Judgment :- GOVARDHAN, J. 1. The applicant in his affidavit contends briefly as follows: The deponent is the Director of the applicant Company. The suit property originally belonged to one Elie alias Anunani wife of Dr. V.K. John and mother of the respondents 1 and 2. By a Will left by her, the first respondent inherited the same. She was in possession and occupation of the same. The Probate proceedings are pending. The second respondent is the executor of the will. They have entered into an agreement dated 18-9-1993 with the plain tiff for promotion of Flats in the suit property for a consideration of Rs. 2,75,00,000/-. The applicant has paid Rs. 41,51,000/- to the first respondent. Subsequently, the applicant and the respondents came to know that the extent of ground is less than the extent mentioned in the agreement. Yet, the applicant agreed to pay the entire consideration of Rs. 2,75,00,000/-. The applicant and the first respondent have applied to the appropriate Authority for “No objection” certificate. A Supplementary agreement dated 29-12-1993, was executed in which it was agreed that the applicant should be delivered vacant possession on or before 30-6-1994. The applicant has paid a sum of Rs. 1,06,000/- to Madras Purasawalkkam Janopakara Saswatha Nidhi in order to discharge a mortgage created by the respondents. The respondents are colluding together and have prevented the ‘Nidhi’ from releasing the title deeds to the applicant. The applicants were handed over possession of the vacant land on 16-2-1994. The respondent has not turned over the building to the applicant. The applicant if liable to pay the balance of sale consideration only after 18 months from the date of taking possession of the entire property. The first respondent failed to obtain an order of probate as agreed with the applicant. She had failed to deliver the encumbrance certificate also, to the applicant. The first respondent has set up the respondents 2 and 3 to defeat the right of the applicant. Even though a sum of Rs. 25,00,000/- alone is to be paid by the applicant, as advance, he has paid so far Rs. 41,51,000/- On 3-7-1995, some people attempted to take possession of the property by dispossessing the applicant using force. But, it was prevented by the intervention of the local people. Even though a sum of Rs. 25,00,000/- alone is to be paid by the applicant, as advance, he has paid so far Rs. 41,51,000/- On 3-7-1995, some people attempted to take possession of the property by dispossessing the applicant using force. But, it was prevented by the intervention of the local people. Hence the applicant in O.A. No. 874/1995 has sought for restraining the respondents, from interfering with the peaceful possession of the property by the applicant and O.A. No. 875/1995 to restrain the respondents from alienating the suit schedule property to third parties. 3. The first respondent filed a common counter contending as follows: The applicant has filed the suit to enforce the specific performance of the contract. The 3rd respondent has filed C.S. No. 423/1995 before this Court for partition of the suit schedule property and the same is pending. The third respondent has also filed a similar application for injunction and it is also pending enquiry. The Application is therefore not maintainable. The applicant has not filed any document to show that the respondents proposed to alienate the property. No injuction can be granted on a bald allegation. 4. The allegation that the first respondent had executed a supplementary agreement and she agreed to give vacant possession of the suit schedule property on or before 30-6-1994 is not true. The supplementary agreement itself is a forged one. The first respondent has not executed any supplementary agreement. The first respondent has given a police complaint against the applicant for committing forgery. The first respondent has not handed over vacant possession at any point of time. She has not made any endorsement confirming the transfer of possession. The applicant has not disclosed any date of taking over possession. The allegation that the first respondent attempted to dispossess the applicant by force is not true. The applicant is not in possession of any part of the property. Since no possession has been given, the question of part performance of the contract of sale does not arise. The applicant has not come to court with clean hands. The application is therefore liable to be dismissed. 5. The applicant is not in possession of any part of the property. Since no possession has been given, the question of part performance of the contract of sale does not arise. The applicant has not come to court with clean hands. The application is therefore liable to be dismissed. 5. The suit is for specific performance of an agreement dated 18-9-1993 and 29-12-1993 for directing the first respondent to obtain probate of the Will by which, she had inherited the suit schedule property and for directing the first respondent to hand over vacant possession of the building and register a sale deed in respect of the suit property in favour the plaintiff or his nominee. The plaintiff has filed three applications, one for restraining the respondents from interfering with their possession and enjoyment of the property, the second one for restraining the respondents from alienating the properties and third one is for mandatory injunction directing the first respondent to deliver vacant possession of the building in the suit property. The learned counsel appearing for the applicant in all these three applications has even at the outset made it clear that he is not arguing O.A. No. 873/1995 in which the relief sought for is mandatory injunction directing the first respondent to deliver vacant possession of the building to the applicant. Therefore, that application is not considered. 6. The learned counsel appearing for the applicant in these two applications viz., O.A. No. 874/1995 and O.A. No. 875/1995 would argue that the applicant has entered into an agreement of sale with the first respondent who claims title to the suit property by virtue of a Will executed in her favour by her mother, for a sum of Rs. 2,33,74,000/- and in pursuance of the said agreement, the applicant has paid Rs. 41 lakhs and odd and the agreement itself provides for details of the payment and there are endorsements to that effect. According to the learned counsel, the property when measured was found less in extent than the extent given in the agreement dated 18-9-1993 and therefore, a supplementary agreement was entered into between the parties on 29-12-1993 for the same consideration and the applicant was a willing party to this agreement even though it is deterimental to their interest and this supplementary agreement provided for delivery of possession of the property. According to the learned counsel appearing for the applicant in the agreement dated 18-9-1993, itself, an endorsement has been made at page 2, which would prove that the delivery was made on 16-12-1994 of a vacant plot, and it would go to show that in pursuance of the agreement of sale, part performance has been done. The learned counsel appearing for the applicant would argue that when the applicant has been delivered vacant possession of the plot and the applicant has also paid more than Rs. 41 lakhs, when the agreement provides for payment of advance of Rs. 25 lakhs only, the first respondent who claims tide under a Will is trying to avoid the agreement and she had not pursued the Probate proceedings and in collusion with the third respondent, is trying to defeat the rights of the plaintiff-applicant. The case of the first respondent is that she had not entered into any supplementary agreement with the applicant and it is a rank forgery and she had given a complaint against the applicant on that ground. The first respondent has also produced the copy of the F.I.R. in which she has alleged that the Managing Director of the applicant Company has forged her signature. This complaint is after the filing of the suit. Therefore, much credence need not be attached to this complaint dated 18-9-1995. 7. The applicant has filed copy of the application under Section 269 of the Income Tax Act which was given by the first respondent and the applicant jointly to the Appropriate. Authority in which it is specifically stated by them that among the document filed by them, is a supplemental sale agreement dated 29-12-1993. When the said application has been filed by the first respondent and the applicant jointly two days after the inspection of the site by the Appropriate Authority, enclosing the additional documents as information, we cannot give much credence to the contention of the first respondent that she was not a party to the supplemental agreement dated 29-12-1993. Whether the supplemental agreement dated 29-12-1993 is a forged one and the letter by the transferor and the transferee to the Appropriate Authority is a fabricated document are matters to be decided during the trial of the suit. Whether the supplemental agreement dated 29-12-1993 is a forged one and the letter by the transferor and the transferee to the Appropriate Authority is a fabricated document are matters to be decided during the trial of the suit. Suffice it for us to observe that prima facie , the joint application by the transferor as well as the transferee to the Appropriate Authority establishes that the agreement dated 29-12-1993 is a document brought by consensus between the parties. The learned counsel appearing for the applicant has stated that the Appropriate Authority has also given approval and the same is also recorded. As per the endorsement in the agreement dated 18-9-1993, delivery of possession has been made as agreed between the parties in the supplemental agreement dated 29-12-1993. The question that now arises for consideration is whether the applicant is entitled to the injunction prayed for in these two applications. 8. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents would argue that there is no evidence to prove the possession of the property by the applicant to consider whether the applicant is entitled to injunction or not. Admittedly, the site in question is a vacant plot. The possession is also said to have been delivered only recently, viz., 16-12-1994. Therefore we cannot expect any documentary evidence to prove the possession of the vacant site by the applicant. We have to rely upon the endorsement in the agreement dated 18-9-1993 for the said purpose. It has been held in the decision reported in Vijay Lalchand Huf & Another v. K.M. Lulls Huf (1995 T.L.N.J. 152) that in a suit for specific performance of an agreement of sale., where it is stated that the plaintiff has been put in possession pursuant to such agreement, the plaintiff can claim injunction not only from interfering with his possession but also injunction restraining the respondent from alienating the property pending final hearing of the suit. The Division Bench of our High Court has observed that if the defendant proceeds to alienate the property in any manner during the pendency of the suit, that will give rise to unnecessary complication and third partys rights will intervene and hence it is a fit case in which an injunction restraining the defendant from alienating the suit property in any manner during the pendency of the suit should be issued. Their Lordships have also observed that in the interests of justice, the plaintiffs were also not entitled to raise any construction on the disputed property till the disposal of the suit and there should be an injunction restraining the defendant from putting up any construction on the suit property. When we approach the case on hand, in the light ot the decision referred above, I am of opinion that the applicant is entitled to the injunction prayed for in both the applications, one restraining the respondents from interfering with his possession and the other restraining the respondent from alienating the property till the disposal of the suit. In the interests of justice, it is also observed that the plaintiff also shall not put up any construction in the suit property till the disposal of the suit. 9. In the result, O.A. Nos. 874/1995 and 875/1995 are allowed. Interim injunction is granted till the disposal of the suit.