JUDGMENT 1. :- This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated July 12, 1995 passed by the learned Single Judge rejecting the writ petition filed by the appellant-petitioner. The appellant petitioner had challenged the legality and validity of the order of termination dated 12.6.1995 by which his services have been terminated. 2. The appellant-petitioner was temporarily appointed for a period of four months on the post of Vaterinary Assistant Surgeon vide order dated 23.2.1994. The appointment was under Rule 26 of the Rajasthan Animal Husbandry Service Rules, 1963 (in short 'the Rules of 1963'). The appointment was extended by order dated 1.6.1994 and again by order dated 22.11.1994. In these appointment orders, it has been specifically mentioned that the appointment was purely temporary and it was for specified period. It was also mentioned that as and when regularly selected candidates are available, the services of the petitioner-appellant shall be terminated. Thus, ultimately, by order dated 12.6.1995. (Anx. 7 to the writ petition), his services have been terminated. It is mentioned in the order of termination of service that regularly selected candidates by the R.P.S.C. are available and therefore, his services were being terminated with immediate effect. 3. The appellant-petitioner challenged the legality and validity of the aforesaid order dated 12.6.1995 by filing S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2782/1995. Learned Single Judge has rejected the writ petition by order dated 12.7.1995. It is against this order that the present appeal under section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 is filed. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant relied upon a judgment rendered by a learned Single Jude of this Court in the case of Nalin Kumar V. State of Rajasthan and another 1992 (2) RLR 294=1992(2) WLC (Raj.) 32. In that case, in para 14, the learned Single Judge observed as follows : "In the present case, it is clearly brone out from the facts which have come on record, that the petitioner had been appointed on urgent temporary basis on the basis of short term advertisement. Regular selection has been made and in the regular selection the petitioner has not been selected. As per petitioner's own saying fresh vacancies have become available. The competent authority has so far not undertaken exercise for making fresh urgent temporary appointment under Rule 26 of 1975 Rules and it has straight away terminated the services of the petitioner. Regular selection has been made and in the regular selection the petitioner has not been selected. As per petitioner's own saying fresh vacancies have become available. The competent authority has so far not undertaken exercise for making fresh urgent temporary appointment under Rule 26 of 1975 Rules and it has straight away terminated the services of the petitioner. In the light of the principles which have been discussed earlier, it must be held that the petitioner does not have a right to continue in service to the exclusion of other persons who may have become eligible for the purpose of consideration for appointment on urgent temporary basis against the new vacancies. The Competent Authority ought to have undertaken exercise for making the temporary appointment if against the newly created vacancies regular selection have not been made so far. The termination of the service of the petitioner without undertaking exercise for regular recruitment or even for fresh urgent temporary appointment cannot, however, be justified in the light of the decisions of the Supreme Court in Rattan Lal's case, Rajbala's case, Rajbinder Singh's case and Mrs. Anita Kothari's case (supra)". On the basis of this decision it is submitted that the order of termination of service of the petitioner should be quashed and set aside. 5. With utmost respect, it is difficult to agree with the aforesaid observations made by the learned Single Judge. 6. In the case of Rattanlal and others V. State of Haryana AIR 1987 SC 478 , the question which arose before the Supreme Court was the practice adopted by the State Government of Haryana appointing teachers on ad hoc basis at the commencement of academic year and terminating their services before the commencement of the next summer vacation or earlier and thereafter to appoint them again on ad hoc basis at the commencement of the next academic year and to terminate their services before the commencement of the succeeding summer vacation or earlier. This was being done from year to year. This policy of adhocism followed by the State Government for a long period was held to be in contravention of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. 7. This was being done from year to year. This policy of adhocism followed by the State Government for a long period was held to be in contravention of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. 7. In the case of Rajbinder Singh V. State of Punjab and others 1988 (Suppl.) SCC 428 , Supreme Court disapproved the practice of making fresh appointments every year, to deprive of the vacation salary and ad hoc appointees were directed to be continued until appointments of regularly selected persons by the P.S.C. were made. 8. In the case of Raj Bala V. State of Punjab Civil Original Appellate Jurisdiction Case No. 125/87 , which has been referred to and reproduced in the case of Mrs. Anita Kothari etc. etc. V. State of Rajasthan and others (1990 (1) RLR Page 87 (at page 91), one paragraph order has been passed by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has given direction to continue the petitioners in service until persons regularly selected by the Punjab Service Commission are appointed to the posts held by the petitioners. 9. In the case of Mrs. Anita Kothari etc. etc. V. The State of Rajasthan and others, 1990(1) RLR 87 . which was decided by a division bench of this Court, the petitioner was in service for a period of about seven years. Every year, she was required to appear before the Temporary Selection Committee. It was prayed that the practice of ad hoc appointment from year to year be discontinued and she be continued in service till the regularly selected candidates were available. The Division Bench directed that termination of the services of the petitioner and other similarly situated persons will only be followed when directly recruited R. P.S.C. recruitees are available. 10. It is evident that in none of the aforesaid cases i.e. Rattan Lal's case, Rajbala's case, Rajbinder's case and Mrs. Anita Kothari's case, the question which has arisen in the present case, was ever raised before the Supreme Court or before the division bench of this court. 10. It is evident that in none of the aforesaid cases i.e. Rattan Lal's case, Rajbala's case, Rajbinder's case and Mrs. Anita Kothari's case, the question which has arisen in the present case, was ever raised before the Supreme Court or before the division bench of this court. If one reads the aforesaid decisions, in none of them, the question as to whether a temporary employee who was appointed with the express condition that his services will be terminated as and when regularly selected candidates are available or when the fixed term for which the appointment has been made, is over, whichever event occurs earlier, can claim a right to continue in service because the vacancies still existed and remained unfilled ? 11. In the case of State of Orissa V. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra AIR 1968 SC 647 , in para 13 of the judgment, Supreme Court inter-alia observed that a decision is only an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from the various observations made in it. It is not a profitable task to extract a sentence here and there from a judgment and to build upon it. 12. The same principle is reiterated by the Supreme Court in the case of Ambica Quarry Works V. State of Gujarat and others AIR 1987 SC 1073 wherein the Supreme Court has inter-alia observed as under:- "The ratio of any decision must be understood in the background of facts of that case. It has been said long time ago that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides, and not what logically follows from it." 13. The aforesaid view has again been reiterated in the case of M/s Goodyear India Ltd. V. State of Haryana AIR 1990 SC 783. 14. In view of the aforesaid settled legal proposition it is difficult to agree with the view expressed by the learned Single Judge in Nalin Kumar's case (supra). With utmost respect, it is not possible to read from any of the decisions referred to and relied upon by the learned Single Judge i.e. Rattan Lal's case, Rajbala's case, Rajbinder Singh's case and Mrs. With utmost respect, it is not possible to read from any of the decisions referred to and relied upon by the learned Single Judge i.e. Rattan Lal's case, Rajbala's case, Rajbinder Singh's case and Mrs. Anita Kothari's case, that the Supreme Court or the division bench of this Court has laid down the principle that an employee who has been appointed on a fixed term basis or till regularly selected candidates are available, has a right to continue in service till the vacancies are filled in or till the exercise is undertaken by the authority concerned to fill in the existing vacancies. 15. Here, reference may be made to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Rajasthan V. Rajendra Kumar Rawat and others reported in 1989 Suppl.(2) SCC 268. In that case the question arose as regards the legality and validity of termination of services of employees who were appointed under Rule 30 which provided for urgent temporary appointments. The Supreme Court after reproducing and referring to the aforesaid Rule 30, inter-alia held as follows:- "There is no dispute that the respondents had offered themselves as candidates before the Public Service Commission and have not been successful. On that footing it has been contended relying upon the decision of this Court in the case of Om Prakash Shukla V. Akhilesh Kumar Shukla, that the persons of this category are no more entitled to lay claim on the basis of termination of their employment under Rule 30. We agree that the same is the position in law." 16. Thereafter, in para 8 of the aforesaid decision, the Supreme Court observed that the rule nowhere contemplates regularisation of such recruitment. Under Rule 30, appointments are bound to terminate in the event provided in the proviso to the Rule. After making these observations, the Supreme Court gave necessary directions in facts of that case. 17. It may be noted that in that case, this High Court had held that once provision was made in the budget, it was obligatory upon the Government to fill the vacancy, High Court had further held that in case there was failure on the part of the State Government in filling the vacancies, a writ could be issued by the High Court directing the State Government to fill up the posts. Supreme Court in terms negatived this preposition. 18. Supreme Court in terms negatived this preposition. 18. For the aforesaid reasons, the view taken by the learned Single Judge in the case of Nalin Kumar (supra) is not the correct view. It is in conflict with the law laid down by the Apex Court. 19. For the aforesaid reasons, the judgment and order rendered by the learned Single Judge in the case of Nalin Kumar (supra) is of no help to the petitioner in the instant case. With utmost respect, we would like to observe that the decision of the learned Single Judge in the case of Nalin Kumar (supra) does not lay down the correct proposition of law. 20. No other contention is raised. 21. There is no substance in the appeal. Hence, dismissed.SPL. Appeal dismissed. *******