the offence and the ground of satisfaction, and (2) by adducing evidence aliunde to show the facts placed before the sanctioning Authority and the satisfaction arrived at by it. Any case instituted without a proper sanction must fail because this being manifest defect in the prosecution, the entire proceedings are rendered vaid ab initio. What the court has to see is whether or not the sanctioning authority at the time of giving sanction was aware of the facts constituting the offence and applied its mind for the same and subsequent fact which may come into existence after the grant of sanction is wholly irrelevant. The grant of sanction is not an idle formality or an acrimonious exercise but a solemn and sacrosant act which affords protection to Government servants against frivolous prosecutions and must therefore be strictly complied with before any prosecution can be launched against the public service concerned." Following, the ratio of the Apex court, this Court in Periasamy v. Inspector Vigilance and Anti Corruption. Tiruchirapalli, 1992 L.W. (Crl)582, has held that the sanction order given by authority to prosecute an accused under the Prevention of Corruption Act is not an empty formality but it should be after full satisfaction on the basis of the materials and evidence made available with regard to the allegations made against the particular accused and that the non giving of any reasons pertaining to the grounds of satisfaction amounts to invalidate the sanction order itself and not in accordance with law. The Allahabad High Court in Har Bharosey Lal v. State of U.P. 1988 Crl.L.J. 1122 has also observed that courts cannot act on surmises or conjectures nor will have to be guided by extraneous considerations matters which are not on record. The grant of sanctions is not an idle formality but a solemn and sacrosanct act which provides protection to public servants against frivolous prosecutions. This requirement of law has not been complied with before launching prosecution against the appellant. It is thus seen that in according sanction prosecution as contemplated under Sec.6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act the sanctioning authority should necessarily apply its mind and get itself satisfied that a case for sanction has been made out, constituting the offences. The prosecution has to prove this in two ways, either (1) by producing the original sanction which itself contains the facts constituting the offence and the grounds of satisfaction, and (2) by adducing evidence aliunde to show that facts place before the sanctioning Authority and the satisfaction arrived at by it. A case instituted without adopting the above referred legal concept and ingredients must necessarily fall because this being a defect manifest in the prosecution and as such the entire proceedings are rendered void ab initio. Though the report of the Direction of Vigilance and Anti-Corruption with particular reference number has been referred to in the column of ‘reference’ to Ex.P-29, and in paragraph 5 careful and full examination of the materials and records placed before the sanctioning authority was referred to, it is manifest and apparent that it is not known what are all the documents that have been relief upon by the sanctioning authority to arrive at the satisfaction and what are all the grounds of satisfaction are totally absent in this case. Above all, evidence aliunde involved in this case prostrating the facts leading to the offence before the sanctioning authority and his perusal of the same is absent totally in this case.“” 21. Keeping in view the principle laid down in the above cases to the facts of the instant case, particularly, with reference to the contents of Ex.P-13, I have to say that the decision of mine held in the above case law squarely applies in all the four, namely, that the sanctioning authority not at all seems to have applied his mind in according the sanction to prosecute the accused. The report of the Director of Vigilance and Anti-Corruption has not been placed before the court nor copy of which is forthcoming. It is not known what are the documents and materials placed before the sanctioning authority and on what matters and materials and grounds, the sanctioning authority has arrived at its satisfaction to accord the sanction for prosecution. Merely adverting to a reference of a report without either stating the grounds or facts even, it is seen that the basic norms held by the courts very often and repeatedly have not been followed. It is the sealed principle of law that the granting of sanction for the competent authority to prosecute a public servant is not an empty or an idle formality but, however, it is an act attached with sacrosanctity to be exercised with every solemnity to look into every matter and materials so carefully in order to save the public servant from falsely and fictitiously roping him in vexatious or frivolous prosecution and public servants are expected to be saved only when the competent authorities are complying with the abovesaid legal norm settled down by the courts of law and unless this has been fully followed, the legislative mandate nor the law settled by the Apex Court cannot be deemed to have been followed which otherwise renders the whole proceedings void ab initio. This case is yet another instance of not following the legal principles enunciated in this regard. For the foregoing reasons, I am at every difficulty to countenance the very contentions made 6y the learned Additional Public Prosecutor in this regard. 22. This case is yet another instance of not following the legal principles enunciated in this regard. For the foregoing reasons, I am at every difficulty to countenance the very contentions made 6y the learned Additional Public Prosecutor in this regard. 22. The legal presumption envisaged under Sec.20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, was relied on by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor coupled with Sec. 19 of the Act Sec. 19(1)(b) reads as follows: 19.Previous sanction necessary for prosecutions: (1) No court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under Secs.7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 alleged to have been committed by a public servant, except with the previous sanction,- .... ..... .(b) in the case of a person who is employed in connection with the affairs of a State and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the State Government, of that Government; .(c) in the case of any other person, of the authority competent to remove him from his office.” Sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 19 reads as follows: “(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974),- (a) no finding, sentence or order passed by a special Judge shall be reversed or altered by a court in appeal, confirmation or revision on the ground of the absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in the sanction required under Sub-sec.(1), unless in the opinion of that court, a failure of justice in fact been occasioned thereby;” Sub-sec.(4) also relevant to be noted reads as follows: “(4) In determining under Sub-sec.(3) whether the absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity, in such sanction has occasioned or resulted in a failure of justice the court shall have regard to the fact whether the objection could not should have been raised at any earlier stage in the proceedings. Explanation-For the purposes of this section,- .(a) error includes competency of the authority to grant sanction; .(b) a sanction required for prosecution includes reference to any requirement that the prosecution shall be at the instance of a specified authority or with the sanction of a specified person or any requirement of a similar nature.” 23. Explanation-For the purposes of this section,- .(a) error includes competency of the authority to grant sanction; .(b) a sanction required for prosecution includes reference to any requirement that the prosecution shall be at the instance of a specified authority or with the sanction of a specified person or any requirement of a similar nature.” 23. It is obvious and specifically spelt out that Sub-sec.(3) of Sec. 19 introduced a new provision that a finding, sentence or order passed by a Special Judge shall not be reversed or altered by a court in appeal, confirmation or revision on the ground of absence of sanction or on the grounds of any error, omission or irregularity in the sanction unless in the opinion of that court, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby. Sub-sec.(4) as above referred seems to have laid that in determining whether there is a failure of justice or not, the court shall have regard to the fact whether the objections could and should have been raised at an earlier stage in the proceedings. The explanation given thereto further clarifies that what is meant by or what exactly means the concept of error, which of course includes the competency of the authority to grant sanction and that sanction required for prosecution includes reference to any requirement that the prosecution shall be at the instants of a specified authority or the sanction of a specified person or any requirement of a similar nature. It is thus seen that simply because there is an error or omission or irregularity found in the sanction, the finding or sentence or order passed by the trial court or a Special Judge shall not be reversed or altered unless the basic element that the court identifies is a failure of justice emerging out of such an error, omission or irregularity. What exactly means the error, omission or irregularity has also been explained that it includes the competency, of the authority and the requirement of any reference at the instance of a specified authority or any requirement of a similar nature. The above definitions and conditions are subject to one limit by the enactment that on finding that there is a failure of justice in the case of a judgment or order, then court has got power to vary or alter irrespective of the omission, irregularity or error which are only technical in nature. The above definitions and conditions are subject to one limit by the enactment that on finding that there is a failure of justice in the case of a judgment or order, then court has got power to vary or alter irrespective of the omission, irregularity or error which are only technical in nature. It has also incumbent upon the court to see that the objection in this regard could and should have been raised at the earlier stage in the proceedings. The Act does not define what exactly is the stage which pertains to the earlier stage either, whether it was before the commencement of the trial or during the trial. Be that as it may, It is settled that the validity of the sanction can be conclusively exercised only after the trial for the mere reasoning that the prosecution, has adduced the original sanction order or the evidence all under to prove its validity. If both the aspects are put in juxtaposition and read together, it is incumbent upon the court to see that the obligation in the above regard could and should have been taken during the time of trial. This kind of legal exercise is not supposed to be obligatory but somewhat directory in nature. However, it is noticed that the validity of a sanction order is a question which should have been raised during the time of trial. But the wordings and phrases employed in the above section of law after it was amended does not imply that the non-taking of such a plea of invalidity during the trial of the proceedings at the earlier stage amounts to estoppel by plea in the criminal trial. Nevertheless, it is incumbent upon the court to consider that fact also. Since the granting of sanction is held to be a solemn and sacrosanct act on the part of the competent authority to grant it and not an idle formality or a matter of routine procedure. It has to be done with the application of its mind in full liquor and after fully satisfied only follows the according of sanction. Thus, the new provisions provided under the amended act also do not help the prosecution to stick on with the sanction which is held void ab initio. It has to be done with the application of its mind in full liquor and after fully satisfied only follows the according of sanction. Thus, the new provisions provided under the amended act also do not help the prosecution to stick on with the sanction which is held void ab initio. There is virtually a great distinction between a sanction inherent with irregularity or omission or error that may be superfluous and a sanction void ab initio which is totally invalid and cannot be cured. Having thus seen the distinction and legal position identified and applying it to the facts of the instant case, I am of the firm view that though the question of total invalidity of the sanction Ex.P-13 has not been taken before the trial court since it is a question of law comprehensively intended to protect the public servants from roping them by false case or motivated personalities the whole proceedings in this case has resulted in the gross failure of justice done in rendering the impugned judgment. For all the said reasonings and having thus considered the whole case with its legal and presumptive implications and the legal validity, I am of the definite view that there was no valid sanction in this case which vitiates the whole prosecution against the appellant in toto. 24. For all the foregoing reasons, I feel that I am totally unable to persuade myself to countenance the various submissions made by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor in justifying the impugned judgment. The converse, is I have accepted the very contentions raised by the Bar on behalf of the appellant. No other point has been urged before me. Having thus considered the whole gamut of the case, the impugned judgment is found inherented with the total failure of justice to the accused and that in view of the same, I am fully constrained to set aside. 25. In the result, the appeal succeeds and stands allowed. The conviction and sentence recorded by the learned VI Additional Special Judge, Madras Division in Calendar Case No.21 of 1989 dated 211. 1990 is set aside and the appellant/accused is acquitted. Fine amount if any, already paid is ordered to be refunded.