JUDGMENT : A. CHAKRABARTI, J. 1. The order dated 21.9.1990 passed by the Respondent No. 2 at Annexure No. 11 to the writ petition and the order dated 12.7.1989 passed by the Respondent at Annexure No. 8 to the writ petition have been challenged in the present writ petition. 2. As appears from the record, the Petitioner was appointed as Routine Grade Assistant in the Respondents-University on 4.12.1976 (Annexure No. 1 to the writ petition). Such appointment was said to be purely temporary and was time-bound. But, admittedly the employment continued even beyond February, 1977 as was indicated in the appointment letter. Upon creation of certain more posts of Routine Grade Assistant on 22.8.1980, a resolution was taken by the Executive Council of the University on 10.1.1981 resolving the adjustment of the service of the Routine Grade Assistants. The Petitioner was promoted to the post of Junior Assistant. He earned his due increment and was allowed to cross the efficiency bar by communication order dated 18.6.1988. According to the Petitioner, being highly qualified person and dedicated to his service, the Petitioner was elected as General Secretary of the Employees' Welfare Society, Rohilkhand University and due to certain activities in his capacity, including levelling charges against the Registrar, Rohilkhand University, Bareilly for corruption, embezzlement and nepotism by letter dated 19.6.1989, the Petitioner earned annoyance and on 10.7.1989 the officer on special duty (Administration) called for an explanation of the Petitioner in regard to certain charges levelled by him in a letter written by the Petitioner against the officers of the University. The said letter was received by the Petitioner on 11.7.1989 and even before he could submit his explanation, the Petitioner was transferred from the account Section to the despatch department of the General Administration Section, such transfer was on 11.7.1989. The Petitioner assumed his charge in his transferred department at 4.30 p.m. and he was dismissed from service barely twelve hours thereafter by a letter issued by the Registrar on 12.7.1989. The appeal preferred by the Petitioner could not produce any result and without considering the relevant facts, the appeal was dismissed which was communicated by letter dated 21.9.1990. 3. The Respondents filed counter-affidavit to which the Petitioner filed his rejoinder-affidavit. 4. Heard the learned Counsel for the Petitioner as also the learned Counsel for the Respondents and considered the materials on record. 3. The Respondents filed counter-affidavit to which the Petitioner filed his rejoinder-affidavit. 4. Heard the learned Counsel for the Petitioner as also the learned Counsel for the Respondents and considered the materials on record. Parties agree that the writ petition may be disposed of finally at the stage of admission as affidavits have already been exchanged. 5. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner mainly contends that the Petitioner was appointed and thereafter his service was regularised by reason of his efficient discharge of duties and good conduct. The Petitioner was promoted to the next higher post, was given increment and was allowed to cross efficiency bar and these facts show conclusively that till June, 1989, there was no complaint against the Petitioner. 6. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner relies on the facts that only activities of the Petitioner in his capacity as General Secretary of the Union caused him to earn the dissatisfaction of the authorities. As the Registrar was not having the authority to terminate the service of the Petitioner so long the Petitioner was in the accounts section, he was transferred from accounts section to despatch department of the General Administration section by letter dated 10/11.7.1989. The quick succession of the matter of issuance of letter calling for explanation on 10.7.1989 followed by the transfer of the Petitioner by letter dated 10/11.7.1989 and dismissal on 12.7.89 conclusively show the mala-fide activity of the authorities. According to the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, the mala-fide is further apparent from the fact that several employees junior to the Petitioner have been allowed to continue and ostensible ground of termination shows that the Petitioner could not even be retrenched in the facts of the case. 7. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner draws attention of the court to certain materials on record. The allegations of the Petitioner against the Registrar on 19.6.1989 (Annexure No. 4 to the writ petition), Press Report on 6.7.1989 (Annexure No. 5 to the writ petition), show cause notice to the Petitioner on 10.2.89 (Annexure No. 6 to the writ petition), transfer of the Petitioner to a suitable department so that the Registrar could take action instead of Executive Council being transferred on 11.7.89 (Annexure No. 7 to the writ petition) and ultimately the impugned order of termination on 12.7.1989. The combined effect of these makes the case of mala-fide clear in the background of the fact that the Petitioner was allowed to cross efficiency bar through communication dated 18.6.1988. There is no material showing any change of circumstance leading to show cause and transfer of the Petitioner in quick succession within a period of two days and that too after the activities of the Petitioner as General Secretary against the authorities. The last one of such was the Press Report on 6.7.1989. 8. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner further stated that even according to the Respondents, the Petitioner was dismissed by reason of his unsuitability. Even If it be so, the unsuitability must be on the promoted post and as such, there could not be dismissal from service, at best there could be reversion to the lower post in his support, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner says that the fact of promotion to the superior post shows conclusively that the Petitioner was found suitable in the lower post and as such, there could not be termination of service by reason of unsuitability. 9. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner referred to the cases of Om Prakash Walia vs. Registrar Co-operative Societies, Lucknow, (1987) UPLBEC 621 and Radhakant Jha vs. Chief Commissioner and Others, (1987) 3 SCC 222 . 10. On behalf of the Respondents, it was contended that the Petitioner was not regularised as contended by the Petitioner and he was adjusted along with others. It has been stated that as no authority by name has been made party, no allegation of malice could be made in the said writ petition in support of such contention, reference was made to the case of State of Bihar and Another vs. P.P. Sharma, IAS and Another, (1992) 1 SCC 222. 11. Learned Counsel for the Respondents relied upon the case of State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Kaushal Kishore Shukla, 1991 (1) UPLBEC 152 and contended that the Petitioner, being a temporary employee, the fact that the Juniors are working, does not entitle the Petitioner to continue particularly when his service has been terminated because of his non-suitability. 12. Learned Counsel contended that no disciplinary proceeding was set up and only a show cause notice was issued and as such, the law laid down in the case of Kaushal Kishore (supra) still applies in full force. 13. 12. Learned Counsel contended that no disciplinary proceeding was set up and only a show cause notice was issued and as such, the law laid down in the case of Kaushal Kishore (supra) still applies in full force. 13. With regard to the claim of the Petitioner that his service could not be terminated for non-suitability, at best, he could be reverted, the learned Counsel for the Respondents contends that the temporary employment against a temporary post did not create any right and even on the ground of non-suitability, the Petitioner's service could be validly terminated and in this connection, the law laid down in the case of Radhakant Jha (supra) has been referred to. 14. As to Petitioner's having no right to the promoted post as he was a temporary employee, the learned Counsel for the Respondents also referred to the case of Triveni Shankar Saxena vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, (1992) 1 SCC 524. It has further been stated that the promotion of the Petitioner was not on the basis of assessment of quality but was a routine promotion. 15. Upon hearing the parties and considering the materials on record. I find that quick succession of events within three days in July, 1989 leads to a conclusion that there was a malice in the matter of activities of the respondents. The action of the petitioner in his capacity as General Secretary of the Union is not disputed, nor it has been disputed that on 10.7.1989 a show cause notice was issued to the petitioner for some of such activities as General Secretary. This show cause notice was followed in quick succession by transfer order dated 10/11.7.1989 and the dismissal order dated 12.7.1989. In view of such admitted facts, I do not think that fact of not making authorities parties by name disentitles the petitioner to make out the case. Actions challenged are the result of malice in law. Even on the admitted facts, malice becomes apparent, in such case the petitioner is entitled to challenge the termination order successfully making out a case of malice. Actions challenged are the result of malice in law. Even on the admitted facts, malice becomes apparent, in such case the petitioner is entitled to challenge the termination order successfully making out a case of malice. Reference may be made to the law as decided in the case of The Regional Manager and Another vs. Pawan Kumar Dubey, (1976) 3 SCC 334 , Smt. S.R. Venkataraman vs. Union of India and Another, (1979) 2 SCC 491 and Mahabir Auto Stores and Others vs. Indian Oil Corporation and Others, (1990) 3 SCC 752 . 16. I do not think any proper explanation for such actions within such a short span of time relating to the petitioner after the activities of the petitioner as General Secretary of the Union which admittedly annoyed the authorities and show cause notice was issued on 10.7.1989. No explanation has also been given by the respondents as to why because of the non-suitability in the superior post (even assuming to be true) did not make the respondents to revert the petitioner to the lower post. Extreme action of termination of service has not been explained. Mere right of the employer that the petitioner is a temporary employee against a temporary post does not explain the conduct of the employer. 17. In the aforesaid circumstances, I accept the contentions of the petitioner that the impugned termination of the petitioner is a result of malice and bias and that too by reason of the activities of the petitioner in his capacity of General Secretary of the said Union. 18. In such circumstance of malice and bias, even the service of a temporary employee cannot be terminated without following the principle of natural Justice and giving the employee opportunity of defending his case. 19. Accordingly, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The Impugned order dated 12.7.1989 passed by the Registrar, Rohilkhand University, Bareilly, respondent No. 1 at Annexure No. 8 to the writ petition is hereby quashed and the appellate order dated 26.7.1990 as communicated by letter dated 21.9.1990 at Annexure No. 11 to the writ petition is also hereby quashed. The petitioner is entitled to continue in service and to get salary in accordance with law.