Judgment B. P. Singh, J. 1. These three writ petitions involve common questions and have, therefore, been beard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment Apart from the submissions urged in C. WJC. Nos.2929/94, and 2993/94, in C W. J. C. No.3256/04 an additional submission was advanced on behalf of the petitioners which shall be dealt with separately. 2. The facts of the case may be taken from C. W J C. No.2993/94, as learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the facts are more or less the same and, therefore, it is not necessary to refer to the pleadings in c W. J. C. No.2929/94. In these writ petitions the petitioners have challenged the acquisition of land under the Land Acquisition Act by the State of Bihar for the purpose of widening the Braj Kishore Path. The petitioners are some of the owners as well as tenants of the premises situate on the portion of the land sought to be acquired. Initially, in the writ petitions the petitioners had challenged the approval granted by the State Government to the making of the award by order dated 16-3-1994 (Annexure-1 ). The award made by the collector (Annexure-2) dated 16-3-1994 was also challenged. Later, the petitioners sought leave 1o amend the writ application with a view to challenge the notification dated 25-8-1990 under Sec.4 (1) of the Act as also the notification as published in the Bihar Gazette on 1-9-1990. They also challenged the declaration made under Sec.6 of the Act on 19-9-1991 and the publication, of the said declaration in the Bihar Gazette dated 18-3-1992. These have been annexed as Annexures 7, 8, 9 and 10 respectively to the supplementary affidavit filed on behalf of the petitioners. 3. The facts, not in dispute, may first be noticed. The Cabinet took a decision to acquire the land necessary for widening the Brij Kishore Path. Pursuant to the said decision of the Cabinet, Secretary, Road Construction department, Government of Bihar wrote to the Vice Chairman of the Patna regional Development Authority for necessary action. The aforesaid letter contains the guidelines subject to which the acquisition was to be made. A requisition was sent by the Executive Engineer on 26-4-1990 for acquisition of the land in question. Consequently, a notification was issued under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act notifying the lands in question for acquisition. The aforesaid letter contains the guidelines subject to which the acquisition was to be made. A requisition was sent by the Executive Engineer on 26-4-1990 for acquisition of the land in question. Consequently, a notification was issued under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act notifying the lands in question for acquisition. The aforesaid notification under Sec.4 was published in the bihar Gazette on 1st September.1990, and was also published in two local dailies on 17-9-1990, as required by the Act. According to the State, the substance of the notification was also given in the locality on 18-3-1991. This is disputed by the petitioners. A declaration under Sec.6 of the Act was issued on 19-9-1991 and the same was published in the Bihar Gazette on 18-3-1992. The declaration was also published in the two local dailies on 14-10-91 and 16-10-91. It is not in dispute that objections were invited, and the same were considered and disposed of under Sec.5-A of the Act Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in C. W. J. C. Nos 3256/94 and 2993/94 submitted that the notification issued under Sec.4 of the Act was not in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Firstly, the notification was bad for the reason that it did not record the satisfaction of the appropriate Government that the land in question was needed or likely to be needed for any public purpose. The notification (Annexure-7) does not record the satisfaction of the state Government, but only records the satisfaction of the Additional Collector, Patna, which is contrary to the provisions of sub-section (1) of Sec.4 of the Act. Secondly, it was submitted that the substance of the notification was to be given at convenient places in the locality. This was not done and, therefore, the notification was invalid. The notification issued under Sec.6 of the Act was challenged on the ground that the same should have been issued within one year from the date of issuance of notification under Sec.4 of the Act. Since the same was issued on 18-3-1992, the same was barred by the second proviso to Sec.6 (1) of the Act. The declaration under Sec.6 was also bad for the reason that the substance of the said declaration was not given at convenient places as required by sub-section (1) of Sec.6 of the Act. Since the same was issued on 18-3-1992, the same was barred by the second proviso to Sec.6 (1) of the Act. The declaration under Sec.6 was also bad for the reason that the substance of the said declaration was not given at convenient places as required by sub-section (1) of Sec.6 of the Act. The award made by the Collector was challenged on the ground of nop-compliance with the provision of Sec.11 of the Act. It was submitted that the award could have been made only with the prior approval of the state Government as required by the first proviso to sub-section (iii) of subsection (1) of Sec.11 of the Act. 4. Mrs. Sheema AH Khan, teamed standing counsel appearing on behalf of the State, submitted that the notification issued under Sec.4 and the declaration under Sec.6 of, the Act were issued in accordance with law and were duly notified in the manner required by law. Even it was assumed that public notice of substance of declaration under Sec.6 was not given at convenient places in the said locality, that did not affect the validity of the requisition. The provisions of the law were substantially complied with and, in any event no prejudice was caused to the petitioners. She further maintained that the writ petitions filed by the petitioners should be dismissed on the ground of delay alone, because the petitioners has approached this court in March and April 1994, when the notification under Sec.4 was issued on 25-8-1990 and the declaration under Sec.6 on 19-9-1991. She has relied upon decisions of the Supreme Court in support of her contention that such delayed writ petitions should not be entertained. It was also submitted by her that Sec.11 did not require that the award should be approved by the Government. It only required that before an award is made, an approval of the Government should be obtained. 5. Learned Standing counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents vehemently contended that in exercise of its writ jurisdiction, this Court should not interfere with the acquisition proceeding as the petitioners are guilty of delay and laches in approaching this Court for quashing of the acquisition proceeding. She submitted that the notification under Sec.4 was published in the Gazette on 1-9-90. Objection under Sec.5-A were thereafter invited and considered. She submitted that the notification under Sec.4 was published in the Gazette on 1-9-90. Objection under Sec.5-A were thereafter invited and considered. A declaration under Sec.6 followed on 19-9-91 which was also notified in the Gazette on 18-3-92. Even before that, the same was published in two local dailies in October 1991. Notices were thereafter issued under Sec.9 of the Act, and ultimately an award was made on 16-3-94, The instant writ petitions ware filed in March and april 1994, bat the notification and declaration under Sec.4 and 6 respectively, were not challenged. It was only in July 1991, that the petitioners sought to amend the writ petitions and challenge the aforesaid notification and declaration. Thus the notification under Sec.4 was challenged after 3 years and 10 months of its publication in the gazette, and similarly the declaration under Sec.6 was challenged after two years and four, months of its publication in the Gazette. Such long unexplained delay, disentitled the petitioners from claiming relief. She relied upon several decisions of the supreme Court, and a decision of this Court in support of her plea. 6. In (1975) 4 Supreme Court Cases 285 (Aflatoon V/s. Lt. Governor of Delhi) a notification under Sec.4 was issued in 1959, the declaration under Sec.6 was published ir 1966, and notices under Sec.9 issued in 1970. The petitioners filed the writ petitions in 1972. Dismissing the writ petitions on the ground of delay, the Court held ; "11. Nor do we think that the petitioners in the writ petitions should be allowed to raise this plea in view of their conduct in not challenging the validity of the notification even after the publication of the declaration under Sec.6 in 1966 of the two writ petitions, one is filed by one of the appellants There was apparently no reason why the writ petitioners should have waited till 1972 to come to this Court for challenging the validity of the notificalipn issued in 1959 on the grouad that the particulars of the public purpose were not specified A valid notification under section 4 is a sine qua non for initiation of proceedings for acquisition of property. To have set on the fence and allowed the Government to complete the acquisition proceedings on the basis that the notification under Sec.4 and the declaration under Sec.6 were valid and then to attack the notification on grounds which were available to them at the time when the notification was published would be! putting a premium on dilatory tactics. The writ petitions are liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches and delay on the part of the petitioners (see Tilokchand Motichand v, H. B. Munsi and Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India ). 7. In (1976) 2 SCC 895 (State of Mysore V/s. V. K. Kangan) in similar circumstances, the Court held : "16. The notification under Sec.4 was published on April 13, 1967. Objections were filed by the respondent under Sec.5a of the act. The Deputy Commissioner submitted his report to the government. The Government overruled the objections. The notification under Sec.6 was published in the gazette on october 19, 1968. The writ petition challenging the validity of the notifications was filed sometime in July or Agust, 1959. We do not think that the respondent was entitled to challenge the validity of the notification under Sec.4 of the Act as the writ petition challenging the notification was filed after an unreasonable lapse of time. If public notice as required by Sec.4 of the Act was not given and that would per se vitiate the notification under section 4, the appellant should have challenged its validity within a reasonable time of the publication of the notification The respondent knew of the notification and filed objection under Sec.5-A of the Act, In there circumstances we are no reason to ascept the submission of Counsel. 8. In AIR 1984 SC 1020 (Hari Singh v State of UP.) The Supreme court held that a delay of 2 to 2 1/2 years in challenging the notification was enough justification for dismissing the writ petition on ground of laches alone. It was observed : "4. At the out set we are of the view that the writ petition filed in july, 1982 questioning the notification issued in January, 1980 after a delay of nearly two and a half years is liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches only. It was observed : "4. At the out set we are of the view that the writ petition filed in july, 1982 questioning the notification issued in January, 1980 after a delay of nearly two and a half years is liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches only. It is no doubt true that the appellants have pleaded that they did not know anything about the notifications which had been published in the Gazette till they came to know of the notices issued under Sec.9 (3)of the Act but they have not pleaded that there was no publication in the locality of the public notice of the substance of the notification as required by law. It is significant that a large number of persons who own the remaining plots have not challenged the acquisition proceedings The only other petition in which these proceedings are challenged in Civil Misc. Writ petition No.11476 of 1982 on the file of the High Court filed subsequently by Amar Singh and four others. Moreover in a small place like Kheragarh were these plots are situate, the acquisition of these lands would be the talk of the town in a shortwhile and it is difficult to believe that the appellants who are residents of that place would not have known til) July, 1982 that the impugned notification had been published in 1980. Any interference in this case filed after two and a half years with the acquisition proceedings is likely to cause serious public prejudice. This appeal should, therefore, fail on the ground of delay alone. " in similar facts, this Court in AIR 1985 Patna 70 (Keshav Pal V/s. State)held : "10. In my opinion, these petitioners should not have waited till 1982 to come to this Court for challenging the validity of the notification issued on 1st Sept 1980. They ought to have moved this court within a reasonable time. These petitioners should have moved this Court in 1980 for quashing the notification under section 6 of the Act. In these two writ petitions, these petitioners have offered no explanation as to why the writ petitions were filed after such an inordinate delay and after the entire process of acquisition was over. These writ petitions are liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches and delay on the petitioners. In these two writ petitions, these petitioners have offered no explanation as to why the writ petitions were filed after such an inordinate delay and after the entire process of acquisition was over. These writ petitions are liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches and delay on the petitioners. This view is also being supported bv the decision in Babu Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1979 SC 1713 . " 9. No good explanation is forthcoming from the petitioners for the delay in filing of the writ petitions. They permitted the proceeding to continue till it culminated in an award. Even thereafter though the writ petitions were filed, the notification under Sec.4 of the Act and declaration under Sec.6 thereof, were not challenged. Only several months later, the notification and the declaration were challenged by amending the writ petitions. I am, therefore, of the view that C. W. J. C. Nos 2993 and 5256 of 1994, deserve to be rejected on the ground of delay and laches alone. 10. In view of my finding on the question of delay, it is not necessary to consider the other submissions urged on behalf of the petitioners. However, since counsel appearing on their behalf argued at length and advanced sub-missions before us, out of deference for him, I proceed to consider his submissions. 11. I shall first take up the contention urged on behalf of the petitioners that the notification under Sec.4 (1) issued on 25-8-1990 should have recorded the satisfaction of the appropriate Government that the land was needed for a public purpose. Instead, the notification under Sec.4 records the satisfaction of the Additional Collector. On the other hand, counsel for the State contends that Sec.4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, has been amended in so far as it is applicable to the State of Bihar by the Land Acquisition (Bihar Amendment) Act, 1960 (Act 11 of 1960 ). The amendment to the Central Act by the Stale Act must apply in so far as the State of Bihar is concerned, since the said Act was enacted after following the procedure under clause (2) of Article 254 of the Constitution of India. The Act was enacted with the approval of the President of India and must, therefore, prevail over the provisions of the Central Act. The Act was enacted with the approval of the President of India and must, therefore, prevail over the provisions of the Central Act. With a view to appreciate the submissions urged at the bar sub-section (1) of Sec.4 can be divided into two parts. The first part relates to the satisfaction, of the authority that the land is required for a public purpose; The second part deals with the manner in which the notification is to be published or given. Under the Land Acquisition Act.1894, sub-section (1) of Sec.4 begins with the following words ; "whenever it appears to the appropriate government that the land in any locality is needed or is likely to be needed for any public purpose. . . . . . "sub-section (1) of Sec.4 as amended by the bihar Act 11 of 1960 begins with the following words" whenever it appears to the appropriate Government or the Collector that land in a locality is needed or is likely to be needed for any public purpose. . . . . . " It would, thus, be apparent that while under the Central Act it was only the appropriate government which had to be satisfied about the need to acquire land for a public purpose, under the Act, as amended by the State law the appropriate government or the Collector may be satisfied about the need to acquire land for a public purpose. If the State Act is to prevail as it should, the notification is perfectly valid since it has been issued by the Additional Collector, who was authorised to exercise all the powers of a Collector under the Act counsel for the petitioner did not dispute that such was the legal position til the year 1984, but submitted that after amendments brought about in the land Acquisition Act, 1894, by Act 68 of 1984 the position has changed. it was submitted that in view of the subsequent amendment of, sub-section (1) of Sec.4 of the land Acquisition Act, 1894, shall override the provisions of the Land Acquisition (Bihar Amendment) Act, 1960. The submission is attractive, but devoid of merit. 12. It will be seen that so far as the first part of sub-section (1) of section 4 is concerned, Act 68 of 1984 did not bring about any change by amendment. The submission is attractive, but devoid of merit. 12. It will be seen that so far as the first part of sub-section (1) of section 4 is concerned, Act 68 of 1984 did not bring about any change by amendment. The provision remained the same as before and only after the words public purpose the words for a Company was added. It would thus be seen that the provision remained the same, as it was before act 68 of 1984 except the addition of the words or for a Company. No change was brought and, therefore, the law continued to be what it was before Act 68 of 1984 was enacted. It is not as if Act 68 of 1984 substituted a new provision or altered or amended any part of Sec.4 (1) so as to make it inconsistent with the State law. Since no amendment was effected, the position in law remained the same, as it was before Act 68 of 1984 was enacted. This view is supported by a decision of a Full Beach of this Court, reported in 1992 (1) PLJR 264 (T. S. Griha Nirman Samiti Ltd. V/s. State of bihar), One of the learned Judges held : "45. I, therefore, hold that under the Central Amendment Act, 1984, nothing has been added or substituted which makes the State act (11 of 1961) repugnant to the Central Act. The question of repugnancy does not arise because there is no conflict between these two Acts in pith and substances. I fail to understand when the State Amendment Act, 1961 was not repugnant to the Central act, 1894 how it is repugnant to the new Central Act. If both the Acts could tread the same field before the amendment of the central Act, it can tread the same field even after amendment. In the premises aforesaid, the argument of the respondents that after the amendment of the Central Act, the State Amendment act stands repealed has to be rejected. " Another learned Judge agreeing with the said view held : "57. In the premises aforesaid, the argument of the respondents that after the amendment of the Central Act, the State Amendment act stands repealed has to be rejected. " Another learned Judge agreeing with the said view held : "57. Another submission, which has been made highlighting the central Amendment of 1984, is that after the Central Amendment it is only the State Government being the appropriate government which can issue notification and not the Collector as provided by the Bihar Amendment The argument also, for the reasons already stated above, is devoid of any substance Proviso to clause (2) of Article 254, no doubt, empowers the Parliament to enact at any time any law with respect to the same matter including a law adding to, amending, varying or repealing the law so made by the legislature, of the State. However, merely because few words have been added in sub-section (1) of Section 4, it cannot be said that the whole of sub-section has been amended or varied or repealed. ". . . . . . . . . The Central Amendment as it stood originally and as it stands even now after the amendment of 1984, empowers only the State Government being the apptopriate Government to issue notification in that regard. The Bihar Amendment of 1961 empowering the Collector also to issue notification on the basis of his satisfaction does not stand amended or varied and, therefore, there is no question of repeal of that part of the Bihar Amendment. In my opinion, sub-section (1) of Sec.4 consists of several parts, the first part deals with the satisfaction of the competent authority in regard to the need of the land for any public purpose, the second part deals with the mode of publication of the notification or substance of the notification. These parts are different subjects or matters severable from each other and, therefore, if some amendment has been made adding something to one part of the provion, it cannot be said that the other parts is also necessarily affected by reason of any such addition. According to me, it is a case of addition within the meaning of the proviso to article 254 (2), and not a case of repeal, so far as sub-section (1) of section 4 is concerned. According to me, it is a case of addition within the meaning of the proviso to article 254 (2), and not a case of repeal, so far as sub-section (1) of section 4 is concerned. We have already seen above that the amendment made by the Central Act adding few words in regard to the mode of publication does not amount to repeal of even that part cf the Bihar Amendment since they are not mutually inconsistent or irreconciliable and it is not necessary to deal with that aspect again. In my opinion, therefore, notwithstanding the Central Amendment of 1984, the Collector is competent to issue notification on the basis of his satisfaction that a particular land in any locality is needed or is likely to be needed for any public purpose. " In view of the authoritative pronouncement of the Full Bench of this court which binds us, the first submission must be rejected. 13 The second submission urged on behalf of the petitioners that no public of the substance notice of such notification was given at convenient places in the locality and, therefore, the notification was not published in accordance with the provision of Sub-section 4 of the Act, must also be rejected in view of the facts brought on record. In the original writ petition filed by the petitioners no such plea was taken. For the first time, such a plea, was taken in paragraph No.12 of the supplementary affidavit filed on behalf of the petitioners, affirmed on 7th July, 1994. In it reply the State has controverted the facts alleged in the said supplementary affidavit. In paragraph no.6 of the reply filed in C. W. J. C. No.3256 of 1994 it was stated that a public notice was put up at a convenient place in the locality. On 18-3-1991. The learned Standing counsel produced before us the original record for our perusal. From the record it appears that such a notice was read over and was affixed to an electric pole in the locality. The said notice has been witnessed by a member of the public. We are satisfied after perusal of the original record that a public notice was affixed at a convenience place in the locality on 18-3-1991. From the record it appears that such a notice was read over and was affixed to an electric pole in the locality. The said notice has been witnessed by a member of the public. We are satisfied after perusal of the original record that a public notice was affixed at a convenience place in the locality on 18-3-1991. Counsel for the petitioners, however, submitted after perusing a copy of the said notice that the notice had not been issued in the manner prescribed by Sec.45 of the Act which required that such a notice should be signed by the officer therein mentioned Counsel for the state rightly submitted that the original notice had been affixed to an electric pole in the locality after being read out to the public and after the same was witnessed in writing by a member of the public. The copy of the notice produced in Court may not bear the signature of the officer concerned, because it was not the original notice. In my view, the counsel for the state is justified in her submission. There is no averment in the writ petition that the notice which had been displayed in the locality did not bear the signature of the officer issuing the notice. In fact, the plea of the petitioners is that no such notice was ever affixed at a conspicuous place in the locality. In the absence of specific plea on the question of fact. I shall presume that official acts have been done in a regular manner. The second submission must, therefore, be rejected. 14. It was then submitted that since the notification under Sec.4 was published last in the two local dailes on 17-9-1990, the declaration under Sec.6 should have been made within one year from that date. The submission was made on the basis that public notice was not given at a conspicuous place in the locality and, therefore, in the terms of Sec.4 (1) of the Act, the date of publication in the local dailies should be treated as the date of publication of the notification. On that basis it was submitted that the declaration under Sec.6 of the Act should have been made on or before 16th September, 1991. On that basis it was submitted that the declaration under Sec.6 of the Act should have been made on or before 16th September, 1991. In view of my finding that the last notice given under Sec.4 (1) of the Act was the public notice given at a convenience place in the locality on 18-3-1991, the last date for making the declaration would be 17th March, 1992. In the instant case, the declaration was made on 19-9-1991 though it was published in the official gazette on 18-3-1992. For the purpose of proviso (ii) to sub-section (1) of Sec.6, the making of the declaration, and not its publication is relevant for the purpose of determining the period of one year under the said proviso. Learned counsel for the. petitioners also submitted that if it is believed that public notice was given on 18th March, 1991, then the declaration under section 6 was made within time. This submission, therefore, must also be rejected. 15. It was then contended that the substance of the declaration ought to have been given at convenient places in the locality, but this was not done. It is not disputed that the declaration under Sec.6 of the Act was published in the official gazette It is also not disputed that the declaration was published in two local dailies having circulation in the area in question. What was not done, was the giving of public notice by notifying the substance of the declaration in the locality in question. Counsel for the petitioners contends that non-compliance in this regard vitiated the declaration itself made under Sec.6 of the Act. The learned Standing counsel on the other hand, contends that even if it is assumed that the substance of the declaration was not notified in the locality in question, that would not effect the declaration smade under Sec.6. On behalf of the petitioners reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in AIR 1985 SC 1622 collector (District Magistrate) Allahabad and another V/s. Raja Ram Jaiswal, and others decisions of the Supreme Court holding that the requirement of notice under Sec.4 of the Land Acquisition Act was mandatory. On behalf of the petitioners reliance was placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in AIR 1985 SC 1622 collector (District Magistrate) Allahabad and another V/s. Raja Ram Jaiswal, and others decisions of the Supreme Court holding that the requirement of notice under Sec.4 of the Land Acquisition Act was mandatory. Learned counsel submitted that the Supreme Court in that case held that if the substance of the notification was not given publicly in the locality in question that effected the validity of the notification, it is true that the provisions of section 4 are mandatory, and there are good reasons for holding that the provisions are mandatory. After a notification under Sec.4 of the Land acquisition Act, an aggrieved party may prefer objections and may be able to influence the mind of concerned authority that his land should not be acquired. There is no doubt that the provisions with regard to the manner in which the notification under Sec.4 must be published, is a mandatory requirement. The question is whether the giving of public notice of the declaration under Sec.6 is also mandatory in the sense that for non-compliance with the requirement to give public notice, the acquisition iself will be vitiated. Though in a slightly different context the matter came up for considaration before the Supreme Court in AIR 1976 SC 417 (Khadim Hussain V/s. State of U. P.) Their Lordships after considering the provision of Sec.6 ol the Land Acquisition Act observed : "25. It is clear from the provisions set put above that the objection of the notification under Sec.6 is to ensure that the Govt. is duly satisfied, after an enquiry at which parties concerned are heard, that the land under consideration is really needed for a public purpose and that the declaration is to operate as conclusive evidence to show that this is so. The conclusiveness of this declaration cannot be questioned anywhere if the procedure dealing with its making has been observed. The notification which takes place under Sec.6 (2), set out above, follows and serves only as evidence of the declaration. That the declaration mentioned in Sec.6 (1), set out above, differs from its notification is shown by the fact that it has to be signed by a secretary or other officer duly authorised. The declaration is in the from of an order. That the declaration mentioned in Sec.6 (1), set out above, differs from its notification is shown by the fact that it has to be signed by a secretary or other officer duly authorised. The declaration is in the from of an order. The notification in its publication and proof of its existence. It has, been shown, in the case before us, that the deemed notification under Sec.6 took place about three and a half months after the expiry of two years from the commencement of the Ordinance of 1967. But, it is not argued on behalf of the appellants that the declaration under Sec.6 was similarly delayed. Presumably, it was within time.26. A look at the amendment introduced by Sec.4 (2) of the land Acquisition (Amendment) and Validation Act 1967, shows that it is the declaration which had to take place within two years of the expiry of the commencement of the Ordinance which came into force on 20th January, 1967. In fact, Section 4 (2) of the Amendment Act of 1967, set out obove, itself makes a distinction between a "declaration" under Sec.6 and its "notification" under Sec.4 of the principle Act. It does not say that no notification under Sec.6 of the principle act can take place beyond the time fixed. The prohibition is confined to declarations made beyond the specified period. If the case of the appellant could be that no declaration was made within the prescribed time, it was his duty to prove it. He has not discharged that onus. " 16. From the above observation it is clear that the satisfaction of the government is recorded in the declaration made under Sec.6 (1) of the act. The notification which follows, serves only as evidence of the declaration. The declaration is in the form of an order, whereas the notification is its publication and proof of its existence. Moreover, no prejudice is caused to the petitioners because pursuant to the publication of the declaration, the petitioners were not required to do anything. Their rights were not therefore, adversely affected. The declaration had been published in the official gazette and had also been published in two local dailies. Moreover, no prejudice is caused to the petitioners because pursuant to the publication of the declaration, the petitioners were not required to do anything. Their rights were not therefore, adversely affected. The declaration had been published in the official gazette and had also been published in two local dailies. Having regard to the fact that several adjoining plots were being acquired, the petitioners could not say that they had no knowledge of the acquisition or that any prejudice was caused to them by not giving public notice as required. Moreover, the petitioners have been found guilty of delay and laches. Subsequently, as well notices under Sec.6 were given to the petitioners. With regard to enhancement of compensation the petitioners could always resort to the provision of Sec.18 of the Land Acquisition Act. In fact, an award had been made in favour of the petitioners. Assuming that the requirements of Sec.6 also are mandatory. I am of the view that the provision has been substantially complied by publication of the declaration in the gazette and publication of the declaration in two local dailies. Substantial compliance to my mind is enough to saves the acquisition, particularly when the petitioners have approached this court after much delay which disentitled them from grant of discretionary relief. In this view of the matter, I do not feel persuaded to quash the acquisition only on the ground that the public notice as to the substance of the declaration was not given in the concerned locality, though the other two modes of publication of the declaration were complied with. 17. The last submission in support of the writ petitions was that in making the award the Collector disregarded the provisons of the first Proviso to sub-section (iii) of sub-section (1) of Section (1) of Sec.11 which provided that no award shall be made by the Collector under this sub-section without the previous approval of the appropriate Government or of such officer as the appropriate Government may authorise in this behalf. Counsel for the petitioners submitted that before its publication, the award had not been sent to the Government for its approval. The learned Standing counsel contends that the aforesaid proviso does not provide that the award shall be sent to the appropriate Governmeut for its approval. All it requires is that no award shall be made by the Collector without the previous approval of the appropriate Government. The learned Standing counsel contends that the aforesaid proviso does not provide that the award shall be sent to the appropriate Governmeut for its approval. All it requires is that no award shall be made by the Collector without the previous approval of the appropriate Government. The purpose is obvious. Before an award is made which is in the nature of an offer made by the Government to the owners of the land, the Government must know as to what approximately is the extent of liability that it might incur if an award is to be made. The collector, therefore, is only required to seek the approval of the appropriate government by placing before it the necessary material which may enable the appropriate Government to make up its mind whether to acquire or not to acquire the land in question having regard to the costs involved. The provision is really with a view to protect the interest of the State so that it is not burdened with unforseen liability. Annexure-1, which is approval granted by the State Government on 16-3-1994 discloses that the estimate and the relevant particulars had been forwarded to the State Government for its approval and after considerating all aspects of the matter, the approval was granted by the State Government. I am satisfied that the approval was properly granted by the State Government and there was no need for the collector to send the award for the approval for the State Government. It should not be forgotten that in making an award, the Collector under the act performs a function of quasi judicial nature, and it would be impermissible for him in the performance of such duties to get his decision approved by the State Government in advance. The purpose of the aforesaid proviso in Sec.11 of the Act is not to compel the Collector to seek approval of the Government even in regard to his quasi judicial acts, but only to apprise the State Government of the liability that it might incur if an award is made acquiring the notified lands. This, as I have said earlier, is only with a view to apprise the Government of tne approximate liability that it might incur so that after the award is made, the State may not feel embarassed on account of incurring unforseen liability which it may find difficult to discharge. This, as I have said earlier, is only with a view to apprise the Government of tne approximate liability that it might incur so that after the award is made, the State may not feel embarassed on account of incurring unforseen liability which it may find difficult to discharge. I have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that the approval of the State government was properly obtained by the Collector under Sec.11 of the act. 18. I, therefore, do not find any any merit in C. W. J. C. No.2993/94 and C. W. J. C. No.3256/94 and the same are, accordingly, dismissed. 19. In C. W. J. C. No.2929 of 1994 Sri A. B. Ojha, counsel for the petitioners submitted that the petitioner is the owner of a portion of plot No.722 as also of plot No, 715. The petitioner has no grievance with regard to the notices served upon her so far as they relate to plot No.715. However, with regard to plot No 722 it was submitted that she received no notice under section 9 of the Land Acquisition Act It was contended that she a right to represent under Sec.9 of the Land Acquisition Act and that she has been deprived of that opportunity. It is not disputed that an award has been made in favour of the petitioner. It also appears that in respect of two portions of plot No.722 notice was given to the husband of the petitioner under Section 12 of the Land Acquisition Act, who accepted the same, but with an objection that the plots in question should not be acquired since they were not required for the widening of the road to the extent of 90 Ft. Learned counsel for the state submitted that even if no notice was given under Sec.9 to a particular person whose land was sought to be acquired, the acquisition proceeding as to whole will not be vitiated. In any event, such opportunity can be given even now, so that the petitioner may have no grievance. Counsel for the petitioner also submitted that if an opportunity is given to the petitioner, she may make her representation as required by law. In these circumstances, the respondents are directed to serve a notice on the petitioner under Sec.9 and thereafter to consider any representation made by the petitioner. The concerned authority will thereafter pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. In these circumstances, the respondents are directed to serve a notice on the petitioner under Sec.9 and thereafter to consider any representation made by the petitioner. The concerned authority will thereafter pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. 20. Learned counsel also urged before us that with a slight realignment of the road the property of the petitioner can. perhaps, be saved from acquisition. With his assistance and the assistance of the learned Standing counsel we have perused the acquisition plan and we are satisfied that we shall not be justified in interfering in this matter. If an attempt is made to save the plot of land belonging to the petitioner from acquisition that may result in the acquisition of manv other plots on the other side of the road, because otherwise the road cannot be widened in a straight line. Having regard to the area in question, the road has to bear the burden of heavy traffic It is. therefore, desirable that the road should be straight and should not have unnecessary carves because that may impede free flow of trafic. 21. C. W, J. C. No 2929/94 is, therefore, partly allowed to the extent that the respondents are directed to give notice to the petitioner under Section 9 of the Land Acquisition Act in respect of two portions of plot No.722 having the arears of 9-062 acres and 0.01325 acres respectively. These writ petitions are disposed of accordingly. Partly Allowed.