ORDER A. R. TIWARI, J. - At the instance of the Commissioner of Sales Tax, Madhya Pradesh, the Appellate Tribunal (Board of Revenue) has referred the common question of law as extracted below, in these two reference applications under section 44 of the M.P. General Sales Tax Act, 1958, arising out of the order dated June 10, 1980 passed in Appeals Nos. 180 and 181-I of 1979. "Whether, on the facts and the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in holding that in view of the Tribunal's orders in the second appeal, the matter having become final under section 38(6) of the Act, the assessing authority could not reopen the assessment under section 19(1) of the Act." 2. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that M/s. Vinod Mills Co. Ltd., Ujjain, run a textile mill and have a branch styled as Naresh Ginning and Pressing Factory in which cotton is purchased and ginning is undertaken. Ginned cotton is transferred to textile unit for manufacture of cloth. The tax assessment officer levied purchase tax at 1 per cent on the purchased cotton in this branch for Rs. 25,09,535 for the year 1964 and Rs. 27,64,348 for 1965. Aggrieved, the assessee filed appeals before the Appellate Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax but without success. The assessee then filed second appeals before the Tribunal, on the contention that purchase tax should not have been levied on transfer of cotton to the head office after ginning for manufacture of cloth. It was contended that Notification No. 737-3694-V-SR dated March 31, 1959, exempted unginned cotton from purchase tax, if it was established that purchase was made for ginning within the State and ginned cotton was sold in the State of M.P. or in the course of inter-State trade. The Tribunal, however, rejected the contention on the linchpin that cotton had not been sold but utilised for manufacture of cloth. Thereafter, the case was reopened under section 19(1) of the M.P. General Sales Tax Act by the assessing authority holding that the purchase turnover was not correctly determined. It was maintained that the purchase tax was leviable on the total purchase price of cotton which was ginned and ginned cotton which was transferred to the textile section for manufacture of the cloth. The purchase price of cotton was determined at Rs. 29,56,873 for the year 1964 and Rs. It was maintained that the purchase tax was leviable on the total purchase price of cotton which was ginned and ginned cotton which was transferred to the textile section for manufacture of the cloth. The purchase price of cotton was determined at Rs. 29,56,873 for the year 1964 and Rs. 34,85,418 for the year 1965. Treating this difference as escaped assessment, the tax assessment officer proceeded to assess purchase tax under section 19(1) of the Act. The assessee then preferred the appeals to the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax against such step. The Deputy Commissioner allowed the appeal holding that the earlier order had attained finality under section 38(6) of the Act and as such, the proceedings of reopening under section 19(1) of the Act were unauthorised in law. The Additional Commissioner took up the matter in suo motu revision under section 39(2) of the Act. He held that purchase tax was leviable on the total purchase price of the cotton and not on the value of the ginned cotton transferred to the textile section. He also observed that the first and second appeals preferred against the original assessment were limited to the question whether purchase tax was leviable. It was, therefore, found that the assessing authority had the requisite authority under the law to reopen the case under section 19(1) of the Act as earlier proceedings did not involve the question of purchase turnover. The order passed by the tax assessment officer was thus, restored in suo motu revision. The assessee then preferred appeals to the Tribunal. In the Tribunal, the single Member, hearing this question, referred the three questions arising out of the proceedings to the Division Bench of the Tribunal. The Division Bench of the Tribunal decided the matter in favour of the assessee and against the revenue and held that the proceedings under section 19(1) of the Act were ab initio void as no new fact was brought on record and that the order of reassessment does not become sustainable by its confirmation in revision. The Tribunal, thus, allowed the appeal and set aside the orders of the Additional Commissioner, Sales Tax. The Commissioner of Sales Tax then submitted an application to the Tribunal for reference of the question to this Court. The Tribunal, at the instance of the department, thus, referred the common question in both the cases as referred above. 3. The Tribunal, thus, allowed the appeal and set aside the orders of the Additional Commissioner, Sales Tax. The Commissioner of Sales Tax then submitted an application to the Tribunal for reference of the question to this Court. The Tribunal, at the instance of the department, thus, referred the common question in both the cases as referred above. 3. We have heard Shri Anoop Choudhary, learned Advocate-General with Shri K. K. Gupta, Government Advocate for the department and Shri Goyal, learned counsel for the assessee. 4. Section 19(1) of the Act provides as under : "19(1). Where an assessment has been made under the Act or any Act repealed by section 52 and if for any reason any sale or purchase of goods chargeable to tax under this Act or any Act repealed by section 52 during any period has been under-assessed or has escaped assessment or assessed at a lower rate or any deduction has been wrongly made therefrom, the Commissioner, may, at any time within five calendar years from the date of order of assessment, after giving the dealer a reasonable opportunity of being heard and after making such enquiry as he considers necessary, proceed in such manner as may be prescribed to reassess within a period of two calendar years from the commencement of such proceedings, the tax payable by such dealer and the Commissioner may, where the omission leading to such reassessment is attributable to the dealer, direct that the dealer shall pay, by way of penalty in addition to the amount of tax so assessed, a sum not exceeding that amount." 5. Shri Choudhary very fairly conceded before us that what is actually decided in the order of assessment and confirmed by the appellate authority attains finality under section 38(6) of the Act and as such, the same question is not open to become subject-matter of reopening of reassessment under section 19(1) of the Act. He, however, added that, the initial proceedings of assessment and eventual appellate orders were limited to the question whether purchase tax was or was not leviable and the question regarding the purchase turnover on which such purchase tax was leviable was not the issue before the tax assessment officer or the appellate authorities. According to him, resort to section 19(1) of the Act pertained to the quantum and not on leviability of purchase tax. According to him, resort to section 19(1) of the Act pertained to the quantum and not on leviability of purchase tax. He, therefore, submitted that the Tribunal was not justified in incinerating the order passed by the Additional Commissioner of Sales Tax under section 39(2) of the Act. According to him, the scope of issue estoppel or res judicata was not properly understood and appreciated by the Tribunal. 6. Shri Goyal, on the other hand, contended that the Tribunal, on appreciation, found that the same issue was involved in the original proceedings which became final in terms of section 38(6) of the Act and as such, the proceedings under section 19(1) of the Act were validly held to be incompetent. 7. Whether the original proceedings and late proceedings under section 19(1) of the Act covered the same issue or not is a question of fact to be determined by the Tribunal on appreciation of facts and features as projected. 8. So far as the question of law as referred to is concerned, the correct legal position is that if the matter is the same, then it does become final under section 38(6) of the Act and as such, the assessing authority loses jurisdiction to reopen the assessment under section 19(1) of the Act. The crucial question is whether the matter is the same. 9. The principle of res judicata is indicated by section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. We quote the provision of section 11 : "No court shall try any suit or issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties, or between the parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title, in a court competent to try such subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue has been subsequently raised, and has been heard and finally decided by such court." 10. As regards the point of issue - "estoppel", the apex Court held in AIR 1970 SC 1381 (Lalta v. State of U.P.) as under : "Where an issue of fact has been tired by a competent Court on a former occasion and a finding of fact has been reached in favour of accused, such a finding would constitute an estoppel or res judicata against the prosecution, not as a bar to the trial and conviction of the accused for a different offence but as precluding the reception of evidence to disturb that finding of fact when the accused is tried subsequently even for a different offence which might be permitted by the terms of section 403(2), Criminal Procedure Code. Section 403 does not preclude the applicability of this rule of issue estoppel. Judgment in Cri. Revn. Applns. Nos. 410 and 413 of 1964, decided on 3-6-1966 (All.) reversed. AIR 1956 SC 415 ; AIR 1965 SC 87 ; (1900) 2 QB 758; 77 CLR 511; 96 CLR 62 and 1950 AC 458, Rel. on." 11. The ultimate goal in all matters more so in tax matters is to answer and to attain finality. That is the view laid down by the apex Court in [1977] 106 ITR 1 (SC); AIR 1977 SC 429 (Parashuram Pottery Works Co. Ltd. v. Income-tax Officer, Circle I, Ward "A", Rajkot, Gujarat). 12. The question, as referred in both these cases, does not show or reflect whether the matter in original assessment proceeding, which attained finality, and the matter in reassessment proceeding is identical or not. If identical, then there would be no jurisdiction to resort to section 19(1) of the Act and there would be bar under section 38(6) of the Act on the ground of finality as mandated by law. The proceeding under section 19(1) shall be competent only on showing that matter is different and not identical. The Tribunal is thus, required to appreciate and ascertain whether the question on leviability of purchase tax, as is said to be the only matter in assessment proceedings, and question of quantum of turnover for levy of purchase tax, as is contended to be the matter in reassessment proceedings is same matter as already adjudicated or is different matter open for reassessment under section 19(1) of the Act and suffering no bar under section 38(6) of the Act. 13. 13. Our answer to the question is in the affirmative if matter of both the proceedings is same and in the negative if matter is distinct and different. The Tribunal shall thus, record a definite finding whether or not matter in both the proceedings is same. It shall treat the cases as closed if the matter is found to be same, but shall proceed further if the matter is held to be different. 14. The answer is indicated yet we should desire to say in greater detail as to why we had to record the answer as affirmative an negative at the same time. 15. The orders dated February 24, 1977, passed by the Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax in appeal No. 22A/76-77 and 34A/74-75 (annexure F) held that proceeding under section 19(1) was without jurisdiction. This conclusion was based on the assumption that the assessing authority lacked jurisdiction to revise order of superior authority. The Additional Commissioner took the matter in suo motu revisions, registered as No. 94 and No. 55/Apar/DO/RSM/77-78 under section 39(2) and vacated two orders dated February 24, 1977, and restored orders dated September 23, 1974 and May 7, 1976, passed under section 19(1) on the ground of competence and escaped assessment by orders dated January 30, 1979 (annexure G). The assessee filed appeals Nos. 180 and 181/1-179 against the orders dated January 30, 1979. The learned President referred three questions to Division Bench of Tribunal on January 10, 1980 (Annexure D) which answered the questions in favour of the assessee on March 5, 1980 (annexure H). The Division Bench took the view that "where assessment has been confirmed and no new facts have been brought on record, it is not open to the assessing officer to initiate proceedings under section 19(1) (para 11 of the order dated March 5, 1980). In our view this manifests the attempt to escape from the crucial question. Luculently what was required to be noticed and dealt with is chronicled below : (a) Whether the matter of earlier order, tested under appeal and becoming final, and matter of reassessment on the basis of alleged escaped assessment or under-assessment was same or different ? (b) Whether the discovery of alleged difference in regard to quantum of purchase turnover was or was not "new fact" to permit or bar proceeding under section 19(1) ? (b) Whether the discovery of alleged difference in regard to quantum of purchase turnover was or was not "new fact" to permit or bar proceeding under section 19(1) ? (c) Whether expression "from the date of order of assessment" employed in section 19(1) meant "order of assessing officer or order of final appellate authority or Tribunal, as the case may be" for action and limitation ? 16. Question No. 1, referred to and considered by the Tribunal spoke of "levy of purchase tax" and not the point of exact quantum of purchase turnover as such. The question of law referred to this Court contains the expression like matter but does not say anything like same or different matter. Without such prefix before the word "matter", the question of law demonstrably remained obscure and misleading unrepresentative of exact controversy. This is why we deemed it proper to give qualified answer and required the Tribunal to record finding whether, according to it, "matter" of two proceedings is same or different and to proceed accordingly. Learned counsel for both the sides offered no dissent to this course. 17. In Poe v. Ullman (1961) 367 US 497, 508 it was observed that "justifiability is......not a legal concept with a fixed content or susceptible of scientific verification". So every case turns on its own facts. We have thus, attempted to highlight the content, as portrayed and controversy, as projected. 18. The Tribunal shall now act accordingly to deal with exact controversy and to do complete justice between the parties. 19. The omega is said. Yet a word more thereafter. The party, dissatisfied by the order of the Tribunal after this remand, will have freedom to resort to proper remedy as may be permissible under the law. Aggrieved party, may also approach the Tribunal to state the case and refer the question of law as may arise out of the fresh order to this Court and Tribunal may answer such prayer, if made, in conformity with law. 20. These cases thus, stand disposed of in terms indicated above, but without any orders as to costs. 21. The Tribunal is directed to make an endeavour to decide the case expeditiously say within nine months from the receipt of the copy of this order. 22. One copy of this order shall be retained in the connected Misc. Civil Case No. 255 of 1988 for ready reference. 21. The Tribunal is directed to make an endeavour to decide the case expeditiously say within nine months from the receipt of the copy of this order. 22. One copy of this order shall be retained in the connected Misc. Civil Case No. 255 of 1988 for ready reference. Applications disposed of accordingly.