Judgment :- Srinivasan, J 1. This writ appeal is directed against the order of learned single Judge, dismissing the appellant's writ petition (Writ Petition No. 7993 of 1995, dated 21 July 1995). The appellant was working as Warehouse Manager in the respondent Corporation at Arani during the period between 8 April 1993 and 22 July 1993. Thereafter he was transferred to Polinaickenpettai Warehouse, Tuticorin. On 13 September 1993, he was served with a charge memorandum alleging discrepancies in the issue of cement stock at Arani Warehouse, in as much as there were variations of specimen signatures in the delivery orders and release order, etc. The said charge memorandum was issued under Regulation 12 of Tamil Nadu Warehousing Corporation General and Staff Regulations, 1965. It in not necessary to refer to the other facts, but suffice it to say that an order of suspension was made against him in R.C. No. 14541/K4/93, dated 15 December 1993 pending enquiry into the charges. He challenged the said order of suspension by filing Writ Petition No. 939 of 1994, which was dismissed on 21 April 1994. In spite of the dismissal of the said writ petition, the order of suspension, dated 15 December, 1993, by order, dated 7 June 1994 was revoked and thereafter, he was transferred and posted to work as Superintendent, Technical Section, Head Office at Madras. 2. The enquiry had not been commenced for some time. He submitted his explanation to the said charge memorandum, denying the charges levelled against him. By proceedings, dated 1 June 1995, the respondent appointed an enquiry officer to conduct an oral enquiry into the charges. Simultaneously by proceeding R.C. No. 00579/95/K4, dated 1 June 1995, the respondent suspended him from service pending enquiry unto the charges. It is the said order of suspension, which was challenged in the writ petition, out of which, the present with appeal arises. 3. The writ petition was dismissed by learned counsel single Judge of this Court by taking note of the various allegations made in the counter-affidavit by the respondent, regarding the nature of the position held by the appellant in Madras. Learned single Judge held that the order of suspension was not unreasonable or arbitrary. 3. The writ petition was dismissed by learned counsel single Judge of this Court by taking note of the various allegations made in the counter-affidavit by the respondent, regarding the nature of the position held by the appellant in Madras. Learned single Judge held that the order of suspension was not unreasonable or arbitrary. He directed the enquiry to be completed as expeditiously as possible and observed that if the enquiry is not completed within a period of four months from the date of the order passed in the writ petition, the employer shall review the order of suspension and consider revoking the same. It is against the said order, dated 21 July 1995, the present writ appeal is filed. 4. This writ appeal, has to be allowed on a very short ground. We find that regulation 14(4) of the relevant Regulations provides that the employees may be placed under suspension pending enquiry on grave charges, where such suspension is necessary in the interest of the Corporation or for facilitating enquiry into charges and that the reasons for such suspension should be recorded in detail. (emphasis is ours). The order, dated 1 June 1995, suspending the appellant reads in so far as it is relevant as follows : "Whereas grave charges have been framed against Shri R.Shanmughan, Superintendent, I.A. Head Office, in the charge memo second cited above. 2. And whereas an enquiry into the grave charges framed in the chargememo second read above is pending. 3. And whereas in the circumstances of the case, it is necessary in the public interest to place the said Shri. R. Shanmugham, Superintendent, I.A. Head Office, under suspension from service. 4. Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred under Regulation 14(4) of the Tamil Nadu Warehousing Corporation General and Staff Regulations, 1965, the said Sri R. Shanmugham, Superintendent, I.A. Head Office is placed under ad interim suspension with immediate effect" * . 5. There is no reason given in the said order, except to state that the suspension is necessary in the public interest. The regulation contemplates "specific reasons" being recorded in the order of suspension. 5. There is no reason given in the said order, except to state that the suspension is necessary in the public interest. The regulation contemplates "specific reasons" being recorded in the order of suspension. Further in this case, the fact that the appellant was suspended earlier and the order placing him under suspension, was revoked inspite of the same having been confirmed by this Court in Writ Petition No. 939 of 1994, dated 21 April 1994 is of great significance to be taken into consideration before passing the second order of suspension on 1 June 1995. The concerned authority must have read the Regulation 14(4) of the regulations in the light of the facts and circumstances of the case which prevailed when the second order of suspension was passed. 6. The Supreme Court has considered the scope of order of suspension during the enquiry pendency in State of Orissa v. Bimal Kumar Mohanty, 1994 I C.L.R. 615 and settled the law thus, in para 13 at page 619 : "It is thus settled law that normally when an appointing authority or the disciplinary authority seeks to suspend an employee, pending investigation into grave charges of misconduct or defalcation of funds or serious acts of omission and commission, the order of suspension would be passed after taking into consideration the gravity of the misconduct sought to be inquired into or investigated and the nature of the evidence placed before the appointing authority and on application of the mind by disciplinary authority. The appointing authority or disciplinary authority should consider the above aspects and decide whether it is expedient to keep an employee under suspension pending aforesaid action. It would not be as an administrative routine or an automatic order to suspend an employee. It should be on consideration of the gravity of the alleged misconduct or the nature of the allegations imputed to the delinquent employee. The Court or the Tribunal must consider each case on its own facts and no general law could be laid down in that behalf. Suspension is not a punishment but is only one of forbidding or disabling an employee discharging the duties of office or post held by him. The Court or the Tribunal must consider each case on its own facts and no general law could be laid down in that behalf. Suspension is not a punishment but is only one of forbidding or disabling an employee discharging the duties of office or post held by him. In other word, it is to restrain him for availing further opportunity to perpetrate the alleged misconduct or to remove the impression among the members of service that dereliction of duty would bear fruits and the offending employee could get away even pending enquiry without any impediment or to prevent an opportunity to the delinquent officer to scuttle the enquiry or investigation or to win over the witnesses or the delinquent having had the opportunity in office in impede the progress of the investigation or enquiry, etc. But as stated earlier, each case must be considered depending on the nature of the allegations, gravity of the situation and the indelible impact it creates on the service, for the continuance of the delinquent employee in service pending enquiry or contemplated enquiry or investigation. It would be another thing if the action is actuated by mala fides, arbitrary or for ulterior purpose. The suspension must be a step in aid to the ultimate result of the investigation or enquiry. The authority also should keep in mind public interest of the impact of the delinquent's continuance in office while facing departmental enquiry or trial of a criminal charge" * . 7. The test prescribed by the Supreme Court in the above decision had not at all been kept in mind by the authority in this case nor has it been satisfied on record by the said authority. In the circumstances, we have no hesitation to hold that the second order of suspension, dated 1 June 1995 passed in R.C. 00579/95/K4 is unsustainable in law and the same is liable to be quashed. Consequently, the said order is quashed. We make it clear that this judgment of ours will not in any manner affect the enquiry against the petitioner/appellant initiated by the respondent. The said enquiry can be continued and completed in accordance with law and on the basis of the charges framed. 8. In the result, this writ appeal is allowed and the writ petition is ordered as prayed for. In view of the disposal of the writ appeal. The said enquiry can be continued and completed in accordance with law and on the basis of the charges framed. 8. In the result, this writ appeal is allowed and the writ petition is ordered as prayed for. In view of the disposal of the writ appeal. Civil Miscellaneous Petition No. 11061 of 1995 also is dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs.