Judgment : This revision is against the order of the learned XVIII Metropolitan Magistrate Saidapet, Madras, for the production of the records ordered under Sec. 91 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The respondent herein is the complainant for the offences under Secs. 461, 471, 474, Indian Penal Code read with Sec. 31 of Indian Penal Code. The first accused/first revision petitioner is employed as Personnel Manager in Hotel Chola Sheraton, Madras, whereas the second accused/second revision petitioner is the Senior Supervisor, Credit Department, in the same hotel. The respondent complainant was also working in the same hotel as Restaurant Cashier. 2. The private complaint of the respondent before the learned Magistrate is that the resignation letter dated nil was obtained from him under threat and coercion long back, by the management was pressed into service against him by these petitioners fabricating the same as a voluntary resignation letter given by the respondent herein to send him out. The respondent-complainant filed a petitioner under Sec. 91, Code of Criminal Procedure for production of certain documents by the persons mentioned in the list appended to the petition and the learned Magistrate has allowed for the production of these records by the persons mentioned in the list. As against this order, the accused have come forward with this revision. 3. When this matter was taken up the learned counsel for the respondent was absent. 4. The accused petitioners challenged the impugned order on two grounds viz. that the learned Magistrate, without applying his mind as to whether these documents are necessary for the trial has simply ordered for the production and secondly, most of the documents in the list have to be produced by the first petitioner himself and first petitioner, who is the accused, cannot be compelled to produce the records. 5. that the learned Magistrate, without applying his mind as to whether these documents are necessary for the trial has simply ordered for the production and secondly, most of the documents in the list have to be produced by the first petitioner himself and first petitioner, who is the accused, cannot be compelled to produce the records. 5. Learned counsel for the revision petitioner submitted that under Sec. 91, Criminal Procedure Code, only whenever, the court was satisfied with the necessity for the records for the trial of the case, the documents could be ordered to be produced before the court but in this case, the respondent complainant in his petition has not even mentioned the necessity or the purpose for which the documents mentioned in his list were required for the trial and the learned Magistrate also, without even considering the purpose for which these records were required by the complainant, has ordered for production and therefore, the order is not sustainable. 6. The learned counsel referred to certain decisions in support of his contention. In Bashir Hussain v. Gulam Mohamed, A.I.R. 1966 Bom. 253, the Bombay High Court, observed as follows: "Therefore the relevancy of a statement or a document or a thing of which the production sought would be one of the considerations which the court will have to take into account while deciding the question and the necessity or desirability of production of such statement, document or thing. Further, before ordering production of such statement, document or thing, the court must consider whether such statement, document or thing is being suppressed or might be tampered with or destroyed by the party in whose possession it is or might be lost altogether." In State of Andhra Pradesh v. P.S. Ismail, 1973 Crl.L.J. 931, also the view expressed is that Sec. 91, Code of Criminal Procedure does not give an absolute right for the accused to ask for summoning any document and it is only when the court, on a consideration of the facts and circumstances, considers that the production of the document or thing sought for is necessary or desirable for the purpose of the trial, enquiry or proceedings, that is summons the same but not otherwise. 7. 7. It is true that when a document is sought for from the custody of some one, the court cannot mechanically order for production at the very request of either side without considering the relevancy of the document because a third party cannot be so easily compelled to part with his documents which may cause hardship to him. The respondent complainant has not mentioned the relevancy of the document mentioned in his list for this case and the learned Magistrate also has not ascertained the purpose or relevancy of these documents for the offences alleged against the petitioners. It appears that the learned Magistrate thinking that it is the absolute right of the complainant to summon the documents, has mechanically ordered for the production of the documents. In the list of the persons who are to produce the documents, the Personnel Manager, Hotel Chola Sheraton, who is none else than the first accused, also is found in the list. Documents Nos. 2 to 5 and 8 to 11 have to be produced by him. Therefore, certainly, he is entitled to question the correctness of the order of the learned Magistrate. As found above as the learned Magistrate without considering the relevancy of the documents, has ordered for production, the order is not sustainable. 8. Then coming to the second ground of attack, learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that when the first petitioner/first accused himself is the Personnel Manager of Hotel Chola Sheraton, he cannot be called upon to produce the document mentioned in the list from his custody as it will amount to testimonial compulsion against the first accused on that ground also, the order is liable to be set aside. It is true that the first petitioner is prosecuted in his individual name. But on a reading of the complaint, the offence alleged is said to have been committed not in his individual capacity but as the employee of the Hotel Chola Sheraton. As it is alleged that the resignation letter obtained from him long prior to 1988 under threat and coercion, was utilised against him by these petitioners accused in the year 1990 to send him out from his employment in Hotel Chola Sheraton, the alleged offence should have been committed by them only in their official capacity as Personnel Manager and Senior Supervisor. Therefore, the complainant- respondent cannot be permitted to compel the Personnel Manager the first petitioner to produce the records from his custody . This Court in a Bench decision in Swarnalingam v. Assistant Labour Inspector, Karaikudi, A.I.R. 1956 Mad. 165, has held that the guarantee under Art. 20(3) of the Constitution would extend to any compulsory process for production of evidentiary documents which are reasonably likely to support a prosecution against the accused and in such cases, the accused cannot be compelled to produce the records. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioners represents that the petitioners may not have any objection for direction to the Management of the Hotel Chola Sheraton for the production of documents, which are relevant for the case, from their custody and even the General Manager of the Chola Sheraton Hotel has the supervisory control over the entire documents and without directing him, the Personnel Manager, who is the first accused cannot be directed to produce the records from custody. If at all, the allegations against the first petitioners are true, the offence should have been committed only in the course of his employment as Personnel Manager. Therefore, such Personnel Manager cannot be compelled to produce the document to support the prosecution case. Therefore, the learned Magistrate was not correct in ordering for the production of the documents 2 to 5 and 5 to 10 by the first petitioner as both the grounds raised by the petitioners are well-founded the order of the court below has to be set aside. 10. In the result, setting aside the order of the learned Magistrate, the revision is allowed subject to the right of the respondent/complainant to take steps to secure the documents explaining the relevancy of the documents, from a person other than the accused.