Judgment :- SRINIVASAN, J. 1. With the consent of the parties, these appeals are taken up together. The facts are as follows:— 2. The property situate at old No. 7, New No. 12, Muthu Gramani Street, Periamet, Madras-3, belonged originally to one Jeevarathinam Chettiar. Jeevarathinam Chettiar had a wife by name Rajambal and a brother by name Ponnusamy Chettiar. Jeevarathinam Chettiar died on 15.6.1958. Date of death of Ponnusamy Chettiar is not known. Rajambal was the only heir of Jeevarathinam Chettiar. She was in enjoyment of the property. Ponnusamy Chettiar had two wives, Thayalnayagi and Jayammal. Thayalnayagis son was one Ellappa Chettiar and Jayammals daughter was one Kokila. They had no other issues. Kokila married one Panchanathan Chettiar, who is the appellant in all these appeals. Ellappa Chettiar is the 1st respondent in the two O.S. Appeals. He died during the pendency of the appeals and his legal representatives have been brought on record as respondents 3 to 6. 3. Rajambal executed a deed of trust on 10.9.1958, which is marked as Ex: A.7 in O.S. No. 9230 of 1984. Under that document, she dedicated the property to a trust and constituted herself as Founder-Trustee for her life time. The document provided that after her lifetime, the trust shall be managed by three persons, by name K. Palanisami Chettiar, M. Ramasami Chettiar and P. Ellappa Chettiar, the last of them being the brothers son of her husband, already referred to. The document further provided that after the lifetime of the three trustees mentioned therein, the property shall be taken over by South India Vaniga Vaisya Sangam and be managed in accordance with the deed of trust. The document also refers to an intention on the part of the executants husband during his lifetime to dedicate the property to the said Trust. As per the terms of the document, the income accruing from the property is to be utilised for awarding scholarship to poor students of Vaniga Vaisya community studying in educational institutions. The Founder intended herself to reside in a portion of the property during her lifetime and utilise the rental income from the other portions of the property for her maintenance as well as the trust purposes. The Founder intended herself to reside in a portion of the property during her lifetime and utilise the rental income from the other portions of the property for her maintenance as well as the trust purposes. As per the document, after her demise, the trustees shall carry out the terms of the trust by collecting rents from the property and spending the same for the purposes for which the trust was created. 4. She executed another document called a supplemental deed on 7.9.1963. According to that document, one portion of the property was to be taken by Ellappa Chettiar, her husbands brothers son, who should perform the funeral rites to herself and all the monthly and annual ceremonies connected therewith. That portion of the property was described in the B schedule to the said document. According to him, it was to be taken by him for his lifetime and after his lifetime, by his heirs from generation to generation. 5. A third document was executed by Rajambal on 22.11.1965, cancelling the earlier supplemental deed dated 7.9.1963. In that document, she had mentioned that she executed the supplemental deed, on account of the persuasive words of Ellappa Chettiar, who promised that he would attend to her wants and render all necessary services in her old age. She has further said in that document that under the mistaken belief that she had a right and power to execute a supplemental deed to the trust deed, she had altered the terms of the original trust deed dated 10.9.1958 and she cancelled the said supplemental deed and also declared that the said document was void in law and had no legal effect. Thus, the terms of the original trust deed were restored in tact by Rajambal Ammal. 6. She died on 30.4.1968. After her death, the property was in the management of the three persons mentioned in the trust deed dated 10.9.1958. They were collecting the rents and managing the property. There was some mismanagement on their part after some years, which led to a suit being filed by five members of the public in C.S. No. 58 of 1972 on the file of this court. Three persons named as trustees by Rajambal, were made the party-defendants to that suit. They were collecting the rents and managing the property. There was some mismanagement on their part after some years, which led to a suit being filed by five members of the public in C.S. No. 58 of 1972 on the file of this court. Three persons named as trustees by Rajambal, were made the party-defendants to that suit. The prayer was for the removal of the defendants from the trusteeship of the trust estate, for appointment of new trustees in the place of the defendants and settling a scheme for the proper administration of the trust estate, besides directing the defendants to render a true and proper account for the management of the trust. 7. That suit was contested by the defendants therein mainly on the ground that it was a private trust and so, the suit was not maintainable. This court by its judgment dated 28.3.1973, negatived the contention of the defendants that it was a private trust. A clear finding was rendered by the court that the trust was a public trust. The court proceeded to hold that the defendants were guilty of mismanagement and misconduct and removed them from trusteeship. The court also held that there was no necessity to appoint new trustees in the place of the defendants or settle a scheme for the proper administration of the estate. It also held that there was no liability to render accounts on the part of the defendants. Relying on the terms in the deed of trust that after the three trustees named therein, the trust property shall vest in Vaniga Vaisya Sangam and who court held that the Sangam shall administer the trust estate and carry out the terms of the trust. The court also said that it was open to the Sangam to take steps against the defendants to file a suit for rendition of accounts regarding the management of the estate from the date of death of Rajambal. 8. After obtaining a decree in that suit, the Sangam issued a notice under Ex: A.14 in O.S. No. 9230 of 1984 dated 6.6.1975 to the appellant herein. After referring to the decree passed in C.S. No. 58 of 1972, the notice called upon the appellant to quit and deliver vacant possession of the two rooms and a hall, which were in his occupation and also pay damages for wrongful use and occupation at Rs. After referring to the decree passed in C.S. No. 58 of 1972, the notice called upon the appellant to quit and deliver vacant possession of the two rooms and a hall, which were in his occupation and also pay damages for wrongful use and occupation at Rs. 100/- p.m. from the date of occupation till the date of delivery. The appellant sent a reply on 27.6.1975 (Ex: A.15 in O.S. No. 9230 of 1984) claiming that he was in occupation of the premises in his own right and that he was in such occupation even during the lifetime of Jeevarathina Chettiar, husband of Rajambal, and continued to be in occupation till the death of Rajambal. He denied the right of Sangam to claim possession. He did not make any reference to any will having been executed by Rajambal in his favour. The Sangam filed O.S. No. 4617 of 1976 on the file of City Civil Court, Madras, for recovery of possession and damages, as against Ellappan and Panchanathem Chettiar on 17.11.1975. In that suit, the present appellant filed a written statement (which has been marked as Ex: A.1 in O.S. No. 9230 of 1984) on 19.4.1977, in which, for the first time, he claimed that Rajambal Ammal had executed a Will on 4.1.1968, by which, the property had been bequeathed in his favour and therefore, the suit was liable to be dismissed. He contested the suit. However, thereafter, he rmained exparte and an exparte decree was passed on 27.7.1979. The appellant filed an application to set aside the exparte decree; but the same was dismissed. Thereafter, he filed another application to set aside that order and that application was also dismissed. Thereafter, he did not take any further proceedings therein and that decree become final. 9. At that stage, the appellant filed O.P. No. 511 of 1979 on the Original Side of this court on 5.12.1979 for the grant of letters of administration with the Will annexed in that petition, he stated that Rajambal Ammal died on 1st May, 1968 at Panruti and she had executed a Will at Madras on 4.1.1968. Para 8 of the petition reads as follows:— ‘The deceased left surviving the petitioner, to whom the deceased is Aunt, having married the brothers daughter of the deceaseds husband. The deceased Rajambal Ammal had no issue. Her husband had pre-deceased her. Para 8 of the petition reads as follows:— ‘The deceased left surviving the petitioner, to whom the deceased is Aunt, having married the brothers daughter of the deceaseds husband. The deceased Rajambal Ammal had no issue. Her husband had pre-deceased her. She had only one sister, by name Audhilaxmi who had only son named Ramasamy Chettiar residing at No. 5, Thirukamer Chetty St., Panruti. The mother and the father of the deceased had pre-deceased her. The petitioner is the only heir’. 10. In that petition, a learned single judge of this court passed an order directing the issue of probate on 20.12.1979. It appears that the office brought to his notice that the original petition was for the issue of letters of administration and not for probate. Hence, he passed an order on 18.1.1980 that there was a mistake in classifying the O.P. as one for grant of probate, while in fact it was one for grant of Letters of Administration. In view of that, the order dated 20.12.1979 was cancelled and the petition was directed to be posted for orders, after all the formalities were satisfied. It is thereafter for the first time, notice on the original petition was published in two Tamil Dailies, one on 31.1.80 and another on 1.2.1980. On 14.2.1980, the same learned judge passed an order directing the issue of Letters of Administration of the petitioner furnishing security to the value of Rs. 47,000/- 11. After getting the Letters of Administration, as aforesaid, the appellant filed on 23.4.82 a suit as an indigent person in O.P. No. 366 of 1982 and after leave was granted, it was taken on file as a suit in O.S. No. 9230 of 1984. The only defendant in that suit is the South India Vaniga Vaisya Sangam. 47,000/- 11. After getting the Letters of Administration, as aforesaid, the appellant filed on 23.4.82 a suit as an indigent person in O.P. No. 366 of 1982 and after leave was granted, it was taken on file as a suit in O.S. No. 9230 of 1984. The only defendant in that suit is the South India Vaniga Vaisya Sangam. The prayers in the suit are, for ‘declaring that the plaintiff is the absolute owner of the property, for declaring that the deed of trust dated 10.9.1958 executed by Rajambal Ammal was revoked and set asi de and non-est declaring that the decree dated 28.3.1973 in C.S. No. 58 of 1972 was non-est, null and void not binding and unenforceable against the plaintiff, declaring that the decree dated 27.7.1979 in O.S. No. 4617 of 1976 on the file of the City Civil Court, Madras was null and void, unenforceable and inexecutable against the plaintiff, directing the issue of an order of injunction restraining the defendant from disturbing the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit property by the plaintiff in execution of the decree in O.S. No. 4617 of 1976, directing the defendants to pay a sum of Rs. 21,600/- as arrears of rental income of the property and for future damages at Rs. 600/-p.m. and directing the defendants to deliver vacant possession of the entire ground floor portion and the first floor portion in the rear side of the suit property. 12. In the plaint, the plaintiff claimed that the deed of trust dated 10.9.1958 was not acted upon and it was revoked in the Will of Rajambal dated 4.1.1968. He claimed to be the owner of the property under the Will of Rajambal. It was also his contention that the trust deed was itself null and void, inoperative and ineffective and revoked and cancelled. He contended that the decree in C.S. No. 58 of 1972 was a collusive decree without bringing the real facts to the notice of the court and without making him a party to that suit. He referred to the proceedings in O.S. No. 4617 of 1976 and had averred that his Advocate had not properly looked into the records and filed a second application for setting aside the exparte decree. He referred to the proceedings in O.S. No. 4617 of 1976 and had averred that his Advocate had not properly looked into the records and filed a second application for setting aside the exparte decree. He stated that the suit was filed without prejudice to his other proceedings in the earlier suit to set aside the exparte decree and irrespective of the same. 13. The suit was contested by the sangam. Evidence was recorded in detail and ultimately, judgment was rendered by the City Civil Court on 27.1.1989. The first issue related to the truth and validity of the Will dated 4.1.1968. Issues 3 and 4 related to the settlement deed dated 10.9.1958 and the alleged revocation thereof. Issue No. 5 pertaining to the doctrine of res judicata, in view of the decree in O.S. No. 4617 of 1976. The court found that the Original Will was not marked as an exhibit in the suit, but a registration copy of the deed of trust executed by Rajambal Ammal was filed by the plaintiff himself. The Court held that in view of the trust deed executed in 1958, Rajambal Ammal had no right over the property and could not dispose of the same by a Will. The court also found that the decree obtained by the Sangam in O.S. No. 4617 of 1976 as against the plaintiff, was valid and binding on him and there cannot be any declaration as prayed for by him, that the decree was null and void. However, the trial judge gave a finding that the suit was not hit by the doctrine of res judicata . Ultimately, the suit was dismissed as the trial court held that the plaintiff had not no right whatever to the property. It is to the said decree that is challenged by the plaintiff in A.S. No. 20 of 1990. 14. Even when the said suit was pending, Ellappa Chettiar filed Application No. 6346 of 1987 on 12.12.1987 in O.P. No. 511 of 1979 for revocation of the Letters of Administration, under section 263 of the Indian Succession Act. In that application, the appellant herein filed a detailed counter affidavit. On 18.12.1989, a learned single judge of this court passed an order allowing the application and revoking the grant of Letters of Administration. The said order was passed on merits after evidence was recorded. 15. In that application, the appellant herein filed a detailed counter affidavit. On 18.12.1989, a learned single judge of this court passed an order allowing the application and revoking the grant of Letters of Administration. The said order was passed on merits after evidence was recorded. 15. However, the appellant filed Application No. 1876 of 1990 for setting aside the said order on the ground that it was an exparte order. That application was dismissed on 19.4.1990. 16. Against the order dated 18.12.1989, in Application No. 6346 of 1987, the appellant has filed O.S. Appeal No. 236 of 1990. Against the order dated 19.4.1990 in Application No. 1876 of 1990, the appellant has filed O.S. Appeal No. 153 of 1990. As the subject matter of all these appeals, is the same, they are taken up together with the consent of parties. 17. The appellant argued his case as party in person. According to the appellant, the trust deed dated 10.9.1958 was cancelled and revoked by the Will dated 4.1.1968. It is his contention that the Will is a genuine one and the Letters of Administration were rightly granted by this court on 14.2.1980. It was argued by him that the application to revoke the Letters of Administration filed by Ellappan under Section 263 of the Indian Succession Act is not maintainable. According to him, Section 263 of the Indian Succession Act will not apply in this case as Ellappann has no right whatever to the property. In fact, he described Ellappan as a stranger in the street. Probably, the appellant is emboldened to raise such a contention because of the finding of the learned single judge in his order dated 18.12.1989 that the applicant before him had no locus standi to file the petition. Inspite of that finding, the learned single judge has held that the grant of Letters of Administration was liable to be revoked, as material facts had been concealed from court. The learned single judge held that the appellant had not disclosed the existence of the trust deed, the decree passed in C.S. No. 58 of 1972 and the decree passed in O.S. No. 4617 of 1976, when he applied for the grant of Letters of Administration. On that ground, the learned single judge held that the grant was liable to be revoked and consequently, revoked the same. 18. On that ground, the learned single judge held that the grant was liable to be revoked and consequently, revoked the same. 18. In the O.S. Appeals, it is contended by learned counsel for the legal representatives of Ellappan that Ellappa Chettiar would have been a legal heir of the deceased Rajambal in the absence of the Will and as such, he was a person, who had sufficient caveatable interest. It was argued that an application under Secttion. 263 of the Indian Succession Act was, therefore, maintainable at this instance. In short, learned counsel contested the finding that Ellappan had no locus standi to file a petition under Section 263. It is also argued by him that in the Original Petition, the appellant had not chosen to even set out the relations of deceased Rajambal Ammal correctly. The appellant had completely omitted to mention the existence of Ellappan, who was none other than the son of Ponnusami Chettiar, brother of Rajambals husband. It is pointed out by learned counsel that the son of Ponnusamy would be standing on the same degree of relationship as the daughter, who is the wife of the appellant. In any event, it is argued by learned counsel that once the court finds that there is suppression of material facts, the grant should be revoked and there is no question of the court rejecting the application on the ground of want of locus standi. 19. Learned counsel for the Sangam, who is the respondent in A.S. No. 20 of 1990, supports the findings of the City Civil Court, excepting the finding on the question of res judicata . According to him, the City Civil Court had erred in holding that the suit was not barred by res judicata . It is submitted by him that the decree in O.S. No. 4617 of 1976 will clearly bar the present proceedings on the principle of res judicata . Apart from that, it is pointed out by him that the trust deed was valid and acted upon and the only contention of the appellant was that it was not acted upon. The court having found that the Trust deed having been acted upon, even if there was a Will by Rajambal Ammal, it will have no effect, as Rajambal has no disposable interest in the said property. The court having found that the Trust deed having been acted upon, even if there was a Will by Rajambal Ammal, it will have no effect, as Rajambal has no disposable interest in the said property. It is therefore contended by him that irrespective of the proceedings for grant of Letters of Administration, the suit filed by the plaintiff for a declaration of his title and recovery of possession, has to fail and it has been rightly dismissed by the City Civil Court. 20. We have already set out the relevant facts. We find from the Original Petition No. 511 of 1979 filed by the appellant herein that he has not made any reference to Ellappan, son of deceased Ponnusamy, who was the brother of the husband of Rajambal. The wife of the appellant and Ellappan stood at the same degree of relationship to Rajambal. The appellant ought to have made a reference in the said petition to Ellappan and in fact, he ought to have impleaded him as a party and sought for notice being sent to him in the Original Petition, before seeking any order from the court. Order XXV of the Original Side Rules of this court, as it stood then, prescribes the procedure for applying for probate and letters of Administration. Rule 5 thereof provided that every application for Letters of Administration or Letters of Administration with Will annexed shall be made by petition in Form No. 58 or F orm No. 59. Form No. 58 contains an express provision for referring to the relations of the deceased. Para 3 in the said form is as follows:— “3. That the said deceased left him surviving the following relations, namely,:— 1. C.D., your petitioner, 2. G.H. of (residence and description) his son: 3. J.K., the wife of I.M., his daughter, and left no other relations.” Inspite of the said form requiring the mentioning of the close relations of the deceased, who would normally be entitled to claim heirship in the absence of a testament, the appellant chose to file the petition, without making any reference whatever to Ellappan Chettiar. That itself is sufficient to revoke the grant of Letters of Administration. 21. Apart from that, the Will is said to have been executed on 4.1.1968 and Rajambal Ammal died on 30.4.1968. That itself is sufficient to revoke the grant of Letters of Administration. 21. Apart from that, the Will is said to have been executed on 4.1.1968 and Rajambal Ammal died on 30.4.1968. The Will did not see the light of the day till it was referred to for the first time in the written statement in O.S. No. 4617 of 1976 filed on 19.4.1977. Even then, the appellant did not choose to file an application for Letters of Administration. He filed it only after the suit was decreed in favour of Sangam. Even so, the appellant did not make any reference whatever either to the proceedings in C.S. No. 58 of 1972 or the suit in O.S. No. 4617 of 1976 in the Original Petition. When the Sangam was claiming right to the property under the deed of trust executed on 10.9.1958, the genuineness of which has never been in dispute, it was the duty of the appellant to have mentioned about the Sangam in his Original Petition and informed the court that a claim was being made by the Sangam that it was the owner of the property, for the reason, that Sangam would be interested in contesting the genuineness of the Will put forward by the appellant. 22. The question as to who is entitled to file an application under section 263 of the Indian Succession Act, has been the subject matter of several decisions of various High Courts. In Sadananda Pyme. v. Harinam Sha ( AIR 1950 CAL. 179 ), a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court held that a person holding an interest in the property in the event of intestacy is one, who will have locus standi to file an application under Section 263 of the Indian Succession Act. In Promode Kumar Roy v. Sephalika Dutta ( AIR 1957 Cal 631 ), a Division Bench of that Court held that a person who has acquired an interest in the testators estate, though after his death, by reason of the mortgage transfer by the testators son and who is undoubtedly also a creditor of the testators said son, whom the alleged Will purports to disinherit has plainly locus standi to apply for revocation of the grant, particularly when his allegation is that the grant was obtained in fraud of the creditors. In The Goods of Ganapathi Sarkar ( AIR 1959 CAL. In The Goods of Ganapathi Sarkar ( AIR 1959 CAL. 277 ) a single judge of that court held that a slightest interest in the estate will entitle one to be a party in probate proceedings. In another Bench Decision the Calcutta High Court in Annapurna Kumar v. Subodh Chandra Kumar ( AIR 1970 CAL 433 ), has held that any interest, however, slight, and even the bare possibility of an interest, is sufficient to entitle a party to oppose a testamentary paper. In Rao & Sons v. Chandramoni del (AIR 1971 Orissa 95), a single judge of that court went to the extent of holding that creditors of the heirs at law of the testator were entitled to ask for revocation of probate and enter caveat during probate proceedings in response to a general citation. It Sima Rani Mohanti v. Puspa Rani Pal ( AIR 1978 CAL 140 ), a Division Bench of that court reiterated the proposition laid down in Annapuma Kumars case ( AIR 1970 CAL 433 ) ( Supra ) 23. Recently, a Division Bench of this court, to which one of us was a party held in Gita alias Gita ravi v. Mary Jenet James alias James (1995 (I) M.L.J.467 = 1995-2-L.W. 831) held that explanation (a) to (e) in Section 263 of the Indian Succession Act is not exhaustive and the court is not fettered by the explanation while deciding whether there is just cause for revocation of a grant. It is held that the explanation would only mean that in cases, where one of the circumstances set out in clauses (a) to (e) is present, a legal fiction comes into existence to the effect that in such cases, there is just cause for revocation. If there are circumstances, which do not fall within the ambit of clauses (a) to (e), but which warrant or necessitate the revocation of the grant, the court is entitled to revoke the grant or annul the same even though there is no legal fiction. 24. In the present case, there is no doubt whatever that the applicant in Application No. 6346 of 1987, viz., Ellappan, who was the son of deceased Ponnusamy, had locus standi to seek revocation of the grant of Letters of Administration. The learned single judge is in error in holding that he had no locus standi . 24. In the present case, there is no doubt whatever that the applicant in Application No. 6346 of 1987, viz., Ellappan, who was the son of deceased Ponnusamy, had locus standi to seek revocation of the grant of Letters of Administration. The learned single judge is in error in holding that he had no locus standi . The reasoning of the learned judge is that the property being a trust property, had already vested in Vaniga Sangam and Ellappa Chettiar could not claim any right therein. The learned judge has overlooked that the test is to find out whether a person, who seeks revocation would have been entitled to an interest in the property in the absence of a testament, if there is no Will by Rajambal, Ellappa Chettiar would certainly be one of her legal heirs and probably he might have been the sole legal heir. It is not necessary for us to express any opinion on that question here. But the fact remains that he is a close relation standing in the same degree of relationship, as the wife of the appellant and also a probable legal heir of Rajambal in the event of intestacy. Hence, we set aside the finding that Ellappa Chettiar had no locus standi to maintain the application under section 263, Indian Succession Act. 25. We also have hesitation to hold that the grant is liable to be revoked in this case as there is clear suppression of material facts. Explanation (b) Will apply on all fours in this case. We have already pointed out that the applicant ought to have disclosed the existence of Ellappan and also the proceedings in C.S. No. 58 of 1972 as well as O.S. No. 4617 of 1976. He, not having done so, is guilty of suppressing relevant facts from the court and therefore, the grant is liable to be revoked. Hence, we hold that the order dated 18.12.1989 passed by the learned single judge revoking the grant of Letters of Administration is correct and unassailable. Therefore, O.S. Appeal No. 263 of 1990 deserves to be dismissed. 26. There is also no merit in the appeal O.S.A. No. 153 of 1990. The order passed by the learned single judge on 18.12.1989 cannot be treated as an ex parte order as such. It is an order passed on merits after recording evidence. Therefore, O.S. Appeal No. 263 of 1990 deserves to be dismissed. 26. There is also no merit in the appeal O.S.A. No. 153 of 1990. The order passed by the learned single judge on 18.12.1989 cannot be treated as an ex parte order as such. It is an order passed on merits after recording evidence. The learned single judge has discussed the entire evidence on record and has given his findings. The only remedy open to the appellant was to have preferred an appeal against the order and he cannot file an application, as in this case. Hence, the application filed by the appellant in Application No. 1876 of 1990 was not maintainable in law. Even otherwise, there is no merit in his contentions that the reasons given by him for his allowance at the time when Application No. 6346 of 1987 was heard are not acceptable. Consequently, O.S. Appeal No. 153 of 1990 also deserves to be dismissed. 27. Turning to A.S. No. 20 of 1990, we uphold all the findings of the learned judge excepting on issues No. 5. We have already pointed out that the suit was barred by the principles of res judicata in view of the decree in O.S. No. 4617 of 1976. That was a suit filed by the Sangam against the appellant herein on the basis that the Sangam has title to the property. The appellant contested that suit putting forward his own title. He remained exparte later and the Sangam got a decree on merits by adducing sufficient evidence to prove its title. The appellant ought to have challenged that decree by filing an appeal; but he did not do so. Having allowed that decree to become final, he cannot now file a separate suit challenging the validity of the said decree. The present suit is, therefore, barred by the principles of res judicata . We have also already held that even if the will alleged to have been executed by Rajambal, is genuine, it cannot pass any title to the legatee therein. As regards the trust deed, the only contention of the appellant was that it was not acted upon. There is no merit in this contention. We have also already held that even if the will alleged to have been executed by Rajambal, is genuine, it cannot pass any title to the legatee therein. As regards the trust deed, the only contention of the appellant was that it was not acted upon. There is no merit in this contention. Even during her lifetime, Rajambal Ammal constituted herself as founder trustee of the trust and she had been performing the trust and after her lifetime, the trust was managed by the three trustees named by her in the trust deed. The appellant did not take any steps to put forward the will and claim rights in the property at that time. When the trustees were found to be mismanaging the property, they were removed and the property was entrusted to Sangam. From the above, it would be seen that the property had vested in the Sangam in accordance with the Trust deed dated 10.9.1958. 28. As regards this aspect of the matter, it is the contention of the appellant that under section 78 of the Trusts Act, the deed dated 10.9.1958 has been revoked. He places reliance on the recital in the Will which is propounded in the proceedings before this court for the grant of Letters of Administration. It may be pointed out that the Trusts Act itself will not apply to a Public Trust. The trust created by Rajambal Ammal is a Public Trust and not a Private Trust and hence, the Trusts Act has no application. Even assuming the principle of Section 78 of the Trusts Act could be invoked by the appellant, there is no question of any situation mentioned in Section 78, being present in this case for in vocation of the Trusts Act to the present case. None of the methods set out in Section 78, has been adopted in this case to revoke the trust. The recitals in the Will, even if true, cannot have the effect of revoking the trust. This contention of the appellant is falsified even by the admission of the appellant as P.W. 1 in O.S. No. 9230 of 1984. He has admitted therein expressly that after Rajambal Ammal died in 1968, three persons named in the trust deed, were collecting the rents and latter on, difference of opinion arose among the trustees. This contention of the appellant is falsified even by the admission of the appellant as P.W. 1 in O.S. No. 9230 of 1984. He has admitted therein expressly that after Rajambal Ammal died in 1968, three persons named in the trust deed, were collecting the rents and latter on, difference of opinion arose among the trustees. Therefore, the contention of the appellant that the trust deed was not acted upon, has to fail. 29. One other contention was raised by the appellant in these appeals. According to him, the deed dated 10.9.1958 should be treated as a Will, as no interest was conveyed during the lifetime of Rajambal. It is contended by him that the trust was to come into force only on the death of Rajambal Ammal Under the deed of 1958 and therefore, it should be treated as a Will. It is argued by him that a Will can always be revoked and it has been revoked in this case by the Will dated 4.1.1968. There is no merit in this contention. Apart from the fact that such a contention was not put forward in the suit O.S. No. 4617 of 1976 or in the plaint in O.S. No. 9230 of 1984, there is no substance in the said contention. The recitals of the document clearly show that it was intended to come into force in praesenti immediately after the execution of the document. The vesting of the title in the trust was not postponed till the death of Rajambal Ammal. The recitals of the document clearly show that it was intended to come into force in praesenti immediately after the execution of the document. The vesting of the title in the trust was not postponed till the death of Rajambal Ammal. The relevant recitals are as follows:— ‘Whereas the Founder has not been keeping good health for some time past and whereas she is desirous of creating a trust in respect of the aforesaid house and ground with a view to fulfil the intention of her deceased husband to make an endowment of the said property and whereas the Founder intends to be the said Trustee during her lifetime for the purpose of administering the trust..’ This Deed of Trust Witnesseth as follows:— (1) The Founder hereby declares that the house and ground in No. 7, Muthu Gramani street, Periamet, Madras-3 shall be the trust property and the income thereof shall be utilised in the manner and for the purposes specified below: (2) The Founder shall, during her lifetime, be the sole trustee to administer the trust estate and she shall collect and realise the rents and profits from the said property and after payment of taxes and meeting charges for repairs and maintenance, shall pay Rs. 100/- per annum to the South India Vaniga Vysia Sangam (Regd.) for the purpose of awarding scholarship for the poor students of Vaniga Vysia Community studying in Educational Institutions.’ The above recitals clearly prove that the trust was intended to operate immediately and there is no question of treating the document as a Will by any stretch of imagination. Therefore, we have no hesitation in holding that the judgment and decree passed by the City Civil Court, Madras, dismissing the suit of the appellant are correct and unassailable. 30. In the result, all the appeals fail and are dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs. The appellant shall pay the court fee due and payable on the memorandum of appeal in A.S. No. 20 of 1990.