Mr. Arun Kumar, J. ( 1 ) THESE petitions under Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code have beenfiled for quashing FIR No. 174/93, Police Station Janak Puri under Sections 448/342/506 IPC, FIR No. 251 /93, P. S. Janak Puri under Sections 307/457/34 Indian Penal Code readwith Sections 27/54/59 Arms Act and FIR No. 252/93, P. S. Janak Puri, New Delhiunder Sections 307/34 Indian Penal Code read with Sections 27/54/59 Arms Act. ( 2 ) PARTIES in these petitions are common. The FIRs came to be lodged in viewof a dispute over a plot bearing No. C-5, Kiran Garden, Uttam Nagar, New Delhimeasuring 200 sq. yds. A civil suit for permanent injunction bearing Suit No. 97/93 was also filed in the Civil Court by Rakesh Kumar and Gulshan Kumar againstbishan Swarup in respect of the said plot. These persons are parties in the presentpetition. There was a dispute regarding possession of the said plot. On the day ofthe occurrence an altercation took place between two groups which resulted incross cases being registered against the parties. It is averred that the disputesbetween the parties have been amicably settled out of Court and the compromisehas been reduced into writing. None of the parties has any grievance against eachother any more in view of the compromise. A copy of the compromise arrived atbetween the parties has been placed on record. Therefore, it is prayed that theoffences may be allowed to be compounded and the FIRs be ordered to be quashed. ( 3 ) SOME of the offences subject matter of the FIRs are not compoundable inview of the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. That iswhy the present petitions have been moved under Section 482 Criminal Procedure Code for permission to compound the offences and/or quashing of the FIRs. ( 4 ) THE learned Counsel appearing for the State raised a preliminary objectionthat those offences which are not compoundable under the Code of Criminalprocedure, cannot be allowed to be compounded by this Court. According to thelearned Counsel even the provisions of Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedurecannot be invoked for such a purpose in view of a specific bar contained in Section320 (9), Cr. P. C. ( 5 ) I have heard Counsel for the parties. Both sides have besides making oralsubmissions tried to support their respective stands with judgments of this Court,other High Courts and the Supreme Court. P. C. ( 5 ) I have heard Counsel for the parties. Both sides have besides making oralsubmissions tried to support their respective stands with judgments of this Court,other High Courts and the Supreme Court. ( 6 ) ACCORDING to the learned Counsel for the petitioner in view of the compromise no useful purpose would be served in allowing the matter to be furtherinvestigated by the police and thereafter putting it up for trial. No witnesses arelikely to come forward and it will be a futile exercise which will involve wastage ofprecious time of the Court. On the other hand according to the learned Counsel forthe respondent it is only serious crimes which are not allowed to be compoundedby Section 320 Code of Criminal Procedure. Some of the offences in the presentpetitions fall in that category. She submits that such serious offences are not onlyoffences qua the individual victim, they are offences against the society and that iswhy they are not allowed to be compounded by the Code. If such offences areallowed to be compounded the offender will go scot free which will be against theinterest of the society. ( 7 ) IT is true that criminal offences besides causing harm/injury to the individual concerned are crimes against the society. Individual s feelings may beassuaged in view of the compromise between the parties, but social injusticeresulting from the crime persists. Therefore, the Court rightly does not permitcompounding of serious offences. Section 32u Code of Criminal Procedurecontains lists of compoundable offences while Section 320 (9) contains a banin the following words: "no offence shall be compounded except as providedby this Section". ( 8 ) THE question is in view of the aforesaid express bar should the High Courtshave no power to allow non-compoundable offences to be compounded? For thisone has to turn to Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure which is reproduced asunder:- 482. Saving of inherent powers of High Court.-Nothing in this Code shall bedeemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make suchorders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or toprevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends ofjustice. " ( 9 ) THIS Section starts with the words "nothing in this Code shall be deemedto limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court xxx". " ( 9 ) THIS Section starts with the words "nothing in this Code shall be deemedto limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court xxx". What meaning is tobe given to these words of Section 482 Code of Criminal Procedure? Section 320 (9) contains a limitation on the powers of the Court to allow compounding ofoffences. Section 482 occurs after Section 320 (9) and starts with the words quotedabove. Therefore, can it still be said that power of the High Court to allowcompounding of non-compoundable offences is limited by Section 320 (9) of thecode? ( 10 ) ONE view can be that in view of the wording of Section 482 of the Code thepower of the High Court to secure ends of justice cannot be limited or affected byany other provision in the Code. Section 482 leaves a wide discretion with the Highcourt to pass orders to secure ends of justice. The High Court being the highestcourt of the State is entrusted with this discretionary power with the confidencethat the same will be exercised only in appropriate cases which fully justify theexercise of such power. The power is not meant to be exercised in routine. It willbe exercised only in particular cases when the High Court is satisfied that the natureof the offence, its social repercussions and other relevant aspects require that theoffence may be permitted to be compounded. The High Court is expected tobalance the social aspect of the crime and the need to permit compounding of theoffences to secure the ends of justice. Social aspect does not only mean thatcriminals should be punished. It also involves other considerations like notwasting the limited and precious resources of the society in a futile trial. Sometimesinterests of the parties involved will also have prime importance because a trialmay have other ruinous affects on the parties. It may be relevant to consider thatin view of the compromise arrived at between the parties no witness would becoming forth to depose against the accused. Without evidence it may not bepossible to establish his guilt. Such a trial will mean wastage of precious time of thecourt, the Public Prosecutor and the law enforcement agency. It will also result inexpenses and harassment to the accused. Harassment may also be in the shape ofcontinued incarceration. Without evidence it may not bepossible to establish his guilt. Such a trial will mean wastage of precious time of thecourt, the Public Prosecutor and the law enforcement agency. It will also result inexpenses and harassment to the accused. Harassment may also be in the shape ofcontinued incarceration. In view of all such conflicting interests it may beappropriate to leave the matter to the discretion of the High Court to be exercisedon the basis of merits of each case. There should be no self imposed limitation onthe High Court in not permitting compounding of an offence which falls outsidesection 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. ( 11 ) THE other view as propounded by the learned Counsel for the State is thatthere should be an absolute bar on the power of the High Court in allowingcompounding of non-compoundable offences. The learned Counsel for the respondent has in support of her contention strongly relied on State of Karnataka v. H. S Ravanasiddappa etc. , 1994 Crl. L. J-2928 and a recent Full Bench decision of therajasthan High Court reported as Mohan Singh and Ors. v. State, 1993 Crl. Lawjournal 3193. These judgments hold that the High Court cannot grant permissionto compound offences which are not covered under Section 320 (1) or (2) of thecode of Criminal Procedure in view of specific bar contained in Sub-sec. (9) of Sec. 320. None of these cases has considered the affect of the opening words of Sec. 482of the Code in this behalf. In my view the openingwords of Sec-482 are in the natureof a non-obstante clause and deserve due consideration. ( 12 ) THE Full Bench decision of the Rajasthan High Court notes in para 12 thejudgment of the Supreme Court in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, AIR1978 SC 47 where the Supreme Court expressed that the High Court possessed andpossesses inherent powers to be exercised ex-debito justitiae to do real andsubstantial justice for the administration of which alone the Court exists. However,in relation to the exercise of such inherent powers the Supreme Court had laiddown the following principles:- " (I) that the power is not to be resorted to if there is a specific provision inthe Code for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party; (ii) that it should be exercised very sparingly to prevent abuse of processof any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice; (iii) that it should not be exercised as against the express bar of lawengrafted in any other provision of the Code. " ( 13 ) IN this case the Supreme Court was concerned with the question whethersec. 482 Criminal Procedure Code could be invoked to revise an order revision whereof is otherwisebarred under Section 397 (2) of the Code. The case really went on a considerationas to which will be an interlocutory order falling within Sub-sec. (2) of Section 397. What meaning is to be given to the opening words of Section 482 was really notunder consideration. ( 14 ) FURTHER it was noted that in Sooraj Devi v. Pyarelal, (1981) I SCC 500 ithas been reiterated that inherent power could not be exercised for doing that whichis specifically prohibited by the Code. Another Supreme Court decision noticed inthis behalf is Mst. Simrikhia v. Smt. Dolley Mukherjee, AIR 1990 SC 1605 . Boththese cases are on the power of the High Court to review its own judgment. It washeld that in view of provisions of Section 362 of the Code review was notpermissible by invoking Section 482. ( 15 ) BEFORE the Full Bench a judgment of the Supreme Court in Mahesh Chand v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1988 SC 2111 was cited. In that case the Supreme Courthad in the peculiar facts of the case permitted an offence under Section 3071. P. C. to be compounded. Regarding this dedsion the Full Bench observed that in specialcases the Supreme Court may have power to direct compounding of non-compoundable offences but the High Court has no such power. The decision in Maheshchand s case (supra) has been cited before me also by the learned Counsel for thepetitioner. Besides this the learned Counsel for the petitioner has cited Ram Parsad and Anr. The decision in Maheshchand s case (supra) has been cited before me also by the learned Counsel for thepetitioner. Besides this the learned Counsel for the petitioner has cited Ram Parsad and Anr. v. State of U. P. , (1982) 2 SCC 149 , in which offences under Section 307 wereconverted into one under Section 324 Indian Penal Code read with Section 34 and compoundingwas allowed. ( 16 ) JUDGMENTS of this Court in Charan Singh Sharma v. State, 48 (1992) DLT (SN) 2; Arvind Bhushan Chug and Ors. v. Dr. Promilla Rita and Ors. , 48 (1992) DLT 112; and Vinod Kumar v. State, IV (1993) CCR 2590 have also been cited on behalfof the petitioner as illustrations where compounding of non-compoundable of-fences was permitted. However, these judgments do not contain a discussion of thepoints raised before me and noticed hereinabove. ( 17 ) I may also note here that in several cases involving matrimonial disputesunder Sections 406/498-A Indian Penal Code etc. are being allowed to be compounded and FIRsin such cases are being allowed to be quashed in the interests of justice particularlyin view of the fact that the parties have or have had such close relationship. If onprinciple and as a matter of law compounding of non-compoundable offencescannot be permitted, I see no basis how an exception can be made in such cases. ( 18 ) IT may also be worthwhile to note here that in various judgments includingthe latest judgment in State of Haryana and Ors. v. Ch. Bhajan lal and Ors. , JT 1990 (4) SC 650, the Supreme Court has recognised the power of the High Court to quashfir in certain circumstances. If the High Court has power to quash an FIR inexercise of its powers under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, is it notappropriate to recognise that High Court should have powers to allow compounding of offences which have been made non-compoundable by Section 320 of thecode of Criminal Procedure?having regard to the important issues involved I am of the considered viewthat the matter be placed before the Hon ble the Chief Justice for constitution of alarger bench for an authoritative pronouncement in this behalf.