JUDGMENT Altamas Kabir, J. A point of considerable interest has been raised in these four writ applications which have been taken up for disposal together as they involve common questions of law and the facts are also similar in nature. 2. In all these four cases, the petitioners acquired the respective premises owned by them by purchase at different points of time and a common challenge has been thrown to the vires of clause (i) of sub-so (2) of s. 180 of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act, 1980, hereinafter referred to as "the 1980 Act". 3. In the case of Shree Mahamaya Mining and Industries Pvt. Ltd., the petitioner company appears to have purchased premises No. 28, Hindustan Road, Calcutta, on 21st September, 1991, at a consideration of Rs. 58, 00,000/-. According to the petitioners, at the time of purchase of the said property there was an existing structure with foundation and construction upto plinth level with R.C.C. pillars upto the ground floor roof level. At the time of purchase, the existing Annual Valuation of the premises was Rs. 7,030/-, which was in effect from the third quarter of 1983-84. 4. On 11th August, 1983, the petitioners were served with a notice by the Calcutta Municipal Corporation, hereinafter referred to as "the Corporation", under sub-so (4) of s. 184 of the 1980 Act informing them that the Annual Valuation of the premises had been revised and re-assessed at Rs. 4,06,000/- with effect from the third' quarter of 1991-92, inter alia, on account of change of ownership, under S. 180(2)(i) read with S. 180(3) of the 1980 Act. 5. The petitioners appear to have filed an objection on 16th August, 1993, against such revaluation, which was heard and disposed of by the Assistant Assessor XVIV on 19th August, 1993, by confirming the valuation of Rs. 4,06,000/-. 6. In the case of Mis. Avenue Properties (P) Ltd., the petitioner company appears to have purchased premises No. 11/1, Judges' Court Road, Calcutta, on 16th July, 1991. The premises was in occupation of various tenants who continued to be in occupation of their respective portions even after such purchase. 7. On 29th November, 1992, a special notice under S. 184(3) of the 1980 Act was issued by the Corporation to the Vendor of the petitioner Company, wherein the proposed Annual Valuation was assessed at Rs.97,2001- from the first quarter of 1989-90. 7. On 29th November, 1992, a special notice under S. 184(3) of the 1980 Act was issued by the Corporation to the Vendor of the petitioner Company, wherein the proposed Annual Valuation was assessed at Rs.97,2001- from the first quarter of 1989-90. The petitioners filed an objection to the said proposed valuation on 1st December, 1992. 8. Thereafter, on 17th March, 1993, the petitioners were served with another Special notice under S. 184(4) of the 1980 Act informing them that the premises had been revalued and the Annual Valuation had been re-assessed at Rs. 8,64,000/- from the third quarter of 1991-92 inter alia on the basis of change of ownership under S. 180(2)(ii) read with S. 180(3) of the 1980 Act. 9. An objection filed by the petitioners against such re-valuation was heard and disposed of by the Assistant Assessor, Division XXII, and the valuation was reduced to Rs. 5,75,640/- from the third quarter of 1991-92. 10. An appeal preferred by the petitioners against such revaluation, being M.A.A. No. 159 of 1993, is still pending before the Municipal Assessment Tribunal. 11. M/s. G.R. Hotel (P) Ltd. claims to have purchased premises No.8B, Royd Street, Calcutta, in 1992 with the intention of running a hotel therein. According to the petitioner Company the said premises has been left in the said condition as it was in prior to purchase and the nature and character and user of the said property has not been changed in any manner whatsoever. 12. The name of the petitioner Company was duly mutated in the records of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation and the petitioner Company was paying the rates and taxes as fixed previously in respect of the said property. 13. On 11th June, 1993, the petitioner Company was served with a notice under s. 184(4) of the 1980 Act whereby it was informed that the Annual Valuation of the property had been re-assessed as Rs. 4.42,800/as against the previous assessment of Rs. 16,200/-, in purported exercise of the powers under s. 180(2)(i) of the 1980 Act. 14. It appears that an objection was filed by the petitioner Company against such enhancement of the Annual Valuation. 15. 4.42,800/as against the previous assessment of Rs. 16,200/-, in purported exercise of the powers under s. 180(2)(i) of the 1980 Act. 14. It appears that an objection was filed by the petitioner Company against such enhancement of the Annual Valuation. 15. In Roma Sircar's case, premises No. 58/ID Tollygunge Road, Calcutta-33, was purchased by the petitioners by a registered conveyance dated 9th March, 1987, and it is their specific case that they are in occupation of the entire premises and there is no tenant in any portion thereof. At the time of purchase of the property the Annual Valuation of the said premises was RSi, 1,118/-. 16. After acquiring the premises, the petitioners applied for mutating their names in the records of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation, but the premises continues to be in the name of the erstwhile owners. In October, 1987, the petitioners received a notice under s. 182 of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act, 1951, read with s.179(i) of the 1980 Act informing the petitioners that their objection to enhancement of the Annual Valuation was to be considered by the Hearing Officer on 15th October, 1987. 17. According to the petitioners, they were subsequently. informed that the Annual Valuation had been determined as Rs. 1,296/- with effect from 2nd quarter of 1977-78, and as Rs. 4,752/- with effect from the 2nd quarter of 1983-84. Thereafter, the petitioners were served with yet another notice under s. 184(4) of the 1980 Act informing the petitioners that the Annual Valuation had been enhanced to Rs. 16,200/with effect from the 4th quarter of 1987-88. The ground as given for such revision of the Annual Valuation was that substantial additions and alterations and improvement to the existing buildings had been made by the petitioners. 18. Appearing in support of the writ petitioners, Mr. Pradip Kumar Ghosh, learned Senior Advocate, firstly drew the attention of the Court to s. 179 of the 1980 Act which deals with periodic assessment of lands and buildings. 18. Appearing in support of the writ petitioners, Mr. Pradip Kumar Ghosh, learned Senior Advocate, firstly drew the attention of the Court to s. 179 of the 1980 Act which deals with periodic assessment of lands and buildings. Sub-section (1) of s. 179 provides that the Annual Value of any land or building situated in any 'ward' of the Corporation, which has been determined before and is in force on the date of commencement of the Act, namely, 4th January, 1984, shall remain in force and shall be deemed to be the Annual Value for the purpose of assessment of consolidated rate until a fresh Annual Valuation was made under the Act. Subsection (2) of s. 179 provides that subject to the other provisions of Chapter XII of the 1980 Act, the Annual Valuation would remain in force in respect of each ward of the Corporation for a period of 6 years and shall have effect from the beginning of the quarter of a year ending on 30th June or 30th September or 31st December or 31st March, as the case may be, following that in which a notice under sub4s. (2) of s. 184 is issued. Section 179 also empowers the Municipal Commissioner to revise the Annual Valuation of such land or building on the expiry of the aforesaid period. 19. Mr. Ghosh then drew my attention to s. 180 of the 1980 Act which deals with intermediate revision of assessment during the period when an assessment continues in force in terms of s. 179 of the said Act. 20. Mr. Ghosh urged that mere change of ownership, as indicated in clause (i) of sub-so (2) of S. 180 of the said Act, without the occurrence of any of the taxable events referred to in clauses (ii) to (viii) thereof, would not by itself provide any ground for revision of the Annual Valuation already in force. Mr. Ghosh also urged that such change of ownership could at best be the reason for the taxable events referred to in clauses (¢i) to (viii), but was not a taxable event in itself. 21. Mr. Mr. Ghosh also urged that such change of ownership could at best be the reason for the taxable events referred to in clauses (¢i) to (viii), but was not a taxable event in itself. 21. Mr. Ghosh urged that in order to attract the provisions relating to revision of the Annual Valuation there must either be a change in the user of the property or the rents payable therefore, or a splitting up of the holding, which need not be dependant on change of ownership. 22. Mr. Ghosh contended that clause (I) of sub-so (2) of S. 180 of the 1980 Act could not exist in isolation since change of ownership could not by itself be the trigerring mechanism for revision of the Annual Valuation. 23. Mr. Ghosh pointed out that the different circumstances in which an intermediate revision of the Annual Valuation could be made, as enumerated in clauses (ii) to (viii) of s. 180 of the 1980 Act, all relate to taxable events, except for the ground given in clause (i) of sub-so (2) of S. 180, which Mr. Ghosh pointed out was not a taxable event since there was no change in the user of the properties involved or the rents derived therefrom, or even splitting up of the holdings and only the ownership of the entire building or land had changed. Mr. Ghosh reiterated that mere change of ownership of land or building was not a taxable event and could not be the basis for an intermediate reassessment of the Annual Valuation thereof. 24. Mr. Ghosh pointed out that the effect of the change in ownership was merely to allow the new owner to possess the property and to derive the benefits therefrom. If, however, there was a change in the nature of user of the said property, or even where the rents had been decreased or enhanced, the question of causing an intermediate revision may arise and not otherwise. 25. Mr. Ghosh questioned the vires of clause (i) of sub-so (2) of s.180 of the 1980 Act on the ground that the same could not be the basis of effecting a change in the Annual Valuation of the property. 26. Referring to s. 171 of the 1980 Act, Mr. Ghosh submitted that the same was the charging section which vested the Corporation with powers to impose a consolidated rate on lands and buildings. Mr. 26. Referring to s. 171 of the 1980 Act, Mr. Ghosh submitted that the same was the charging section which vested the Corporation with powers to impose a consolidated rate on lands and buildings. Mr. Ghosh urged that the expression "consolidated rate" is a special expression since it is really in the nature of a tax payable in respect of lands and buildings. Mr. Ghosh pointed out that the consolidated rate was calculated on the basis of the Annual Valuation of the land or building which was 'to be arrived at by one of the three recognised methods namely (i) Comparative Method, (ii) Contractors Method, and (iii) Unitary Method. Mr. Ghosh pointed out that the first method involved comparison of rents paid either for the building or of a building of a similar kind. The Contractors Method was to estimate the rent which a tenant would have to pay if the same were let out to him by a contractor. The Unitary Method involved valuation on the basis of units of things 'in use in the premises. 27. Mr. Ghosh submitted that in each of the said methods, the object was to arrive at the letting value of the premises which would form the basis of arriving at the Annual Valuation of the property. 28. Mr. Ghosh urged that the Annual Valuation of a land or a building for the purposes of the 1980 Act had to be ca1culated on the value at which it may be let and could not be said to be synonymous with the price which the property might fetch. 29. In support of his said contention, Mr. Ghosh referred to and relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Patel Gordhandas Hargovindas & Ors. vs. The Municipal Commissioner, Ahmedabad and A nother, reported in AIR 1963 SC at Page 1742, wherein the usage of the expression "rate" has been considered. Although, holding that the same was a kind of tax, the Supreme Court observed that it was really a rate imposed on lands and buildings which amounted to a tax not on their capital value, but on their Annual Valuation: It was also observed that whenever the word "rate" is used with respect to local taxation, it means a tax on the Annual Value on lands and buildings. 30. Mr. 30. Mr. Ghosh also questioned the vires of the aforesaid provisions on the ground of legislative competence having regard to Entry 49 of List 2 of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India as against Entry No. 86 of List 1 of the said Schedule. It was pointed out by Mr. Ghosh. that Entry No. 49 of List 2 of the Seventh Schedule empower9 the State to legislate on matters relating to taxes on lands and buildings, as distinct from Entry No. 86 of List 1 of the said Schedule, which empowers the Parliament to enact laws relating the taxes on the capital value of the assets, exclusive of agricultural land, of individuals and companies. 31. Mr. Ghosh pointed out that while legislation relating to Entry No. 86 of List 1 was in the nature of a personal tax, Entry No. 49 of List 2 of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution related to taxes on lands and buildings, which could not be equated. Mr. Ghosh submitted that the two were distinctly different in that while one related to taxation on an individual's personal income, the other related wholly to a tax imposed on a land or building which had nothing to do with the ownership thereof as such. 32. Mr. Ghosh submitted that by including the consideration of a transfer as a basis for reassessment and intermediate revision of the Annual Value of a land or building, the State Legislature had "introduced a personal element of ownership involving the income of an 'individual, which, in fact, was beyond the legislative competence of the State Legislature, as it came within the purview of Entry No. 86 of List No. 1 of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. 33. In support of his aforesaid contention Mr. Ghosh relied upon the decision of! the Supreme Court in the well-known case of D. G. Gouse & Co. (Agents) Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Kerala & Another, reported in AIR 1980 SC at page 271. 33. In support of his aforesaid contention Mr. Ghosh relied upon the decision of! the Supreme Court in the well-known case of D. G. Gouse & Co. (Agents) Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Kerala & Another, reported in AIR 1980 SC at page 271. By the said decision, several similar matters questioning the provisions of the Kerala Buildings Tax Act, 1975, were disposed of on the finding that the Act had been enacted by the State Legislature by virtue of Entry 49 of List 2 of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution and was in no way hit by a tax or impost levied on the total assets of an individual which would fall within the purview of Entry 86 of List 1 and would, therefore, be beyond the legislative competence of the State Legislature. It was held that a tax directly on one's lands and buildings would not be a tax under Entry 86 of List- 1. 34. Mr. Ghosh urged that the very fact that the tax was in the form of rates imposed on a property by the State Legislature, would immediately exclude the said tax from the purview of tax leviable on an individual's income. Mr. Ghosh urged that the introduction of the price element for the purpose of arriving at the Annual Valuation of a land or building was, therefore, wholly contrary to the accepted methods of valuation of properties and could not be described as a taxable event for the purpose of re-assessing the Annual Value. Mr. Ghosh urged that there was no nexus between change of ownership and the object sought to be achieved, namely, assessment of Annual Value for the purpose of imposition of rates and taxes in the property. 35. In this regard, Mr. Ghosh also referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of K.T. Moopil Nair vs. State of Kerala, reported in AIR 1961 SC at Page 552, wherein while considering the provisions' of Article 265 of the Constitution, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the State could not levy or collect a tax, except by authority of law, that is, the legislative competence of the legislature to impose a tax and to authorise the collection thereof. 36. Mr. 36. Mr. Ghosh also referred to the Bench decision of the Mysore High Court in the case of P. Bhubaneswaria vs. State of Mysore (AIR 1965 Mysore Page 170) in this regard. 37. Mr. Ghosh then urged that the provisions of s. 180(2)(i) of the 1980 Act gave rise to hostile discrimination, inasmuch as, there was a wide disparity between the Annual Valuation arrived at by all the other methods, prescribed in s. 174 of the 1980 Act and on account of change of ownership. Mr. Ghosh urged that modes could differ, but the ultimate object was to arrive at the rateable value of the property for the purpose of determining the Annual Valuation. It was contended that, in this perspective, the attempt to arrive at the Annual Value on the basis of the market price of the property was entirely absurd and discriminatory. 38. Mr. Ghosh urged that as would be evident from s. 174 of the 1980 Act, the methods prescribed for determination of Annual Valuation in all cases, except for the mode prescribed in sub-so (4A), are aimed at finding out the grosst annual rent which the property is expected to fetch. Only in cases where the same cannot be determined, the method prescribed in sub-so (4A) is to be resorted to. But, in no case, has the element of market value of the property on transfer, been included as a method for determining the Annual Valuation. 39. In support of his aforesaid contention, Mr. Ghosh referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Dewan Daulat Rai Kapoor vs. New Delhi Municipal Committee & Anr., reported in AIR 1980 SC at Page 451, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court while considering the question relating to determination of Annual Value under the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911, held that the Annual Value of a premises would have to be determined on the basis of the standard rent which the premises was likely to fetch and not the amount of rent actually paid, upon the reasoning that the landlord could not expect to receive a rent higher than the standard rent determinable under the Rent Control Act. It was also held that the same would also held good in case of a tenant who had lost his right to apply for fixation of standard rent and self-occupation by the owner, and the assessing authority would, in either case, have to arrive at its own figure regarding the standard rent by applying the principles laid down in the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, for determination of the standard rent and determine the Annual Value on the basis of the figure arrived at as standard rent. 40. Mr. Ghosh urged that the same principle had been considered by the Supreme Court in the case of Dr. Balbir Singh vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, reported in AIR 1985 SC at Page 339, and while holding that the rateable value of a building, whether tenanted or self-occupied, was limited by the measure of standard rent arrived at by the assessing authority, in certain cases', the reasonable rent expected may be less than the standard rent, and in such cases the rent which the owner reasonably expects would be the basis, of determining the rateable value, which could not in any event exceed the standard rent. 41. Mr. Ghosh then drew the attention of the Court to the provisions of s. 4 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, which, inter alia, provides that a tenant shall, subject to the provisions of the Act, pay to the landlord the fair rent as fixed, or, in other cases, the rent agreed upon until the fair rent is fixed. 42. In this regard, Mr. Ghosh, also referred to a Bench decision of this Court in Corporation of Calcutta vs. East India Commercial Co. Pvt. Ltd., reported in AIR 1982 Cal at p 479, wherein the decision of the Supreme Court in Devan Daulat Rai' Kapoor's case was sought to be distinguished in the light of the provisions of the aforesaid Act, which recognised payment of contractual rent and made it obligatory on the tenant pay the said rent till such time as the fair rent was fixed. Mr. Ghosh urged that even if it is, assumed that the aforesaid decision would be applicable to the State of West Bengal in view of the provisions. Mr. Ghosh urged that even if it is, assumed that the aforesaid decision would be applicable to the State of West Bengal in view of the provisions. of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, even then the same would not hold good in a case of self-occupancy by the owner, in which case the principles enunciated in Devan Daulat Rai Kapoor's would continue to be applicable. 43. Much the same sentiments have been expressed in the case Shida Kaushish vs. The Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi, (AIR 1981 SC p. 1729) and in the case of, Khoda vs. C.I.T., Delhi II (AIR 1982 SC p. 16), also referred to by Mr. Ghosh. 44. Mr. Ghosh urged that since in all the four cases under consideration the Annual Value had been determined and was in force when the transfers were effected, it could not be said that the same could not be easily estimated, since nothing had changed as far as each of the premises was concerned as, a result of such transfers, except for a change in the 'ownership thereof. 45. Mr. Ghosh urged that the provisions of sub-so (4A) of s.174 of the 1980 Act could not be imported in cases of this nature. 46. Mr. Ghosh lastly contended that "price" and "value" were not synonymous terms and could not be equated. Mr. Ghosh urged that while the price of a property was dependent on various factors, such as location and even personal expediency, the value of a property is an estimate of what could be its expected price. Mr. Ghosh contended that while one person might be willing to pay a fancy price for a particular property owing to different factors personal to him, it did not necessarily follow that another person would also be willing to pay such price. 47. Mr. Ghosh urged that price could not, therefore, be taken as an indication of the actual value of the property in question. 48. Referring to John A. Parks on "Valuations", Mr. Ghosh pointed out that the learned author had referred to a quotation of Hadley that "a price is a fact and a value is an estimate of what the price ought to be." The learned author had also observed that when one spoke of the price of anything one did not necessarily mean the value or market value of that thing. 49. Mr. 49. Mr. Ghosh urged that the provisions of S. 180(2)(i) of the 1980 Act were ultra vires and beyond the legislative competence of the State Legislature and were, therefore, liable to be struck down. 50. Opposing the writ applications on behalf of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation, Mr. A. P. S'ircar, learned senior advocate, firstly referred to the provisions of s. 179 of the 1980 Act and submitted that in view of the enactment of the 1980 Act, the Annual Value of any land or building, which had been determined prior to the commencement of the 1980 Act, would continue to remain in force until a fresh valuation was made under the said Act. 51. Mr. Sircar urged that the s. 180 of the 1980 Act, sets out the circumstances in which the Annual Valuation could be revised, and one of the circumstances was changed in ownership. 52. Mr. Sircar added that in certain cases involving change of ownership, the Corporation had to resort to the provisions of sub-so (4A) of S. 174 of the 1980 Act, since in those cases it had not been possible to estimate the gross annual rent of the land or building in question. 53. Mr. Sircar urged that in the four cases under consideration, except in Roma Sircar's case, the petitioners had purchased the properties in question for the purpose of commercial exploitation, and it had not, therefore, been possible to estimate the gross annual rent which the said properties might reasonably be expected to fetch. Mr. Sircar urged that in the case of G.R. Hotel Pvt. Ltd. since the property was untenanted, the problem was even mere accentuated, particularly as it was admitted that the writ petitioner company intended to run a hotel 'in the premises in question. 54. Mr. Sircar urged that in the circumstances, the Corporation had to take recourse to the provisions of sub-so (4A) of S. 174 of the 1980 Act, which provided for one of the accepted modes of determining the Annual Valuation of a land or building. 55. Mr. Sircar contended that Part IV of the 1980 Act related to taxation, and Chapter XII thereof was confined to imposition of rates and taxes on lands and buildings. 56. Mr. 55. Mr. Sircar contended that Part IV of the 1980 Act related to taxation, and Chapter XII thereof was confined to imposition of rates and taxes on lands and buildings. 56. Mr. Sircar urged that in the scheme evolved for imposition of rates and taxes on lands and buildings on the basis of Annual Valuation of the property, and the provisions relating to intermediate assessments between two general revaluations, there was sufficient ground for reassessment of the Annual Valuation on account of change of ownership. 57. Mr. Sircar submitted that no actual change of user was required to be manifested, and the intention to use the premises acquired by purchase for commercial purposes was sufficient to invoke the provisions of sub-so (4A) of S. 174 of the 1980 Act. Referring again to the case of G.R. Hotel Pvt. Ltd., Mr. Sircar urged that as soon as the application was made for mutation of the premises in the name of G.R. Hotel Pvt. Ltd., the said premises ceased to be a dwelling house, and the earlier valuation became subject to re-assessment for the purpose of determining the Annual Valuation afresh in accordance with the provisions of S. 180 of the 1980 Act. Mr. Sircar also urged that with the change in ownership, the onus of proving that there was no change of user shifted to the new owner. 58. Mr. Sircar then referred to S. 176 of the 1980 Act which relates to the Annual Valuation of lands or buildings belonging to various statutory bodies. Mr. Sircar pointed out that even in such cases the Annual Valuation is sometimes linked up with the purchase price of a land or building, as will be clear from S. 176(ii) of the aforesaid Act. Mr. Sircar also referred to the provisions of S. 184(4) of the said Act and submitted that the petitioners had ample opportunity to appear before the Municipal Authorities and to prove that the premises continued to be a dwelling home. 59. Referring to paragraphs 106 to 110 of Halsbury's "Laws of England", Mr. Sircar pointed out that the same dealt with the various methods of valuation for the purpose of rating. 60. Paragraph 106 indicates that except in case of public utility undertakings, there is no rule of law as to the method of valuation to be adopted for the purposes of rating. 61. Sircar pointed out that the same dealt with the various methods of valuation for the purpose of rating. 60. Paragraph 106 indicates that except in case of public utility undertakings, there is no rule of law as to the method of valuation to be adopted for the purposes of rating. 61. Paragraph 107 provides that the actual rent paid for the premises is not conclusive evidence of valuation, but where the premises is let at what is plainly a rack-rent, that rent is the best evidence of valuation, provided that it was fixed in recent times by the "higgling of the market". It provides further that if the actual rent is paid on terms which differ from those of the hypothetical tenancy, it must be adjusted, if possible to the terms of the hypothetical tenancy before it affords evidence of value. 62. Paragraph 108 provides that in the absence of rental evidence of value, receipts or profits of the occupier of the premises may be relevant. Although, the profits themselves are not rateable, they may serve to indicate the rent at which the premises might reasonably be expected to let, particularly where profit is the motive of the hypothetical tenant in taking the premises. The rent to be ascertained is that which the hypothetical tenant would pay. 63. Paragraph 109 refers to valuation with reference to the cost of construction or structural value and profits and where neither actual rents nor the profits of trade afford evidence of annual rental value, a percentage on the cost of construction or structural value of the premises, or of a substitute premises, is sometimes taken as evidence of effective, capital value. 64. Paragraph 110 deals with the comparable method of comparing different premises for the purposes of establishing the valuation of a particular premises. 65. Mr. Sircar also referred to Chapter 17 of Syamales Datta's "Valuation of Real Property, Principles and Practice", wherein the different kinds of rent payable in respect of different kinds of transactions relating to property, have been set out. In fact, rack-rent as referred to by Halsbury has been explained to mean the full rental value of the vacant property when let out in the open market and signifies the full Annual Value of the land and building together. 66. Referring to the various decisions cited by Mr. Ghosh, Mr. In fact, rack-rent as referred to by Halsbury has been explained to mean the full rental value of the vacant property when let out in the open market and signifies the full Annual Value of the land and building together. 66. Referring to the various decisions cited by Mr. Ghosh, Mr. Sircar firstly pointed out that in the case of Patel Gordhandas Hargovindas (supra) the Supreme Court was considering the provisions of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act, 1925, and the observations made therein were in connection with legislative history upto 1925 which may not be entirely relevant in the context of the laws as existing today. 67. Referring next to the decision of the Supreme Court in Devan Daulat Rai Kapoor's case (supra), Mr. Sircar urged that the standard rent to be determined would have to be the basis for determining the Annual Value of the premises and that even if the standard rate had not been fixed by the Controller, the landlord could not reasonably expect to receive from a hypothetical tenant anything more than the standard rent determinable under the Act and this would be equally so whether the building has been let out to a tenant who has lost his right to apply for fixation of the standard rent or the building is self-occupied by the owner. In either case, the Assessing authority would have to arrive at its own figure of the standard rent by applying the principles laid down in the Rent Control Act for the said purpose. 68. Mr. Sircar then referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Balbir Singh's case (supra) wherein while considering the decision in Devall DauZat Rai's case, the Supreme Court was of the view that the reteable value could not always be determined at the figure of the standard rent, but that the standard rent was the upper limit of the rent which the landlord may except to receive from a hypothetical tenant. Accordingly, -in a given case, the rateable value could be even less than the standard rent having regard to the various attending circumstances and considerations. Accordingly, -in a given case, the rateable value could be even less than the standard rent having regard to the various attending circumstances and considerations. The test, therefore, is not what is the standard rent of the building, but what is the rent which the owner reasonably expects to receive from a hypothetical tenant and such reasonable expectation can, in no event, exceed the standard rent of the building determinable in accordance with the principles laid down in the Rent Act, though, it may in a given case be lower than such standard rent. 69. Mr. Sircar then referred to the case of D.G. Gouse and Company (supra) and pointed out that while considering the different recognised methods of arriving at the Annual Value of a building, the Supreme Court in paragraph 32 of the said judgment achoed the observations of Halsbury in paragraph 106 of his Laws of England Vol. 32, to the effect that there is no rule of law as to the method of valuation to be adopted for determining the Annual Value of a building, but where the building has been let at what is plainly a rack-rent, that rent is the best evidence of value if it has been fixed by the "higgling of the market". Mr. Sircar contended that it had been observed by the Supreme Court that if the legislature selects that particular method to determine the Annual Value of a building, there is neither reason nor authority for holding that it is hypothetical or arbitrary. 70. Mr. Sircar pointed out that the Supreme Court had further observed that the express-ion "capital value" used in the Act is not the cost of construction of a building or its market value as well, but a working expression which may roughly be said to be the taxable value of a building and the State Legislature was quite competent to select that as the basis for assessing the building tax. 71. Mr. Sircar then referred to a Division Bench decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Morvi Municipality vs. State of Gujarat and Ors., reported in 1993 SC at p. 1508, wherein the views expressed in Devan Daulat Rai Kapoor's case (supra) have been noted with approval. 72. Mr. Sircar also referred to the case of New Manek Chowk Spg. and Wvg. Co. 72. Mr. Sircar also referred to the case of New Manek Chowk Spg. and Wvg. Co. Ltd. "s. Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad and Ors., reported in AIR 1967 SC at p. 1801, wherein the Flat Rate method on the basis of the area involved, used for fixing the rateable value of the property, was looked upon with disfavour by the Supreme Court which observed that the method was not one which was generally recognised by authorities on rating. Applied indiscriminately, it was sure to give rise to inequalities. 73. Mr. Sircar submitted that sub-so (32) of S. 2 of the 1980 Act defined a "dwelling house" to mean a masonry building constructed, used or adapted to be used wholly or principally for human habitation. On the other hand, "domestic building" had been defined in sub-so (28) to include a dwelling house and any other masonry building which is neither a building of the warehouse class, nor a public building defined in subs'. (70), nor a place exclusively used for private worship. 74. Mr. Sircar urged that unless a building came within the definition of dwelling house and or domestic bujlding, the municipal authorities would be justified in invoking the provisions of subs. (4A) of s. 174 of the 1980 Act, which could be occasioned QY a change in ownership, as contemplated in s. 180(2)(i) of the said Act. 75. Referring to Entry 49 of List 2 of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, Mr. Sircar urged that no taxes were levied under the said Entry and the same related to valuation of lands and building only, as opposed to Entry 86 in List 1 of the said Schedule which provided for legislation by the Central Government on the capital value of the assets, exclusive of agricultural land, of individuals and companies. Mr. Sircar contended that valuation was not based on an assessee's income which reflected the price of the land. On the other hand S. 180(2)(i) namely provided the circumstances in which a particular method was to be invoked and not the method itself. Accordingly, if the consideration amount or a transfer is taken as the basis for determining the Annual Valuation, the provisions of S. 180(2)(i) could not be said to be ultra vf1'es. 76. In this regard, Mr. On the other hand S. 180(2)(i) namely provided the circumstances in which a particular method was to be invoked and not the method itself. Accordingly, if the consideration amount or a transfer is taken as the basis for determining the Annual Valuation, the provisions of S. 180(2)(i) could not be said to be ultra vf1'es. 76. In this regard, Mr. Sircar also referred to the provisions of Articles 246 and 248 of the Constitution which deals with the exclusive power vested in the Parliament to make laws in respect of any of the matters enumerated in List 1 of the Seventh Schedule and any matters not enumerated in the Concurrent List or State List. In support of his aforesaid contention, Mr. Sircar referred to the following cases, namely, (1) Union of India vs. Harbhajan Singh Dhillon, reported in AIR 1972 SC at page 1061 ; (2) Sudhir Ch. Nawn vs. The Wealth Tax Officer, Calcutta and Ors., reported in AIR 1963 SC at page 59 ; and (3) Assistant Commissioner of Urban Land Tax Madras and Ors. vs. Buckinghum and Carnetic Co. Ltd., repotted in AIR 1970 SC at page 169. 77. In the first of the said three judgments, the majority view of the seven judges' Bench of the Supreme Court was that the Wealth Tax Act was not a law in respect of Entry 49 of List 2. The legislation was valid either under Entry 86 or Entry 97 of List 1 of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. 78. Similar sentiments have also been expressed in Sudhir Chandra Nawn's case, wherein it was pointed out that the tax imposed by Entry 86 of List 1 of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution is not directly a tax on land and buildings but is a tax imposed on the capital value of the assets of individuals and companies on the valuation date. 79. In the last of the said three cases, the Supreme Court was of the view that imposition of a tax on urban land at a percentage of the market value was entirely within the ambit of Entry 49 of List 2 and within the competence of the State Legislature and it did not in any way encroach upon the field of legislation contemplated in Entry 86 of List 1 of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. 80. Mr. 80. Mr. Sircar urged that since a challenge has been thrown by the petitioners to s. 180(2)(/1) and not s. 174 of the 1980 Act, it could not be contended that the provisions of s. 180(2)(i) of the 1980 Act were arbitrary and ultra vires the provisions of the Constitution. 81. Mr. Sircar concluded his submissions by urging that a percentage on the effective capital value of a premises was a recognised method of determining the Annual Value and its inclusion in sub-so (4A) of s. 174 of the 1980 Act, was, therefore, valid and could in cases be applied under the circumstances set out in S. 180(2)(i) of the 1980 Act. 82. Mr. Debasish Kar Gupta, who appeared for the Calcutta Municipal Corporation in Roma Sircar's case, adopted the submissions made by Mr. Sircar and added that in the said case no application had been received by the Corporation for mutation of the names of the petitioners in the records of the Corporation in respect of the property acquired by them. 83. Appearing for the State of West Bengal, Mr. Manick Chandra Das, learned advocate, submitted that the enhancement of the Annual Valuation was neither arbitrary nor unreasonable, inasmuch as, s.180(2)(i) of the 1980 Act authorised intermediate revision of Annual Valuation on account of change of ownership of the property in question. 84. Mr. Das submitted that intermediate valuation on account of change of tenancy was justifiable owing to the fact with a change in tenancy there could be a change in the rate of rent payable by the tenant. Likewise, change of ownership could also have an impact on the valuation of the holding for which reassessment could become necessary. Mr. Das submitted that change of ownership could in cases result in splitting up of the holding necessitating revaluation of the different split-up parts. 85. Mr. Das urged that transfer reflects the change of value in the Deed of Transfer itself, and hence market value had a direct nexus with determination of the Annual Valuation for the purpose of imposition of rates and taxes. Mr. Das urged that s. 180(2)(i) of the 1980 Act could not, therefore, be said to be arbitrary or discriminatory. 86. Mr. Das also reiterated Mr. Sircar's submissions regarding change of user consequent upon transfer of a premises. Mr. Mr. Das urged that s. 180(2)(i) of the 1980 Act could not, therefore, be said to be arbitrary or discriminatory. 86. Mr. Das also reiterated Mr. Sircar's submissions regarding change of user consequent upon transfer of a premises. Mr. Das' urged that change of user from domestic usage to commercial usage also had a direct bearing on the valuation of the property and was one of the important factors for determination of the gross annual rent which the premises could reasonably expect to fetch. 87. Mr. Das then urged that, although, construction may not have been completed in the premises acquired by Shree Mahamaya Mining & Industries (Pvt.) Ltd., some improvements had been made which necessitated the same to be assessed as vacant land. Referring to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bombay Municipality vs. Poly Chems Ltd., reported in AIR 1974 SC at p. 1779, Mr. Das submitted that it had been held by the Supreme Court that so long as a building is not completed or constructed to such an extent that at least a partial completion notice can be given so that the completed portion can be occupied and let, the land can, for the purpose of rating, be equated with or treated as vacant land. In this regard, Mr. Das also drew the attention of the Court to the provisions of s. 174(2) of the 1980 Act which, Inter alia, provides that the Annual Value of any land which has not been built upon shall be fixed at 7 per cent of the estimated market value of the land. 88. Mr. Das urged that in the circumstances aforesaid, the respondent Corporation was wholly justified in effecting intermediate revision of Annual Valuation on account of change in ownership, as envisaged in s. 180(2)(i) of the 1980 Act, and the submissions made on behalf of the petitioners that the said provisions were arbitrary and ultra vires the provisions of the Constitution were unfounded and were liable to be rejected. 89. The primary question which falls for determination in these four matters is whether the provisions of clause (i) of sub-so (2) of S. 180 of the Ca1cutta Municipal Corporation Act, 1980, are ultra vires the Constitution as being discriminatory, arbitrary and unreasonable, and also on the ground that it was beyond the legislative competence of the State Legisture to enact the same. 90. 90. Chapter XII of Part IV of the 1980 Act vests the Corporation with power to levy taxes. 91. Section 170(i)(a) of the said Act deals with the power of the Corporation to levy a tax by way of a consolidated rate on lands and buildings. 92. Section 171 of the said Act set out the quantum of consolidated rate to be imposed on different categories of lands and buildings on a graded percentage of the Annual Value thereof. 93. Section 174 of the said Act, which is of particular interest and/ or relevance in these four cases, sets out the different modes for determining the Annual Value of lands and buildings. Sub-section (2) provides that the Annual Value of any land which is not built upon should be fixed at 7 per cent of the estimated market value of the land. Sub-section (4A) provides that if the gross annual rent of any land or building or part thereof cannot be early estimated, the gross annual rent of such land or building for the purpose of determing the Annual Value thereof shall be deemed to be 7 Y2 per cent of the value of the building obtained by adding the estimated present cost of erecting the building at the time of assessment less a reasonable amount to be deducted on account of depreciation, if any, to the estimated present market value of the land. 93. Section 176 of the said Act provides for determination of the Annual Valuation of lands or buildings belonging to statutory bodies on the basis of cost of acquisition of such premises. Sub-section (2) stipulates that the cost of acquisition shall in the case of any land or building privately acquired, the purchase price of such land or building. 95. Section 179 of the said Act, inter alia, provides for periodic assesment and provides further that the Annual Valuation shall, subject to the other provisions of Chapter XII, remain in force for a period of six years and may be revised thereafter. 96. Section 180 of the said Act, which is of great relevance in the cases under consideration, provides for revision of assessment of any land or building in the contingencies enumerated therein, during the period the Annual Valuation remains in force and reads as follows :- "S. 180. REVISION OF ASSESSMENT. 96. Section 180 of the said Act, which is of great relevance in the cases under consideration, provides for revision of assessment of any land or building in the contingencies enumerated therein, during the period the Annual Valuation remains in force and reads as follows :- "S. 180. REVISION OF ASSESSMENT. (1) Notwithstanding, anything contained in s. 179, the Corporation may by resolution direct a general revaluation of lands and buildings in any ward of the Corporation or part thereof during the currency of any period specified under this Chapter. Such general revaluation shall have effect from the beginning of the quarter following that in which a notice under sub-so (2) of s. 184 issued and shall remain in force in respect of each ward or portion thereof, as the case may be, for the unexpired portion of the period during which but for such revaluation the annual valuation would have remained in force. (2) The Municipal Commissioner may cause any revision to be made in the annual valuation of any land or building in the following cases :- (i) when its ownership changes; or (ii) when any tenancy or any rent changes; or (iii) when the nature of its use changes; or (iv) when a new building is erected or an existing building is redeveloped or substantially altered or improved during the period the Annual Valuation remains in force; or (v) when, on an application made in writing by the owner or the person liable to pay its consolidated rate, it is established that during the period of the Annual Valuation remaining in force its value has been reduced by reason of any substantial demolition or has suffered depreciation from any accident or any calamity proved to the satisfaction of the Municipal Commissioner to have been beyond the control of such owner or such person; or (vi) when any land or building or portion thereof is acquired by purchase or otherwise by the State Government or the Corporation or any statutory body mentioned in clause (a) of sub-so (8) of S. 171 during the period of the Annual Valuation remaining in force; or (vii) when any land or building, or portion thereof, is sold or otherwise transferred by the State Government or the Corporation or any statutory body mentioned in clause (a) of sub-so (8) of S. 171. Provided that all land used for roads and other public purposes shall be excluded from such revaluation; or (viii) when, upon the acquisition or transfer of any land or building in part, a residual portion remains; or (ix) when, it becomes necessary so to do for any .other reason to be recorded in writing. (3) Any revision in the Annual Valuation of any land or building or portion thereof under this section shall come into force from the beginning of the quarter of a year ending on the 30th June or 30th September or 31st December or 31st March, as the case may be, following that in which such revision becomes applicable and shall remain in force for the unexpired portion of the period during which but for such revision such Annual Valuation would have remained in force. (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-so (1) or sub-so (2) or sub-so (3), any land or building, (i) which for any reason has no Annual Value assigned to it under this Act, may be valued by the Municipal Commissioner at any time during the currency of the period specified in respect of such land or building under S.179 or sub-so (3) of S. 180; or (ii) the valuation of which has been cancelled on the ground of irregularity, may be valued by the Municipal Commissioner at any time after such cancellation, and such valuation shall remain in force until a fresh valuation or revision is made and shall take effect from the beginning of the quarter from which the previous valuation which has been cancelled would have taken effect: Provided that the valuation made under clause (i) or clause (ii) 'shall remain in force for the unexpired portion of the period specified under this chapter." 97. In the scheme relating to imposition of rates and taxes, the Corporation has been vested with powers to impose a tax on lands and buildings on the basis of the Annual Valuation thereof and the various methods of arriving at such Annual Valuation have also been prescribed. Provision has also been made for intermediate assessment between two General Revaluations. 98. What we are concerned with is whether change of ownership can by itself be a ground for intermediate revision of the Annual Valuation. 99. As pointed out by Mr. Provision has also been made for intermediate assessment between two General Revaluations. 98. What we are concerned with is whether change of ownership can by itself be a ground for intermediate revision of the Annual Valuation. 99. As pointed out by Mr. Ghosh, change of ownership by itself is not a taxable event necessitating a revision of the Annual Valuation, but may result in certain changes with regard to the user of the property or the rents payable in respect thereof, or even splitting up of the property, as enumerated in clauses (ii) to (viii) of sub-so (2) of s. 180 of the 1980 Act. which are all taxable events. Whether the provisions of sub-so (2) or subs. (4A) of S. 174 of the said Act are to be applied in a given case, either during General Revaluation or for the purpose of intermediate assessment, would depend on the special facts of such case. 100. The method to be adopted for determining the Annual Valuation of a land or building, either during General Revaluation or intermediate revision, is not, therefore, dependant on change of ownership, but on the change in circumstances relating primarily to the user of the land or building or the rents payable in respect thereof. The method prescribed in sub-ss. (2) and (4A) of S. 174 of the 1980 Act are to be resorted to in exceptional circumstances where the land has not been constructed upon or where the gross annual rent of any land or building or part thereof cannot be easily estimated. The same, in my view, has no nexus with the ground relating to change of ownership alone for the purpose of intermediate revision. In my view, change of ownership cannot by itself be a ground for intermediate revision of the Annual Valuation. 101. I am not inclined to accept Mr. Das's submission that the price mentioned in the Transfer Deed reflects the market value of the property conveyed and that it has a direct nexus with the determination of the Annual Valuation consequent upon change of ownership alone. 101. I am not inclined to accept Mr. Das's submission that the price mentioned in the Transfer Deed reflects the market value of the property conveyed and that it has a direct nexus with the determination of the Annual Valuation consequent upon change of ownership alone. Price, in fact, is a fickle and unreliable indicator of the market value as it is related to various factors, some of which are of a nature personal to an individual, and should be relied upon or arriving at the Annual Valuation only in cases where the gross annual rental cannot be easily estimated, as it runs counter to the generally accepted mode of determination of the Annual Valuation on the basis of the standard rents payable for the premises in question. It is the exception rather than the rule. 102. For the reasons given below I am also not inclined to accept Mr. Das's submission that change of ownership was in itself sufficient for revision of the existing Annual Valuation, since the same could give rise to change in user of the property or the rents payable in respect thereof, or could even lead to a splitting up of the holding. 103. I am also not inclined to accept Mr. Sircar's submission that change of ownership is sufficient for invoking the provisions relating to revisions of the Annual Valuation and that the intention to use the premises acquired by purchase for commercial purposes was sufficient to attract the provisions of sub-ss. (2) and (4A) of s. 180 of the 1980 Act, without any actual change of user thereof. 104. The decisions cited by Mr. Sirear, in fact, support the case of the petitioners that the Annual Valuation of a premises should generally be determined on the basis of the Rental method. 105. As observed hereinbefore, mere change of ownership cannot be said to be a taxable event unless accompanied by a change in the user of the land or building or a change in the amount of rent received therefore, or even a splitting up of the holding, which are all taxable events in themselves. 106. 105. As observed hereinbefore, mere change of ownership cannot be said to be a taxable event unless accompanied by a change in the user of the land or building or a change in the amount of rent received therefore, or even a splitting up of the holding, which are all taxable events in themselves. 106. Had there been a change in the user of the properties in question or of the rents received therefrom, or if any of the properties had been split up as a result of the change of ownership, even then in such a case, the remaining provisions of s. 180(2), barring clause (i), would be sufficient to take care of the situation. The change of ownership "is, therefore, not a factor which can set in motion the process of reassessment of the Annual Valuation. Clause (i) of sub-so (2) of S. 180 cannot stand in isolation and it is the other taxable events set out in clauses (ii) to (viii) on the basis whereof the Annual Valuation may be revised, 107. Since the Annual Valuation of the properties had been determined earlier and such valuation continued to be in force, in the absence of any of the taxable events set out in clauses (ii) to (viii) of sub-s, (2) of S. 180 of the 1980 Act, there was no occasion for re-assessment of the, Annual Valuation either in terms of sub-ss. (2) or (4A) of S. 174 of the 'said Act. It is not the case of the Corporation that the Annual Valuation or the said properties had not been determined earlier or that it was not possible to easily estimate the gross annual rent thereof, which would have entitled the respondents to invoke the provisions of sub-so (4A). Simply because the ownership had changed hands, it cannot be contended that the gross annual rent of the said lands and buildings were not capable of being easily estimated, when the valuation in force was available to the Corporation. 108. Some of the decisions cited by Mr. Ghosh indicate that the standard rent payable for a premises is generally to be taken as the basis for determination of the Annual Value thereof. Of course, in the case of Corporation of Calcutta vs. East India Commercial Co. 108. Some of the decisions cited by Mr. Ghosh indicate that the standard rent payable for a premises is generally to be taken as the basis for determination of the Annual Value thereof. Of course, in the case of Corporation of Calcutta vs. East India Commercial Co. Pvt. Ltd, (supra) this Court had held that in the context of the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, the contractual rent would form the basis for determination of the Annual Value. But, in cases of self-occupancy, the decision in Devan Daulat Rai Kapoor's case (supra) would have application. 109. From the language of sub-so (4A) of S. 174 of the 1980 Act it will also be evident that the same can be invoked only when the gorss annual rent of a land or building or a part thereof cannot be easily estimated (the emphasis supplied is mine). The inference is that an attempt must be made to estimate the gross annual rent, and only when the same cannot be easily estimated, can recourse be taken to the provisions of sub-s. (4A) of s. 174 of the said Act, and not as a matter of course as a result of change in ownership. In my view, mere change of ownership is not sufficient for invocation either of the provisions of sub-so (2) or sub-so (4A) of s. 174 of the 1980 Act, as has been done in these four cases. 110. It is very clear that each of the clauses in sub-so (2) of S. 180 are disjunctive and one is not dependant on the other. I am, therefore inclined to agree with Mr. Ghosh that the provisions of clause (i) of sub-s (2) of s. 180 of the 1980 Act cannot exist independently as one of the grounds for revision or reassessment of the existing Annual Valuation. In fact, each of the grounds enumerated in clauses (ii) to (viii) of s. 180 may be the result of a change in ownership. 111. In some of the decisions cited by Mr. Ghosh, the principle as laid down by the Supreme Court, is that primarily the rate imposed on lands and buildings amounts to a tax on such lands and buildings and is not a personal tax on the assets of the owner of the building. 111. In some of the decisions cited by Mr. Ghosh, the principle as laid down by the Supreme Court, is that primarily the rate imposed on lands and buildings amounts to a tax on such lands and buildings and is not a personal tax on the assets of the owner of the building. As was pointed out in the case of Patel Gordhandas Hargovhzdas (supra), although, the rate imposed on lands and buildings was a kind of tax, it was really a rate imposed on such lands and buildings which amounted to a tax on their Annual Valuation and not on their capital value. 112. There is no ambiguity that a building may from part of the total assets of an individual, and when a tax is imposed under Entry 86 of list I, it cannot have any direct bearing with the building. On the other hand, a tax imposed on a building under Entry 49 of List 2 is not personal tax on the assets of the owner of the building. The two taxes are different" although, the same building may form the subject-matter of the "1ndividual's wealth tax under Entry 86 of List 1 and also the subject matter of a tax on the building itself under Entry 49 of List 2 of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. 113. The question that surfaces is whether the introduction of the price factor in determining the Annual Valuation of a property could be the subject-matter of legislation within the scope of Entry 49 of List 2 114. To my mind, although, the price factor may be relevant for the purposes of determining an individual's wealth tax, within the meaning of Entry 86 of List 1 of the Seventh Schedule, it would not serve as a proper basis for determination of the Annual Valuation of the property for the purposes of Entry 49 of List 2 thereof. There is substance in Mr. Ghosh's submission that if the price factor is taken as a basis for determining the Annual Valuation, it would be unreasonable and would suffer from the vice of discrimination. There is substance in Mr. Ghosh's submission that if the price factor is taken as a basis for determining the Annual Valuation, it would be unreasonable and would suffer from the vice of discrimination. While the gross annual rental of a particular property may be low on account of old rentals, the price of a contiguous property on account of prevalent market prices may in comparison be astronomical, resulting in discriminatory valuations in respect of the two properties for the purpose of imposition of rates and taxes. 115. As pointed out by Mr. Ghosh, while referring to an observation of John A. Parks, when we speak or the price of anything, we do not necessarily mean the value or market value of that thing. 116. While disserting on the theories of value, the learned author also observed as follows : "A man may have a premises to sell for Rs. 50,000/- but that may not be the value of the property. The situation and class of building may suit a prospective buyer. It may be ideal for his purpose and may have a special value for him. Whereas another purchaser may not have any special reason, other than speculation, for purchasing the property and the value to him would be less than the man who wanted the premises for a specific purpose. If a property was for sale and two prospective purchasers were determined to outbid each other, the selling price would definitely not be the value of the property. . . . . . ". 117. The aforesaid observations, with which I am in complete agreement, aptly summarise Mr. Ghosh's submissions that price cannot, except in a case of extraordinary coincidence, be equated with the market value of a land or building (the emphasis supplied is mine). Taking recourse to price for determining the Annual Valuation of a property could, therefore, result in glaring discrepancies, even if unintended. 118. In the ultimate analysis, each of the points urged by Mr. Ghosh must be upheld. 119. Taking recourse to price for determining the Annual Valuation of a property could, therefore, result in glaring discrepancies, even if unintended. 118. In the ultimate analysis, each of the points urged by Mr. Ghosh must be upheld. 119. In all these four cases, the petitioners had acquired their respective properties by purchase and there is nothing on record to indicate that there has either been a change in the user thereof or that there had been a change in the rents received therefrom, or that such change of ownership has resulted in splitting up of any of the holdings, so as to attract any of the provisions of s. 180 of the 1980 Act. On the other hand, on behalf of the petitioners it has been urged that no such change had taken place. If any change of the nature indicated in clauses (ii) to (viii) of sub-so (2) of s. 180 has taken place, the Corporation will be at liberty to revise the Annual Valuation of the concerned premises, but such revision cannot be undertaken only on account of change of ownership. Any attempt to link up the provisions of clause (1) of sub-so (2) of S. 180 of the 1980 Act with sub-ss. (2) and (4A) of S. 174 thereof must be rejected. 120. As observed hereinbefore, clause (i) of sub-so (2) of S. 180 of the 1980 Act cannot exist independently and the consequences that may arise as a result of change of ownership have been amply provided for in Clauses (ii) to (viii) thereof. Change of ownership can at best give rise to the taxable events referred to in clauses (ii) to (viii) of sub-so (2) of s. 180 of the said Act. 121. For the reasons indicated hereinabove, the provisions of clause (i) of subs. (2) of s. 180 of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act, 1980, are held to be ultra vires the provisions of the Constitution and are struck down. 122. Consequently, each of the notices issued to the petitioners under S. 184(4) of the said Act are also quashed. 121. For the reasons indicated hereinabove, the provisions of clause (i) of subs. (2) of s. 180 of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act, 1980, are held to be ultra vires the provisions of the Constitution and are struck down. 122. Consequently, each of the notices issued to the petitioners under S. 184(4) of the said Act are also quashed. As indicated above, this will not prevent the Corporation from invoking any of the relevant provisions contained in clauses (ii) to (viii) of the said Act, if there has either been a change of user or change in the rents payable in respect of the properties in question or if the change of ownership has resulted 'in a splitting up thereof. 123. These four writ applications succeed to the extent indicated hereinabove. 124. There will be no order as to costs. 125. Having regard to the findings referred to hereinabove, the prayer for stay of this judgment made on behalf of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation is considered and refused. 126. All parties will act on a signed copy of the minutes of the operative part of this judgment on the usual undertaking. Applications allowed to the extent indicated in the judgment.