JUDGMENT 1. 1.This Special Appeal is directed against the judgment and order passed by learned Single Judge on August 30, 1995 in SB Civil Writ Petition No. 3774/1995. In the Writ Petition it was prayed that order dated August 5, 1995 passed by the Jaipur Development Authority Appellate Tribunal, Jaipur, be quashed and set aside and the Jaipur Development Authority be restrained from interfering in the construction work in terms of decision of Building Plan Committee-11 meeting held on February 3, 1994 and revised plans dated February 14, 1994, alternatively it was prayed that the matter be remanded to the Tribunal for consideration of Stay Application on merits. These prayers were not granted and the writ petition was rejected by the learned Single Judge. The petitioners applied for permission to construct a hotel on Mirza Ismail Road, Jaipur sometime in the year 1987. Initially permission was granted in January, 1988. The petitioners submitted plan for approval on January 24, 1989. On December 18, 1989 approval of the plan submitted was granted. Thereafter the petitioners made representation for increasing the height of construction. After some procedural steps the plan was released on February 26, 92. 2. Thereafter notice for review of the plan was issued by respondent No.1. After considering the reply filed by the petitioners, the notice was dropped on October 12, 93. Again the petitioners submitted revised plan on February 14, 94. There appears to be some dispute with regard to the approval of plan, hence, the petitioners filed reference application on September 7, 1994 as provided under Section 83 of the Jaipur Development Authority Act, 1982. Thereafter respondent No.1 passed order dated September 12, 94 and withdrew all the earlier permissions except the permission dated December 12, 87. The petitioners were served with the second notice for review of the plan on June 20, 95 by respondent No.1. After the notice of revocation, order was passed by respondent No.1 on July 10, 95 which was communicated to the petitioners vide letter dated July 14, 95. Against this order, the petitioners filed appeal before the Tribunal (respondent No.1 herein) on July 20, 1995. 3. The reference, filed by the petitioners, bears No. 164/94 and the appeal, filed by the petitioners, bears No. 51/94. Against this order, the petitioners filed appeal before the Tribunal (respondent No.1 herein) on July 20, 1995. 3. The reference, filed by the petitioners, bears No. 164/94 and the appeal, filed by the petitioners, bears No. 51/94. The petitioners applied for interim relief praying to the effect that the respondent JDA be directed to proceed further as per the order dated February 26, 92 and decisions dated February 3, 94 and February 11, 94, by which plans were approved and that the respondent JDA be restrained from interfering with the progress of the construction work which was being carried on by the petitioners. 4. In reference also the petitioners submitted application for interim relief praying that operation and implementation of the order of revocation of approval dated July 10, 95, which was served upon the petitioner on July 14, 95, be stayed. It was further prayed that the respondent JDA be restrained from interfering with the construction work carried on by the petitioners in accordance with the approved plans dated February 3, 1994 and February 14, 1994. 5. The Tribunal in reference by order dated July 13, 95 held that it has no jurisdiction to pass interim order and hence rejected the application. Similarly in appeal also the application for interim relief has been rejected on August 5, 95. Both the applications were rejected on the ground that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to pass interim order. The Tribunal relied upon a decision of this Court passed by a learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No. 2184/95 on 23.5.95. 6. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order passed by the Tribunal, the petitioners preferred Writ Petition No. 3774/94 and prayed for relief as stated above. The petition has been rejected by learned Single Judge. It is against this order that this Special Appeal is filed. 7. The JDA has been created under the provisions of the JDA Act, 1982 (Act No. 25 of 1982) (for short 'the Act'). Section 2(3) of the Act defines 'Authority' which means the Jaipur Development Authority constituted under Section 3. Section 2 (20) defines 'Tribunal' which means tribunal constituted under the provisions of this Act. Other provisions of Section 2 define 'building operations', 'development', 'development area', 'Government', 'Jaipur Region', 'Land', 'Local authority', 'Municipality', 'Occupier', 'Owner', 'Panchayat', 'Plan' etc. Section 2(3) of the Act defines 'Authority' which means the Jaipur Development Authority constituted under Section 3. Section 2 (20) defines 'Tribunal' which means tribunal constituted under the provisions of this Act. Other provisions of Section 2 define 'building operations', 'development', 'development area', 'Government', 'Jaipur Region', 'Land', 'Local authority', 'Municipality', 'Occupier', 'Owner', 'Panchayat', 'Plan' etc. Section 83 of the Act provides for 'Constitution of Tribunal' and it reads as follows "Constitution of Tribunal" - (1) The state Government shall, by notification in the Official Gazette, constitute a Tribunal for the purposes of this act. (2) The Tribunal shall consist of one person who shall be an officer of the State Government and shall be paid such salary and allowances as may be determined by the State Government. (3) The State Government may, to assist the Tribunal, direct the Authority to appoint such number of servants and of such cadre as may be deemed necessary. (4) The expenses of the Tribunal shall be borne by the Authority. (5) The procedure to be followed by the Tribunal in deciding the appeals or disputes referred to it under this Act shall be such as may be prescribed. (6) The Tribunal shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Central Act V of 1908) in respect of hearing & deciding of an appeal or any dispute referred to it. (7) Except as otherwise provided, any dispute arising out of any provision of this Act may be referred to the Tribunal by the Authority. The decision of the Tribunal shall be final and binding on all the parties thereto. (8) Except as otherwise provided, any person aggrieved by an order of the Authority may file an appeal in the Tribunal within 30 days of the communication of the order to him. The decision of the Tribunal in appeal shall be final and binding on all the parties thereto. The afore side provisions of the Act has been amended by JDA (Amendment) Act, 1991 (Act No. 20 of 1991). The amended provisions have come into force w.e.f. August 27, 1991 as provided in Section 1 (2) of the amended At. The decision of the Tribunal in appeal shall be final and binding on all the parties thereto. The afore side provisions of the Act has been amended by JDA (Amendment) Act, 1991 (Act No. 20 of 1991). The amended provisions have come into force w.e.f. August 27, 1991 as provided in Section 1 (2) of the amended At. After the amendment, sub-section (8) of Section 83 reads as follows "Except as otherwise provided (a) Any person-aggrieved by an order or notice of the Authority may file an appeal in the Tribunal within 30 days of the communication of such order or notice to him; and (b) any person aggrieved by any threatened act or injury from the Authority affecting his rights may refer the dispute to the Tribunal within 30 days of the communication or knowledge of such threatened act or injury; and the decision of the Tribunal shall be final." 8. The Act has been passed by the appropriate Legislature for achieving the following object "An Act for forming Jaipur City and certain contiguous areas into a Jaipur Region, to provide for the establishment of an Authority for the purposes of planning, co-ordinating and supervising the proper, orderly and rapid development of the Jaipur Region and of executing plans, projects and schemes for such development and to provide for matters connected therewith." Chapter II (Sections 3 to 12) of the Act deals with Establishment and Constitution of the Authority; Chapter III (Sections 13 to 15) deals with Constitution of Functional Bords; Chapter IV (Sections 16 to 20) provides for Powers and Functions of the Authority; Chapter V (Sections 21 to 28) provides for Master Development Plan and Zonal Development Plans; Chapter VI (Sections 29 to 37) deals with Control and Development and use of Land included in Plans; Chapter VII (Sections 38 to 43) deals with Projects and Schemes; Chapter VIII (Secs. 44 to 54 A) provides for Acquisition and Disposal of Land, Sections 48 to 53 which provided Lands in Municipal Areas and Lands in Rural Areas have been deleted; Chapter IX (Secs. 55 to 64) deals with Finance, Budget and Accounts; Chapter X (Secs. 44 to 54 A) provides for Acquisition and Disposal of Land, Sections 48 to 53 which provided Lands in Municipal Areas and Lands in Rural Areas have been deleted; Chapter IX (Secs. 55 to 64) deals with Finance, Budget and Accounts; Chapter X (Secs. 65 to 68) provides for Powers to levy certain charges; Chapter XI (Sec. 69 to 82) provides for Prosecutions, Suits and Power of Police; Reference may be made to the provisions of Section 78 which grant Immunity to the Authority and provides that no suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding shall be maintainable against the Authority or any person acting under the direction of the Authority or the Chairman, member or any officer or servant of the Authority, Executive Committee, other committees, any Functional Board or anybody thereof in respect of anything lawfully and in good faith and with due care and attention done under this Act. Section 79 requires that if any suit is to be instituted against the Authority, previous notice of two months is required to be given stating therein the particulars and details mentioned in the Section. The Authority is conferred with certain police power also as provided in Section 82 of the Act. The Authority is also conferred with the power to authorise a police officer not below the rank of Sub-Inspector to arrest any person committing in his view any offence relating to encroachment or unauthorised development on the lands vested in the Authority or on public streets; Chapter XII (Secs. 83 to 102) provides for miscellaneous matters. Therein Section 83 occurs which provides for Constitution of Tribunal. This Chapter inter alia provides for Recovery of moneys due to the Authority as arrears of land revenue; Power of search and seizure. It also provides that the officers and other employees of the Authority are to be treated as public servants meaning thereby these officials will have all the privileges as are being enjoyed by the other public servants by different provisions of law. Section 99 provides for bar of jurisdiction of civil courts and it reads as follows "99. Bar of jurisdiction of civil court-(1) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, no civil court shall take cognizance of any matter which is required to be or may be decided by the Authority, Executive Committee, Jaipur Development Commissioner, Functional Board, any body thereof, the Tribunal or the State Govt. Bar of jurisdiction of civil court-(1) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, no civil court shall take cognizance of any matter which is required to be or may be decided by the Authority, Executive Committee, Jaipur Development Commissioner, Functional Board, any body thereof, the Tribunal or the State Govt. under this Act. (2) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, an order passed' or a direction given by the State Government to the Authority or an order passed or notice issued by the Authority under this Act shall be final and shall not be questioned in any suit or other legal proceeding." It is in the context of the aforesaid provisions of the Act that the question as to whether the Tribunal has power to issue any interim order or not, is required to be considered and decided. 9. It is evident that the State Legislature has thought it fit to create Authority under the Act for the purposes of planning, co-ordinating and supervising the proper, orderly and rapid development of the Jaipur Region and for the purposes to see that there is execution of plans projects and schemes for such development. While carrying out these functions, disputes are likely to arise between the owners of property on the one hand and the Authority on the other. In order to see that such disputes are not subjected to prolonged litigation in civil courts, the Legislature has thought it fit to bar the jurisdiction of civil courts as provided under Section 99 of the Act. The Legislature provided alternative forum by making provisions under Section 83 of the Act for constitution of Tribunal. The Tribunal is constituted 'for the purposes this Act'. The expression for the purposes of this Act' is very wide enough to take within its sweep all possible functions which are to be carried on by the Authority by necessary implication. The expression also carries within its sweep the possible disputes and conflicts which may arise between the competing and conflicting interests when the Authority carries on such functions. In order to see that an impartial body for resolution of the dispute is created, the legislature has thought it proper that the Tribunal shall consist of an officer of the State Government and the salary and allowances are to be paid as may be determined by the State Government. In order to see that an impartial body for resolution of the dispute is created, the legislature has thought it proper that the Tribunal shall consist of an officer of the State Government and the salary and allowances are to be paid as may be determined by the State Government. By making this provision, the legislature made it clear that the officers so appointed will not be an officer of the Authority. He is not to depend upon the Authority for the purpose of his salary and allowances. Moreover it is provided that to assist the Tribunal the State Government is empowered to direct the Authority to appoint such number of servants and of such cadre as may be deemed necessary. An obligation is cast upon the Authority to bear the expenses of the Tribunal. The procedure to be followed by the Tribunal is as may be prescribed. The term 'prescribed' is defined in Section 2(16) which means prescribed under the rules under the Act. The Tribunal is conferred with the powers under Section 83(6) which are similar to the powers conferred on any civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. An enabling provision is made in favour of the Authority also to see that it may refer the dispute to Tribunal. Sub-clause (a) of Section 83(6) as amended, provides that any person aggrieved by an order or notice of the Authority may file an appeal in the Tribunal within thirty days of the communication of such order or notice. Sub-clause (b) of Section 83(6) provides that any person aggrieved by any threatened act or injury from the Authority affecting his rights may refer the dispute to the Tribunal within thirty days of the communication or knowledge of such threatened act or injury. 10. The analysis of the aforesaid provisions of the Act makes it abundantly clear that all sorts of disputes which are likely to arise between the Authority on one hand and the owners of the property and any other party on the other hand, are covered by the provision of the Act and particularly Section 83 of the Act. Again it may be repeated that Section 83(1) of the Act states that the Tribunal is constituted for the purposes of this Act. As indicated herein above, the disputes which are likely to arise may be with regard to the permission to construct, approval of plan. Again it may be repeated that Section 83(1) of the Act states that the Tribunal is constituted for the purposes of this Act. As indicated herein above, the disputes which are likely to arise may be with regard to the permission to construct, approval of plan. It may be with regard to taking of development charges, it may be with regard to imposition of penalty and many such other things as provided under the Act. Now in these cases when an appeal is filed or when reference is made as provided under Section 83(a) & (b) respectively, if there is no power with the Tribunal to pass interim order, the very purpose of the Act may be frustrated. It is not only that the owners of the property may have to resort to the provisions of Section 83 and invoke the jurisdiction of Tribunal under the Act. As provided under Section 83(7), even with regard to the Authority enabling provision is made and it can also refer the dispute to the Tribunal. A situation can very well be imagined that an owner of a land may try to encroach upon the land belonging to the Authority. This act may be malafide or may be under genuine mistake. In such a case despite the request made by the Authority if the owner of the land persists in the encroachment and wishes to make further construction so as to make the situation irreversible, even the Authority may have to approach the Tribunal and request for interim relief. In such a situation if Tribunal were to say that since there is no express provision in the Act, it will not pass any interim order, the very object of the Act would be frustrated. The object of the Act is to see that the development of Jaipur region is made in planned, co-ordinated and properly supervised manner. If during the pendency of the appeal or reference the Tribunal has no power to pass interim orders and the parties are required to wait till the final decision is rendered, one whosoever is more powerfully would be in a position to grab the land belonging to the society. Thus to say that the Tribunal has no power to pass interim order would be against the public interest and against the spirit and object of the Act. 11. Thus to say that the Tribunal has no power to pass interim order would be against the public interest and against the spirit and object of the Act. 11. In this connection, reference be made to a decision of Supreme Court in the case of Sub-Divisional Officer, Sadar, Faizabad v. Shambhoo Narain Singh, reported in AIR 1970 SC 140 . In para 8 of the decision the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as follows "It is well recognised that where an Act confers a jurisdiction, it impliedly also grants the power of doing all such acts, or employing such means as are essentially necessary to its execution. But before implying the existence of such a power the court must be satisfied that the existence of that power is absolutely essential for the discharge of the power conferred and not merely that it is convenient to have such a power." In the case of Income Tax Officer, Cannanore v. M.K. Mohammed Kunhi, reported in AIR 1969 SC 430 , the question arose as regards powers of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal to grant interim relief. Admittedly there was no express provision in the Act conferring power on the Appellate Tribunal to grant interim relief. After analysing the scheme of Income Tax Act, 1961, in para 8 of the reported decision, the Supreme Court inter alia observed to the effect that the Appellate Tribunal must be held to have power to grant stay as incidental or ancillary to its appellate jurisdiction. The Supreme Court further observed that when Section 254 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 confers appellate jurisdiction it impliedly grants the power of doing all such acts, or employing such means, as are essentially necessary to its execution and that the statutory power carries with it the duty in proper cases to make such orders for staying proceeding as will prevent the appeal, if successful from being rendered nugatory. Here reference may be made to the decision of Gujarat High Court in the case of Minish K. Sheth and others v. State of Gujarat and others, reported in 1985 (1) GLR 202 . Therein the question arose as regards the powers of the State Government under the provisions of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. As per the provision of the Act the Government has been conferred with revisional powers under the Urban Land Ceiling Act. Therein the question arose as regards the powers of the State Government under the provisions of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. As per the provision of the Act the Government has been conferred with revisional powers under the Urban Land Ceiling Act. In the entire provision of Urban Land Ceiling Act, there is no provision which expressly confers powers to grant interim relief upon the Government. However, having regard to the scheme of the Act and in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court, Gujarat High Court has held that the Government had power to issue interim orders. We are in respectfully agreement with the observations made in the decision of Gujarat High Court. Reference may also be made to the decision of Supreme Court in the case of Union of India & another v. Paras Laminates (P) Ltd., reported in (1990) 4 SCC 453 . While considering the question of powers of the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal, the Supreme Court in para 8 of the reported decision observed as follows "There is no doubt that the Tribunal functions as a court within the limits of its jurisdiction. it has all the powers conferred expressly by the statute. Furthermore, being a judicial body, it has all those incidental and ancillary powers which are necessary to make fully effective the express grant of statutory powers. Certain powers are recognised as incidental and ancillary, not because they are inherent in the Tribunal, nor because its jurisdiction is plenary, but because it is the legislative intent that the power which is expressly granted in the assigned field of jurisdiction is efficaciously and meaningfully exercised. The powers of the Tribunal are no doubt limited. Its area of jurisdiction is clearly defined, but within the bounds of its jurisdiction, it has all the powers expressly and impliedly granted. The implied grant is, of course, limited by the express grant and, therefore, it can only be such powers as are truly incidental and ancillary for doing all such acts or employing all such means as are reasonably necessary to make the grant effective. The implied grant is, of course, limited by the express grant and, therefore, it can only be such powers as are truly incidental and ancillary for doing all such acts or employing all such means as are reasonably necessary to make the grant effective. As stated in Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes (11th edn.) 'Where an Act confers a jurisdiction, it impliedly also grants the power of doing all such acts, or employing such means, as are essentially necessary to its execution.' " In view of the aforesaid settled legal position, powers of the Tribunal constituted under the provision of Section 83 of the Act, are required to be considered. In our opinion, as stated hereinabove, it would be impossible for the Tribunal to function effectively and to implement its orders unless the power to grant interim relief is also read in the provision of Section 83 itself. If this is not so, as stated above, the very purpose of creation of the Tribunal would be frustrated and absence of such power would invite lawlessness rather than rule of law. Such can never be the intention of legislature. Of-course this power is subject to the limitation. While granting interim relief the Tribunal cannot go beyond express powers conferred upon it. It is well settled principal of law that a Court or Tribunal cannot grant such interim relief which it cannot grant finally. 12. The learned counsel for the appellant has also relied upon the language of the provision of Section 83. In his submission, Section 83(6) of the Act confers all the powers of civil court on the Tribunal. It is submitted that the phrase in respect of hearing and deciding of an appeal or any dispute referred to it', should be construed to take within its sweep all powers vested in a civil court exercising powers under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908. The aforesaid expression is required to be read in the context and scheme of the Act. As indicated hereinabove, if the scheme of the Act is analysed and the context on which the power is conferred upon the Tribunal, the only reasonable inference is that the Tribunal is conferred with the powers of granting or refusing interim relief also as provided under the Code of Civil Procedure. As indicated hereinabove, if the scheme of the Act is analysed and the context on which the power is conferred upon the Tribunal, the only reasonable inference is that the Tribunal is conferred with the powers of granting or refusing interim relief also as provided under the Code of Civil Procedure. To repeat if these powers are not read into the aforesaid provision, the very hearing and deciding of the appeal at the final hearing stage may become fruitless. By the time the appeal or reference is finally heard, a powerful party may alter the situation of property in such a way that an irretrievable situation be created. The successful party will have only paper order in his hand. As far as the ground realities are concerned, it may take years for the successful party to see that the situation is restored to its original position. In many cases this may become impossible also. Therefore, having regard to the scheme of the Act and the context in which the provision occurs, the power of civil court to grant or refuse interim relief, is required to be read into the aforesaid provision. 13. In this connection reference may be made to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Martin Burn Ltd. v. R.N. Banerjee, reported in AIR 1958 SC 79 . In that case the question arose with regard to the powers of the Industrial Disputes Appellate Tribunal. Sections 9 and 10 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate) Tribunal Act, 1950, read as follows "Section 9. Powers and procedure of the Appellate Tribunal. (1) The Appellate Tribunal shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court, when hearing an appeal, under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act V of 1908). .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... Powers and procedure of the Appellate Tribunal. (1) The Appellate Tribunal shall have the same powers as are vested in a civil court, when hearing an appeal, under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act V of 1908). .... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... (10) The Appellate Tribunal shall follow such procedure as may be prescribed, and subject thereto, it may, by order, regulate its practice and procedure and the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act V of 1908) shall so far as they are not inconsistent with this Act, or the rules or orders made thereunder, apply to all proceedings before the Appellate Tribunal." After referring to the aforesaid provisions, the Supreme Court in para 15 of the reported decision observed as follows "....The words 'when hearing an appeal' have moreover, been used between the words 'a civil court' and 'under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908' which in the context in which they have been used could only have been meant to refer to a civil court. Whatever the jurisdiction the Labour Appellate Tribunal is exercising-whether original or appellate-it is vested with the powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 when it is hearing an appeal. The very juxtaposition of the words 'when hearing an appeal' with the words 'a civil court' is sufficient in our opinion to invest the Labour Appellate Tribunal while exercising its jurisdiction-whether original or appellate-with the same powers as are vested in a Civil Court when it is exercising its appellate jurisdiction, and hearing appeals..." Thus both from the point of view of language of the Act as well as by way of interpretation of the statute, it has got to be held that the Tribunal has power to grant or refuse interim relief during the pendency of appeal and/or reference under the provisions of Section 83 of the Act. 14. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the Tribunal is a creature of the statute and the Tribunal cannot have more power than what has been expressly conferred upon it. Therefore, it is submitted that if the Tribunal passes an interim order, it would amount to usurping the powers which it does not posses. 14. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the Tribunal is a creature of the statute and the Tribunal cannot have more power than what has been expressly conferred upon it. Therefore, it is submitted that if the Tribunal passes an interim order, it would amount to usurping the powers which it does not posses. The contention cannot be accepted for the simple reason that in view of the settled legal position as indicated hereinabove, if the Tribunal does not exercise power of grant or refusal of interim relief, it would amount to abdicating its jurisdiction and failure to exercise jurisdiction vested in it. As indicated hereinabove, we may again repeat that if this power is not read into the provisions and if the Tribunal refuses to exercise this power, the very purpose of the Act and the main reason why the Tribunal is created, is frustrated, Therefore, the contention that there is no express provision conferring power upon the Tribunal, the Tribunal cannot be clothed with the powers, has no merit. Learned counsel for the respondents referred to the provisions of Article 323 B of the Constitution of India. The said Article occurs in Part XVI-A of the Constitution, which has been inserted in the Constitution by Constitution (42nd) Amendment Act, 1976. Article 323-A provides for Administrative Tribunals and Section 323-B provides for Tribunals for other matters. The learned counsel particularly referred to the provision of Section 323-B (3) clause (f). In his submission the Constitution contemplates law to be passed by the appropriate legislature with regard to the matters mentioned in clause (f) of sub-clause (3) of Article 323-B. Clause (f) reads as follows "(f) contain such supplemental, incidental and consequential provisions (including provisions as to fees) as the appropriate Legislature may deem necessary for the effective functioning of, and for the speedy disposal of cases by, and the enforcement of the orders of, such tribunals." Relying upon this provision it is submitted that if the law does not make any express provision with regard to grant or refusal of interim relief, such powers cannot be read into the law by the Court. 15. With utmost respect, we are constrained to say that reference to the provisions of Article 323-B of the Constitution of India is irrelevant and it has no bearing whatsoever upon the question to be decided in this case. 15. With utmost respect, we are constrained to say that reference to the provisions of Article 323-B of the Constitution of India is irrelevant and it has no bearing whatsoever upon the question to be decided in this case. It may be noted that Tribunal constituted under the Jaipur Development Authority Act, is not one as is constituted under the provisions of Article 323-B of the Constitution. It is a Tribunal constituted in exercise of legislative powers vested in the state Government and the short question before the Court is to read the scheme of the Act and to determine the width of the power of the Tribunal. Therefore, the reference made to the provisions of Article 323-B, is of no help to the respondents. Similarly the reference made to the provisions of the Representation of Peoples Act, 1951 is also not relevant. The election law and the provisions made therein are in different spheres. The election law is enacted having regard to the appropriate provisions of the Constitution. Election Tribunal also functions in different sphere. No reliance whatsoever could be made on the provisions of the Representation of the People Act for interpreting the provisions of Section 83 of the JDA Act. 16. Learned counsel for the respondents then relied upon the decision of Supreme Court in the case of Morgan Stanley Mutual Fund v. Kartick Das, reported in (1994) 4 SCC 225 . It is a decision pertaining to the provisions of Consumer Protection Act, 1986. In that case the question that arose was altogether different. The question was not with regard to the powers of the Consumer Forums to grant or refuse interim relief. The question was as regards the Forum. in relation to public issue of a mutual fund called Morgan Stanley Mutual Fund. By filing a suit in Delhi High Court, interim relief was obtained by one Piyush Agarwal, restraining the public issue from being floated by the appellant i.e. Morgan Stanley Mutual Fund. In this context the Supreme Court examined the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 and decided the question as mentioned in para 16 of the reported decision which reads as follows "We have already extracted the impugned order. The correctness of the same can be determined with reference to the following questions (1) Whether the prospective investor could be a `consumer' within the meaning of Consumer Protection Act, 1986? The correctness of the same can be determined with reference to the following questions (1) Whether the prospective investor could be a `consumer' within the meaning of Consumer Protection Act, 1986? (2) Whether the appellant company 'trades' in shares? (3) Does the Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum have jurisdiction in matters of this kind? (4) What are the guiding principles in relation to the grant of an ad interim injunction in such areas of the functioning of the capital market and public issues of the corporate sectors and whether certain 'venue restriction clauses' would require to be evolved judicially as has been done in cases such as State of W.B. v. Swapan Kumar Guha and Sanchaita Investments, (1982) 1 SCC 561 ? (5) What is the scope of Section 14 of the Act? The answers to these questions will decide not only the fate of this civil appeal but also the appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 321 of 1994." Mere look at the questions decided by the Supreme Court makes it clear that the Supreme Court did not consider the question as to whether the Forum concerned had incidental and ancillary powers to grant interim relief or not. Therefore, this decision is of no help to the respondents. 17. Reference has been made to a decision of Supreme Court in the case of Engineering Mazdoor Sabha and another v. Hind Cycles Ltd., reported in AIR 1963 SC 874 . Their in the difference between Court and Tribunal is indicated in para 6 of the reported decision. In our opinion, for the purposes of interpretation of powers of the Tribunal, this decision is of no help. 18. For the aforesaid reasons, the judgment rendered by learned Single Judge in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2184 of 1995, does not lay down the correct law. In the instant case the Tribunal, relying upon the decision of this High Court in Writ Petition No. 2184/95, has declined to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it. For the reasons stated above, the Appeal is required to be allowed. The judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge dated August 30, 1995 is reversed and set aside. Similarly the judgment and order passed by the Jaipur Development Authority (Appellate) Tribunal dated August 5, 1995 is also quashed and set aside. For the reasons stated above, the Appeal is required to be allowed. The judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge dated August 30, 1995 is reversed and set aside. Similarly the judgment and order passed by the Jaipur Development Authority (Appellate) Tribunal dated August 5, 1995 is also quashed and set aside. The Tribunal is directed to decide the application submitted by the appellant-petitioners on merits and in accordance with law. It will, however, be open to the appellants to request the Tribunal to grant interim relief during the pendency of appeal/reference. If and when such an application is filed, the Tribunal will decide the same in accordance with law. Meanwhile, for a period of 15 days from today, the parties are directed to maintain status as on today. The Tribunal will hear and decide the application for grant of interim relief within a period of ten days from the date of its filing. It is further clarified that this direction shall not come in the way of Tribunal in hearing and deciding the main appeal/reference finally.The appeal stands allowed to the aforesaid extent with no order as to costs.Appeal allowed. *******