Judgment :- The first plaintiff in O.S.6 of 1983 is the appellant. The second plaintiff has been impleaded as respondent No. 2. The plaintiffs are the children of one Raru. The defendant in the suit was another son of Rani. In addition to the plaintiffs and the defendant, Raru had another child Unnooli. The defendant is respondent No.1 in the Second Appeal. Pending Second Appeal he died on 13-2-1991. His wife Unni Peri was impleaded as additional respondent in the Second Appeal. The defendant, respondent No.1 put forward a contention that pending the proceedings he had assigned the plaint schedule properties in favour of One Alavi and one Mohammed. The said persons have been supplementally impleaded as additional respondents in this Second Appeal. There appears to he a mistake showing the ranking in the memorandum of Second Appeal. The ranking will he corrected to show Unni Peri, wife of the first respondent as supplemental respondent No. 3. Alavi as supplemental respondent No. 4 and Mohammed as supplemental respondent No. 5, 2. The suit by the plaintiffs was one for a perpetual injunction restraining the defendant from alienating the plaint schedule properties on the ground that he had a limited interest in the properties and that the title to the properties vest with the plaintiffs. This claim of the plaintiffs was denied by the defendant, who claimed that he had absolute title to the properties and he could not be restrained by any injection as cl aimed by the plaintiffs. The suit was dismissed by the courts below accepting the contention of the defendant and hence this Second Appeal by the first plaintiff. 3. The plaint schedule properties and other items of properties belonged to Raru, the father of the plaintiffs and the defendant. On 26-9-196! Rani executed a Will which is marked as Ext. Al. Under the said Will Raru bequeathed the properties in favour of the defendant, his eldest son plaintiffs and Unnooli and Tirumala his wife. The defendant was shown as part No.1 to that Will, the plaintiffs were shown as parties 2 and 3, Unnooli was part No. 4 and Tirumala was party No. 5. In para.4 of the Will Raru provided that items 1 and 2 of the schedule to the Will along with two Palmyra palms standing at the north western corner of item No. 4 would devolve on the defendant exclusively on his death. In para.4 of the Will Raru provided that items 1 and 2 of the schedule to the Will along with two Palmyra palms standing at the north western corner of item No. 4 would devolve on the defendant exclusively on his death. In para. 7 of the Will he provided that i n case the defendant died prior to his death, if he had left behind children, the properties set apart to him were to go to those children. In case he had no children, his wife, additional respondent No. 3 herein would have a life interest with a right to be in possession and the right to take the income until her life time and item No.1 would vest with the first plaintiff herein and item No. 2 and the Palmyra palms would vest with plaintiff No. 2 herein. It was further stated that since the defendant had no children at the time of execution of the Will, the defendant had no right to sell the properties set apart to him in para.4 of the Will and that he had only a right to encumber the properties to the extent of Rs. 100/-. In para.8 he provided for the contingency if any one of the plaintiffs pro-deceased him. In para.9 of the Will he reiterated the position by providing that the Will come into effect only on his death and all the conditions provided in clauses 3 to 8 would come into effect only on his death and he would have the right to alter or cancel the Will. The case of the plaintiffs was that read as a whole the estate bequeathed to the defendant was only a life interest with vested remainders to the plaintiffs in the respective items that the defendant could not therefore alienate the properties and hence they are entitled to an injunction restraining him from doing so. The defendant on the other hand contended that the bequest; in his favour was absolute that since he survived Raru, clause 7 of the Will had no operation and that in any event the said clause was bad and could not defeat the absolute estate conferred on him under clause 4 of the Will. He relied on S.124 of the Indian Succession Act in support of his plea. He relied on S.124 of the Indian Succession Act in support of his plea. The trial court held that the divesting clauses in the Will are unenforceable in law and consequently the defendant would have absolute rights over the properties bequeathed to him under Ext. AI will. This view of the trial court has been upheld by the lower appellate court with the result that the suit by the plaintiffs stands dismissed. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that one of I he cardinal principles of construction of Wills is that to the extent it is legally possible effect should be given to every disposition contained in the Will unless the law prevents effect being given to it. He relied upon the decision in Ramachandra v. Hilda Brite (AIR 1964 SC 1323) in support of his contention. According to him it is clear on a reading of the Will that the intention of Raru was to ensure that the children of the defendant would take the properties if he had children and it he did not have any children, the property should go to two of his other children with a tile estate in favour of the widow of the defendant in case the defendant pre-deceased her. He submits that there is no difficulty in giving effect to all the terms of the Will and it is possible to reconcile the disposition in the Will. He also relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Bhura v. Kashiram (AIR 1994 SC 1202') to point out that intention of the testator was paramount and the Will has to be consumed in such a way as to give effect to the expressed intention. Learned counsel for the defendant on the other hand contended mat the bequest in favour of the defendant was absolute and subsequent clauses in the Will purporting to cut down the absolute estate already bequeathed are void and that S.124 of the Indian Succession Act would ensure that the defendant acquired an absolute estate in view of the fact that he survived Raru, though he was issue-less. Learned counsel relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Talkeshwari Devi v. R.R.B. Prasad Singh (AIR 1972 SC 639). 5. Learned counsel relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Talkeshwari Devi v. R.R.B. Prasad Singh (AIR 1972 SC 639). 5. In the light of the principle enunciated in Ramachandra v. Hilda Brite (AIR 1964 SC 1323), it is clear that the court will proceed to the farthest extent to avoid repugnancy in a Will, so that effect could be given as far as possible to every testamentary intention contained in the Will and it is for this reason that where there is a bequest even though it be in terms apparent y absolute followed by a gift of the same absolutely to another on or alter the death of the first, the first is prima facie held to take a life interest and the second an interest in remainder, thus the apparent absolute interest of the first being cut down to accommodate the i merest created i n favour of the second. Read in this light and hearing in mind that the intention of the testator must be given effect to as far as possible as laid down in Bhura v. Kashiram (AIR 1994 SC 1202), It is clear from the terms of the Will that what Raru intended was to confer an interest on the defendant with the intention to benefit the children of the defendant absolutely and in the absence of the children, the defendant should hold the properly during his life lime followed by his widow who also was entitled to hold the properties during her the time with a subsequent bequest in favour of the plaintiffs herein. In other words, the testator wanted to provide that in case the defendant died without issues, the properties should go to his other children rather than to the wife of the defendant or her relatives. Gathering the intention thus expressed and reading the Will as a whole, I have no hesitation in coining to the conclusion that the apparent absolute estate in favour of the first defendant must be cut down to a limited interest to accommodate the interest created in favour of the plaintiffs in view of the fact that the defendant died without issues. 6. 6. Learned counsel for the defendants submitted that the provision in clause 7 can apply only if the defendant had pre-deceased the testator Ram and the defendant being alive when Raru died, S.124 of the Indian Succession Act as expounded in Talkeshwari Devi's case would apply and notwithstanding what is provided in Ext. Al, the defendant would get an absolute estate in the properties. Learned counsel has necessarily placed emphasis on the opening words of para.7 of Ext. Al to the effect that the estate of the defendant would be a limited one if he died prior to the death of the testator. But a reading of para.7 of the Will would show that what is contemplated therein are different contingencies The first contingency is that in case the defendant pre-deceased the testator leaving his own children, the properties would go to the said children. In case he had died without children, his wife Unni Peri would have a limited interest and on her death, the respective properties would go to the plaintiff herein. The further contingency contemplated in para.7 is that since the defendant had no children at the time of execution of the Will, the defendant would have no right of alienation in respect of the properties and would have only a limited right to encumber the properties to the tune of Rs. 100/-, What learned counsel for the defendant wants the court to do is to read the bequest in favour of the plaintiffs related only to a situation where the defendant pre-diseased the testator, her further contention being that the bequest in favour of the plaintiffs cannot take effect in case the defendant outlived the testator. 7. I do not think that, that is the proper way to understand the effect of the terms in the Will. There is a clear manifestation of intention in Ext. Al not to confer an absolute estate on the defendant or his wife in case the first defendant did not have any children. The intention of the testator in that case was that the property should go to his other children namely the plaintiffs. In my view, there is no legal impediment to give effect to this intention. Al not to confer an absolute estate on the defendant or his wife in case the first defendant did not have any children. The intention of the testator in that case was that the property should go to his other children namely the plaintiffs. In my view, there is no legal impediment to give effect to this intention. The contention that once the defendant had survived the testator, the stipulation in clause 7 of the will becomes ineffective cannot also be accepted since in ray view a reading of clause 7 as a whole indicates the nature of the bequest made to the defendant providing for the contingency when he left behind issues and for a contingency when he did not leave behind any issues. Understood in the light of the decision in Bhura 's case and Ramachandra 's case, I am of the view that the defendant is not entitled to alienate the properties as if they belonged to him absolutely. 8. Learned counsel for the defendant referred to a decision of this court in Narayanan Anandan v. Rakesh (SA.58/88) (Subsequently reported in 1994 (1) KLT 475) to contend that once there is a he quest absolutely followed by a restriction, the latter clause imposing the restriction would be invalid. It is seen that the decision of the Supreme Court in Ramachandra and the various other decision exhorting the court to construe a will to give effect to the intention expressed by the testator even by cutting down an apparently absolute estate into a limited one is not seen referred to in the said decision. It appears to me to be well-settled that in construing a Will the attempt must be to reconcile the various dispositions and not to search for repugnancies. In that view, I do not think that the decision in Narayanan Anandan's case could be applied to invalidate the stipulations in para.7 of Ext. Al Will. 9. In the view I have taken, it is clear that defendant and following him, his wife, additional respondent No. 3, herein would have only a life interest in the properties and neither of them would have the right to alienate the properties. The properties vest in the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs would therefore be entitled to perpetual injunction restraining the defendant from alienating the properties. 10. The properties vest in the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs would therefore be entitled to perpetual injunction restraining the defendant from alienating the properties. 10. At this stage, learned counsel for the defendants submitted that pending the appeal, the properties had already been alienated by the defendant and the suit being only one for perpetual injunction against the defendant, and the defendant having died pending the Second Appeal, the suit has only to be dismissed. I am not in a position to agree with this submission. On the construction of the Will as above, it is clear that the defendant had no right to alienate the property to enure beyond his life time. Same is the position with regard to his wife impleaded as additional respondent No. 3 in this Second Appeal. The alienees subsequently impleaded as additional respondents 4 and 5 would not therefore get any right in the property as against the interest of the plaintiffs in the present suit. More over, the alienation in their favour being vitiated by lis pendence they would derive no right or possession over the properties to the derogation of the rights of the plaintiffs. Obviously, the plaintiffs would be entitled to present possession of the property on that cessation of the life interest in favour of the widow of the defendant impleaded as supplemental respondent No. 3 in this Second Appeal and no right could be put forward by supplemental respondents 4 and 5 as against the title of the plaintiffs. In the nature of relief claimed in the suit, it cannot be said that the suit becomes infructuous by a transfer pendente lite by the defendant or that the cause of action comes to an end on the death of the defendant. The plaintiffs therefore are entitled to the reliefs claimed by them. In the result, I set aside the judgment and decrees of the courts below and decree the suit as prayed for. I make it clear that respondent No. 3 has only a right to be in possession until her death. I find that the alienation by the defendant in favour of respondents 4 and 5 do not confer any title or possession on them as against the plaintiffs. I make it clear that respondent No. 3 has only a right to be in possession until her death. I find that the alienation by the defendant in favour of respondents 4 and 5 do not confer any title or possession on them as against the plaintiffs. Since respondents 4 and 5 are pendente lite transferees, I further grant the plaintiffs a right to recover the properties from them on the cessation of the interest of respondent No. 3, in execution of the present decree itself. Respondents 4 and 5 will not be entitled to put forward any objection to such execution. Respondents 4 and 5 are also restrained from altering the nature of the property, from putting up any construction therein and from committing any waste therein. In the circumstances of the case, I make no order as to costs.