MANMOHAN SARIN ( 1 ) THIS is plaintiffs application under Order 22 Rules 4 and 9 read with Section 151 CPC for impleadment of the legal representatives, namely two sons of the sole deceased defendant as defendants. Further directions are sought to the proposed legal representatives to disclose the names of the other legal representatives of the deceased defendant. The facts in brief leading to the filing of the present application are as under:- (I)THE plaintiff had filed on 14-10-1994, a suit for specific performance of agreement to sell dated 8-9-1994 against the defendant in respect of the plot bearing No. E-14, Naraina Residential Scheme, Narain Vihar, New Delhi. In the alternative damages of Rs. 35,00,000. 00 were sought. It was the plaintiffs case that the agreed consideration was Rs. 4,00,000. 00 and a sum of Rs. 50,000. 00 had been paid at the time of agreement to sell and thereafter a sum of Rs. 2. 45 Lakhs was paid. Certain further payments were also pleaded. The plaintiff is in possessioon of the property. The defendant had denied the agreement to sell and receipt of consideration. It was claimed that the defendant was a widow, not knowing the English language and the plaintiff was a tenant in the premises and had got certain papers signed deceitfully. (II)THE defendant is reported to have expired on 8-2-1993. It is the plaintiff s case that it was only on 26-11-1993 that it learnt of the demise of the defendant. It is averred in the application that the counsel for the plaintiff repeatedly requested the counsel for the defendant to disclose the names of the legal representatives of the defendant, but the latter did not do so. The plaintiff even wrote a letter to the defendant s counsel, but there was no response. The plaintiff had therefore, sought the impleadment of the two legal representatives namely Shri Y. N. Bindra and Shri R. N. Bindra, who were already on record. The application was initially filed on 10. 2. 199, with court fee being affixed only on urgent application. The application was refiled on 16. 3. 1994 after removal of objections and making up deficiency in court fee. The application of the plaintiff is supported by an affidavit filed by one Mr, Rajbir Singh, Clerk of M/s Chandhiok and Associates, Advocates. The application was initially filed on 10. 2. 199, with court fee being affixed only on urgent application. The application was refiled on 16. 3. 1994 after removal of objections and making up deficiency in court fee. The application of the plaintiff is supported by an affidavit filed by one Mr, Rajbir Singh, Clerk of M/s Chandhiok and Associates, Advocates. ( 2 ) THE application is opposed by separate replies filed by the proposed legal representatives Shri Y. N. Bindra and Shri R. N. Bindra. The averments made in the plaint are refuted. The factum of the demise of the deceased was disclosed by the counsel for the defendant on 16-4-1993 as recorded in the orders passed on the said date. The plaintiff was therefore required to take necessary steps. Thereafter, a counsel had appeared on behalf of the counsel for the plaintiff on 8-7-1993, when adjournment was sought. Accordingly, the plaintiff s contention that it learnt of the demise of the defendant only on 26-11-1993, was false and contrary to record. It is denied that the plaintiff s counsel ever requested or wrote to the defendant s counsel to the names of the legal representatives to be furnished. It is further contended that the averments in the application that the proposed legal representatives were already on record is wrong. A number of other averments and allegations are made in the replies regarding the deceitful and fraudulent and criminal conduct of the plaintiff s director. It is not necesary to advert to the above allegations or plea of proposed L. Rs. that the finding of the Joint Registrar regarding date of knowledge being 8. 7. 1993 in order dated 22. 3. 1994 having not been assailed has become final, for the purpose of decision of this application. ( 3 ) LEARNED counsel for the plaintiff submitted that the plaintiff has paid the sale consideration and is in possession of the property in suit of which specific performance had been sought. It is submitted that it was only on 26-11-1993, that the plaintiff came to know about the death of the deceased. On 16-4-1993, none was present on behalf of the plaintiff and thereafter on 8-7-1993, a proxy counsel had appeared to seek adjournment. It is submitted that it was only on 26-11-1993, that the plaintiff came to know about the death of the deceased. On 16-4-1993, none was present on behalf of the plaintiff and thereafter on 8-7-1993, a proxy counsel had appeared to seek adjournment. Counsel for the plaintiff submits that having regard to the facts of the case, where the sale consideration is paid and the plaintiff is in possession, consideration of substantial justice should prevail and the application ought to be allowed and the delay be condoned. Counsel submits that even though a separate application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act had not been filed, the present application discloses sufficient cause for condoning the delay in bringing the legal representatives on record and it should also be treated as application under section 5 of the Limitation Act. He also relies on a judgment of R. C. Lahoti. J reported at 57 (1995) DLT Rakesh Kumar Jain and Others Vs. Devlnder Singh and Others in support ot his submission that while dealing with the applications seeking the condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act or for setting aside of the abatement under Rule 9 of order XXII CPC, the approach has to be liberal and judiciousguided by the paramountconsideration of not deprivinga litigant, adjudication of rights on merit. The above cited case was also one for specific performance and in the alternative for recovery of damage. The defendant No. 1 in the said case has expired on 24-5-1991, and this information was given by the defendants counsel on 16-7-1991. An application for substitution was filed on 26-8-1991. This was followed by application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act filed on November, 1992. Directions were, thereafter, issued to the counsel for the proposed legal representatives to disclose on affidavit the names of the legal representatives. The application was allowed. The Court observed that the defendant had died abroad and the plaintiff had been contesting the suit with diligence. Further that it could not be assumed that the plaintiff would permit the suit to abate by negligence, if they would have been aware of the death of defendant No. 1 and full particulars of the legal representatives of the deceased. Reliance was also placed on Union of India Vs. Further that it could not be assumed that the plaintiff would permit the suit to abate by negligence, if they would have been aware of the death of defendant No. 1 and full particulars of the legal representatives of the deceased. Reliance was also placed on Union of India Vs. Kundan AIR 1977 Delhi 38, wherein a Divison Bench of this Court had held that even an application for substitution could be treated in substance as one to set aside the abatement. Mr. Chadha also submitted that the office of the plaintiff remained closed since July, 1994 being in the basement of the building, which was waterlogged and there was thus disruption of the communication with the counsel. He referred in this regard to the facts mentioned in an application moved for restoration of the suit that had been dismissed in default. ( 4 ) COUNSELS for the proposed legal representatives Mr. Kuldeep Pabley and Mr. Ashok Kashyap submitted that the plaintiff had failed to disclose any cause leave aside sufficient cause for the delay in making the application, which was hopelessly barreed-by limitation. Gross negligence was writ large. The factum of the death of defendant had been disclosed on 16. 4. 1993. It was the plaintiff s own negligence that no steps were taken to avail of information available on record. Learned counsel for the plaintiff had even appeared on 8. 7. 1993 and taken an adjournment yet the application was filed initially on 10. 2. 1994, which was allowed to remain under objections. The objections were removed beyond the permissible period. The date of filing of application has therefore to be taken as 16. 3. 1994. Counsel for the proposed L. Rs. relied on cases Union of India Vs. Kundan (Supra); Kartar Chand Vs. Jawala Singh AIR 1979 Delhi 49, Ratanchand Vs. Askar Nawaz Jung and Others AIR 1976 AP 112 Reliance was placed on State of Gujarat Vs. Sayad Mohd. Bakir EL Edrross AIR 1981 SC 1921 in support of the contention that a strong case on merits of the suit was not a ground for condonation of delay. The case relied on by the plaintiff that is Rakesh Kumar Jain and Others Vs. Devinder Singh and Others (Supra) was clearly distinguishable on facts. Sayad Mohd. Bakir EL Edrross AIR 1981 SC 1921 in support of the contention that a strong case on merits of the suit was not a ground for condonation of delay. The case relied on by the plaintiff that is Rakesh Kumar Jain and Others Vs. Devinder Singh and Others (Supra) was clearly distinguishable on facts. ( 5 ) HAVING heard the learned counsel for the parties and Perused the record, I find that the present application is hopelessly barred by limitation. Once, counsel for the defendant had recorded the factum of the defendant s death on 16-4-1993, the plaintiff or its counsel cannot take any advantage out of their own negligence and default in not being present on 16-4-1993 or not inspecting the Court file till 8-7-1993 or thereafter till 26-11-1993. This is a case where the alleged ignorance of factum of death from 16. 4. 1993 is either a self induced one or flowing directly from the plaintiffs negligence. It cannot be converted into sufficient cause for purposes of condonation of delay and setting aside abatement. A cause arising from negligence would not be sufficent cause. Assuming that even if the plaintiff learnt of the. defendant demise on 8-7-93, when counsel appeared or even on 26-11-1993, the application came to be filed in accordance with law only on 16-3-1994, when the plaintiff after initial filing on 10-2-1994 removed the objections beyond the permissible period. There is not even a whisper in the application for this delay. It is thus clear that the application required to be filed within 90 days of death i. e. 8. 2. 1993 was filed on 16-3-1994 much beyond time. The plaintiff s contention that he requested the counsel for the defendant many times for the names of the defendant is denied by the defendant. Moreover, the plaintiff has not produced any communication on record which he claims to have adressed to the defendant s counsel for furnishing of the names. Moreover the application is not supported by an affidavit by the director of the plaintiff. It is filed with an affidavit of the clerk of the counsel. The plaintiffs averment that the two proposed legal representatives are already on record is also incorrect. Learned counsel s contention that since the office of the plaintiff was waterlogged since July, 1994, does not help the plaintiff since the application is presented in February, 1994. It is filed with an affidavit of the clerk of the counsel. The plaintiffs averment that the two proposed legal representatives are already on record is also incorrect. Learned counsel s contention that since the office of the plaintiff was waterlogged since July, 1994, does not help the plaintiff since the application is presented in February, 1994. Above all, I find on perusal of the written statement that the names of the legal representatives of sole defendant Mrs. Nirmal Kanta are disclosed in para 2 of the written statement, which is as under: -. ls1 "the defendant is the widow of late Shri Trilok Nath. The following (a) Asha Talwar W/0 Dr. J. K. Talwar aged 49 years. (b) Shri Y. N. Bindra aged 41 years. (c) Smt. Rama Puri W/0 Shri Vinod Kumar Puri and (d) Dr. R. N. Bindra aged 50 years are the children of the deceased. " The names of the legal representatives had been disclosed in the written statement. Yet the plaintiff failed to move the application for bringing the legal representatives on record, the impleadment of daughters of deceased had not even been sought till date. This also belies the plaintiffs version of seeking the names of the legal representatives from the counsel of the defendant. I have proceeded on the basis that the present application under order 22 Rules 4 and 9 can be treated also as one to set aside the abatement. Further that the necessity of an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act could be dispensed with if the application itself disclosed sufficient grounds for condonation of delay. Even then, I find that this is a case where the plaintiff has been grossly negligent and has placed no material whatsoever on record to make out sufficient cause for condonation of delay in bringing the legal representatives on record. ( 6 ) A liberal approach to do substantial justice between the parties of not allowing merits to case to suffer, does not allow us at the same time to ignore the obligation of the plaintiff to be diligent. I have looked in vain at the record to find any plausible ground for condoning the delay. The negligence of plaintiff is writ large on the record. The plaintiff has slept over and failed to implead the legal representatives on record despite knowledge of particulars of L. Rs. I have looked in vain at the record to find any plausible ground for condoning the delay. The negligence of plaintiff is writ large on the record. The plaintiff has slept over and failed to implead the legal representatives on record despite knowledge of particulars of L. Rs. and factum of death of defendant having been placed on record. The application does not disclose any ground or sufficient cause by which the delay could be condoned. The application is not even supported with an affidavit of either the plaintiff or the counsel. In view of the foregoing discussion, I am constrained to hold that this is a case where no ground is made out for condoning the delay in bringing the legal representatives on record or for setting aside the abatement. The application has no merit and is dismissed,