JUDGMENT T.S. Doabia, J. 1. Learned Counsel for the respondents has raised a preliminary objection to the effect that the disputed questions of fact with regard to the claim pertaining to insurance cannot be gone into in this writ petition. Is this objection to stand in the way of the petitioner as the "Great wall of China" which is impregnable and cannot be bypassed even by Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 2. There would have been merit in this contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents had some disputed facts were required to be gone into. In this petition this is not the situation. The facts are not in dispute. The petitioner wants an inference to be drawn on the basis undisputed facts. The position of law with regard to interference in the writ jurisdictions be noticed. 3. The question as to whether interference can be made in writ jurisdiction be examined. It be seen that there is enough judicial precedent which does support, the view that interference can be made Under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Some of the decision dealing with scope of Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution of India be noticed. 4. In Rudul Singh v. State of Bihar , it was observed that the right to compensation is some palliative for the unlawful acts of instrumentalities which act in the name of public interest and which present for their protection the powers of State as a shield. It was observed that the State must repair the damage done by its officers. Following the above decision, a Division Bench of Madras High Court speaking through Ratnavel Pandian, J., Officiating Chief Justice (later Judge of the Supreme Court of India) in Lalitha v. The Director General of Police, Madras and Ors. 1989 Crl.L.J. 1732, the State was directed to pay compensation to the extent ofRs. 50,000/- in a writ of habeas corpus. The Supreme Court of India in Nilabati Behera (Smt. Alias Lalita v. State of Orissa and Ors. dealt with power of the Court to grant compensation Under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Lord Diplock's majority opinion in Maharaj v. Attorney-General of Trinidad and Lodago (No. 2), 1978 (2) All ER 670 was quoted in Nilabati Behara's (supra). This be noticed. dealt with power of the Court to grant compensation Under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Lord Diplock's majority opinion in Maharaj v. Attorney-General of Trinidad and Lodago (No. 2), 1978 (2) All ER 670 was quoted in Nilabati Behara's (supra). This be noticed. It was argued on behalf of the Attorney General that Section 6(2) does not permit of an order for monetary compensation despite the fact that this kind of redress was ordered in Jaundoo v. Attorney General of Guyana 1971 AC 972. Reliance was placed on the reference in the Sub-section to enforcing, or securing the enforcement of, any of the provisions of the said foregoing sections as the purpose for which orders etc. could be made. An order for payment of compensation, it was submitted, did not amount to the enforcement of the rights that had been contravened. In Their Lordship's view an order for payment of compensation when a right protected under Section 1 "has been" contravened in clearly a form redress' which a person is entitled to claim under Section 6(1) and may well be the only practicable form of redress as by now it is in the instant case. The jurisdiction 6(2) viz., jurisdiction to hear and determine any application made by any person in pursuance of Sub-section (1) of this section. The very wide powers to make orders, issue writs and give directions are ancillary to this. After noticing the above question J.S. Verma, J. speaking on his behalf and on behalf of N. Venkatachala, J. said: It may be mentioned straightaway that award of compensation in a proceeding Under Article 32 by this Court or by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is a remedy available in public law, based on strict liability for contravention of fundamental rights to which the principle of sovereign immunity does not apply, even though it may be available as a defence in private law in an action based on tort. 5. In Saheli; A Women's Resources Centre v. Commissioner of Police, Delhi Police Headquarters 1990 (1) SCC 422 the State was held liable to pay compensation payable to the mother of the deceased who died as a result of beating and assault by the police. However, the principle indicated therein was that the State is responsible for the tortious acts of its employees. However, the principle indicated therein was that the State is responsible for the tortious acts of its employees. In Bhuwneshwar Singh v. Union of India and Ors. for violation of fundamental rights of personal liberty a sum of Rs. 30,000/- was granted for illegal pre-trial detention. In Maniyeri Madhavan v. Inspector of Police, Cannanore 1993 Supp. (2) SCC 501, where there was non-compliance of the order passed by the Court penal costs by way of compensation were imposed. In this case, a journalist complained of an attack on his person and property at the instance of the police officers of the State. The Supreme Court gave directions to complete the investigation into the allegations of physical torture within the stipulated period. There was non-action on the part of the Police Authorities. A sum of Rs. 10,000/- was awarded as tentative costs in addition to whatever damages were to be finally determined. Again the Supreme Court in the case of Sabastian M. Hongrary v. Union of India AIR 1984 SC 1026 directed payment of compensation to the extent of Rs. 1,00,000/- when the submission of the Government as to detenu in question leaving the camp and there after not traceable were not found to be correct. 6. The decision given by the various High Court in this country dealing with liability in tort be also seen. 7. P.P. Desai, C.J., while speaking for the Division Bench of Himachal Pradesh High Court in Kalmati v. State of Himachal Pradesh 1988 A.C.J. 780, allowed adhoc interim compensation to the extent of Rupees 50,000/-, when death of a patient occurred in a Government Hospital, on account of negligence. 8. See also Jairam Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh , and Thressia v. Kerala State Electricity Board , where claimant were granted compensation in writ jurisdiction. In Sita Ram Gupta v. State of Assam 1989 A.C.J. 348, B.L. Hansaria J. (now Judge of Supreme Court of India) speaking for the Division Bench allowed compensation to widow whose husband had died in a Motor accident. 9. In Punjab Istri Sabha v. S.S. Bernala , S.D. Bajaj, J. overruled the objection as to maintainability of writ petition. 10. In Sita Ram Gupta v. State of Assam 1989 A.C.J. 348, B.L. Hansaria J. (now Judge of Supreme Court of India) speaking for the Division Bench allowed compensation to widow whose husband had died in a Motor accident. 9. In Punjab Istri Sabha v. S.S. Bernala , S.D. Bajaj, J. overruled the objection as to maintainability of writ petition. 10. In Padma Behari Lal v. Orissa State of Electricity Board AIR 1992 Orissa 68, death of cyclist on a public road in the dead of the night in stormy whether, when he came in contact with a live hanging wire detached from an electric pole was compensated by awarding Rupees 30,000/-. In Seema v. Himachal Pradesh Electricity Board , a Division Bench of Himachal Pradesh High Court speaking through Bhiwani Singh, Acting Chief Justice allowed compensation where a girl of seven years sustained burn injuries when she came in contact with high tension live wire hanging 3 feet above ground level. Thus, there is abendant authority that compensation can be granted in writ jurisdiction. In the present case facts are not in dispute. These be noticed as under: The petitioner M/s. Krishna Enterprises (hereinafter referred to as the Firm) is having an exclusive show room for the sale of Titan Watches. This is located at Sarafa Bazar, Lashkar, Gwalior. The stock lying in the shop was duly insured against theft and fire. Claim has been made against theft. This theft took place in the shop in the night intervening 12th November, 1994 and 13th November, 1994. It is not in dispute that the insurance policy was in operation on the night when the theft took place. The insurance cover was for rupees 9 lacs. The petitioner submitted a claim for a sum of Rs. 7,48,780/-. The statement of stock was furnished. A First Information Report was also lodged. The Insurance Company appointed a Surveyor. This was done on 27th June, 1994. The claim was settled on 12th December, 1995. The petitioner was held entitled to a sum of Rs. 6,30,405/-. A cheque in this regard has been issued. This cheque has been encashed. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner is entitled to the following additional amounts (i) Rs. 1,18,275/- as loss not taken note of. (ii) Interest, with effect from the date of theft. 10. The amount of Rs. 6,30,405/-. A cheque in this regard has been issued. This cheque has been encashed. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner is entitled to the following additional amounts (i) Rs. 1,18,275/- as loss not taken note of. (ii) Interest, with effect from the date of theft. 10. The amount of Rs. 1,18,275/- is being claimed on the ground that when the insurance cover was taken, the sale price of stock was taken into consideration. While settling the claim purchase value has been taken into consideration. According to the Counsel, the Insurance Company should bve consistent in its approach. According to him,when the stock value as per the sale price was taken into consideration, at the time of providing insurance cover them this criteria should be taken note of while settling the claim of the petitioner. The requisite averments have been made in paras 5.14(i) and (ii). 11. In the return filed, this position has not been denied. All that has been stated is that a claim of more than Rs. 7 lacs, was required to be referred to Delhi Office, and as the petitioner wanted the money immediately, the value of the claim was decreased and the amount was settled at Gwalior only. 12. I am of the view that the reasoning is of no consequence. The Insurance Company should be consistent. When it has taken note of the sale price at the time of giving insurance cover the same criteria should be taken note of while settling the claims. 13. So far as the interest is concerned, the petitioner would be entitled to interest also. The theft in question took place on 12.11.1994. The Insurance Company took more than six months to settle the claim. The claim of the petitioner was found to be true and justifiable. If this be the position, then the petitioner cannot be deprived of the interest. The petitioner would thus be entitled to interest from the date the theft took place. 14. If any authority is needed for the proposition that interest can be granted from the date of incident (or accident) reference be made to the following decision: 1. Vilasini and Ors. v. Kerala State Road Trans. Corpn. and Anr. 1988 ACJ 756. 2. Vijay Laxmi Shivajirao Jagtap and Ors. v. Delhi Automobiles (P) Ltd. and Ors. 1988 ACJ 802. 15. If any authority is needed for the proposition that interest can be granted from the date of incident (or accident) reference be made to the following decision: 1. Vilasini and Ors. v. Kerala State Road Trans. Corpn. and Anr. 1988 ACJ 756. 2. Vijay Laxmi Shivajirao Jagtap and Ors. v. Delhi Automobiles (P) Ltd. and Ors. 1988 ACJ 802. 15. As such this petitioner would be entitled to interest at the rate of 12%. This petition is allowed. The Insurance Company would pay compensation by assessing the value at the same criteria at which the insurance cover was issued. Interest would also be payable in the manner indicated above.