Judgment : JAYARAMA CHOUTA, J. In these two petitions for habeas corpus, the petitioner is one and the same person, the points involved in both the matters are similar and hence we dispose of these cases by this single order. 2. In Habeas Corpus Petition No. 1328 of 1995, the prayer of the petitioner is to issue a writ of habeas corpus, directing the respondent. The Inspector of Police, Q Branch, Trichy, Trichy District, to produce the detenu-Periasamy and Senthilkumar before this Court and set them at liberty and pass such further or other orders as this Court may deem fit and proper. 3. In support of this petition, the petitioner one Thangamani, brother of detenu-Periasamy and friend of Senthilkumar has sworn to an affidavit, wherein he has stated that the two detenus have been falsely implicated with an offence under Secs.3(1), 4 and 5 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as ‘TADA ACT’ for short). Periasamy was arrested on 1. 1994 and Senthilkumar on 12. 1993 and both were remanded to custody from time to time by Designated Court at Coimbatore, The TADA ACT expired on 23.S.1995 and thereafter the case has been transferred to newly constituted Designated Court at Trichy on 26. 1995 and the said transfer was mala fide, illegal and without jurisdiction. He has further sworn that the respondent has to review the case as directed by the Supreme Court in Kortar Singh’s (1994)2 L.W. (Crl) 422 and no review has taken place. His next grievance was that constituting a court under dead law is malice in law and the detention in the hands of Designated Court at Trichy is illegal and violation of Art.21 of the Constitution of India. On these grounds, the petitioner has prayed to issue a writ of habeas carpus directing the respondent to produce the detenu Periasamy and Senthilkumar before the court and set them at liberty. 4. On these grounds, the petitioner has prayed to issue a writ of habeas carpus directing the respondent to produce the detenu Periasamy and Senthilkumar before the court and set them at liberty. 4. On behalf of the respondent, one K.Pattabiraman, Inspector of Police, Q Branch, C.I.D. Trichy, has filed a counter affidavit, in which he has sworn that the habeas corpus petition is not maintainable either in law or on the basis of the averments made and the contentions raised in the affidavit filed in support thereof, He has submitted that C.C. No. 18 of 1994 was pending before the Designated Judge at Coimbatore and subsequently after the constitution of the Designated Court at Trichy pursuant to the provisions of Sec.9(1) of the TADA Act, the abovesaid case was transferred to the Trichy court on 27. 1995 and the case is pending in C.C. No.45 of 1995, before the Designated Judge, Trichy, He has denied the allegation that the transfer of the case from the Designated Judge at Coimbatore to the Designated Judge at Trichy was mala fide and it was necessitated under bona fide circumstances. He has pointed out that as on 12. 1993, five Designated Court had been constituted and each one of them was allotted certain cases for trial. Except the Designated Court No.1, Madras, which was exclusively allotted for the trial of Rajiv Gandhi Assassination case, the rest of the four Designated Courts heard before them a number of cases for trial. On 12. 1995, a communication was addressed by the Director General of Police, Tamil Nadu, to the Secretary to Government, Home Department, Madras-9, appraising the necessity for the constitution of the newly Designated Court at Trichy and also reallotting the cases which were pending before the five Designated Courts as on 12. 1995 and the said Designated Court was constituted in accordance with Sec.9(1) of the Act and the cases from the Districts of Trichy, Pudukkottai, Thanjavur and Nagapattinam Quaid-E-Milleth District were allotted to the said court for disposal. He has further submitted that in respect of the case relating to Ammapet P.S.Cr. No:429 of 1994, Mannargudi P.S.Cr. No.8924 of 1994, Koottar P.S. Cr.No. 1151 of 1994, Burgur P.S.Cr. Nos. 14 of 1993; 16 of 1993; 18 of 1993; and 20 of 1993 and Eriyur P.S.Cr. He has further submitted that in respect of the case relating to Ammapet P.S.Cr. No:429 of 1994, Mannargudi P.S.Cr. No.8924 of 1994, Koottar P.S. Cr.No. 1151 of 1994, Burgur P.S.Cr. Nos. 14 of 1993; 16 of 1993; 18 of 1993; and 20 of 1993 and Eriyur P.S.Cr. No. 190 of 1993 were pending in the Designated Court No.II, Madras, the examination of witnesses had not yet commenced as on 12. 1995 and these cases were pending with the Designated Court No. II, Madras. Inasmuch as these cases involved the examination of the witnesses residing in far of destinations like, Thanjavur, Coimbatore, Periyar etc., and considerable hardship would be caused to these witnesses to go over to Madras, they were allotted to the Designated Court at Trichy as to avoid such hardship to the witnesses. The affidavit further reads that the present case in C.C. No.45 of 1995 which was previously pending as C.C. No. 18 of 1994 before the Designated Court at Coimbatore had been transferred to Trichy from the point of view of jurisdiction. The transfer of case was not mala fide and it was well within the jurisdiction of the State Government to constitute the Designated Court at Trichy even after the lapse of the present TADA Act on 25. 1995 and this is especially so in view of the saving clause contained in Sec. 1 (4) of the said enactment. He has also submitted that there is no violation of Art.22 of the Constitution of India and pointed out that H.C.P. Nos.1073 of 1994 and 223 of 1995 already filed on behalf of these accused have been dismissed by the High Court. On these grounds, he has asked this Court to dismiss the habeas corpus petition as devoid of merits. 5. The prayer in H.C.P. No. 1329 of 1995 is for production of detenu Kamaraj before the court and set him at liberty and pass such further or other orders as this Court may deem fit and proper. In support of the said petition, petitioner-Thangamani, friend of detenu- Kamaraj, has sworn to an affidavit, wherein, he has stated that his friend Kamaraj was arrested on 8. 1994 and produced before the court on 28. 1994 and was remanded from time to time and prosecuted under Secs. In support of the said petition, petitioner-Thangamani, friend of detenu- Kamaraj, has sworn to an affidavit, wherein, he has stated that his friend Kamaraj was arrested on 8. 1994 and produced before the court on 28. 1994 and was remanded from time to time and prosecuted under Secs. 3, 4 and 5 of TADA Act, originally before the II Additional Designated Court, Madras, and the same was transferred after 25. 1995 to Designated Court, Trichy, the newly constituted court, on 16. 1995 and the said court has no jurisdiction to remand the accused to custody. Hence, the detention is illegal and violates Art.21 of the Constitution of India, as the remand passed by the Designated Court, Trichy, is illegal and void. 6. On behalf of the respondent, one M.Shanmugham, Deputy Superintendent of Police, ‘Q’ Branch, C.I.D. Trichy, has sworn to a counter-affidavit, in which he has denied the allegations made in the affidavit by the petitioner and submitted that Kamaraj was arrested on 28. 1994 and was remanded to judicial custody by the Judicial Magistrate Court at Mannargudi, C.C. No.1 of 1995 was pending before the Designated Judge-II, Madras and subsequently after the constitution of the Designated Court at Trichy pursuant to the provisions of Sec.9(1) of the TADA Act, the abovesaid case was transferred to the Designated Court, Trichy, on 27. 1995 and the said case is pending as C.C. Nos. 41, 42 of 1995 before that court. The other averments in the counter-affidavit are similar to that found in the counter-affidavit filed in the other habeas corpus petition. Under these circumstances, the respondent has prayed this Court to dismiss the petition as devoid of merits. 7. We heard the learned advocate Mr. R. Sankarasubbu for the petitioner and Mr. I. Subramaniam, learned Additional Public Prosecutor on behalf of the respondent and perused the records. The main contention raised by the learned advocate for the petitioner was that the cases could not have been transferred to the newly constituted Designated Court which has been constituted after the lapse of TADA Act i.e. 25. 1995 and since the trial could not proceed before the said Designated Court, the detenus are entitled to be set at liberty forthwith. 1995 and since the trial could not proceed before the said Designated Court, the detenus are entitled to be set at liberty forthwith. According to the learned counsel once the Act ceases to be in force, neither the State Government nor the Central Government has got power to constitute the Designated Court, to substantiate his contention, he has placed reliance on the following decisions: .(i) Lachmandas Kedarnath Ahuja v. State of Bombay, 1952 M.W.N. (Crl.) 200. .(ii) Hyderabad State v. Chandar, A.I.R. 1950 Hyd. 711. (iii) A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 531: J.T. (1988)2 S.C. 325: (1988)2 S.C.C. 602 : 1988 S.C.C. (Crl.) 372. .(iv) Sham Sundar v. Rami Das, A.I.R. 1951 Punj. 52. .(v) Krishnan v. State of Madras, (1951)2 M.L.J. 105: A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 301: 1951 S.C.J. 453:1951 S.C.R. 621:52 Crl.L.J. 1103. .(vi) State of Uttar Pradesh v. Seth Jagamander Das. A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 683: 55 Crl.L.J. 1736. 8. Now let us consider the above decisions and find out in what way they are helpful to the petitioner. The first decision is reported in Lachmandas Kedarnath Ahuja v. State of Bombay, 1952 M.W.N. (Crl.) 200 and the learned Advocate placed reliance on the following passage: "The continuation of a trial commenced before the commencement of the Constitution, under the discriminatory procedure after the Constitution came into force operates to the prejudice of the accused and as such offends against their newly acquired fundamental right of equal protection guaranteed by Art. 14. The Constitution has no retrospective operation to invalidate that part of the proceedings that has already been gone through but the Constitution does not permit the special procedure to stand in the way of the exercise or enjoyment of post constitutional rights and must therefore strike down the discriminatory procedure if it is sought to be adopted after the Constitution came into operation." In the said decision, the Supreme Court was dealing with the continuation of a trial commenced before the commencement of the Constitution, wherein the court has held that the Constitution has no retrospective operation and it does not permit the special procedure to stand in the way of the exercise or enjoyment of post constitutional rights and hence it has struck down the discriminatory procedure. Present cases are not such type of cases and the said decision has no application to decide the present cases. 9. Present cases are not such type of cases and the said decision has no application to decide the present cases. 9. The second decision, on which the learned Advocate has placed reliance is reported in Hyderabad State v. Chandar, A.I.R. 1950 Hyd. 711 and invited our attention to the following passage: "By Sec.2 of India and Hyderabad Exchanges of Enclaves Order, 1950, the Hyderabad enclaves in Bombay were included and under Sec.2(e) of the Order read with Art.2(a) of the Agreement between the Governor-General of India and the Nizam of Hyderabad dated 21. 1950. The transfer of the enclaves became effective on 21. 1950, i.e., before the Constitution of India came into force. Arts.225 and 330 of the Constitution of India refer to transfers after the Constitution came into force and are, therefore, inapplicable to such a case. In the absence of clear intention to the contrary the transfer of the territory did not effect the vested jurisdiction of the Magistrate in the territory transferred in a case pending before him, at the time of the transfer, and he continues to exercise the same even after the transfer of the territory. No such contrary intention appears either from Sec.7 or its proviso (read with Sec.6, General Clauses Act) or any other provision of the order." We are unable to understand how this decision is helpful to the petitioner in these petitions. It is well known that the provisions of Sec.6 of the General Clauses Act are not applicable to temporary enactments. TADA Act is a temporary Act and hence Sec.6 of the General Clauses Act is not applicable to the said Act. In view of Sec. 1(4) of the said Act, this decision is not applicable to the cases in hand. 10. In the next decision reported in A.R. Antulay v. R.S.Nayak, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 1531: J.T. (1988)2 S.C. 325: (1988)2 S.C.C. 602 :1988 S.C.C. (Crl.) 372, the following portion of the judgment is pressed into service: "Sec.7(1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952: Creates a condition which is sine qua non for the trial of offenders under Sec.6(1) of that Act. The offences specified under Sec.6(1) of the 1952 Act are those punishable under Secs.161, 162, 163, 164 and 165-A of the Penal Code and Sec.5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The offences specified under Sec.6(1) of the 1952 Act are those punishable under Secs.161, 162, 163, 164 and 165-A of the Penal Code and Sec.5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. Therefore, the order of the Supreme Court transferring the cases filed against the Chief Minister, of the State who is alleged to have committed the offences under Secs.161, 165, 384, 420, 164, 165-A of Penal Code and Sec.5 of Prevention of Corruption Act to the High Court was not authorised by law especially when the Order was clearly per incuriam. The Supreme Court by its directions could not confer jurisdiction on the High Court to try any case when it did not possess such jurisdiction under the scheme of the 1952 Act. The Supreme Court was not called upon and did not decide the express limitation on the power conferred by Sec.407 of the Code which includes offences by public servants mentioned in the 1952 Act to be overridden in the manner sought to be followed as the consequential direction of the Supreme Court. The directions was alleged to have been issued by the Supreme Court without observing the principle of audi alteram partem. Therefore, singling out of the accused in such case for a speedier trial by the High Court for an offence of which the High Court had no jurisdiction to try under the Act of 1952 was unwarranted, unprecedented and the directions given by the Supreme Court for the said purpose, were not warranted." In the said decision, the question before the Supreme Court was that the Supreme Court on an earlier occasion suo moto withdrew the special case pending in the court of the Special Judge, Greater Bombay, and transferred the same to the Bombay High Court, Supreme Court in the present decision has observed that in giving the direction on an earlier occasion the court infringed the constitutional safeguards granted to a citizen or to an accused and injustice results therefrom. It is just and proper for the court to rectify and recall that injustice in the peculiar facts and circumstances of that case. The court directed that the trial shall proceed in accordance with law. It is just and proper for the court to rectify and recall that injustice in the peculiar facts and circumstances of that case. The court directed that the trial shall proceed in accordance with law. That is to say under the Act of 1952 on the ground that there was no power to the Supreme Court to transfer a proceeding under the Act of 1952 from one Special Judge to the High Court. This is not the situation in the present case, hence the decision will have no relevance to decide the present cases. 11. In Sham Sundar v. Ram Das, A.I.R. 1951 Punjab 52, the learned Advocate for the petitioner drew our attention to para 39 at page 57, which reads as below: "Indeed, the rule is that if the saving clause is in irreconcilable conflict with the body of the statute of which it is a part, it is ineffective or void. In this connection reference may be made to para No. 300 of Interpretation of laws by Crawford, 1940 Edn. & Para 164 of Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, 1946 Edn. Para No. 300 of Interpretation of laws by Crawford reads: "As we have stated elsewhere, the saving clause is used to exempt something from immediate interference or destruction. It is generally used in repealing statutes in order to prevent them from affecting rights accrued, penalties, incurred, duties imposed, or proceedings started under the statute sought to be repealed. Its position or verbal conflict is unimportant. But if it is in irreconcilable conflict with the body of the Stat-ute of which it is a part, it is ineffective, or void." At p. 164 of Maxwell on interpretation of statutes we find: "A difference, indeed, has been said to exist in this respect between the effect of a saving clause, or exception, and a proviso in a statute. When the proviso appended to the enacting part is repugnant to it, it questionably repeals the enacting part, but it is said by Lord Coke that when the enactment and the saving clause (which reserves something which would be otherwise included in the words of the enacting Part) are repugnant.........the saving clause is to be rejected, because otherwise the enactment would have been made in vain?" Learned Advocate is unable to point out how the saving clause Sec. 1 (4) of the Act is in irreconcilable conflict with the body of the statute of which it is a part. This decision will not help the petitioner. 12. Mr. R.Sankara Subbu, learned Advocate, then took us to the following passage of the judgment reported in Krishnan v. State of Madras, (1951)2 M.L.J. 105: A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 301: 1951 S.C.J. 453: 1951 S.C.R. 621: 52 Crl.L.J. 1103. "The general rule in regard to a temporary statute is that in the absence of special provision to the contrary, proceedings which are being taken against a person under it will ipso facto terminate as soon as the statute expires." In the present enactment there is a special provision in Sec. 1(4) of the Act, which is a saving clause and hence this decision has no application. 13. The last decision on which reliance was placed by the learned Advocate was reported in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Seth Jagamander Das, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 683. Paragraph 7 of the said decision at page 685 reads as follows: "When a statute is repealed or comes to an automatic end by efflux of time, no prosecution for acts done during the continuance of the repealed or expired Act can be commenced after the date of its repeal or expiry because that would amount to the enforcement of a repealed or a dead Act. In cases of repeal of statutes this rule stands modified by Sec. 6 of the General Clauses Act. An expiring Act however is not governed by the rule enuniciated in that section. On the 30th March, 1946, before the expiry of the Defence of India Act, the Governor-General promulgated an Ordinance "The Defence of India (Second Amendment) Ordinance" No.XII of 1946. An expiring Act however is not governed by the rule enuniciated in that section. On the 30th March, 1946, before the expiry of the Defence of India Act, the Governor-General promulgated an Ordinance "The Defence of India (Second Amendment) Ordinance" No.XII of 1946. This Ordinance, amended Sec. 1(4) of the Defence of India Act by adding a saving clause in the following terms: "But its expiry under the operation of this subsection shall not affect — (a) the previous operation of, or anything duly done or suffered under this Act or any rule made thereunder or any order made under any such rule......" This saving clause is almost in the same terms as Sec.6(a), (b), (c), (d) and (e) of the General Clauses Act. Thus the saving clause achieved the purpose which otherwise would have been achieved, if it was a case of a repeal, by Sec.6 of the General Clauses Act. By virtue of the provisions of the saving clause "for things done or omitted to be done under the Defence of India" the prosecution could be commenced even after the expiry of the Act. The saving clause added in the Act by the Ordinance clearly permitted a prosecution for offences committed before the expiration of Defence of India Act even after its expiry". This decision instead of helping the petitioner will help the respondent. What the decision says is that in the absence of a saving clause, no prosecution for infringement of its provisions could be commenced after the life of the Act, Sec.6 of the General Clauses Act not being applicable to such a case. Here in the Act there is a saving clause in Sec. 1(4) of the Act, even though Sec.6 of the General Clauses Act is not applicable to temporary enactments. None of the above decisions cited by the learned Advocate for the petitioner will come to his aid to support the contention raised by him. 14. On the other hand, Mr. I. Subramaniam, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, negativing the above contention, submitted that as long as Sec. 1 (4) is there in the Act, it will take care of all the contingencies and there is no bar for the State Government to constitute or establish a new designated Court to try the offences under the Act committed during the period when the Act was in force. He took us through Sec. 1 (4) of the Act. It will be appropriate to extract the said section, which reads thus: “1(4) it shall remain in force for a period of (eight years) from the 24th day of May, 1987, but its expiry under the operation of this sub-section shall not affect- .(a) the previous operation of, or anything duly done or suffered under this Act or any rule made thereunder or any order made under any such rule, or .(b) any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under this Act or any rule made thereunder or any order made under any such rule, or .(c) any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence under this Act or any contravention of any rule made under this Act or of any order made under any such rule, or .(d) any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability penalty forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid. and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if this Act had not expired.” According to the learned Additional Public Prosecutor, by virtue of above section, remedy in respect of such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty forfeiture or punishment is saved and the said remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if this Act had not expired and hence there is no bar for the Central Government or a State Government to constitute Designated Courts even after the lapse of TADA Act invoking Sec.9 of the said TADA Act as the offence under the present Act shall be tried only by a Designated Court. He has also invited our attention to Sec 11(1) of the Act, which reads as follows: “11. Jurisdiction of Designated Courts: (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, every offence punishable under any provision of this Act or any rule made thereunder shall be triable only by the Designated Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed or, as the case may be, by the Designated Court constituted for trying such offence under Sub-sec.(1) of Sec.9”. The court must strive to so interpret the statute as to protect and advance the object and purpose of the enactment. The court must strive to so interpret the statute as to protect and advance the object and purpose of the enactment. Any narrow or technical interpretation of the provisions would defeat the legislative policy. The court must therefore keep the legislative policy in mind in applying the provisions of the Act to the facts of the case. Sec.l(4)(d) of the Act has saved remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty forfeiture etc., and to attain the said remedy there should be machineries and those machineries are the Designated Courts, which are constituted under Sec.9 of the said Act. Hence, even after the Act is not in existence, there is power either with the Central Government or the State Government to constitute the Designated Courts to try the terrorists and disruptive activities, which have been committed when the Act was in force. The State Government has the power to notify any area as a notified area. The said ‘Notified Area’ has been defined under Sec.2(l)(f) of the Act, which is to the following effect: “2(1)(f)”Notified Area“means such area as the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify;” When the terrorist acts or disruptive activities are increased on a large scale in a particular area or there is likelihood of such an increase in that area, then the State Government may very well declare it as a notified area. The effect of declaring the area as notified area is that the person found in possession of unauthorised arms and ammunition in such notified area is liable to be prosecuted under Sec.5 of the Act. This gives an impression that the State Government has got the power to declare any area as a ‘notified area’ and then necessarily the State Government has the power to constitute Designated Court as and when occasion arises especially in view of Sec. 1(4) of the Act. As long as that power is therewith State Government, it does not mean that all the Designated Courts should have been established at one time only. It is difficult to accept this proposition of law. According to us, the only limitation is that the said Designated Court should try the offences under TADA Act, committed during the existence of the said Act. 15. It is difficult to accept this proposition of law. According to us, the only limitation is that the said Designated Court should try the offences under TADA Act, committed during the existence of the said Act. 15. In fact, constitutional validity of Sec. 1(4) of the TADA Act has been listed before the Supreme Court in Abdul Aziz v. State of West Bengal and another, W.P. (Crl.) No. 413 of 1995 and the Supreme Court has held that although Sec. 1(4) of the Act was not specifically taken into consideration, the TADA Act was generally held intra vires in Kartar Singh’s case, (1994)2 L.W. (Crl.) 422. In that case, the Supreme Court has negatived the contention of the learned Senior Counsel that in view of Sec. 1(4) of the Act, those offenders who have committed offences prior to the expiry of the Act will be treated differently as compared to those offenders who may commit such acts after the expiry of the Act and therefore Sec. 1(4) of the Act can be said to have made hostile discrimination of such prior offenders and held that it was left to the discretion of the executive to pick and choose offenders, for the purpose of applicability of warrant procedure or summons procedure for trial of all similarly situated accused. Supreme Court further observed that the Parliament itself by enabling Sec. 1(4) of the Act has made a clear distinction between the two classes of offenders — 1. those offenders who have committed offences when the Act was in force; and 2. persons who are not offenders under the Act at all as their activities take place after the expiry of the Act. These two classes of persons cannot be treated at par. Consequently, no fault can be found with Sec. 1(4) of the Act on that score. 16. Following the above decision, this Court has held in Mrs. S. Voila Selvin v. State of Tamil Nadu and another, H.C.P. No. 749 of 1995 dated 20.9.1995 that even after the expiry of the TADA Act, the trial for offences under the said Act should continue before the Designated Court. 17. 16. Following the above decision, this Court has held in Mrs. S. Voila Selvin v. State of Tamil Nadu and another, H.C.P. No. 749 of 1995 dated 20.9.1995 that even after the expiry of the TADA Act, the trial for offences under the said Act should continue before the Designated Court. 17. It will be useful to refer to page 458 of paragraph 96 of the decision reported in Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994)2 L.W. (Crl.) 422, which reads as follows: “As we have now found this impugned Act is enacted under Entry 1 of List I, the constitution of the Designated Courts by the Central Government cannot be said in violation of Entry 65 of List II which empower the State Legislature to Constitute the Courts. Under Sec.9 of the Act, both the Central Government and the State Governments are authorised to constitute Designated Courts by notification under Sub-sec.(2) of Sec.9. It is made clear that the courts constituted by the Central Government either before or after the issue of the notification constituting the Designated Courts by the State Government shall have jurisdiction to try any offence committed in that area or areas and the Designated Courts constituted by the State Government shall not have any jurisdiction to try any offence committed in that area or areas.” In addition, Sub-sec.(3) of the impugned section states that where any question arises as to the jurisdiction of any Designated Court, the decision taken by the Central Government in that regard will be final.” For the above reasons, we hold that the State Government has got power to constitute Designated Courts under the provisions of TADA Act even after the expiry of the TADA Act, to try the offences under the Act committed during the existence of the said Act. 18. The next contention of the learned Advocate for the petitioner was that the State Government has not complied with the direction given by the Supreme Court in Kartar Singh’s case, (1994)2 L.W. (Crl.) 422, referred to above. 18. The next contention of the learned Advocate for the petitioner was that the State Government has not complied with the direction given by the Supreme Court in Kartar Singh’s case, (1994)2 L.W. (Crl.) 422, referred to above. Learned Advocate took us through para 179 at page 476 of the above referred Supreme Court decision, which reads as follows: “In order to ensure higher level of scrutiny and applicability of TADA Act, there must be a Screening Committee or a Review Committee constituted by the Central Government consisting of the Home Secretary, Law Secretary and other concerned Secretaries of the various Departments to review all the TADA cases instituted by the Central Government as well as to have a quarterly administrative review, reviewing the States’ action in the application of the TADA provisions in the respective States, and the incidental questions arising in relation thereto. Similarly, there must be a screening or Review Committee at the State level constituted by the respective States consisting of the Chief Secretary, Home Secretary, Law Secretary, Director General of Police (Law and Order) and other officials as the respective Government may think it fit, to review the action of the enforcing authorities under the Act and screen the cases registered under the provisions of the Act and decide the further course of action in every matter and soon.” Learned Advocate for the petitioner also placed reliance on the decision reported in Rajinder Saini v. State of Punjab, (1994)4 S.C.C. 134 . 19. On the other hand, learned Additional Public Prosecutor repelling the said submission contended that such a committee has been constituted and the said committee has reviewed the action of the enforcing authorities under the Act and screened the cases including the present cases registered under the provisions of the Act and decided to proceed further with the case. He also pointed out that this is the guideline laid down by the Supreme Court to the Central Government to take note of them and to incorporate them by appropriate amendments in the Act and the Rules. Hence, we see no force in this contention of the learned advocate for the petitioner. 20. We have been taken through the notification issued by the Government of Tamil Nadu exercising its power under Sub-sec.(1) of Sec.9 of the TADA Act by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor and we see no illegality in the said notification. Hence, we see no force in this contention of the learned advocate for the petitioner. 20. We have been taken through the notification issued by the Government of Tamil Nadu exercising its power under Sub-sec.(1) of Sec.9 of the TADA Act by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor and we see no illegality in the said notification. As long as the said notification is in force, the petitioner cannot contend that the remand and trial before the said Designated Court cannot go on as it will be illegal and the detenus/ accused should be released forthwith. In the counter-affidavit filed by the respondent, he has given all the details which prompted the State Government to try these cases before the” newly Designated Court at Trichy. We fully agree with those grounds. Further the prayers of the petitioner in these habeas corpus petitions are to release the detenus/ accused as the Designated Court at Trichy has no jurisdiction to try the cases. We fail to understand how such, a prayer could be granted even if the contention of the learned advocate is accepted. At the most, this Court can say that the detenus/ accused should not be tried in the Designated Court constituted after the lapse of TADA Act. Then these detenus/ accused will be tried by the original Designated Courts. Since, we have negatived the contentions of the learned advocate for the petitioner, the above situation will not arise. No other contention has been raised before us. 21. For the reasons stated above, we see no merits in these habeas corpus petitions and accordingly they shall stand dismissed.