V. Venkatachalam v. N. Radhakrishnan and Another — 1995 DIGILAW 86 (MAD)

Judgment :- The unsuccessful tenant before the Rent Controller as well as the Appellate Authority in R.C.O.P. No. 22/ 1990 dated 28-3-1991, and R.C.A. No. 8/ 1991 dated 19-8-1991, which confirms the order of eviction passed against him is the revision petitioner herein canvassing the impugned orders for their want of legality and propriety and correctness, by both Courts below. 2. A residential premises has been let out to the tenant-petitioner herein even during the lifetime of his father and the landlords, the respondents herein became the owner of this property by means of a purchase deed under Ex.P.1 dated 29-10-1986. These facts are not in dispute. Claiming that the revision petitioner-tenant is in arrears of rent and the rental premises in question was a old one, and since the respondents are residing in a rental premises, projecting those three grounds under Ss.10(2)(i), 10(3)(a)(i) and 14(1)(b) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act), the respondents-landlords have filed a petition for eviction before the Rent Controller. On contest and consideration of the entire evidence adduced and the rival contentions, the learned Rent Controller has accepted the case of the respondents-landlords in toto and passed the order of eviction. However, in the appeal preferred by the tenant before the, learned Appellate Authority canvassing the correctness of the order of eviction, the ground sought for under S.10(2)(i) of the Act was not pressed by the landlord-respondents herein. The remaining two grounds were persuaded. On hearing both the parties along with their respective evidence and contentions, the learned Appellate Authority concurred in his finding with the order of eviction passed by the learned Rent Controller and thereby confirmed the order of eviction passed against the tenant. Aggrieved at this, the present revision has been directed. 3. Before the Rent Controller, besides the evidence of PW 1 and PW1 and RW 1, on behalf of the respondents, 13 documents were relied on and marked as Exs.P.1 to P.13, of which Exs.P.8 and P.9 are the Commissioner's report and plan filed in R. C.O. P. No. 21 / 1987 on a prior occasion with Ex.P.9 a rough sketch showing the rental premises in question and its condition. Ex.P.10 is the plan showing the proposed reconstruction, and Exp.11 is the licence granted by the Municipal Authorities to the rental premises. Ex.P.10 is the plan showing the proposed reconstruction, and Exp.11 is the licence granted by the Municipal Authorities to the rental premises. The other documents show that the respondents have got means and of the requirement of the rental premises for own use and occupation and for demolition and reconstruction. On behalf of the revision petitioner-tenant, two documents Exs. R. l and R.2 were relied on before the learned Rent Controller besides his oral claim as RW1. 4. I have heard the rival contentions made by the Bar for the respective parties for and against the order, of eviction passed by both the courts below concurrently on two grounds. It is pertinent to note at this stage that both the Appellate Authority as well as the Rent Controller had concurred in their view and finding in identifying the requirements of the rental premises for the purpose of own use and occupation of the landlord viz., respondents herein under S.10(3)(a)(i) and the requirement of the rental premises for the purpose of immediate demolition and reconstruction as provided under S.14(1)(b) of the Act are bona fide in nature, genuine and true as provided by law and that, therefore, order of eviction was passed against the revision petitioner as he had virtually failed to establish the mala fides in the claim of the landlord-respondents if any. Mr. Srinivasan the learned counsel for the revision petitioner tenant dwells his attack that in identifying the bona fide nature of the requirement of the landlords one under S.14(1)(b) of the Act, both the Courts below had committed an error by placing reliance upon Exs.P.8 and P.9 which came into existence prior to the filing of this petition and that therefore, by basing reliance upon the said Commissioner's report pan, it cannot be ascertained the status and condition of the rental premises is question. The second attack projected by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner is that though the two grounds provided by the Act for eviction of the tenant is based on the concept of bona fide, since both are mutually exclusive, distinct and different in nature, cannot be clubbed together in one single petition in-seeking eviction of a tenant from the rental premises for the simple reason that if one ground is accepted, it would make the other ground automatically redundant and that, therefore, the cumulative effect of which goes to the root of the very matter, viz., the bona fide requirement of the landlord either for personal occupation or for immediate demolition and reconstruction. Inasmuch as the said aspect has not been considered by both courts below, the concurrent finding of order of eviction lacks every legal sanctity and the approach adopted by both the Courts are not correct; and erroneous according to the learned counsel. It is therefore under the circumstances; he wants this Court to interfere with the said impugned order in this revision. 5. However, Mr. Sathyanarayanan, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent landlord was strenuous all through in controverting the said, contention by stating that the landlords have established their case viz., the requirement of the rental premises for own occupation is true, genuine, based on immediate need, as he, himself was residing in a rented premises under the imminent threat of eviction by the legal process by the landlord of that premises and since he owns no other premises of any kind in Tirupur Town where the landlords' premises is situated, . his requirement for his immediate and own occupation cannot be doubted or suspected in any manner and that, therefore, he justifies the order of eviction passed by both the Courts below. With regard to the second contention raised on behalf of the revision petitioner, the learned counsel would controvert the same by contending that though Exs. P.8 and P.9 were of the year 1987, but filed by the learned Commissioner in a previous proceeding were marked only with the consent of the respective parties and the objection now, raised with regard to the proof and relevancy of the said documents cannot be allowed to be taken now for the reason that the revision petitioner had admitted the genuineness and correctness of Exs. P.8 and P.9 during the enquiry before the learned Rent Controller and only' in consequence thereof, the learned Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority considered the matter so elaborately and relied on them and that, therefore, the appellant cannot be allowed to take up such an objection in this revision. 6. In the context of the rival position above referred, the only point which arises for consideration in this revision is whether the impugned order passed by the Appellate authority confirming the order of eviction for any reason suffers from want of legality and impropriety and correctness and as such it is liable to be interfered with. 7. Before proceeding to consider the entire case on factual aspects, I may refer to the case law first decided in Ponnuswami Naicker v. K. Anandan, (1988) 101 Mad LW 31, in which a learned single Judge of this Court, while dealing with the identical facts and points has observed and held as follows: "It is no doubt true that the relief sought for under S.14(l)(b) of the Act is unnecessary in this case, since he has to succeed only on his showing that his requirement is bona fide as far as his personal occupation is concerned. Once that is proved, from the mere fact that there is a reference to S. 14(1)(b) of the Act, in the petition and an allegation to the effect that he is going to demolish the building to suit his purpose; it cannot be stated that the remedy available to him under S. 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act is taken away on the principle that the two reliefs are mutually exclusive." 8. The learned single Judge, in the above case law appears to have followed the ratio decided by the Supreme Court in Ramniklal Pitambardas Mehta v. Indradarnan Amratlal Sheth, 1964 AIR(SC) 1676, 1964 (8) SCR 1 , 1964 (5) GujLR 798, 1965 (2) SCJ 608 : 1964 AIR(SC) 1676, 1964 (8) SCR 1 , 1964 (5) GujLR 798, 1965 (2) SCJ 608). 9. Another learned single Judge of this Court in Nandan Brothers v. Kamaladevi Chandak, (1989) 2 Mad LJ 469, has observed on identical facts of that case, as here under:- "Whenever a landlord requires a building for the purpose of his own occupation, it does not mean that he should-occupy the building as it is. 9. Another learned single Judge of this Court in Nandan Brothers v. Kamaladevi Chandak, (1989) 2 Mad LJ 469, has observed on identical facts of that case, as here under:- "Whenever a landlord requires a building for the purpose of his own occupation, it does not mean that he should-occupy the building as it is. He is certainly entitled to carryout certain structural alienations after getting possession of the building according to law under the provisions of the Act before occupying the same or soon after occupying the same. The provisions under which a landlord is entitled to seek possession from the tenant on the ground of requirement for own occupation is under S. 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act in the case of a non-residential building. Under S. 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act there is no reference whatever to the condition of the building. The section does not prescribe that a landlord who has obtained possession of the building under the sub-section shall not in any factions as may be required to suit his convenience. The provision for requirement for purpose of demolition and reconstruction is found in S. 14(1)(b) of the Act. Under this sub-section, it is not necessary for the landlord today that the new building which is to be erected after the demolition of the existing building would be occupied by himself. In fact, it is now settled law that under the said sub-section, an application can be made by the landlord either on the ground that the building is so old and dilapidated that it requires to be demolished immediately or on the ground that he wants to augment his income and, therefore, requires the building for immediate demolition and erection of new structure which would fetch him a higher or lower income. That itself shows that a landlord who seeks possession of the building for demolition and reconstruction is entitled to get an order whether he proposes to occupy the new building himself or let out the same to tenants. 'The prayers are not mutually exclusive and they are complementary to each other. The fact that the respondent herein claimed in the notice that the building was dilapidated and that they proposed to demolish the same with a view to erect a new one does not militate against the bona fide of the claim made by the respondents and the petition for eviction." 10. The fact that the respondent herein claimed in the notice that the building was dilapidated and that they proposed to demolish the same with a view to erect a new one does not militate against the bona fide of the claim made by the respondents and the petition for eviction." 10. The Supreme Court very recently in M/s. P. ORR and Sons (Pvt.), Ltd. v. M/s. Associated Publisher (Madras) Ltd., (1990) 2 Mad LJ (SC) 12, has observed as follows: "Section 14(l)(b) is satisfied only if the building is bona fide required by the landlord for the "immediate", i.e., direct, sole and timely purpose of demolishing it with a view to erecting a new building on the side of the existing building, various circumstances such as the capacity of the landlord, the size of the existing building, the demand for additional space, the condition of the place, the economic advantage and other factors justifying investment of capital on reconstruction may be taken into account by the concerned authority in considering an application for recovery but the essential , and overriding consideration which, in the general interests of the public and for, the protection of the tenants from unreasonable eviction, the legislature has in mind is the condition of the building that demands timely, demolition by reason of the, extent of damage to its structure making it uneconomical or unsafe to undertake repairs. While the condition of the building by itself may, not necessarily establish the bona fide requirement under cl. (b), that condition is not only one of the various circumstances which may be taken into account by the Controller, but it is the essential condition in the absence of which it would not be possible for the landlord to prove that he has a bona fide requirement which is timely, directly and solely for the purpose of demolition of the building. The Act does not accept the requirement by the landlord as a bona fide requirement within the meaning of the provision unless the condition of the building, in the context of the relevant, circumstances, requires demolition. These are matters which are to be proved by evidence. The Act does not accept the requirement by the landlord as a bona fide requirement within the meaning of the provision unless the condition of the building, in the context of the relevant, circumstances, requires demolition. These are matters which are to be proved by evidence. It must, however, be emphasised, that in order to satisfy the test under S. 14(1)(b), the condition of the building need not have deteriorated to the extent of the building being in danger of crumbling down, but the condition must be such as to indicate a bona fide requirement for the timely, genuine and direct purposes of demolition and reconstruction. The personal requirement of the landlord or any member of his family for residence or business is not germane to Section 14 and that is an exercise which has no warrant in the law. The Controller in the present case asked himself the wrong question, he did not think that the condition of the building was relevant. He disregarded the clear admission of the landlord and other evidence as regards the sound condition of the building. The crucial, condition for demolition was thus absent. The Controller was totally misguided as to the conclusions which he reached. So, were the appellate authority and the High Court. It must be emphasised once again that in the construction of sections such as 10 and 14 of the Act, the Court must be guided by the overriding legislative object articulated in the preamble to the Act, that is" the control of rents of such buildings and the prevention of unreasonable eviction of tenants therefrom in the State of Tamil Nadu." The case laws above referred in my considered view, provide a clear and direct answer for the contentions raised by Mr. Srinivasan, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the revision petitioner. To respond his contention that the requirements felt out in both the grounds viz., one under Section 10(3)(a)(i), and another under Section 14(1)(b) which are though identical, but as was held and settled by now both are mutually and exclusively distinct and it cannot be clubbed together. It may be the remedy on the two similar grounds in one petition, rather than the other redundant in case if the other was found acceptable. It may be the remedy on the two similar grounds in one petition, rather than the other redundant in case if the other was found acceptable. But, that aspect does not go to the root of the controversy suspecting the very bona fide claim or the genuine requirement of the landlord either for the purpose of personal occupation or for immediate purpose of demolition and reconstruction. Therefore, this point in the light of the legal ratio as referred above has become out of point and as such under the circumstances, I do not propose to take that point as a tenable one to be canvassed in this case. 11. Coming to the gamut of the impugned order under this revision, I have to point out, in a way to provide an answer to the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner that Exs. P. 8 and P. 9 were relied upon by the parties before the Rent Controller, but no objection has been raised when they were produced and adduced as the legal evidence before the Court of law, the tenant ought to have objected for the same. However, it is seen that he has not done so. Therefore, they were marked and relied on. Even the contents of the same can be looked into for the aforementioned reasoning. It cannot now be said that it can be rejected. The reasoning for making such reliance was elaborately discussed and given by both the Courts below in an extensive manner. The report and plan was of the year 1987 and according to which admittedly, the status and condition of the building was fully identified by the Courts below. Therefore, ignoring the very contents and subtratum of the same to allege that the same cannot be looked into is not safe for any Court of law to sustain the very contention raised on behalf of the revision petitioner. It is, therefore, under such circumstances, I fully agree with both the Courts below in holding that the status and condition of the building has been clearly exposed by virtue of Exs. P. 8 and P. 9. If the condition of the building during 1987 was such unless a contrary plea has been taken, with reference to any embarrassments made, then on the date of passing the eviction order. P. 8 and P. 9. If the condition of the building during 1987 was such unless a contrary plea has been taken, with reference to any embarrassments made, then on the date of passing the eviction order. The condition of the building might have become still worse and more deteriorated in nature. Therefore, the factual aspects placed in the instant case is well within the ambit and all the force of the legal ratio pronounced by the Supreme Court held in M/s. P. ORR and Sons (Private) Limited v. M/s. Associated Published (Madras) Limited, (1990) 2 Mad LJ (SC) 12 referred above. As was decided by the learned single Judge in the above case laws, in so far as the requirement of the premises under Section 10(3)(a)(i) is concerned, I am constrained to hold that the courts below had elaborately discussed and found that the requirement of the premises by the landlord for his own occupation is bona fide, genuine, true and can be accepted without any hesitation. The very admitted fact that the respondent-landlord does not own any other building either residential or non-residential for his own occupation and that he is residing in a rental premises and has every threat of his landlord evicting him by legal process, itself clearly demonstrate the very bona fide nature of this landlord's claim under S. 10(3)(a)(i) and therefore we need not travel elsewhere in identifying the bona fide requirement. In short to say, after having considered carefully every one of the observations made by the learned Rent Controller as well as the Appellate Authority on the facts and evidence adduced and on materials, I am fully constrained to hold that there are no laches of any kind or illegality or impropriety in the order of eviction passed concurrently by the Courts below. No other point has been argued. As such, this revision lacks in merits. 12. In the result, the revision fails and is dismissed. Accordingly, the impugned order of eviction passed by both Courts below in R.C.O.P. No. 22/ 1990 on 20-3-1991 and in R.C.A. NO. 8/1991 on 19-8-1991 are hereby maintained. No other point has been argued. As such, this revision lacks in merits. 12. In the result, the revision fails and is dismissed. Accordingly, the impugned order of eviction passed by both Courts below in R.C.O.P. No. 22/ 1990 on 20-3-1991 and in R.C.A. NO. 8/1991 on 19-8-1991 are hereby maintained. However, in order to facilitate the tenant, as requested by the Bar, four months time is granted to the revision petitioner-tenant to vacate and hand over possession subject to the condition that he shall file a sworn affidavit within 15 days from the date of receipt of this order, before the learned Rent Controller that he would abide by the Court's decision held in this revision any by Courts below concurrently. On facts and circumstances there will be no order as to costs. Revision dismissed.