JUDGMENT 1. - The instant misc. appeal is directed against the order dated 27.5.1995 passed by learned Additional District and Sessions Judge No. 1, Udaipur in Original Civil Suit No. 104 of 1995. 2. In nutshell the brief facts necessary to be noticed for disposal of the present misc. appeal are that the plaintiff-respondent Laxman Das filed a suit for ejectment and arrears of rent against the defendant-appellant on the ground of default in payment of rent and also on the reasonable and bonafide necessity. 3. According to the plaintiff-respondent the defendant-appellant has not paid rent from October, 1989 uptil date and he required the shop in question for his son Sunil Kumar who was alleged to be unemployed. The plaintiff- respondent also offered an alternative shop to the defendant-appellant in the second floor of his building where according to him the business of photography could be run effectively. 4. The defendant-appellant filed a detailed written statement denying the plaint allegation and took the plea that the shop in question was in the ownership of Jeewan Das Sindhi, father of the plaintiff-respondent, who let out the shop in question to late Shri Dayalal, real brother of defendant- appellant who was doing business of photography alongwith him. After death of his brother the defendant-appellant is continuing the business of photography in the shop in question. 5. The defendant-appellant also filed a counter-claim in the suit stating therein that initially the shop in question was let out on basic rent of Rs. 107/- per month by late Jeewan Das Sindhi, father of plaintiff-respondent to his late brother Dayalal. Thereafter its rent was enhanced from Rs. 107/- to Rs. 119/- per month in the year 1969. Again its rent was enhanced in the year 1975. According to the defendant-appellant his brother Dayalal expired on 23.1.1994 and the plaintiff refused to accept rent from him. 6. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances the defendant-appellant was compelled to deposit the rent in Court and there was again an agreement between the plaintiff-respondent and the defendant-appellant to pay rent from 1.10.1974 to 30.7.1975 @ Rs. 190/- per month. The plaintiff-respondent was again not satisfied with the monthly rent of Rs. 190/- per month and pressurised him to pay the rent @ Rs. 340/- per month. Now according to the defendant-appellant the plaintiff-respondent is pressurising him to pay the rent @ Rs. 190/- per month. The plaintiff-respondent was again not satisfied with the monthly rent of Rs. 190/- per month and pressurised him to pay the rent @ Rs. 340/- per month. Now according to the defendant-appellant the plaintiff-respondent is pressurising him to pay the rent @ Rs. 1,000/- per month and on his failure to pay the aforesaid excessive rent, the present suit has been filed. 7. The defendant-appellant in his counter-claim prayed that the standard rent under Section 6 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (in short 'the Act No. 17 of 1950') may be fixed. According to the defendant-appellant the basic rent in the present case is Rs. 107/- per month and the rent claimed @ Rs. 340/- per month has been raised under pressure and duress which cannot said to be lawful within the meaning of the Act No. 17 of the 1950. The defendant-appellant further prayed that the provisional rent of Rs. 107/- per month may be fixed under Section 7(1) of Act No. 17 of 1950 taking into consideration cumulative effect of the mandatory provisions contained under Section 13(3) of the said Act. 8. The learned trial Court in utter disregard of the counter-claim of the defendant-appellant by its impugned order determined the provisional rent under Section 13(3) of the Act No. 17 of 1950 @ Rs. 340/- per month. Aggrieved against the impugned order of the learned trial Court the defendant-appellant has preferred this misc. appeal before this Court which is posted today before me for admission. 9. After service of show-cause notice on the plaintiff-respondent he is represented by his counsel Shri D.R. Bhandari. 10. With the consent of learned counsel for the parties instead of hearing arguments for admission and disposal of stay application I propose to decide the present misc. appeal on merits at admission stage in order to avoid long drawn litigation between the parties. 11. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the order impugned passed by the learned trial Court. 12. Shri Rajendra Vyas, learned counsel for the tenant defendant-appellant strenuously urged before me that the defendant-appellant has filed a counter- claim for fixation of the standard rent and had also taken a plea that the basic rent in the present case was Rs. 12. Shri Rajendra Vyas, learned counsel for the tenant defendant-appellant strenuously urged before me that the defendant-appellant has filed a counter- claim for fixation of the standard rent and had also taken a plea that the basic rent in the present case was Rs. 107/- per month on the first day of January, 1965 and as such the provisional rent ought to have been fixed in accordance with Section 7(1) of Act No. 17 of 1950 read with mandatory provisions contemplated under Section 13(3) of the aforesaid Act. 13. It is further urged before me by Shri Vyas that if the standard rent itself could not have exceeded more than Rs. 107/- per month hence there was no question of determining provisional rent @ Rs. 340/- per month by the learned trial Court. According to Shri Vyas the order impugned determining the provisional rent by the learned trial Court in utter disregard of counter-claim filed by the defendant-appellant @ Rs. 340/- per month is arbitrary, capricious and against the sound principle of law for determination of provisional rent as contemplated under Section 13(3) of the Act No. 17 of 1950. 14. In support of his aforesaid arguments the learned counsel for the defendant-appellant placed reliance on a decision rendered by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Central Bank of India v. Govind Narain reported in 1971 RLW 213 and on a decision rendered by learned Single Judge of this Court if the case of Niranjanlal v. Nemichand and others reported in 1987(1) WLN 109 . 15. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent Shri D.R. Bhandari vehemently urged that the suit for fixation of standard rent under Section 6 of the Act No. 17 of 1950 could be filed in lowest court of competent jurisdiction. According to Shri Bhandari in the present case the suit ought to have been filed before the learned Munsif and Judicial Magistrate. According to him the defendant-appellant in the present case has no authority in law either to take such a defence for fixation of stanard rent in his written statement or to file a counter-claim before the learned Additional District Judge before whom the suit for eviction was instituted on a different cause of action. According to him the defendant-appellant in the present case has no authority in law either to take such a defence for fixation of stanard rent in his written statement or to file a counter-claim before the learned Additional District Judge before whom the suit for eviction was instituted on a different cause of action. According to Shri Bhandari cause of action for fixation of standard rent cannot be mixed with the cause of action on the basis of which the suit for eviction and arrears of rent was filed before the learned trial Court. 16. The next contention of Shri Bhandari is that once the defendant-appellant admitted in his written statement that agreed rent was being paid from 1.2.1986 @ Rs. 340/- per month it cannot be reduced under section 13(3) of the Act No. 17 of 1950 either by taking such a defence of fixation of standard rent in his written statement or by filing a counter-claim challenging the agreed rent to be excessive within the meaning of Sections 6, 7 and 8 of the aforesaid Act. 17. Lastly, the learned counsel Shri Bhandari contended that as the defendant-appellant failed to file a suit under Section 6 of the said Act within six months from the date of agreed rent i.e. 1.2.1986 @ Rs. 340/- per month such determination of standard rent is barred by lapse of time. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent supported the impugned order passed by the learned trial Court determining the provisional rent under section 13(3) of the Act No. 17 of 1950. 18. A close scrutiny of the impugned order leads towards an irresistible conclusion that the order impugned is a laconic and cryptic order which has been passed in utter ignorance of the counter-claim filed by the defendant- appellant. In the order impugned nowhere it is mentioned that what was the case of the plaintiff-respondent and what was the defence taken by the defendant-appellant in his written statement. Nowhere it is mentioned that what was the argument advanced before the learned trial Court by the learned court for the plaintiff-respondent and nowhere it is mentioned that what was the reply given by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the defendant- appellant. 19. Nowhere it is mentioned that what was the argument advanced before the learned trial Court by the learned court for the plaintiff-respondent and nowhere it is mentioned that what was the reply given by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the defendant- appellant. 19. The learned trial Court has not given any reason or discussed any evidence whatsoever which has persuaded him to believe that the claim of the plaintiff-respondent for provisional determination of rent should be @ 340/- per month. It is also apparent on the face of the impugned order that the learned trial Court has given no reason or discussed any evidence which has persuaded him to reject the claim of the defendant-appellant to determine the provisional rent @ 107/- per month which was claimed by him to be the basic rent of the disputed premises in the present case. 20. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances a perusal of the impugned order throws a flood of light that before this Court the defendant- appellant is deprived to demonstrate that the reasons and evidence which persuaded the learned trial court to reject his claim are erroneous. In the present case the learned trial Court arbitrarily, without giving any reason and without discussing any evidence provisionally determined the rent @ 340/- per month ignoring the counter-claim of the defendant-appellant as well as the mandatory provisions contemplated under the Act No. 17 of 1950. I record my serious disapproval about the manner in which that learned trial Court has provisionally determined the rent between the parties in utter disregard of the counter-claim filed by the defendant-appellant. 21. Since the provisional determination of rent under Section 13(3) of the Act No. 17 of 1950 is a very important and a vital issue between landlord and tenant having serious repercussion on their rights and liabilities, therefore, such vital issues are to be decided by courts of law after application of its judicial mind on the basis of material available on record. 22. It is well to remember that in judicial discipline those who are vested with judicial powers are expected to give reasons and to discuss evidence or material in support of its conclusion. The reasons are link to the conclusions which indicate about application of mind to the facts and circumstances of the case together with law point or points with reference to the material on record. The reasons are link to the conclusions which indicate about application of mind to the facts and circumstances of the case together with law point or points with reference to the material on record. 23. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances this Court insists upon disclosure of reasons, materials or evidence in support of conclusions arrived at by civil courts on five grounds. Firstly, if the reasons and discussion of evidence or material in support of conclusions are given by the civil Court then an aggrieved party in a proceeding before a higher court where such impugned order is amenable to an appeal or a revision may have an opportunity to demonstrate that the reasons, evidences or materials which persuaded the court to reject his case were erroneous or non-existent. Secondly, the obligation to record reasons and discussion of evidence and materials operate as a deterrent against possible arbitrary decisions. Thirdly, a laconic and cryptic order run counter to the settled principles of law evolved by courts from time immemorial that justice should not only be done but it must appears to others that it has been done between the parties. Fourthly, the reasons and discussion of evidences or materials in support of conclusions are one of the most important component of principle of natural justice and fair play and lastly the disclosure of reasons and discussions of evidence or materials in support of conclusions are helpful to keep the scale of justice even and indicate towards the fair and neutral attitude of the court which is a fundamental principle of administration of justice. 24. Although the aforesaid grounds are sufficient to set aside the order impugned but having regard to the nature of the obscure questions frequently raised before this Court I propose to decide these questions raised at the bar threadbare on merit. 25. 24. Although the aforesaid grounds are sufficient to set aside the order impugned but having regard to the nature of the obscure questions frequently raised before this Court I propose to decide these questions raised at the bar threadbare on merit. 25. Having regard to the rival contentions raised at the bar before this court the following questions are formulated for further determination in the light of the mandatory provisions contained under the Act No. 17 of 1950:- "(1) Whether in a suit filed by the landlord for eviction and arrears of rent the tenant can be permitted to raise a controversy that the rent agreed upon is in excess of standard rent by way of filing his defence in his written statement or by filing a counter claim or the tenant is bound to file a suit under section 6 of the said Act for fixation of the standard rent after paying the requisite court fee ? (2) Whether it is incumbent upon the court while provisionally determining the rent under section 13(3) of Act No. 17 of 1950 to look into the last paid agreed rent alone or it is also required to look into the cumulative effect of the mandatory provisions contemplated under sections 3(b) (iv), 3(vii) (b), 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 and 11 of the aforesaid Act ? (3) What should be the correct interpretation of phraseology used under section 13(3) of Act No. 17 of 1950 to the effect that such amount shall be calculated at the rate at which it was last paid or was payable for the period for which the tenant may have made default including the period subsequent thereto ? (4) Whether if a tenant failed to file a suit under section 6 of Act No. 17 of 1950 within six months from the date of agreed rent then within the meaning of Section 5 and Section 6(5) of the said Act the claim of tenant for determination of standard rent would be barred by time ?" 26. Now I consider it expedient to take the aforementioned questions formulated by me in seriatim.Question No. 1: 27. In the present case this Court is called upon to interpret Sections 3(b) (iv), 3(vii) (b), 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 13(3) and 28 of Act No. 17 of 1950. Now I consider it expedient to take the aforementioned questions formulated by me in seriatim.Question No. 1: 27. In the present case this Court is called upon to interpret Sections 3(b) (iv), 3(vii) (b), 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 13(3) and 28 of Act No. 17 of 1950. For proper decision of not only the question No. 1 but for proper decision of other questions formulated above I would like to have a glance of the aforesaid relevant provisions of Act No. 17 of 1950. 28. In the present case the tenant defendant-appellant has specifically stated that the shop in question was in the ownership of late Shri Jeewan Das Sindhi, father of plaintiff-respondent, who let out the shop to late Shri Dayalal, brother of defendant-appellant and he alongwith his brother late Dayalal was doing the business of photography which is still in continuance. Thus in the present case for extending the benefit of basic rent @ Rs. 107/- per month the mandatory provisions as contemplated under section 3(vii) (b) are required to be kept in view which clearly provides that in the event of death of a person as is referred to in sub-clause (a) his surviving spouse, son, daughter and other heir in accordance with the personal law applicable to him who had been, in the case of premises leased out for residential purposes, ordinarily residing and in the case of premises leased out for commercial or business purposes, ordinarily carrying on business with him in such premises as member of his family up to his death is relevant. 29. In the present case in order to get the benefit of Section 3(vii)(b) of Act No. 17 of 1950 a foundation has been led by the defendant-appellant in his written statement as well as in his counter-claim stating therein to the effect that late Jeewan Das Sindhi, father of plaintiff-respondent, let out the shop to late Dayalal, brother of defendant-appellant at the rate of Rs. 107/- per month as basic rent and he was doing business of photography with his late brother Dayalal which is still continuing is sufficient which required to be decided on merits. 30. 107/- per month as basic rent and he was doing business of photography with his late brother Dayalal which is still continuing is sufficient which required to be decided on merits. 30. Section 3(b)(v) of the aforesaid Act defines 'standard rent' which means the rent therefor determined in accordance with the provisions of this Act while Section 5 of the aforesaid Act further provides that the rent payable for any premises situated within the areas to which this Act extends for the time being shall, subject to the other provisions thereof, be ordinarily such, as may be agreed upon between the landlord and the tenant. 31. Section 6(1) of Act No. 17 of 1950 provides that where no rent has been agreed upon or where for any reason the rent agreed upon is claimed to be below or excessive, the landlord or the tenant may institute a suit in the lowest Court of competent jurisdiction for fixation of standard rent for any premises. Upon institution of such suit the court shall after holding such summary enquiry as it may consider just and necessary, determine the standard rent for such premises and shall in doing so act according to the principles enumerated under section 6(2) (a) and (b) of the aforesaid Act. 32. Sub-section 2(a) of Section 6 of the Act No. 17 of 1950 contemplates that where the premises are let for residential purposes or for any of the purposes of a public hospital, aushadhalaya or dawakhana, a recognised educational institution, a public library or reading room or any orphanage, the standard rent shall not exceed the basic rent increased by 50% thereof while sub- section 2(b) of Section 6 of the aforesaid Act provides that where the premises are let for any other purpose, the standard rent shall not exceed two and a half times the basic rent thereof provided that where the premises have been first let after the first day of January 1965 the standard rent shall not exceed the basic rent thereof. 33. 33. The basic rent contemplated under sub-section (2) (a) and (b) is explained by way of explanation added to aforesaid Section 6 that for the purposes of this sub-section, the basic rent of any premises shall mean, the rent at which the premises were let on the first day of January 1962 and, if not let on that day, the rent at which they were first let after that day. 34. Sub-section (5) of Section 6 of the aforesaid Act further provides that in every case in which the Court determines the standard rent of any premises under this section it shall appoint a date from which the standard rent so determined shall be deemed to have effect. The proviso of aforesaid sub- section also contemplates that such date shall, in the case of a tenant who institutes a suit under this section after the expiration of six months from the commencement of his tenancy on the ground of the rent agreed upon being excessive, be the date of the institution of such suit or such later date as the Court may in the circumstances of the case deem reasonable. 35. A bare perusal of section 7 of the aforesaid Act further contemplates that upon the institution of a suit under Section 6, the Court shall forthwith make an order fixing in a summary manner a provisional rent for the premises in question, which shall be binding on all parties concerned and shall remain in force till decree fixing the standard rent therefor is finally made in such suit. Rest of the provisions of Section 7 of the aforesaid Act are not relevant for the present decision of the case, therefore, not necessary to dwell upon the same. 36. Section 8 of the aforesaid Act further contemplates non-liability to pay in excess of standard rent by a tenant to landlord. The mandatory provisions contemplated under Section 8(2) of the aforesaid Act is reproduced below:- "8(2) Any agreement for the payment of rent as such in excess of the standard rent shall be null and void and shall be construed as if it were an agreement for payment of the standard rent only." 37. The mandatory provisions contemplated under Section 8(2) of the aforesaid Act is reproduced below:- "8(2) Any agreement for the payment of rent as such in excess of the standard rent shall be null and void and shall be construed as if it were an agreement for payment of the standard rent only." 37. Section 10 of the aforesaid Act enumerates the circumstances under which standard rent is liable to be increased on the basis of any improvement of structural alteration of the premises not being expenditure on decoration, maintenance or normal repairs, and such expenditure has not been taken into account in determining the standard rent of the premises then in such a situation the landlord may increase the rent by an amount which shall secure him a return of income not exceeding seven and half per cent per annum on such expenditure. Section 11 of the said Act provides a procedure for increase in rent. 38. In the instant case the basic question would be as to whether while deciding the provisional rent under section 13(3) of Act No. 17 of 1950 the courts are also required to take into account the cumulative effect of Sections 3(b) (iv), 3(vii) (b), 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 and 11 of the aforesaid Act. It would be expedient to reproduce the Section 13(3) of the aforesaid Act as under:- "13(3) In a suit for eviction on the ground set forth in clause (a) of sub-section (1); with or without any of the other grounds referred to in that sub-section, the court shall, on the first date of hearing or on any other date as the court may fix in this behalf while shall not be more than three months, after filing of the written statement and shall be before the framing of the issue, after hearing the parties and on the basis of material on record provisionally determine the amount of rent to be deposited in Court or paid to the landlord by the tenant. Such amount shall be calculated at the rate of rent at which it was last paid or was payable for the period for which the tenant may have made default including the period subsequent thereto up to the end of the month previous to that in which such determination is made together with interest on such amount calculated at the rare of six per cent per annum from the date when any such amount was payable up to the date of determination; provided that while determining the amount under this sub-section, the Court shall not take into account the amount of rent which was barred by limitation on the date of the filing of the suit." 39. As regard the decision on the first question the same question arose before a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Central Bank of India (supra) where a Divisional Bench of this Court on a review of the decision cited at the bar and on considerations of the true scope and implications of the various provisions of Act No. 17 of 1950 ruled in paras 30 and 32 which read thus:- "(30) xxx xxx xxx xxx The words "determination of rent" and the "fixation of rent" cannot be treated as synonyms of each other. Section 3(b)(vi) by itself cannot necessarily imply that the determination of the standard rent can be sought only in a suit for fixation of the standard rent. It does not exclude the other modes whereby the standard rent can be determined apart from its fixation by way of a suit under Section 6 of the Act." xxx xxx xxx xxx "(32) xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx We are of the view that remedy by way a suit for the fixation of the standard rent is not the only mode for the determination of the standard rent and the standard rent can as well be determined in a suit of a landlord against a tenant on a plea of the defendant as to the validity of the agreement on the principle relevant for the determination of the standard rent." 40. The aforesaid decision rendered by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Central Bank of India (supra) clearly ruled that a plea for determination of standard rent under section 3(b) (vi) of Act No. 17 of 1950 is not synonyms with the expression 'fixation of standard rent' used under section 6 of the said Act hence in a suit filed by landlord a tenant can be permitted to raise a plea in his defence in his written statement challenging the validity of the agreed rent on the principle relevant for determination of standard rent. I respectfully concur with the decision taken by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Central Bank of India (supra). 41. Apart from the reasons given by the Division Bench of this Court in the aforesaid case I would like to add few lines of my own which would go a long way to prove that in a suit for eviction and arrears of rent filed by the landlord against a tenant such tenant can be permitted to raise a controversy that the rent agreed upon is in excess of the standard rent by way of filing his defence in written statement or by filing a counter claim. 42. A bare perusal of Section 28 of Act No. 17 of 1950 clearly provides that the provisions of this Act shall be in addition to, and not derogatory of, any other law on the subject for the time being in force in the whole or any part of Rajasthan. The aforesaid section 28 of Act No. 17 of 1950 leads towards as irresistible conclusion that the provision for filing counter-claim by a defendant as contemplated under Order 8 Rules 6-A, 6-B and 6-C of CPC together with other provisions of CPC are attracted to a suit or a proceeding filed or initiated by the landlord against a tenant and an argument contrary to it is not tenable. 43. As an abundant caution I would like to make it clear that although a defendant can raise a plea of determination of standard rent by way of his defence in his written statement but it would be just and fair if such claims are raised by tenants by filing a counter-claim and paying the Court fee as contemplated under CPC. As an abundant caution I would like to make it clear that although a defendant can raise a plea of determination of standard rent by way of his defence in his written statement but it would be just and fair if such claims are raised by tenants by filing a counter-claim and paying the Court fee as contemplated under CPC. In my considered opinion if a counter-claim is filed then the plaintiff-landlord will have an opportunity to file a replication to the counter-claim and the attention of the parties can be properly focussed to the facts at which both of them are at variance giving them opportunity to substantiate their claim by adducing proper evidence. 44. As a result of the aforementioned discussion my answer to the first part of the question is in affirmative and in my considered opinion where a suit is filed by landlord for eviction and arrears of rent the tenant can be permitted to raise a controversy that the rent agreed upon is in excess of the standard rent by way of filing his defence in his written statement or by filing a counter claim. I am further of the opinion that the mandatory provisions discussed above do not exclude the other modes whereby the standard rent can be determined by a court apart from its fixation by way of instituting a suit under Section 6 of the said Act as argued by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent Shri D.R. Bhandari. The contention of the learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent to the effect that a tenant is bound to file a suit under section 6 of the said Act for fixation of the standard rent after paying the requisite court fee is only a mode whereby the standard rent can be determined is not tenable and it is hereby repelled. All of us know that even in counter-claims proper court fees are paid by the defendants. At the risk of repetition it is made clear that the expression 'fixation of standard rent' used under section 6 of Act No. 17 of 1950 is not synonyms with the expression 'determination of standard rent', used under section 3(b) (vi) of the said Act.Question No. 2: 45. A part of the aforesaid question arose before a learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Niranjanlal (supra). A part of the aforesaid question arose before a learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Niranjanlal (supra). The learned Single Judge in the aforesaid case ruled in para 10 of the judgment which is reproduced below for ready reference:- "10 xxxxx xxxx xxxxx xxxxx In such circumstances the Court should apply its mind by taking into consideration cumulatively the provisions of Section 13(3) as well as Section 7 for fixing the provisional rent. In such kind of case it is not incumbent upon the court to fix the provisional rent on the basis of principle of agreed rent alone as contemplated under Section 13(3) of the Act. The Court in such kind of case should also take into consideration the provision of Section 7 of the Act before determining the provisional rent. After considering both the provisions the court should determine such provisional rent which may be fair and just in the facts and circumstances of that case." 46. I express my respectful agreement with the pith and substance of the ratio decidendi laid down by the learned Single Judge in the case of Niranjanlal (supra) to the effect that it is not incumbent upon the court to fix the provisional rent on the basis of agreed rent alone. I further respectfully concur with the view expressed by the learned Single Judge in the case of Niranjanlal (supra) to the effect that while a court determining provisional rent under section 13(3) of the Act No. 17 of 1950 it is required to apply its mind by taking into consideration cumulative effect of provisions of Section 7 as well as section 13(3) of the said Act. But I am not able to subscribe the view expressed by the learned Single Judge that such provisional determination of rent will be ultimately subject to the final fixation of standard rent by a Court under section 6 of the said Act. 47. In fact the decision rendered by a Division Bench of this Court in case of Central Bank of India (supra) was not brought to the notice of learned Single Judge which specifically ruled that 'determination of rent' and 'fixation of rent' cannot be treated as synonyms of each other. 47. In fact the decision rendered by a Division Bench of this Court in case of Central Bank of India (supra) was not brought to the notice of learned Single Judge which specifically ruled that 'determination of rent' and 'fixation of rent' cannot be treated as synonyms of each other. The aforesaid decision of learned Single Judge run counter to the ratio of decision rendered by Division Bench of this Court in case of Central Bank of India (supra) which propounded a law to the effect that the provisions of Section 3(b) (v) of Act No. 17 of 1950 by itself cannot imply that the determination of standard rent can be sought only in a suit for fixation of the standard rent. The aforesaid provision does not exclude the other modes whereby the standard rent can be determined apart from its fixation by way of suit under Section 6 of the said Act. It is further ruled that standard rent can be determined in a suit of a landlord against a tenant on a plea of the defendant in his written statement as to the validity of the agreed rent on the principle relevant for the determination of the standard rent. 48. From the aforesaid discussion it is apparent that provisional determination of rent under section 13(3) of the Act No. 17 of 1950 would not be subject to the final fixation of standard rent by a Court under section 6 of the said Act but it would be subject to final decision of the counter- claim filed by a tenant challenging the last paid agreed rent to be excessive on principle relevant for determination of the standard rent. 49. In my considered opinion the provisions contained under Section 3(b) (vi) of Act No. 17 of 1950 defines what standard rent is while section 6 of the said Act provides for fixation of the standard rent by way of suit. Similarly a conjoint reading of Sections 3(vii) (b), 5, 6, 7 and 8 leads towards an irresistible conclusion that no landlord shall claim or receive any amount over and above the standard rent and any agreement for payment of rent in excess of the standard rent shall be null and void and shall be construed as if it were an agreement for the payment of standard rent only. 50. 50. It is true that standard rent is liable to be increased on the grounds enumerated under section 10 of Act No. 17 of 1950 and its enhancement depends on fulfilment of the procedure contemplated under section 11 of the said Act not otherwise. 51. My answer to question No. 2 is that it is incumbent upon the court while provisionally determining the rent under section 13(3) of the Act No. 17 of 1950 not only to look into the agreed last paid rent alone but it is also required to look into the cumulative effect of the mandatory provisions contemplated under sections 3(b) (vi), 3(vii) (b), 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 and 11 of the aforesaid Act and the Court should determine such provisional rent which may be fair and just in the facts and circumstances of a case.Question No. 3: 52. In order to appreciate the question No. 3 formulated by me it would be necessary to look at the two expressions used under section 13(3) of Act No. 17 of 1950 last paid' and 'payable' for the period for which the tenant may have made default including the period subsequent thereto. In my humble opinion the expression 'last paid' means the agreed last paid rent between the landlord and the tenant. Where a tenant has not taken a defence in his written statement that the agreed rent is excessive and is against the mandatory provisions contemplated under Act No. 17 of 1950 or he has not raised such a plea as stated above by way of filing a counter-claim then the court is required to determine the provisional rent under section 13(3) on the basis of agreed rent alone without making further enquiry. But the expression used under section 13(3) 'payable' would be pressed into service where the tenant either by taking a defence in his written statement alleging that the rent is excessive against the mandatory provisions contemplated under Act No. 17 of 1950 and claimed for determination of standard rent or by filing a counter claim prayed for determination of standard rent on the ground of breach of the mandatory provisions of the Act. In my considered opinion the expression 'payable' has reasonable nexus with the mandatory provisions contemplated under Sections 3(b) (vi), 3(vii) (b), 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 and 11 of the aforesaid Act. In my considered opinion the expression 'payable' has reasonable nexus with the mandatory provisions contemplated under Sections 3(b) (vi), 3(vii) (b), 5, 6, 7, 8, 10 and 11 of the aforesaid Act. Connotation of the expression 'paid' or 'payable' are not the same. 53. The expression 'paid' used under section 13(3) of Act No. 17 of 1950 means rent actually paid by a tenant to a landlord irrespective of the fact whether it is legally enforceable within the meaning of section 3(b) (vi), 3(vii) (b), 5, 6, 8, 10 and 11 of the said Act or not. Thus the expression 'paid' under section 13(3) of the Act has no bearing whether a tenant is under statutory legal obligation to pay the same or not while the connotation of expression 'payable' used by State Legislature under the same section refers to that rent which is to be paid by a tenant to a landlord legally enforceable within the meaning of Sections 3(b) (vi), 3(vii) (b) 5, 6, 8, 10 and 11 of the Act. 54. The aforesaid interpretation of the expression 'payable' under section 13(3) of the Act would be in full consonance with the intention of the State Legislature which provides under section 8(2) of the Act that any agreement for the payment of rent in excess of the standard rent shall be null and void and shall be construed if its were an agreement for payment of standard rent only. 55. In my humble opinion any other interpretation of the expression 'payable' used under section 13(3) of the Act would make the mandatory provisions envisaged under section 8(2) of the Act redundant and the expression 'payable' would become superfluous which is not permissible under the Rule of interpretation of a statute. 56. There is yet another reason to arrive at the aforesaid conclusion that Act No. 17 of 1950 is a beneficial piece of legislation made in favour of tenants to protect the tenants from unfair agreements even though they have been voluntarily agreed upon and even if there may be no element under the general law invalidating such agreements even then the tenants are entitled to claim protection against such agreed rent in excess of standard rent as envisaged under sections 6, 7 and 8 of the aforesaid Act. In my humble opinion it will be hardly in keeping with the aim and object of Act No. 17 of 1950 if the rights guaranteed by State legislature for protection of tenants under Sections 6, 7 and 8 are allowed to be extinguished merely on the failure of the tenant to file a suit as required under section 6 of the said Act. The landlords cannot be allowed to increase the rent in any other manner except as contemplated under sections 10 and 11 of the Act otherwise the protection granted to the tenants by State Legislature prohibiting increase in rent beyond certain limit would become illusory. In fact a tenant is entitled to seek the protective umbrella of the mandatory provisions contemplated under the Act by taking a defence in his written statement or by filing a counter- claim in the suit itself. A court cannot be allowed to provisionally determine rent under Section 13(3) of the Act against the mandate of State Legislature to compel a tenant to pay rent in excess of standard rent which is not permissible within the framework of the Act No. 17 of 1950.Question No. 4: 57. For effective decision of the question No. 4 a conjoint reading of Sections 5 and 6(5) reveals that the rent payable for any premises situated within the areas to which this Act extends for the time being shall subject to the other provisions thereof be ordinarily such as may be agreed upon between the landlord and the tenant. Therefore, according to section 5 ordinarily agreed rent between the landlord and the tenant are payable subject to other provisions of the Act No. 17 of 1950. 58. Now under Section 6(5) it is provided that in every case in which the court determines the standard rent of any premises under this section it shall appoint a date from which the standard rent so determined shall be deemed to have effect. Thus after determination of the standard rent by the court it depends upon the discretion of the Court to appoint a date from which the standard rent so determined shall be deemed to have effect. 59. Thus after determination of the standard rent by the court it depends upon the discretion of the Court to appoint a date from which the standard rent so determined shall be deemed to have effect. 59. From the reading of Section 6(5) of the said Act the question of limitation does not arise and after determination of the rent the Court is at liberty to appoint a date from which the standard rent shall be deemed to have effect. But the proviso added to Section 6(5) indicates that such date shall in the case of tenant who institutes a suit under this section after the expiration of six months from the commencement of his tenancy on the ground of rent agreed upon being excessive be the date of the institution of such suit or such later date as the court may in circumstances of the case deem reasonable. Even according to the proviso the expiry of six months from the commencement of tenancy on the ground of rent agreed upon between the landlord and the tenant being excessive although can be computed from the date of the institution of such suit yet it is not final and the court is at liberty even in accordance with the proviso to appoint such later date as the court may in the circumstances of the case deem reasonable. 60. In the facts and circumstances of the present case and the cases of similar nature where suit for eviction and arrears of rent is filed against a tenant and he raised a defence in his written statement about determination of the standard rent showing the agreed rent to be excessive against the mandatory provisions of Act No. 17 of 1950 or by filing a counter claim on the aforesaid grounds the date of expiry of six months is to be computed from the date when a defence is put in by the defendant in his written statement or from the date when a counter-claim is filed before the Court. 61. In this regard in my humble opinion a proviso cannot be permitted by construction to defeat the basic intent expressed in substantive provisions of Section 6(5) of the aforesaid Act. 61. In this regard in my humble opinion a proviso cannot be permitted by construction to defeat the basic intent expressed in substantive provisions of Section 6(5) of the aforesaid Act. The proviso is something subordinate to the main clause and generally what is contained in the proviso is not to be imported by implication into the main clause of Section 6(5) of Act No. 17 of 1950. 62. Keeping in view the aforesaid principle of rule of interpretation of a proviso of Section 6(5) of the Act I am of the opinion that merely after expiry of six months limitation from the commencement of his tenancy on the ground of the rent agreed upon being excessive a tenant cannot be non-suited as argued by the learned counsel for the respondent. Under sub-section (5) of Section 6 as well as proviso added to the said section it is left open by the State Legislature upon the discretion of a court to appoint a date from which the standard rent so determined shall be deemed to have effect irrespective of expiration of six months from the commencement of his tenancy on the ground of rent agreed upon is claimed to be excessive. Discretion of the Court in appointing a date from which the standard rent so determined shall be deemed to have effect irrespective of expiration of six months from the commencement of his tenancy on the ground of rent agreed which is claimed to be excessive is required to be exercised judicially keeping in view the aim and object of Act No. 17 of 1950 treating it a beneficial piece of legislation as discussed in para 56 of this judgment. 63. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances my answer to question No. 4 is in negative and the argument of the learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent to the effect that the claim put forth by the tenant- defendant-appellant for determination of standard rent alleging agreed rent to be excessive and also against the mandatory provisions of Act No. 17 of 1950 is barred by lapse of time since he failed to file his counter-claim before expiry of six months from the date of agreed rent i.e. 1.2.1986 is not acceptable to me. The present argument has been raised by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent merely to be rejected hence it is hereby rejected. 64. The present argument has been raised by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent merely to be rejected hence it is hereby rejected. 64. In abundant caution it is specifically held that the question No. 4 has no bearing on merit at the time of provisional determination of rent under section 13(3) of Act No. 17 of 1950 but it assumes importance at the time of the final determination of standard rent while finally deciding the defence taken by a tenant in his written statement or while deciding his counter-claim at the stage of final disposal of the suit itself.As a result of the aforementioned discussion the order impugned dated 27.5.1995 passed by learned trial court is hereby set aside and the instant misc. appeal is allowed. The case is remanded to the learned District Judge, Udaipur to determine the provisional rent under section 13(3) of Act No. 17 of 1950 taking into consideration the cumulative effect of the mandatory provisions contemplated under Sections 3(b) (iv), 3(b) (vii), 5, 6, 8, 10 and 11 of the said Act in the light of the observations made in the body of the judgment either himself or transfer it for disposal in accordance with law to some other court of competent jurisdiction to decide the original civil suit No. 104/95 including application for provisional determination of rent under the Act other than the learned Additional District Judge No. 1, Udaipur.In the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case both the parties are directed to bear their own costs.After dictation of the judgment, the member of the Bar present in the Court made a request to make the judgment reportable. The request is allowed and the judgment is made reportable. *******