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Madras High Court · body

1995 DIGILAW 851 (MAD)

Mannammal and Another v. State represented by Inspector of Police, Tirukoilur and Another

1995-10-17

N.ARUMUGHAM

body1995
Judgment : This revision is filed by prosecution witnesses 1 and 3 against the judgment of acquittal rendered by learned Sessions Judge, South Arcot District at Cuddalore in C.A. No. 122 of 1990 dated 13. 1991 setting aside and reversing the conviction and sentance recorded by learned Assistant Sessions Judge, Villupuram in S.C. No. 191 of 1989 dated 37. 1990, finding the second respondent guilty for the offences under Secs.306 and 304(b), Indian Penal Code and thereby convicting the sentencing the accused to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years under Sec.304(b), Indian Penal Code. 2. The first revision petitioner who was examined as P.W. 1 is the mother and the 2nd revision petitioner who was examined as P.W.3 is the father of the deceased Vennila. They were living in Alambadi Village, within the jurisdiction of the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Tirukoilur. P.W.2 Sankar is the son of P.Ws.l and 3 and he was studying 10th standard in a school situated therein and the deceased was his eldest sister. The deceased was given in marriage to the accused in the year 1986 with presentation of seven sovereign of gold chain and other jewels each weighing one sovereign along with other ‘Seer Varisai’. Following this, the accused, viz., the 2nd respondent herein and the deceased were living as husband and wife for a period of one year and out of wedlock, a female child was born to her at her parents’ house in the village at Alambadi. After three months with the presentation of silver waist cord, anklet to the child and customary presentation, they have set the deceased and the child to the house of the accused. Even then, it was stated that the accused was demanding one wrist watch, and a cycle from the parents of the deceased. Because of that, when the deceased found it very difficult to be with her husband, the deceased came to the house of her parents and this factum was reported to P.Ws. 1 and 3. However, at the request of the accused/respondent, after 10 days, the deceased and her child returned back to the house of the 2nd respondent/at the behest of P.Ws.5 and 6 who are said to have conducted some mediation. Accordingly, the respondent took the decreased and her child to his house and even then, his insistence to get the cycle and wrist watch from her parents continued. Accordingly, the respondent took the decreased and her child to his house and even then, his insistence to get the cycle and wrist watch from her parents continued. About 12 days prior to 19. 1988, while he was Working in the Mariammal Koil building, P.W.7 saw the accused chasing the deceased and P.W.7 himself mediated and separated them. On 19. 1988 at about 4.00 p.m., P.W.7 was working at the house of the respondent and the parents of the deceased were working in front of their house by chaffing grains. At that time, the deceased Vennila came there with her child, followed by her husband/ respondent herein by saying ‘stop, otherwise I will kill you’. By saying this, the respondent snatched the child from her. Even then, Vennila went to the house of her parents. It was the claim of P.W.7 that he came to know that Vennila consumed poison. 3. It was the evidence of P. W.8 that on 19. 1988 at about 4.00 p.m., while the accused/ respondent, the deceased and others were separating grains, the deceased Vennila stating that she was going to her parents’ house, left that place. At that time, P.W.8 was cutting grass in the field. He along with one Mani, the respondent herein and the deceased were engaged in storing grains. While P.W.8 was taking grains on his head for the third time, one Saroja came and stated that Vennila had consumed poison. They found Vennila lying unconscious. P.W. 1 and others took Vennila to Kandachipuram village where there was no doctor available. Then they went to Tirukoilur and took Vennila to one Akber Ali who was a private doctor. On examination, P.W.9 doctor stated that Vennila had passed away already. Then, they brought the dead body to their house. Subsequently, P.W. 1 and others went to Arakandanallur Police Station and gave a statement to P.W. 13 Sub Inspector of Police at about 12.00 mid-night, who registered the same in Crime No.221 of 1988 under Sec. 174 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Ex.P-5 is the printed first information report. Ex.P-1, complaint given by P.W. 1 and Ex.P-5 were sent to the Revenue Divisional Officer, Tirukoilur. 4. P.W. 14 Revenue Divisional Officer on receipt of reports on 19. Ex.P-5 is the printed first information report. Ex.P-1, complaint given by P.W. 1 and Ex.P-5 were sent to the Revenue Divisional Officer, Tirukoilur. 4. P.W. 14 Revenue Divisional Officer on receipt of reports on 19. 1988, took up the investigation in this case and had been to Alambadi Village and held inquest over the dead body in the house of P.W.1. Having examined P.Ws. 1, 2, 5, 7, 8 and other witnesses, he prepared the inquest report Ex.P-13 and set the same to the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Tirukoilur. He also sent the dead body to conducting autopsy to the Government Hospital, Tirukoilur along with Ex.P-12 requisition, through a police constable. 5. P.Ws. 11 and 12 are doctors attached to the Government Hospital, Tirukoilur. On receipt of Ex.P- 12, they conducted autopsy over the dead body and found no external or internal injuries on the body. Viscera was found with bad odaur of phosphorus and other organs was found pale. Then the viscera was preserved and sent for chemical analysis to Thanjavur and got the report Ex.P-4. Accordingly, it was found with endosulphan poisonous substance. Consequently, these two witnesses have opined that the deceased would appear to have died of consumption of poison, Endosulphan. Exs.P-3 and P-4 are the post-mortem certificate and another certificate given by doctors. P.W. 15 is the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Tirukoilur. On getting information of the registering the above case, he took up the investigation on 18. 1988, verified the statements recorded by P.W. 13 and inquest over the dead body was held by him and thereupon he altered the case into Secs.304(b) and 306 of the Indian Penal Code and examined all the witnesses. He arrested the accused and sent him to judicial custody. After having completed the investigation, he laid the final report against the accused for the offences above referred to. 6. When the accused was questioned under Sec.313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, on the basis of the incriminating portion of the evidence, appearing against him, he denied the same or his complicity in toto. 7. Having recorded the oral testimony of all prosecution witnesses and the documentary evidence relied on by them, in the context of the defence taken by the accused, learned trial Judge found the accused guilty for the offences with which he was charged and accordingly convicted and sentenced him as above referred to. 7. Having recorded the oral testimony of all prosecution witnesses and the documentary evidence relied on by them, in the context of the defence taken by the accused, learned trial Judge found the accused guilty for the offences with which he was charged and accordingly convicted and sentenced him as above referred to. Challenging the abovesaid conviction and sentence, the accused preferred an appeal before learned Sessions Judge at Cuddalore and on the reappraisal of the entire legal evidence adduced, learned Sessions Judge held candidly that the prosecution has totally failed to establish the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubts and that therefore acquitted him by setting aside the conviction and sentence recorded by the trial court. 8. Aggrieved at this, the parents of the deceased Vennila who were examined as P.Ws. 1 and 3 filed this revision, assailing the impugned judgment of acquittal passed by the lower appellate court for want of its legality and propriety under Secs.397 and 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 9. I have heard the Bar for the revision petitioners, attacking the impugned judgment of the lower appellate court in its entirety and learned Government Advocate who supports the impugned judgment, as the State has not come forward with any appeal or revision against the same. For and on behalf of the accused/respondent, though appearance was entered into by the Bar, non appeared or argued. However, the impugned judgment was attacked on behalf of the revision petitioners by Mr.Sankar, per contra, by Mr.A.N.Rajan, learned Government Advocate. 10. In the context of the above rival position, the question that arises before me for consideration is whether the finding given by the lower appellate court, reversing the judgment of the trial court, is vitiated with any illegality and impropriety, warranting interference of this Court under Secs. 397 and 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 11. Before proceeding to discuss the factual as well as the legal aspects of the case, it is worthwhile to note Sec.304(b) as well as 306, Indian Penal Code read with legal presumption provided by the statute. 397 and 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 11. Before proceeding to discuss the factual as well as the legal aspects of the case, it is worthwhile to note Sec.304(b) as well as 306, Indian Penal Code read with legal presumption provided by the statute. Sec.304(b), Indian Penal Code, dealing with dowry death reads like this: "Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of the marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or nay relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry such death shall be called "dowry death", and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death. Explanation: For the purposes of this sub-section ‘dowry’ shall have the same meaning as in Sec.2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. (2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life." Sec.306 reads like this: "If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable to fine." 12. The legal presumption envisaged by the statute with regard to the abatement of suicide by a married woman and also with regard to the dowry death is defined under Secs. 113(a) and 113(b) of the Indian Evidence Act which are extracted as follows: Sec. 113(a): "When the question is whether the commission of suicide by a woman had been abetted by her husband or any relative of her husband and it is shown mat she had committed suicide when a period of seven years from the date of her marriage and that her husband or such relative of her husband and subjected her to cruelty, the court may presume, having regard to all the other circumstances of the case, that such suicide had been abetted by her husband or by such relative of her husband. Explanation: For the purposes of this section ‘cruelty’ shall have the same meaning as in Sec.498-A of the Indian Penal Code." Sec. 113(b) reads like this: "When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman had been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death. Explanation: For the purposes of this section ‘dowry death’ shall have the same meaning as in Sec.304(b) of the Indian Penal Code." 13. A casual reading and minimum understanding of the above two provisions of the penal law and the corresponding statutory presumption clearly demonstrate and envisage the ingredient viz., the perpetration of the cruelty either by her husband or his relatives in connection with the demand of dowry, which would happen within the reasonable proximity so as to tend the criminal liability over any person within the orbit of above provision of law. If this position is clearly negatived, there will be no use in the above referred prosecution. It is, therefore, clear that if the prosecution has to mulct with criminal liability, against a husband or his relatives for the offences under Sec.306 or 304(b), Indian Penal Code, the prosecution has to establish firstly the cruelty being made or perpetrated against the wife in connection with demand of dowry and that element is made available at the first instance, then the prosecution has to strengthen it with legal evidence, by adducing proper and adequate evidence. If the basic concept of proving the cruelty in connection with the dowry demand or dowry death is not made out, then, I am at every difficulty to say that the prosecution is not entitled to have that legal presumption provided under Sec. 13(a) or 113(b) of the Indian Evidence Act. 14. Having looked into the evidence adduced in this case as discussed and analysed by the trial Judge as well as learned Appellate Judge, the three main areas in which the prosecution suffers very heavily and which goes to the root of the prosecution grains and there was nothing on record to show that there was an extraordinary atmosphere surcharged with informal attitudes comprehending any serious activities that had taken place. If the prosecution version is believed, I have no investigation to hold that the accused cannot at all be held liable for the offences either under Sec.306 or 304(b), Indian Penal Code for the mere reasoning that the basic ingredient viz., the demand for dowry by perpetration of cruelty or ill-treatment or totally missing in this case. In short to say, there was no link between the above two concepts. Snatching of the child from the hands of the wife by her husband is not unusual or uncommon in this country. But it is unusual when it has been established that it was done in an uncordial atmosphere. But, that was not made out in this case. Either panchayatars or other witnesses do not speak about the cruelty or the demand of dowry. The person who informed that the deceased was found consuming poison, has not been examined in the court to call out the truth. In my considered view, the non-examination of Saroja, who informed about the consuming of poison by the deceased, is a fatal and also goes to the root of the prosecution case. Post-mortem examination certificate and the evidence of the doctors clinchingly case at its very basis, are as follows: (1) There was no iota of legal evidence at all to say or presume that the respondent/ accused, or his parents or his relatives demanded dowry by way of cycle, watch, etc. at any point of time for the deceased Vennila or her parents. The view of learned Judge in this regard is quantified by the fact that the first information report was given at the earlier point of time during midnight by a person none other than the mother of the deceased. It does not contain a single word about the dowry demand and Cruelty and so on and what has been spelt out in the same is that her daughter had consumed poison and that therefore, whatever the claim made by P.W. 1 or P.W.3 subsequently was a later thought. It is the embellishment schemed out subsequently at the behest of some one who got interest in the prosecution. Therefore, the approach adopted by learned appellate judge in accepting the genuineness of the first information report is correct and the same cannot be deemed to be perverse or otherwise. It is the embellishment schemed out subsequently at the behest of some one who got interest in the prosecution. Therefore, the approach adopted by learned appellate judge in accepting the genuineness of the first information report is correct and the same cannot be deemed to be perverse or otherwise. Secondly, the odd theme of prosecution is that immediately prior to the consumption of poison by the deceased, all were found in a very congenial atmosphere by engaging, working, chaffing, and storing prove the fact that the deceased would have consumed poison, as a result of which she died. But the cause and reason for this is yet to be known and has not been spoken to by the prosecution witnesses and it has not been totally unearthed by the investigating agency in this case. Thirdly, some of the statements recorded by P.W. 13 reveal that there are some elements. Even though let it be as it is noticed, it was done on the next morning, about 12 hours after the occurrence, which is more considerable time to poison the minds of the affected persons in such a prediction to rope the accused by interested persons. For all these reasonings, learned appellate judge has perfectly, correctly and justifiable held that the prosecution has miserably and virtually failed to establish the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubts. While holding so, there were no reasonings, evidence, and circumstances established before learned appellate judge and in this context, I do not come across with any legal lapses or impropriety in the impugned judgment of acquittal. In short, this revision lacks any merit. 15. In the result, for all the foregoing reasonings, the revision fails and accordingly, the same is dismissed. The judgment of acquittal rendered by learned appellate judge in C.A.No. 122 of 1990 dated 13. 1991 is hereby confirmed and maintained.