Honble MADAN, J.– This appeal has been preferred against the order dated 30th October, 1995 passed by the learned Addl. District Judge No. 5, Jaipur City, Jaipur in Misc. Civil Application No. 2/95 by which the said application of the appellant-plaintiff for grant of ad- interim injunction in a suit for permanent injunction against the defendants was rejected. (2). The appellant-plaintiff filed a civil suit before the learned District Judge, Jaipur City, Jaipur, against the respondents which was later on transferred to the learned Addl. District Judge No. 5, Jaipur City, Jaipur. It was alleged in the suit that the appellant is a proprietorship firm and respondent No. 4 i.e. the wife of the appellant is the sole proprietor of the firm. The firm is engaged in the leather busi- ness having its registered office at New Delhi. It was further averred in the suit that respondent No. 1 is a private limited company while respondents No. 2 to 4 are its directors. It was further contended that on 10.1.94 under a lease agreement executed between the appellant and the respondents-defendants two machines were given on lease to the respondents for a period of one year. The monthly rent for user of the machines was fixed at Rs. 16,150/- which was about 1.9% of the price of the machines. The appellant got these machines transported from pondicherry and installed them in the factory premises of respondent No. 1 at Tonk. The appellant had to incur huge expenditure to the tune of Rs. 30,575/- as truck fare from Pondicherry to Delhi and Rs. 7060/- from Delhi to Tonk and Rs. 4696/- as octroi and other expenses. The duration of lease agreement was for a period of one year terminable on 9.1.1995. In, the memo of appeal it has been contended by the appellant that the respondent-company though started production and utilised the machines continuously during the lease period but it neither paid the lease money nor returned the machines as a result of which the appellant was put to great loss and disadvantage. It has been further contended that after the expiry of the lease period i.e., 9.1.95, the appellant approached the respondents with a request for payment of lease money which was due and outstanding to the appellant and also requested them to return the machines but neither the lease money was paid nor the machines were returned. It has been further contended that after the expiry of the lease period i.e., 9.1.95, the appellant approached the respondents with a request for payment of lease money which was due and outstanding to the appellant and also requested them to return the machines but neither the lease money was paid nor the machines were returned. The appellant was consequently constrained to file a suit for permanent injunction in the Court of District Judge, Jaipur City, Jaipur in which the impugned order dt. 30.10.95 declining the relief of ad-interim injunction was passed against the appellants by the learned trial court. In the application for grant of interim injunction, an appellant-plaintiff had prayed for the issuance of appropriate directions from the trial court that the respondents be restrained from selling, alienating or transferring the machines in question or damaging the same pending the hearing and final disposal of the suit. (3). On 19.1.95 on an application of the plaintiff, the learned trial court appointed local commissioner to inspect the machines in question at the disputed site and report to the court accordingly. (4). By the said order the learned trial court further restrained the respondents-defendants from selling, alienating or damaging the machines in question till further orders. Subsequently vide its impugned order dated 30.10.95 the learned trial court dismissed the interim application of the plaintiff on the ground that since the machines in question are in possession of the respondents and therefore, no order could be given by the court to restore their possession since there was no change in the position which existed prior to the filing of the suit. (5). The perusal of the impugned order reveals that notwithstanding the observation of the trial court to the effect that a valid and a property lease agree- ment dt. 10.1.94 was duly executed between the parties and the defendants had admittedly used the machines in question on the basis of the aforesaid lease agreement-the period of which had also expired, yet it cannot be said that the plaintiff had succeeded in making out any prima-facie case on the basis of which any inference regarding balance of convenience or any likelihood of irreparable loss and damage could be drawn in his favour. The learned trial court has further observed that from the perusal of the report of local commissioner, it cannot be disputed that the machines in question were given on lease to the defendants but no presumption regarding their non-user or likely damage can be drawn notwithstanding the expiry of the lease agreement and hence since the plaintiff has failed to make out any prima-facie case, he is not entitled to any interim relief or protection and his application was consequently rejected by the learned trial court. (6). Being aggrieved by the impugned order of the learned trial court dated 30.10.95 this appeal has been preferred on the grounds inter-alia that the impugned order is contrary to law and facts apparent on the record; that the machines belong to the appellant and they were given on lease for a period of one year to the respondents and after the expiry of the period of lease, there was no justification to allow the respondents to continue with the user and possession of the machines for future period in absence of renewal of lease and since the respondents had neither paid the lease money nor they had returned machines after the expiry of the lease period. The appellant has further contended that a valuable right had accrued in his favour to take back the machines after the expiry of the lease period, and it is only on account of the attitude of respondents No. 1 to 3 that with a view to avoid any untoward incident the appellant had earlier approached the learned trial court by way of the injunction suit to restrain the respondents not to put any obstruction or create any hindrence in exercise of his rights. (7). During the course of hearing Shri Mukul Rohatgi, learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently contended at the bar that keeping in view the aforesaid circumstances, the agreement between the parties for user of the machines in question was for a period of one year only commencing with effect from 10.1.94 and during this period of lease the respondents committed breach of the agreement since neither lease money was paid nor the machines were returned back to the appellant. It was further contended by the learned counsel that after the expiry of the lease period the appellants were fully within their rights to take back the machines and were also entitled to a decree for a sum of Rs. 2,36,331/- excluding interest against the respondents. It was further contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that before passing any interim order the learned trial court has to take into consideration the salient aspects of the matter which are essential before an injunction order is passed i.e. the prima facie case, balance of convenience and grave and irreparable loss which may occasion to a party by declining the relief of injunction and since all these essential ingredients of the suit existed in the case, there was no justification for not confirming the earlier order dt. 19.1.95 by which the appellant was earlier protected and which stood vacated by the impunged order dt. 30.10.95. (8). It was further contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that since it was the admitted case of the parties that the machines in question were given on lease to the respondents by the appellant for a period of one year and the machines had admittedly been used by the respondents for promotion of their business and also keeping in view the fact that the respondents had failed to tender any evidence on the record by which they could establish payment of the lease money to the appellant, the appellant was within his rights to take back the machines since its further possession with the respondents was not permissible under law in view of the fact that the agreement had not been extended or renewed for any further period and the apprehension regarding their likely damage was not ruled out. On the question of prima facie case, it was contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that it was incumbent upon the trial court to have examined the lease agreement and should have also seen as to whether the respondents had paid any lease money for the user of the machines in question to the appellant and in view of this cause of the action had definitely accrued in favour of the appellant to file a suit and it was incumbent upon the trial court to have confirmed the interim order which was earlier passed by the court on 19.1.95 and which subsequently stood vacated by the impugned order dated. 30.10.95. (9). The learned counsel for the respondents has controverted the contentions advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant on the ground that there was neither any balance of convenience in favour of the appellant nor there was any question of grave and irreparable loss being caused to the appellant since the ma- chines were admittedly in use of the respondents on the basis of agreement duly executed between the parties and the machines are functioning in the business premises of the respondents and this situation does not lead to the conclusion that the agreement had not been acted upon. During the course of hearing, learned counsel for the respondents has neither disputed the vires of the agreement dated 10.1.94 which was duly executed and acted upon by the parties nor has been able to convince this Court regarding the safety measures which have been adopted by the respondents regarding machines in question. Learned counsel for the respondents has also not been able to show any evidence from the record regarding payment of lease money to the appellant. (10). I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and also examined the rival claims and contentions of the parties as well as the documents on the record. In my opinion since the agreement in question has not been disputed by the parties and which was duly acted upon by the respondents the learned trial court should not have vacated the earlier injunction order dt. 19.1.95 whereby the respondents were restrained from selling, alienating, transferring or damaging the machines in question till further orders. In my opinion since the agreement in question has not been disputed by the parties and which was duly acted upon by the respondents the learned trial court should not have vacated the earlier injunction order dt. 19.1.95 whereby the respondents were restrained from selling, alienating, transferring or damaging the machines in question till further orders. I am further of the opinion that the prima- facie case was fully made out by the plaintiff and also the balance of convenience was in favour of the appellant. I am further of the opinion that instead of declining the stay which was earlier granted to the appellant, the learned trial court should have given full opportunity to the parties to prove their case by leading their evidence which opportunity the appellant has been unjustly deprived of as a result of dismissal of the stay application. As a result of the impugned order the relief sought for by the plaintiff in the suit has consequently become infructuous, which procedure the trial court should not have adopted. My opinion is fortified from the observations of the trial court which are to the effect that ``it is evident that a transaction was held between the parties. The respondents have stated that they are not bound by the action of the plaintiffs. It cannot be assessed at this stage as to what relationship is there of respondent No. 4 with other respondents. It is a fact that machines of the applicant were taken on rent by the respondents and the tenure of lease has expired. It is clear from the reading of the documents. The respondents have also admitted that the machines are working at their place. (11). I am of the considered opinion that in view of the above observations it was incumbent upon the trial court to have confirmed the interim order pending the hearing and final disposal of the suit instead of dismissing the stay application since the trial court has specifically observed that since the factum of either the lease agreement in question or the user of the machines by the respondents has not been disputed on the basis of the relevant documents tendered on the record by the plaintiff. I am further of the opinion that the trial court having come to the conclusion that the machines were functioning at the business premises of the respondents and also that it is the fundamental principle of justice that status-quo should ordinarily not be disturbed during the pendency of the suit, the learned trial court should have extended sufficient opportunity to both the parties to prove their case by leading evidence in this regard. In my opinion the trial court has committed grave illegality by disturbing an order of status-quo which should have been continued pending the hearing and final disposal of the suit, as a result of which a reasonable apprehension has arisen to the appellant that there is every likelihood of the machines being damaged or destroyed by the respondents and it was not possible for the appellant at the preliminary stage to lead any other evidence in this regard except to show reasonable apprehension. (12). As a result of the above discussion, the Misc. Appeal is allowed. The impugned order dated 30.10.95 of learned A.D.J. No. 5, Jaipur City, Jaipur is quashed and set aside and the earlier order dated 19.1.95 of the learned trial court restraining the respondents from damaging selling alienating or transferring the machines in question till further orders is restored pending the final hearing and disposal of the suit. However, the appellant- plaintiff would be at liberty to move to the trial court for appointment of a local commissioner to inspect the present state and condition of the machines and for their protection and report to trial court accordingly and for such other directions which he may be deemed necessary in accordance with law. There will be no order as to costs. The record of the trial court be sent back immediately. (13). The trial court is directed to expeditiously deal with and decide the suit within a period of four months from the receipt of certified copy of this order.