COMMON CAUSE v. UNION OF INDIA — 1995 DIGILAW 8 (DEL)

Mahinder Narain, J. ( 1 ) THE dispute in this writ petition is regarding the right of respondent No. 3, Shri B. Shankranand to be the Member and the President of the All India Institute of Medical Sciences, New Delhi (respondent No. 2) and to be the Chairman of its Governing Body. The petitioners are (1) Common Cause (a registered society under the Societies Registration Act), through its director Shri H. D. Shourie, having its registered office ata-31 West End, New Delhi-110021, and (2) Forum for Justice and Peace (a registered society under the Societies Registration Act), through its Hon. General Secretary Shri Satish Sehgal, having its registered office at B-4/46, Safdarjung Enclave, New Delhi. The respondents are (1) Union of India through its Secretary Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, Nirman Bhawan, New Delhi, (2) All India Institute of Medical Sciences, through its Director, Ansari Nagar, New Delhi-110029 and (3) Shri B. Shankranand, Member of Parliament, 8, Tees January Marg, New Delhi. ( 2 ) ACCORDING to the petitioners, Shri B. Shankranand, the then Minister for Health and Family Welfare was nominated on 9th March, 1994 to be a member of the All India Institute of Medical Sciences, New Delhi (hereinafter REFERRED TO to as the Institute ) by the Central Government in exercise of its powers under clause (e) of Section4of the All India lnstitute of Medical Sciences Act, 1956 (for short called the Act ). On 9th March, 1994 itself Shri B. Shankranand, Minister for Health and Family Welfare and a member of the Institute was nominated to be the President of the said Institute by the Central Government in exercise of its powers conferred by Subsection ( 1) of Section 7 of the Act. Sub-section (3) of Section 10 of the Act says that the President of the" Institute shall be the Chairman of the Governing Body of the Institute. Hence, having been nominated to be the President of the Institute, respondent No. 3 has been functioning as the Chairman of the Governing Body. ( 3 ) ACCORDING to the petitioners, the nomination of respondent No. 3 as the Member and the President of the Institute was "by designation" and in his capacity as Minister for Health and Family Welfare. Hence, having been nominated to be the President of the Institute, respondent No. 3 has been functioning as the Chairman of the Governing Body. ( 3 ) ACCORDING to the petitioners, the nomination of respondent No. 3 as the Member and the President of the Institute was "by designation" and in his capacity as Minister for Health and Family Welfare. Since respondent No. 3 ceased to be the Minister for Health and Family Welfare on 22nd December, 1994 he automatically ceased to be a Member and the President of the Institute. It is also alleged by the petitioners that though respondent No. 3 was himself aware of this position and had confirmed this position to various high ranking officers of respondent No. I including Shri M. S. Dayal, Secretary, Department of Health, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, he subsequently changed his stand and was not prepared to relinquish the offices of Member and President of the Institute. According to the petitioners, respondent No. 3 has no academic or any other qualification to make him a deserving candidate to hold the crucial, responsible and prestigious position of the Member / President of the Institute and it would be ridiculous to contend that respondent No. 3 had been nominated in his personal capacity as the Member and the President of the Institute. The petitioners contend that they are entitled to seek a declaration that respondent No. 3 ceased to be a Member/president of the Institute with effect from 22nd December, 1994 i. e. the date on which he ceased to be the Minister for Health and Family Welfare. ( 4 ) IT is further contended by the petitioners that even if it is accepted that respondent No. 3 was nominated as the Member and the President of the Institute in his personal capacity and not in his capacity as Minister for Health and Family Welfare, respondent No. 3 could not have been nominated as the Member of the Institute under Section 4 (e) of the Act. According to the petitioners, all the five persons to be nominated under Section 4 (e) of the Act should be members and representatives of the Indian Science Congress Association. Respondent No. 3 is not a member or representative of the Indian Science Congress Association and hence is not eligible to be nominated by the Central Government under Section 4 (e) of the Act. Respondent No. 3 is not a member or representative of the Indian Science Congress Association and hence is not eligible to be nominated by the Central Government under Section 4 (e) of the Act. The petitioners contend that nomination of respondent No. 3 was not in accordance with the provisoins in Section 4 (e) of the Act and, therefore, null and void ab initio. As per Sub-section (1) of Section 7 of the Act the President of the Institute has to be a member of the Institute. If respondent No. 3 was not eligible to be nominated as a Member of the Institute and his nomination as Member of the Institute was null and void ab initio, his nomination as the President of the Institute also was null and void ab initio. Thus, according to the petitioners, the nomination of respondent No. 3 as the Member and the President of the Institute was against the provisions in Sections 4 and 7 of the Act and hence respondent No. 3 cannot function or exercise any power or discharge any duties as the Member/president of the Institute. ( 5 ) THE petitioners also contend that in view of his past conduct and his alleged direct and personal involvement in "the Multi crore Securities Seam", respondent No. 3 cannot be allowed to function as the President of the Institute or as the Chairman of its governing body. The petitioners have also REFERRED TO to certain alleged irregularities and allegations committed by respondent No. 3 in connection with sanctioning of posts in his personal staff, entering into certain deals with the suppliers/contractors of the Institute, treatment of the private ward of the Institute as his own personal holiday resort, interference in the matter of appointments and promotions in the Institute etc. According to the petitioners, in larger public interest respondent No. 3 should not be allowed to function as the President of the Institute. ( 6 ) ON the abovementioned averments and allegations the petitioners have made the following prayers in the writ petition :- " (I) A writ order or direction in the nature of quo warranto or any other appropriate writ declaring that respondent No. 3 is not entitled to hold or continue in office as the President/member of the respondent No. 2 Institute or as the Chairman of the Governing Body of the respondent No. 2 Institute. (ii) - A writ order or direction in the nature of mandamus thereby restraining respondent No. 3 from functioning as the President/member of the resondent No. 2 Institute or the Chairman of the Governing Body of the respondent No. 2 Institute. (iii) A writ order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the proceedings, deliberations and minutes of the meetings of the Institute body and Governing Body of respondent No. 2 held on 5. 6. 1995 or any subsequent date called and presided over by respondent No. 3 any subsequent date called and presided over by respondent No. 3. (iv) Any further or other orders as this Hon ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case. " ( 7 ) THE substantial prayer in the writ petition is for a writ, order or direction in the nature of quo warranto or any other appropriate writ declaring that respondent No. 3 is not entitled to hold or continue in office as the President/ Member of respondent No. 2 Institute or as the Chairman of its governing body. The other prayers are either consequential or incidental to the main prayer. ( 8 ) ON 12th July, 1995 this Court issued notice to respondents to show cause as to why rule nisi be not issued. ( 9 ) ON behalf of respondent No. I, Union of India, a counter affidavit has been filed by Shri Dalip Singh, Deputy Secretary, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare. It is stated in the said counter affidavit that in March 1994 the Central Government approved that the Minister of Health and Family Welfare shall be a Member and President of AIIMS and that Shri B. Shankranand was Minister of Health and Family Welfare at that time and, therefore, while issuing the notifications the name of the then Minister of Health was inserted in the notifications. It is also stated that a view was taken in the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare that the then Minister of Health and Family Welfare had ceased to hold the office of the Member and the President of the Institute after demission of the office of the Minister of Health and Family Welfare on 22nd December, 1994 because his name had only been inserted in the notifications on account of his holding the office of Minister of Health and Family Welfare at that time. It is further stated that on receipt of some representa- tion, the matter was REFERRED TO to the Department of Legal Affairs which opined that he continued to be a Member and the President of the Institute even though he ceased to be a Minister, under the notifications dated 9th March, 1994. It is also stated that in the light of the opinion of the Department of Legal Affairs, the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare on 24th April, 1995 withdrew its letter dated 28th December, 1994 which contained the earlier view taken by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare. In other words, the stand of respondent No. I as revealed in the counter affidavit is that respondent No. 3 can continue as the Member and the President of the Institute even though he ceased to be the Minister for Health and Family Welfare on 22nd December, 1994. Even if there is any ambiguity in the counter affidavit the position has been clarified by the learned Additional Solicitor General Shri M. Chandrasekharan, who appearing for respondent No. l, categorically stated that according to respondent No. l, under the notifications issued on 9th March, 1994 respondent No. 3 is entitled to continue as the Member and the President of the Institute notwithstanding his ceasing to be the Minister for Health and Family Welfare. ( 10 ) IN the counter affidavit filed on behalf of respondent No. l it is also stated that the interpretation given to Section 4 (e) of the Act from the very beginning has been that one representative of the Indian Science Congress Association and four others are to be nominated by the Central Government. It is specifically contended that the interpretation that all the five nominations under Section 4 (e) of the Act should be representatives of the Indian Science Congress Association is not tenable. It is specifically contended that the interpretation that all the five nominations under Section 4 (e) of the Act should be representatives of the Indian Science Congress Association is not tenable. The learned Additional solicitor General asserted that under Section 4 (e) of the Act, the Central Government can nominate one non-medical scientist representing the Indian Science Congress Association and any other four persons who need not be member or representative of the Indian Science Congress Association. II. Shri B. Shankranand filed a reply affidavit dated 4th August, 1995 describing the same as reply affidavit by respondent No. 3 for himself and the Institute as its President in response to the show cause notice issued in the writ petition. Later Shri B. Shankranand filed an additional reply affidavit dated 7th October, 1995, after the arguments in the case had commenced. It was explained by the learned Counsel for respondent No. 3 that in the earlier reply affidavit dated 4th August, 1995 the reply was confined to interpretation of Section 4 (e) of the Act as he felt that the show cause notice was restricted to the interpretation of the section and that he would get a further opportunity to file detailed reply affidavit to the allegations and averments in the writ petition in case the writ petition was admitted. In view of the explanation given by the learned Counsel for respondent No. 3 and since the parties agreed to the hearing and disposal of the writ petition itself, the additional reply affidavit dated 7th October, 1995 also was taken on file. In the reply filed by respondent No. 3 he has categorically denied the allegations contained in the writ petition against him. He has also questioned the locus standi of the petitioners to file the writ petition. According to him the petitioners by filing the writ petition are not serving any public interest and in the garb of serving public interest they are attempting to serve their self interest and the interest of few others who have their own vested interest in the Institute. It is contended that the petitioners are neither doctors, nor patients, nor members of the staff, nor the students of the Institute and are not having any interest whatsoever in filing the petition. It is contended that the petitioners are neither doctors, nor patients, nor members of the staff, nor the students of the Institute and are not having any interest whatsoever in filing the petition. The stand of repondent No. 3 is that he was nominated as the Member and the President of the Institute not in his capacity as Health Minister and that he continues to be both Member and President of the Institute even after his demitting the office of the Minister for Health and Family Welfare. According to respondent No. 3, Clause (e) of Section 4 of the Act does not have any provision for nomination under ex officio category which is taken care of only by clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 4 of the Act. He has pointed out the example of Miss Raj Kumari Arnrit Kaur who was the first Health Minister of the country and who continued as the President of the Institute from December 1956 to October 1963 even after she demitted the offie of Minister for Health in 1957. He has also pointed out that Shri Kirpa Narain, the Secretary in the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, was the President of the Institute from 23rd February, 1982 to 29th June, 1983 and that Dr. M. M. Sidhu who was only a member of the Rajya Sabha remained President of the Institute from 15th September, 1978 to 22nd February, 1980. Similarly it is also pointed out that Shri Anand Ram Jaiswal, Member of the Rajya Sabha held the office of the Presidentship of the Institute from 14th April, 1991 to 8th July, 1991. The petitioners also have stated in the writ petition that Shri Anand Ram Jaiswal was the President of the Institute from 18th April, 1991 to 26th June, 1991 even though he was not the Health Minister. Regarding the interpretation of Section 4 (e) of the Act, respondent No. 3 has stated that the Central Government has the authority to nominate five persons as members of the Institute of whom one shall be a non-medical scientist representing the Indian Science Congress Association and not the other four. Regarding the interpretation of Section 4 (e) of the Act, respondent No. 3 has stated that the Central Government has the authority to nominate five persons as members of the Institute of whom one shall be a non-medical scientist representing the Indian Science Congress Association and not the other four. It is also contended that the meaning of the aforesaid provisions has been so understood right from the commencement of the Act there being no ambiguity in its interpretation and that till date only one non-medical scientist representing the Indian Science Congress Association has been nominated under clause (e) of Section 4 of the Act. Respondent No. 3 has also tried to explain his position with regard to the allegations raised in the writ petition relating to his conduct as the President of the Institute and Chairman of its governing body. I do not mention those details here since an investigation into those allegations is beyond the scope of this writ petition. ( 12 ) DR. S. K. Kacker, Director of the Institute filed an affidavit dated 8th August, 1995 describing the same as reply affidavit on behalf of respondent No. 2 in reply to the show cause notice. It is stated in the said affidavit that the affidavit filed by respondent No. 3 may be treated as an affidavit on behalf of respondent No. 3 alone. It is not necessary to go into the legality or propriety of respondent No. 3 filing affidavit on behalf of respondent No. 2 Institute also. The allegations and prayers in the writ petition are against respondent No. 3 and he has explained his position through the two affidavits filed by him. Moreover, in the affidavit dated 8th August, 1995 of Dr. S. K. Kacker, no specific stand is taken in relation to the contentions in the writ petition. According to the oral submissions made by the learned Counsel Shri S. P. Kaira, who appeared for Dr. Kacker, he could only adopt the stand taken by respondent No. I Union of India. ( 13 ) AN application (CM 4802/95) was filed by the All India Institute of Medical Sciences Employees Union seeking permission to intervene in the writ petition as a party. Though the application was not allowed, the learned Counsel Mr. Barun Kumar Sinha was heard by the Court. ( 13 ) AN application (CM 4802/95) was filed by the All India Institute of Medical Sciences Employees Union seeking permission to intervene in the writ petition as a party. Though the application was not allowed, the learned Counsel Mr. Barun Kumar Sinha was heard by the Court. Apart from alleging that the writ petition was filed by the petitioners at the instance of Dr. S. K. Kacker, Shri Sinha could not throw any fresh light on the issues involved in the case. Regarding the locus standi of the petitioners and the interpretation of Section 4 (e) of the Act and the right of respondent No. 3 to continue as Member and the President of the Institute, Shri Sinha supported the contentions raised by respondent No. 3. ( 14 ) AS already observed, the main prayer in this writ petition is for a writ of quo warrahto against respondent No. 3. The scope of quo warranto proceedings has been explained by the Supreme Court of India in the judgment in The University of Mysore v. C. D. Govinda Rao and Another ( AIR 1965 SC 491 ). In paragraph 7 of the said judgment the Supreme Court has held thus :- "broadly stated, the quo warranto proceeding affords a judicial enquiry in which any person holding an independent substantive public office, or franchise, or liberty, is called upon to show by what right he holds the said office, franchise or liberty; if the inquiry leads to the finding that the holder of the office has no valid title to it, the issue of the writ of quo warranto ousts him from that office. In other words, the procedure of quo warranto confers jurisdiction and authority on the judiciary to control executive action in the matter of making appointments to public offices against the relevant statutory provisions; it also protects a citizen from being deprived of public office to which he may have a right. In other words, the procedure of quo warranto confers jurisdiction and authority on the judiciary to control executive action in the matter of making appointments to public offices against the relevant statutory provisions; it also protects a citizen from being deprived of public office to which he may have a right. It would thus be seen that if these proceedings are adopted subject to the conditions recognised in that behalf, they tend to protect the public from usurpers of public office; in some cases, persons not entitled to public office may be allowed to occupy them and to continue to hold them as a result of the connivance of the executive or with its active help, and in such cases, if the jurisdiction of the Courts to issue writ of quo warranto is properly invoked, the usurper can be ousted and the person entitled to the post allowed to occupy it. It is thus clear that before a citizen can claim a writ of quo warranto, he must satisfy the Court, inter alia, that the office in question is a public office and is held by usurper without legal authority, and that necessarily leads to the enquiry as to whether the appointment of the said alleged usurper has been made in accordance with law or not. " ( 15 ) IT is not disputed by the respondents that as Member and President of the Institute, respondent No. 3 is holding a public office. Hence in view of the legal position explained by the Supreme Court in the above-mentioned judgment, this Court is competent to enquire whether respondent No. 3 is holding the office with legal authority and whether his nomination as Member and President of the Institute was made in accordance with law or not. ( 16 ) THOUGH respondent No. 3 has questioned the locus standi of the petitioners to file this writ petition, it is unnecessary to go into that controversy since any person acting bona fide can bring to the notice of the Court the usurpation of a public office and seek ouster of such usurper through a writ of quo warranto. Respondent No. 3 has not pointed out anything to establish lack of bona fides on the part of the petitioners. Respondent No. 3 has not pointed out anything to establish lack of bona fides on the part of the petitioners. Even otherwise, in the light of the liberal view being taken by Courts in India with regard to locus standi of petitioners in public interest litigation, I am not inclined to throw out this petition relating to the functioning of a medical institution of national importance merely on the question of locus standi of the petitioners. I am of the view that the petitioners have sufficient and necessary credentials to file a public interest writ petition like the one under consideration. ( 17 ) IN response to the notice issued by this Court, respondent No. 3 has stated that he is holding the offices of Member and President of the Institute with legal authority and that he has valid title to it. According to him the legal authority is derived from the two notifications issued by the Central Government on 9th March, 1994, one under Section 4 (e) and the other under Section 7 (1) of the Act. The petitioners themselves have produced copies of those two notifications as Annexure C. For convenience the two notifications are extracted below :- GOVERNMENT OF INDIA MINISTRY OF HEALTH and FAMILY WELFARE (DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH) New Delhi, Dated the 9th March, 1994 NOTIFICATION S. O.-In pursuance of clause (e) of the Section 4 of the All India Institute of Medical Sciences Act, 1956 (25 of 1956), the Central Government hereby nominate Prof. P. N. Srivastava, CSIR Emeritus Scientist, Nuclear Science Centre, JNU Campus, P. O. Box 10502, New Delhi, a non-medical scientist representing the Indian Science Congress Association and the following persons to be members of the All India Institute of Medical Sciences, New Delhi, namely: 1. Shri B. Shankranand, Minister of Health and Family Welfare 514 2. Shri M. S. Dayal, Secretary, Department of Health, 3. Prof. J. S. Bajaj, Member, Planning Commission, New Delhi 4. Prof. P. Chandra, Former Dean, AIIMS, New Delhi. V. 16011/2/93-ME (PG) (ii) sd/- (T. K. Das) Joint Secretary to the Govt. Shri B. Shankranand, Minister of Health and Family Welfare 514 2. Shri M. S. Dayal, Secretary, Department of Health, 3. Prof. J. S. Bajaj, Member, Planning Commission, New Delhi 4. Prof. P. Chandra, Former Dean, AIIMS, New Delhi. V. 16011/2/93-ME (PG) (ii) sd/- (T. K. Das) Joint Secretary to the Govt. of India GOVERNMENT OF INDIA MINISTRY OF HEALTH and FAMILY WELFARE (DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH) New Delhi, Dated the 9th March, 1994 NOTIFICATION S. O.-In exercise of the powers conferred by Sub-section (1) of Section 7 of the All India Institute of Medical Sciences Act, 1956 (25 of 1956), the Central Government hereby nominates Shri B. Shankranand, Minister of Health and Family Welfare and a member of the All India Institute of Medical Sciences, New Delhi to be the President of the said Institute. V. 160ll/2/93-ME (PG) (ii) sd/- (V. K. Das) Joint Secretary to the Govt. of India ( 18 ) IT is not disputed that the Central Government is competent to issue notifications under Section 4 (e) and Section 7 (1) nominating the Member and the President respectively of the Institute. It is also not disputed that such notifications have been issued in respect of respondent No. 3. It is also not disputed that as per Section 6 of the Act, the term of office of a member nominated under Section 4 (e) shall be five years from the date of his nomination. It means that the nomination of respondent No. 3 as member of the Institute as per notification dated 9th March, 1994 entitles him to hold the office of member for a period of five years from 9th March, 1994. The term of office of the President is not prescribed by the statute. The notification issued on 9th March, 1994 nominating respondent No. 3 to be the President of the Institute does not mention any term of office. Consequently respondent No. 3 can continue as President till another person is duly nominated as President under Section 7 (1 ). Admittedly, no other person has been nominated as President in the place of respondent No. 3. As per Section 10 (3) of the Act, the President of the Institute shall be the Chairman of the Governing Body. Hence, respondent No. 3 is entitled to be the Chairman of the Governing Body so long as he is the President of the Institution. As per Section 10 (3) of the Act, the President of the Institute shall be the Chairman of the Governing Body. Hence, respondent No. 3 is entitled to be the Chairman of the Governing Body so long as he is the President of the Institution. Thus, prima facie, respondent No. 3 is holding the offices of Member and President of the Institute and the Chairman of the Governing Body with legal authority. ( 19 ) HOWEVER, the petitioners have raised two objections to the continuance of respondent No. 3 in those offices notwithstanding the existence of the two notifications issued by the Central Government on 9th March, 1994. Those objections are:- (I) All the five persons to be nominated under Section 4 (e) of the Act should be members and representatives of the Indian Science Congress Association. One of them shall be a non-medical scientist and the remaining four shall be medical scientists. Respondent No. 3 is not a medical or non-medical scientist. He is also not a member or representative of the Indian Science Congress Association. Hence respondent No. 3 is not eligible to be nominated under Section 4 (e) of the Act and his nomination as Member of the Institute is not in accordance with law, more specifically. Section 4 (e) of the Act. Since his nomination as Member is not in accordance with law, his nomination as President also is defective, because, only a Member can be nominated as President. Consequently he cannot continue as the Chairman of the Governing Body because the President himself is the Chairman of the Governing Body as per Section 10 (3) of the Act. (ii) Even assuming that respondent No. 3 could have been nominated as Member and President of the Institute inspite of his not being a medical or non-medical scientist or a member and representative of the Indian Science Congress Association, he could not have continued in those offices after 22nd December, 1994 on which day he ceased to be the Minister for Health and Family Welfare, because, his nomination to be Member and President as per the notifications dated 9th March, 1994 was by designation in his capacity as Minister for Health and Family Welfare. ( 19 ) IT was not and could not be disputed that in quo warranto proceedings the above mentioned questions could be examined by this Court. ( 19 ) IT was not and could not be disputed that in quo warranto proceedings the above mentioned questions could be examined by this Court. Hence I shall now proceed to deal with those two objections raised by the petitioners with regard to the right of respondent No. 3 to hold the offices of Member and President of the Institute and Chairman of the Governing Body. ( 20 ) THE first objection calls for a correct interpretation or construction of the provisions in Section 4 of the Act. For convenience Section 4 of the Act is extracted below:- "4. Composition of the Institute The Institute shall consist of the following members, namely :- (a) The Vice-Chancellor of the Delhi University, ex-officio, (b) The Director-General of Health Services, Government of India, ex officio; (c) The Director of the Institute, ex-officio, (d) Two representatives of the Central Government, to be nominated by the Government, one from the Ministry of Finance and one from the Ministry of Education; (e) Five persons of whom one shall be a non-medical scientist representing the Indian Science Congress Association, to be nominated by the Central Government; (f) Four representatives of the medical faculties of Indian Universities to be nominated by the Central Government in the manner prescribed by rules; and (g) Three members of Parliament of whom two shall be elected from among themselves by the members of the House of the People and one from among themselves by the members of the Council of States". ( 21 ) THE controversy is regarding nomination under Clause (e) of Section 4. According to the petitioners, five persons mentioned in Clause (e) should be understood as five scientists and the words representing the Indian Science Congress Associaton apply not only to the non-medical scientist but to all the five persons . Mr. Sanghi, learned Counsel for the petitioners contended that though the general term persons is used in the clause, having regard to the objects and functions of the Institute and also to the intention of the Legislature, the Court should interpret the term persons to mean scientists . According to. him, since one of the five persons should be a non-medical scientist the remaining four should be medical scientists. According to. him, since one of the five persons should be a non-medical scientist the remaining four should be medical scientists. He also contended that it would be difficult to conceive that in an Institute of Medical Sciences, the Legislature did not want medical scientists as members even while having a non-medical scientist as a member. According to Mr. Sanghi, tshe Court should give an interpretation consistent with the objects of the Institute. ( 22 ) MR. Chandrasekharan, the learned Additional Solicitor General appearing for Union of India contended that five persons mentioned in clause (e) should be understood as any five persons one of whom shall be a non-medical scientist. According to him, the four persons other than the non-medical scientist may or may not be scientists. The Central Government is given complete discretion to choose any four persons and the Legislature has not restricted the choice to scientists or medical scientists. Wherever choice is restricted it is specifically and clearly stated in the different clauses in the same Section 4. According to the learned Additional Solicitor General under the guise of interpretation the Court cannot substitute the clear and unambiguous words used by the Legislature and cannot assume any intention (of the Legislature) which is not clearly discernable from the expre provisions in the statute. He contended that there was no ambiguity in the provisions of the statute. The Legislature has used clear and distinct words to convey its intention. When the Legislature actually used the expression non-medical scientist in the very same clause, the Legislature would have used the expression five scientists instead of five persons , had the intention been to restrict the choice to scientists. Mr. Chandrasekharan also contended that Clauses (b), (c) and (f) of Section 4 would ensure that at least 6 of the total 17 members are experts in the field of medical sciences and hence medical scientists and that even if medical scientists are not nominated under clause (e), they would be represented under Clauses (b), (c) and (f ). ( 23 ) MR. Chandrasekharan further contended that the words "representing the Indian Science Congress Association" applied only to the "non-medical scientist" and not to all the "five persons". ( 23 ) MR. Chandrasekharan further contended that the words "representing the Indian Science Congress Association" applied only to the "non-medical scientist" and not to all the "five persons". He pointed out that according to the official text, in Clause (e) of Section 4 there is no coma after the words non-medical scientist and that there is a coma after the word association . According to Mr. Chandra sekharan, if the Legislature wanted all the five persons to be representatives of the Indian Science Congress Association, it would have said "five representatives of the Indian Science Congress Association". To support this contention, he pointed out the use of the expressions "two representatives of the Central Government" in clause (d) and "four representatives of the medical faculties" in clause (f ). The legislature could have used a similar expression in clause (e) also but it did not. He also submitted that inasmuch as non-scientists also can become members of the Indian Science Congress Association, members or representatives of the Indian Science Congress Association always need not necessarily be scientists. Mr. Chandrasekharan could not see any logic in insisting that only medical scientists in the strict and technical sense of the expression should be nominated as members of the Institute under clause (e ). According to him, research work in the AIIMS is not done by the members of the Institute. What is required is that among the members of the Institute there should also be experts in the field of medical sciences. This is ensured by caluses (b), (c) and (f) of Section 4, according to which, the Director General of Health Services, Government of India, the Director of the Institute and four representatives of the medical faculties of Indian Universities will be members of the Institute. It cannot be disputed that the above mentioned persons are be experts in the field of medical sciences. Referring to Section 13 of the Act, Mr. Chandrasekharan submitted that the primary object of the Institute was to develop a centre for medical education of a high standard. According to him, providing facilities for research is only one of the several functions enumerated in clauses (a) to (o) in Section 14 of the Act. Hence there is no need for insisting that four persons to be nominated under clause (e) of Section 4 must be medical scientists doing full time research. According to him, providing facilities for research is only one of the several functions enumerated in clauses (a) to (o) in Section 14 of the Act. Hence there is no need for insisting that four persons to be nominated under clause (e) of Section 4 must be medical scientists doing full time research. He also requested that while interpreting clause (e) of Section 4, the Court may take into account thefact that right from the commencement of the Act the Central Government has consistently understood and given effect to the said clause (e) in the very same manner and it has stood the test of time. It was never understood that the four persons to be nominated along with the non-medical scientist under clause (e) should be medical scientists. ( 24 ) MR. G. Ramaswamy, learned Senior Advocate appearing for respondent No. 3 submitted that in understanding clause (e) of Section 4, the Court should go by the meaning conveyed on a plain and grammatical reading of the said clause. According to him, there is no ambiguity in the statute. On a plain and grammatical reading of clause (e) of Section 4, the only meaning conveyed is that the Central Government can nominate any four persons as members of the Institute along with a non-medical scientist representing the Indian Science Congress Association. Mr. Ramaswamy contended that any other interpretation will amount to legislating or rewriting the clause, which is not permissible. ( 25 ) IT is well recognized that a statute is an edict of the legislature and the conventional way of interpreting or construing a statute is to seek the intention of its maker. The duty of the Court is to act upon the true intention of the Legislature. The function of the Court is only to expound and not to legislate. The first and primary rule of construction is that the intention of the Legislature must be found in the words used by the Legislature itself. The question is not what may be supposed to have been intended but what has been said. When the words have a plain meaning the Court is not to busy itself with supposed intention or with the policy underlying the statute . The question is not what may be supposed to have been intended but what has been said. When the words have a plain meaning the Court is not to busy itself with supposed intention or with the policy underlying the statute . When the words of a statute are clear, plain or unambiguous i. e. they are reasonably susceptible to only one meaning, the Court is bound to give effect to that meaning irrespective of consequences. If the words used are capable of one construction only, then it would not be open to the Court to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act. When a language is plain and unambiguous and admits of only one meaning, no question of construction of a statute arises, for the Act speaks for itself. ( 26 ) HAVING carefully considered the arguments of the learned Counsel for the petitioners and the respondents and having examined the various provisions in the Act in the light of the above mentioned well recognized principles of interpretation and construction of statutes, I am inclined to think that the interpretation given to clause (e) of Section 4 by the Central Government and the learned Additional Solicitor General is correct and that it is the only logical and reasonable interpretation that can be given. If the interpretation suggested by the petitioners is accepted, this Court will be rewriting a clear and unambiguous provision in the statute. ( 27 ) I am of the view that the language in clause (e) of Section 4 is plain and unambiguous and admits of only one meaning i. e. the Central Government can nominate one non-medical scientist representing the Indian Science Congress Association and any other four persons to be members of the Institute. The choice of those four persons is not restricted to scientists or representatives of the Indian Science Congress Association. Reading Section 4 as a whole it is not possible to understand the words five persons appearing in clause (e) as five scientists . If the Legislature wanted the Central Government to nominate five scientists under clause (e) of Section 4, nothing prevented it from saying so. While using the expression non-medical scientist later in the same clause, the Legislature started clause (e) with the expression five persons deliberately avoiding the expression five scientists . If the Legislature wanted the Central Government to nominate five scientists under clause (e) of Section 4, nothing prevented it from saying so. While using the expression non-medical scientist later in the same clause, the Legislature started clause (e) with the expression five persons deliberately avoiding the expression five scientists . This is very significant. Similarly, if the Legislature wanted all the five persons to be representatives of Indian Science Congress Association, it could have said so starting the clause with the words "five representatives of Indian Science Congress Association" as in the case of clauses (d) and (f) which provide for nomination of the representatives of the Central Government and the representa- tives of the medical faculties of Indian Universities. But the Legislature chose not to say so. It is clear from a plain reading and grammatical of the entire provisions in Section 4 that only the non-medical scientist has to represent the Indian Science Congress Association. On a perusal of all the provisions in the Act I could not discern any intention of the Legislature to restrict the nomination of all the five persons under clause (e) of Section 4 to scientists or to representatives of Indian Science Congress Association. ( 28 ) LEARNED Counsel for petitioners contended that having regard to the objects and functions of the Institute it is necessary and desirable to have at least four medical scientists nominated as members of the Institute under clause (e) of Section 4. But the Court is concerned only with what is provided by the clear and unambiguous provision in the statute and not with what is necessary or desirable in its opinion. What is necessary or desirable is a matter of policy and hence normally outside the domain of the Court. The Court shall not substitute its wisdom for that of the Legislature. I specifically asked the learned Counsel for the petitioners whether at any time during the last more than three decades any difference of opinion or dissent was expressed in Parliament regarding the cosistent understanding of clause (e) of Section 4 by the Central Government. He could not point out any such instance of dissent or difference of opinion or any instance of suggesting the interpretation offered by the petitioners in this case. He could not point out any such instance of dissent or difference of opinion or any instance of suggesting the interpretation offered by the petitioners in this case. However, a copy of the 31st Report of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Human Resource Development submitted to Parliament on 16th August, 1995 was made available to the Court. It is seen that the Committee has recommended a change in the policy of nominating the Health Minister and Health Secretary as members of the Institute. According to the Committee such a change in policy is necessary to ensure the autonomy of the Institute in practice. It is not known whether the Central Government has accepted the recommendation. But what is relevant for the present discussion is that even the Parliamentary Committee has not suggested that only scientists or representatives of Indian Science Congress Association can be nominated as member of the Institute under clause (e) of Section 4. ( 29 ) I am also not impressed by the argument of the petitioners that if the four persons to be nominated along with the non-medical scientist under clause (e) are not medical scientists the functioning of the Institute will be impaired. Even assuming that such a consequence will follow, I have serious doubts whether it would be a relevant consideration in interpreting the provision in the statute which is clear and unambiguous. At any rate it is for the Legislature and the executive and not for the Courts to plug any loopholes in the statute or to overcome any deficiencies. Further, in a wider sence the expression medical scientists can include those members falling in the categories mentioned in clauses (b), (c) and (f ). They are also experts in the field of medical sciences even if they are not full time researchers. They are capable of helping and guiding the Institute in discharging its function of providing facilities for medical research. ( 30 ) THE petitioners appear to be labouring under a wrong impression that the AIIMS is primarily an institute for medical research and that there should be medical scientists among the members of the Institute to conduct or supervise medical research. The AIIMS is primarily a centre for medical education and training of a high standard. It is also an institute for medical research. Section 13 enumerates the objects, of the Institute as follows :- 13. The AIIMS is primarily a centre for medical education and training of a high standard. It is also an institute for medical research. Section 13 enumerates the objects, of the Institute as follows :- 13. Objects of the Institute The Objects of the Institute shall be: (a) To develop patterns of teaching in undergraduate and postgraduate medical education in all its branches so as to demonstrate a high standard of medical education to all medical colleges and other allied institutions in India; (b) To bring together in one place educational facilities of the highest order for the training of personnel in all important branches of health activity; and (c) To attain self-sufficiency in postgraduate medicaleducation. It is significant that there is no reference to medical research in Section 13. Section 14 which contains the functions of the Institute reads thus :- 14. Functions of the Institute With a view to the promotion of the objects specified under Section 13, the Institute may - (a) Provide for undergraduate and postgraduate teaching in the science of modern medicine and other allied sciences, including physical and biological sciences; (b) Provide facilities for research in the various branches of such sciences; (c) Provide for the teaching of humanities in the undergraduate courses; (d) Conduct experiments in new methods education, both undergraduate and postgraduate, in order to arrive at satisfactory standards of such education; (e) Prescribe courses and curricula for both undergraduate and postgraduate studies; (f) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, establish and maintain (i) One or more medical colleges with different departments including a department of preventive and social medicine sufficiently staffed and equipped to undertake not only undergraduate medical education in different subjects; (ii) One or more well-equipped hospitals; (iii) A dental college with such institutional facilities for the practice of dentistry and for the practical training of students as may be necessary; (iv) A nursing college sufficiently staffed and equipped for the training of nurses; (v) Rural and urabn health organisations which will form centres for the field training of the medical, dental and nursing students of the Institute as well as for research into community health problems; and (vi) Other institutions for the training of different types of health workers, such as physiotherapists, occupational therapists and medical technicians of various kinds; (g) Train teachers for the different medical colleges in India. (h) Hold examinations and grant such degrees, diplomas and other academic distinctions and titles in undergraduate and postgraduate medical education as may be laid down in regulations; (i) Institute, and appoint persons to, professorships, readerships, 521 lecturerships and post of any description in accordance with regulations; (j ) Receive grants from the Government and gifts donations, benefications, bequests and transfers of properties, both movable and immovable, from donors, benefactors, testators or transferors, as the case may be; (k) Deal with any property belonging to, or vested in, the Institute in any manner which is considered necessary for promoting the objects specified in Section 13; (1) Demand and receive such fees and allot other charges as may be prescribed by regulations; (m) Construct quarters for its staff and allot such quarters to the staff in accordance with such regulations as may be made in this behalf; (n) Borrow money, with the prior approval of the Central Government, on the security of the property of the Institute. (o) Do all such other acts and things as may be necessary to further the objects specified in Section 13. Clause (b) above shows that one of the several functions of the Institute is to provide facilities for research in the various branches of medical sciences. To provide facilities for research, the members of the Institute themselves need not be researchers in medical sciences. The members themselves are not expected to conduct or supervise research. In these circumstances I do not find any valid reason to interpret or understand clause (e) of Section 4 as suggested by the petitioners. As already stated, I am of the view that clause (e) of Section 4 confers on the Central Government the power to nominate a non-medical scientist and any other four persons who need not necessarily be scientists or representatives of the Indian Science Congress Association. ( 31 ) MR. Sanghi REFERRED TO to the Parliamentary Debates on All India Institute of Medical Sciences Bill on 18. 2. 1956, 20. 2. 1956 and 21. 2. 1956. To strengthen his argument for nomination of more medical scientists and representatives of the Indian Science Congress Association Mr. Sanghi drew our attention to the following statement of the Minister for Health, Rajkumari Amrit Kaur: "now some criticism has been levelled -1 have so little time to reply - as to the official character of the Governing Body. 2. 1956. To strengthen his argument for nomination of more medical scientists and representatives of the Indian Science Congress Association Mr. Sanghi drew our attention to the following statement of the Minister for Health, Rajkumari Amrit Kaur: "now some criticism has been levelled -1 have so little time to reply - as to the official character of the Governing Body. I may bring to the notice of Members that there arc merely three or four officials out of the seventeen members, because the non-medical scientists and those representing the Indian Science Congress certainly won t be officials. Representatives of the medical faculties are not likely to be officials. Then there are three Members of Parliament who certainly are not officials. So that objection really does not stand. "the above statement made in the Parliament by the Minister for Health cannot strengthen the case of the petitioners. First of all, when the provision in the statute is clear and unambiguous there is no need to look into the Parliamentary debates. Secondly, the Minister for Health was not answering any question whether the persons to be nominated under clause (e) of Section 4 should be medical scientists or representatives of the Indian Science Congress Association. The Minister was answering a question regarding the presence of too many officials among the members of the Institute. Thirdly, the above quoted statement does not make much sense and the Minister appears to have been confused. Though she was obviously speaking about the composition of the Institute, the statement refers to the official character of the governing Body . Though there is provision for only one nonmedical scientist, the statement refers to non-medical scientists . In these circumstances the said Parliamentary debates cannot come to the aid of the petitioners. ( 32 ) LEARNED Counsel for the petitioners cited the judgment of the Supreme Court in Administrator, Municipal Corporation,bilaspur v. Dattatraya Dahankar and another ( AIR 1992 SC 1846 ) and contended that the Court should take the modern positive approach of having a purposeful construction that is to effectuate the object and purpose of the Act. But on a careful reading of Section 4 along with the other provisions in the Act, I am not satisfied that the purpose was to provide for more representation to medical scientists or representatives of the Indian Science Congress Association. But on a careful reading of Section 4 along with the other provisions in the Act, I am not satisfied that the purpose was to provide for more representation to medical scientists or representatives of the Indian Science Congress Association. Nor am I satisfied that the object and purpose of the Act can be effectuated only if all the four persons to be nominated along with the non-medical scientist under clause (e) of Section 4 are medical scientists or representatives of the Indian Science Congress Association. Mr. Sanghi contended that in view of the words "non-medical scientist appearing later in clause (e) of Section 4, the word "persons" appearing at the beginning of the said clause (e) must be understood as "medical scientists". For this purpose he relied on the following passage in the judgment of the Supreme Court in M/s. Oswal Agro Mills Ltd. , etc. v. Collector of Central Excise and others ( AIR 1993 SC 2288 paragraph 6) :- "there is no quarrel with the proposition that in ascertaining the meaning of the Word or a clause or sentence in the statute in its interpretation, everything which is logically relevant should be admissible. It is no doubt true that the doctrine of Noscitur A Sociis, meaning thereby, that it is a legitimate rule of construction to construe words in an Act of Parliament with reference to words found in immediate connection with them i. e. when two or more words which are susceptible of analogous meaning are clubbed their cognate sense. They take, as it were, their colour from each other, the meaning of the more general is restricted to a sense analogous to a less general. The philosophy behind it is that the meaning of the doubtful words may be ascertained by reference to the meaning of words associated with it. This doctrine is broader than the doctrine of ejusdem generis. This doctrine was accepted by this Court in catena of cases but its application is to be made to the context and the setting in which the words came to be used or associated in the statute or the statutory rule. "the doctrine of Noscitur A Sociis, as stated by the Supreme Court, is applicable only "when two ormore words which are susceptible of analogous meaning are doubted together". No such situation arises in clause (e) of Section 4. "the doctrine of Noscitur A Sociis, as stated by the Supreme Court, is applicable only "when two ormore words which are susceptible of analogous meaning are doubted together". No such situation arises in clause (e) of Section 4. "persons" and "nonmedical scientist", are not words susceptible of analogous meaning. The expression "five persons of whom one shall be a non-medical scientist" docs not warrant an interpretation that the remaining four shall be medical scientists. It is to be pointed out that in the above mentioned case the Supreme Court was interpreting the words "soap, household and laundry" and "other sorts" appearing in Excise Item 15 of the First Schedule to the Central Excise and Salt Act. The question was whether "toilet soap" fell within the meaning of "household soap". It would appear that even in such a case the Supreme Court did not apply the above mentioned doctrine and held that "toilet soap" fell within the meaning of "household soap". In the said judgment of the Supreme Court I do not find anything in support of Mr. Sanghi s contention. ( 33 ) MR. Sanghi argued that the conferment of such wide, arbitrary and unguided power of choice of persons to be nominated under clause (e) of Section 4 would render the provision unconstitutional. But he could not point out any precedent to show that in quo warranto proceedings, the holder of the office can be ousted on- the ground that the statutory provision under which he was duly appointed is arbitrary and hence unconstitutional. There is also no challenge in the writ petition against the constitutional validity of the statutory provison. Even otherwise, I am not prepared to hold that clause (e) of Section 4 conferring on the Central Government the power to nominate five persons to be members of the Institute is arbitrary and unconstitutional. Section 4 read as a whole contains sufficient control and guidance with regard to the exercise of the power so as to save the provision from the vice of arbitrariness. A mere possibility of abuse of the power does not render the provision unconstitutional especially when the power is conferred on a high statutory authority like the Central Government which is expected to exercise such power bonafide and consistent with the intention of the Legislature. Abuse, if any, in the exercise of such power can be challenged in the particular case. Abuse, if any, in the exercise of such power can be challenged in the particular case. Admittedly respondent No. 3 has long experience as a Member of Parliament and has also served as Union Minister for Health and Family Welfare. Considering the composition of the Institute the nomination of a person with the legislative and administrative experience of respondent No. 3 cannot be held to be an abuse of the statutory power under clause (e) of Section 4. ( 34 ) IT is also to be noted that Section 4 does not in any way prohibit the nomination of the Minister for Health as a member of the Institute and hence the nomination of respondent No. 3 while holding the office of the Minister for Health was not in violation of the statutory provision. ( 35 ) IN the light of the above discussion I reject the first objection raised by the petitioners against the continuance of respondent No. 3 as Member and President of the Institute and the Chairman of its Governing Body. ( 36 ) THE second objection of the petitioners raises interesting questions regarding the nature of the nomination of respondent No. 3 and the rights flowing from the said nomination. The notifications dated 9th March, 1994 nominating respondent No. 3 as Member and President have been extracted earlier in this judgment. The statements in the counter affidavit of respondent No. I indicate that the decision approved by the Central Government was to nominate the Minister for Health and Family Welfare as one of the members of the Institute under clause (e) of Section 4 and as President under Sub-section (1) of Section 7. The counter affidavit also indicates that Shri B. Shankaranand was the Minister for Health and Family Welfare at that time and hence while issuing the notifications his name was inserted in the notifications. Whatever be the reason that weighed with the Central Government in nominating Shri B. Shankranand, the fact remains that his name was printed in the notifications. The Minister for Health and Family Welfare is not an ex-officio member or the ex-officio President of the Institute. There are only three ex-officio members of the Institute. They are mentioned in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 4. They are the Vice-Chancellor of the Delhi University, the Director General of Health Services and the Director of the Institute. The Minister for Health and Family Welfare is not an ex-officio member or the ex-officio President of the Institute. There are only three ex-officio members of the Institute. They are mentioned in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 4. They are the Vice-Chancellor of the Delhi University, the Director General of Health Services and the Director of the Institute. Respondent No. 3 was nominated admittedly under clause (e) of Section 4. Clause (e) of Section 4 authorises the Central Government to nominate five persons as members. According to respondent No. 3, clause (e) of Section 4 permits only nomination by name and does not permit nomination by designation. Even assuming that nomination by designation is permissible, in the instant case, the notification actually contained the name of respondent No. 3 along with his designation. In the absence of any specific provision in Section 4 for nomination by designation apart from the ex officio members and in view of the inclusion of the name of respondent No. 3 in the notification under clause (e), there is force in the contention of respondent No. 3 that his nomination as member of the Institute was not by designation but by name. Whatever might have been the intention of the Central Government, on the face of the notification dated 9th March, 1994 the worst that can be said against respondent No. 3 is that the reason for his nomination was the fact that at the relevant time he was the Minister for Health and Family Welfare and that the said reason does not hold good any more since he ceased to be the Minister. But the question to be decided is whether his ceasing to be the minister will disentitle respondent No. 3 to continue as member of the Institute when the provisions in Subjection (1) of Section 6 provide that the term of office of a membernominated underclause (e) of Section 4shall be five years from the date of his nomination. In this context it is to be noted that as per Subjection (2) of Section 6, the term of office of an ex-officio member shall continue only so long as he holds the ^^ice by virtue of which he is a member. Admittedly respondent No. 3 does not come under the category of ex officio members and hence Subsection (2) of Section 6 has no application in his case. Admittedly respondent No. 3 does not come under the category of ex officio members and hence Subsection (2) of Section 6 has no application in his case. His case squarely comes under Subjection (1) of Section 6 which entitles him to hold the office of member of the Institute for five years from the date of nomination. The notification issued under clause (e) ofsection 4 does not contain any provision restricting or reducing the term of office stipulated in Subjection (1) of Section 6. My attention was not drawn to any statutory provision or condition of nomination which obliged respondent No. 3 to vacate the office of the member of the Institute consequent on the disappearance of the reason for his nomination i e. his holding the office of the Minister for Health and Family Welfare. It the Central Government nominated respondent No. 3 because he was the Minister for Health and if the Central Government does not want him to continue in office since he ceased to be the Minister, it is for the Central Government to effect the change in accordance with law. The Court cannot be called upon to play the role of the Central Government. ( 37 ) SUB-SECTION (4) of Section 6 reads thus:- "an outgoing member shall, unless the Central Government otherwise directs, continue in office until another person is nominated or elected as a member in his place". Even if it is assumed for arguments sake that consequent on his ceasing to be the Minister, respondent No. 3 was obliged to vacate the office of member and became an out-going member, still, in view of Sub-section (4) of Section 6 he is entitled to continue in office as member of the Institute until another person is nominated as a member in his place, unless the Central Government otherwise directed. Admittedly the Central Government has not nominated any other person as member in the place of respondent No. 3 and has not directed him to vacate office. On the contrary, the Central Government has categorically stated before this Court that respondent No. 3 can continue as member and President of the Institute. ( 38 ) IF respondent No. 3 is entitled to continue as member even after demitting the office of minister, applying the same logic and reasons, he is entitled to continue as President also. On the contrary, the Central Government has categorically stated before this Court that respondent No. 3 can continue as member and President of the Institute. ( 38 ) IF respondent No. 3 is entitled to continue as member even after demitting the office of minister, applying the same logic and reasons, he is entitled to continue as President also. ( 39 ) IN these circumstances I find no valid reason to issue a writ of quo warranto ousting respondent No. 3 from the offices of member and President of the Institute on the ground that he ceased to be the Minister for Health and Family Welfare on 22nd December, 1994. If he is entitled tocontinue as President, by virtue of that office he can continue as Chairman of the Governing Body. Hence the second objection of the petitioners also is liable to be overruled. ( 40 ) THE objections of the petitioners are liable to be rejected for other reasons also. In the judgment in Statesman (Private) Ltd. v. H. R. Deb and others reported in AIR 1968 SC 1495 (para 10), the Supreme Courthas cautioned that the High Court, in a quo warranto proceeding, should be slow to pronounce upon the matter unless there is a clear infringment of the law. In the present case the petitioners have failed to establish any clear infringement of any law. Quo warranto is a discretionary writ. It will not be issued if the result will be futile. The Central Government who is competent, to make nominations under clause (e) of Section 4 and Sub-section (1) of Section 7, has taken the stand that respondent No. 3 can continue as member and President of the Institute without being the Minister for Health and Family Welfare. Even if respondent No. 3 is ousted by a writ of quo warranto on the ground that he was nominated on 9th March, 1994 only in his capacity as Minister, the Central Government can again validly nominate respondent No. 3 by name under clause (e) of Section 4 and Sub-section (1) of Section 7. The relevant question is not whether he would be renominated but whether he could be renominated . The relevant question is not whether he would be renominated but whether he could be renominated . Thus in view of the stand taken by the Central Government, even if a writ of quo warranto is issued ousting respondent No. 3 from the offices of member and President of the Institute, the result will be futile since the Central Government can renominate him immediately. Hence the proper discretion to be exercised in this case is not to issue the discretionary writ of quo warranto. ( 41 ) AS already indicated earlier, I am not inclined to examine the allegations relating to the conduct of respondent No. 3 as member and President of the Institute since such an enquiry is beyond the scope of quo warranto proceedings. Moreover, in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution this Court has inherent limitations in conducting such an enquiry and arriving at the truth. Further, respondent No. 3 is a person nominated by the Central Government which has power to remove him for valid and sufficient reasons. If respondent No. 3 by his conduct has disqualified himself to continue in office and if his continuance will be against the best interests of the Institute, petitioners could have approached the Central Government for remedial action. Since the petitioners have no case that they brought the alleged misconduct and irregularities of respondent No. 3 to the notice of respondent No. 1 and since there is no prayer for any direction to respondent No. 1 in this regard, Idonot consider it proper or necessary to pass any order with regard to those allegations. It is open to the petitioners to move the Central Government appropriately in the matter if they so desire. If they choose to do so, then the Central Government will be bound to examine the matter in accordance with law. ( 42 ) THE prayer for quashing the proceedings, deliberations and minutes of the meetings of the Institute Body and Governing Body cannot be granted since the petitioners have not established any legal infirmity in the convening or in the conduct of those meetings. In view of what has been stated above, the petitioners are not entitled to any relief in this writ petition which is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed. The order dated 12th July. 1995 in CM 4119/95 is vacated. In view of what has been stated above, the petitioners are not entitled to any relief in this writ petition which is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed. The order dated 12th July. 1995 in CM 4119/95 is vacated. There will be no order as to costs.