J. N. BHATT, J. ( 1 ) THE main substratum of this appeal preferred by a convicted police personnel, is the tale of the protector of Law and Order who turns perpetrator of it in purported exercise of personal right to organise and resort to STRIKE beyond the frontiers of Law and horizons of Justice warranting appreciation of and adjudication under the several provisions of Law relating Police Personnel and police Force in India. ( 2 ) BY filing this appeal, the appellant who is original accused has assailed judgment and order of conviction and sentence, passed against him, by the learned additional Sessions Judge, Ahmedabad, Rural, on 30-12-1988, in Sessions Case no. 120 of 1988. As per impugned judgment and order of the trial Court, the appellant-accused came to be convicted for the offence punishable under Sec. 3 read with Sec. 4 of the Police Forces (Restrictions of Rights) Act, 1966 [police Forces Act] and also under Sec. 145 (2) of the Bombay Police Act, 1951. The appellant-accused is ordered to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine of rs. 1,000/- and in default, to undergo Simple Imprisonment for three months for the offence punishable under Sec. 3 read with Sec. 4 of the Police Forces (Restriction of Rights) Act and he is also ordered to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for three months and to pay a fine of Rs. 100. 00, in default of payment of fine, to undergo simple Imprisonment for one week for the offence punishable under Sec. 145 (2) of the Bombay Police Act, 1951. ( 3 ) BEING aggrieved by the said judgment and order passed in Sessions Case no. 120 of 1988, the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ahmedabad, Rural, on 30-12-1988, the accused has come up before this Court challenging its legality and validity under the provisions of Sec. 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (cr. P. C. for short ). ( 4 ) THE learned Advocate for the appellant-accused has contended that the conviction and sentence order passed against the accused by the trial Court is not only unjust, but it is perverse and illegal. In that, it has been submitted that the provisions of Sec. 3 of the Police Forces Act, are not attracted. He has also, seriously, criticised the conviction for the offence under Sec. 145 (2) of the Bombay police Act, 1951. In that, it has been submitted that the provisions of Sec. 3 of the Police Forces Act, are not attracted. He has also, seriously, criticised the conviction for the offence under Sec. 145 (2) of the Bombay police Act, 1951. He has taken this Court through the entire records of the case during course of the submissions. The aforesaid submissions are, seriously, countenanced by the learned Additional Public Prosecutor Mr. B. D. Desai while appearing for the respondent-State. ( 5 ) THE appellant who is original accused was working as Police Constable and was assigned duties, at Prahlad Gate Police Chowky, at Dholka, at the relevant time. According to the prosecution case, the incident occurred, on 27-7-1988 at about 7-30 p. m. at Prahlad Police Chowky, at Dholka, in Ahmedabad District. The complainant Police Constable one Narsinhbhai Vastabhai Makwana was on duty in the said Police Chowky as he was a member of Gram Sevak Dal and was performing duties as a public servant. At that time, the accused had rushed in the said Police chowky with open knife and attempted to cause grievous hurt to the complainant. The accused had disconnected the telephone line of the said Police Chowky by cutting wire and had taken away telephone instrument alongwith him due to Police strike and agitation. According to the prosecution case, in pursuance to the strike call given by Police Association, there was a strike and Police personnels had gone on strike and accused was also on strike. ( 6 ) THE accused had run away taking alongwith him the telephone instrument and the same came to be discovered by the accused later on during the course of investigation. The discovery panchnama was prepared by the Investigating Officer after calling two panchas as Muddamal knife and the telephone instrument could be recovered at the instance of the accused. On completion of the investigation, the accused was charge-sheeted. ( 7 ) LATER on, the accused came to be charged in the Sessions Court for the offences punishable under Secs. 189 and 397 of the Indian Penal Code and under secs. 3 and 7 of the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984. On completion of the investigation, the accused was charge-sheeted. ( 7 ) LATER on, the accused came to be charged in the Sessions Court for the offences punishable under Secs. 189 and 397 of the Indian Penal Code and under secs. 3 and 7 of the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984. He was also charged for the offence punishable under Sec. 3 of the Police Forces Act and also under Sec. 145 (2) of the Bombay Police Act, 1951, in a Sessions Case No. 120 of 1988, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. The accused is held not guilty for the offence punishable under Secs. 189 and 397 of the Indian penal Code by the trial Court, and also under Secs. 3 and 7 of the Prevention of damage to Public Property Act, and also under Sec. 3 of the Police (Incitement to Disaffection) Act, 1966. However, the trial Court, on appreciation of evidence on record, found him guilty for the offence punishable under Sec. 3 of the Police forces Act, 1966, and also under Sec. 145 (2) of the Bombay Police Act and impugned order of sentence came to be passed by the trial Court on 30-12-1988. Being aggrieved by the said judgment and order of conviction and sentence, the original accused has now come up before this Court for challenging its legality and validity. ( 8 ) THE prosecution examined five witnesses including the complainant. The prosecution case is that the accused who was working as Police Constable, due to call of strike, went on strike, and by using mask with a knife, on 27-7-1988, at about 7-30 p. m. attempted to cause grievous hurt to the complainant Mr. Makwana who was posted at the relevant time in his Prahlad Gate Police Chowky premises. The accused had disconnected telephone line by cutting the wires. He had prevented the complainant who was public servant from discharging his duties. The complainant in that place being one of the members of Gram Rakshak Dal was posted and directed to work as Police servant, as the Police people were on strike on that day. The accused threatened the complainant and also caused injury and took away telephone instrument alongwith him. The complainant in that place being one of the members of Gram Rakshak Dal was posted and directed to work as Police servant, as the Police people were on strike on that day. The accused threatened the complainant and also caused injury and took away telephone instrument alongwith him. It is not disputed that the accused was on strike being a member of the Police Forces pursuant to the strike call given by the police Association. ( 9 ) FIRSTLY, material and relevant provisions of charging sections of relevant police Laws may be highlighted. The accused was charged for the offence punishable under Sec. 189 of the Indian Penal Code which provides punishment for threat or injury to any public servant and offender could be punished with imprisonment of either discription for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both. Sec. 397 of the Indian Penal Code for which the accused was also charged prescribes serious punishment. According to the provision of Sec. 397, if, at the time of committing robbery or dacoity, the offender uses any deadly weapon, or causes grievous hurt to any person, or attempts to cause death or grievous hurt to any person, the offender could be punished with imprisonment which shall not be less than seven years. ( 10 ) THERE was also a charge under Sec. 3 of the Prevention of Damage to public Property Act, 1984 which came into force on 16th March 1984. Sec. 3 of the said Act reads as under :- mischief causing damage to public property :- (1) Whoever commits mischief by doing any act in respect of any public property, other than public property of the nature referred to in Sub-sec. (2), shall be punished wih imprisonment for a term which may extend to five years and with fine. Sec. 3 of the said Act reads as under :- mischief causing damage to public property :- (1) Whoever commits mischief by doing any act in respect of any public property, other than public property of the nature referred to in Sub-sec. (2), shall be punished wih imprisonment for a term which may extend to five years and with fine. (2) Whoever commits mischief by doing any act in respect of any public property being - (a) any building, installation or other property used in connection with the production, distribution or supply of water, light, power or energy; (b) any oil installations; (c) any sewage works; (d) any mine or factory; (e) any means of public transportation or installation or other property used in connection, therewith, shall be punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months; but which may extend to five years and with fine : provided that the Court may for reasons to be recorded in its judgment, award a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than six months. ( 11 ) THE accused was also charged for the offence punishable under Sec. 3 of the Police (Incitement to Disaffection) Act, 1922. With a view to penalise the spreading of disaffection among the police and other kindred offences, this Act was brought into force. Looking to the mischief and serious illegal actions alleged to have been committed by the accused who was on strike and that too in the Police chowky, where he was working as a Police Constable, the charge under Sec. 3 of the Police Act, 1922 was framed against him. Sec. 3 of the said Act reads as under :- penalty for causing disaffection, etc. :- whoever intentionally causes or attempts to cause or does any act which he knows is likely to cause disaffection towards the Government established by law in India amongst the members of a police-force, or induces or attempts to induce, or does any act which he knows is likely to induce, any member of a police-force to withhold his services or to commit a breach of discipline shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both. ( 12 ) THE trial Court, on assessment and consideration of the facts and the circumstances and the evidence emerging from the record, found that the accused who is the appellant herein, is not guilty for the aforesaid offences, and therefore, the accused came to be acquitted from the said charges for the offences under Secs. 3 and 7 of the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act and also under Sec. 3 of the Police (Incitement to Disaffection) Act under the provisions of Secs. 397 and 189 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. ( 13 ) HOWEVER, the trial Court found accused guilty for the offences punishable under Sec. 3 of the Police Forces (Restriction of Rights) Act, 1966 and also for the offence punishable under Sec. 145 (2) of the Bombay Police Act, 1951. The accused has filed this appeal under Sec. 374 of the Code by challenging legality and validity of the judgment and order of conviction recorded against him by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ahmedabad, Rural. ( 14 ) THE learned Advocate for the appellant-accused has, firstly, submitted that though the Court has admitted this appeal only on the point of sentence, the accused is entitled to challenge the conviction for the offence punishable under sec. 3 of the Police Forces Act, 1966 and under Sec. 145 (2) of the Bombay Police act. It is true that the appeal is admitted only for a limited purpose of challenge against sentence at the time of admission, on 27-1-1989. ( 15 ) HOWEVER it must be noted that learned Advocate appearing for the appellant at the time of hearing for admission had conceded that in view of the clear admission of the accused-appellant in his further statement recorded under Sec. 313 of the Code that he (accused) was on strike and that he was absent on duty at Prahlad Gate Police Chowky, at Dholka, where he was working as Police constable at the relevant time. Therefore, it was submitted by the learned Advocate for the accused at the time of admission of this matter that the conviction order for the offence punishable under Sec. 3 of the Police Forces Act, 1966 and under sec. 145 (2) of the Bombay Police Act, 1951 was not pressed. Thus, the appeal was admitted for a limited purpose and only on the point of sentence. 145 (2) of the Bombay Police Act, 1951 was not pressed. Thus, the appeal was admitted for a limited purpose and only on the point of sentence. Before this Court at the time of admission, the learned Advocate for the appellant had not pressed the impugned order of conviction. It is in these circumstances, the Court admitted the appeal for a limited purpose and on the point of sentence only. ( 16 ) THE learned Advocate for the appellant seriously contended that though the appeal came to be admitted only on the point of sentence by the trial Court, the accused is, however, entitled to challenge the conviction also. In support of this submission, the learned Advocate for the appellant has placed reliance on the decision of the Honble Supreme Court rendered in Rabari Ghela Jadav v. State of Bombay, reported in AIR 1960 SC 748 . In the said decision, the Supreme Court held that while an Appellate Court has power to dismiss the appeal summarily, if it considers that there is no sufficient ground for interfering, it has no power to direct that the appeal shall be heard only on the point of sentence. Such an order is not an order of summary dismissal under Sec. 421 and neither is it an order in terms of Sec. 422 of the Code. The Appellate Court, after hearing the appeal, certainly, has the power under Sec. 423, in finally disposing of the appeal, to reduce the sentencce but that does not entitled it to direct that an appeal is admitted only on the question of sentence. Such an order if passed is invalid and the appelant is entitled to insist that the appeal should be heard on merits. ( 17 ) THE principle annunciated and expounded by the Apex Court in Rabari ghela Jadavs case (supra) is that an Appellate Court has no power to admit the appeal in part and that the accused appellant would be entitled to insist that the appeal should be heard on merits on all points. ( 18 ) THE ratio propounded in the aforesaid decision by the Apex Court, in view of this Court, is not applicable to the peculiar and special facts of the present case. It cannot be said that the Court of its own admitted the appeal at the stage of admission in part only for sentence. ( 18 ) THE ratio propounded in the aforesaid decision by the Apex Court, in view of this Court, is not applicable to the peculiar and special facts of the present case. It cannot be said that the Court of its own admitted the appeal at the stage of admission in part only for sentence. On the contrary, as mentioned, hereinbefore, at the stage of admission, the learned Advocate appearing for the accused did not press appeal for the conviction part. In other words, at the time of hearing of admission, the learned Advocate appearing for the accused did not raise the question with regard to conviction part. It is very clear from the facts of the present case and the statement made by the learned Advocate appearing for the appellant at the stage of hearing that the Court has admitted the appeal for a limited purpose with regard to sentence in view of the, unequivocal, statement made by the learned advocate for the appellant-accused at the relevant time at that means the time of admission. However, in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case, though prima facie, the accused cannot be allowed to agitate question of conviction, without entering into that controversy and leaving it open, this Court is of the opinion that conviction part may also be examined, in the longer interest of justice. ( 19 ) THE trial Court found accused guilty for the offence punishable under secs. 3 and 4 of the Police Forces (Restriction of Rights) Act, 1966. Sec. 3 of the police Forces Act, 1966, provides restriction with respect of rights to form association, freedom of speech, etc. , of the members of the Police Force. Sec. 3 reads as under :-"restrictions respecting right to form association, freedom of speech etc. 3 and 4 of the Police Forces (Restriction of Rights) Act, 1966. Sec. 3 of the police Forces Act, 1966, provides restriction with respect of rights to form association, freedom of speech, etc. , of the members of the Police Force. Sec. 3 reads as under :-"restrictions respecting right to form association, freedom of speech etc. (1) No member of a Police Force shall, without the express sanction of the central Government or of the prescribed authority - (a) be a member of, or be associated in any way with, any trade union, labour union, political association, or with any class of trade unions, labour unions, or political associations; or (b) be a member of, or be associated in any way with, any other society, institution, association or organisation that is not recognised as part of the Force of which he is a member or is not of a purely social, recreational or religious nature; or (c) communicate with the press or publish or cause to be published any book, letter or other document except where such communication or publication is in the bona fide discharge of his duties or is of a purely literary, artistic or scientific character or is of a prescribed nature. " ( 20 ) IN case of the contravention of provisions of Sec. 3 of the Police Forces act, 1966, the member of Police Force could be prosecuted, as violation of provision of Sec. 3 is punishable under Sec. 4 of the Act. The prosecution is obliged to show that there is breach of provisions of Sec. 3 of this Act. Prosecution has not been able to show as to how, there is violation of provision of Sec. 3 of the said Act. Learned Addl. P. P. made faint attempt to show that there is violation of Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 3 of the Police Forces Act, 1966. In order to constitute a violation of the provision of Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 3, it must be, successfully, shown that the accused who is member of the Police Force participated in or addressed any meeting or took part in any demonstration organised by anybody or person for any political party or for such other purpose as may be prescribed. As far as first part of Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 3, it must be, successfully, shown that the accused who is member of the Police Force participated in or addressed any meeting or took part in any demonstration organised by anybody or person for any political party or for such other purpose as may be prescribed. As far as first part of Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 3 is concerned, it is an admitted position that there was no any allegation of political purpose being involved in the impugned action. Later part is "for such other purpose as may be prescribed". What prescribed action or provision is contravened must be shown. So the purpose other than political could be prescribed under the Rules. Rules could be framed by the Central government under Sec. 6 of the Police Forces Act. It is not the prosecution case that any one or more of the purposes prescribed under the Rules, though the Police forces (Restriction of Rights), Rules, 1966 are framed. . ( 21 ) IN absence of specific allegation of the prosecution about breach of rules or specific purpose which is prescribed, and in absence of evidence to establish one of the material ingredients of Sec. 3 (2) of the Police Forces Act, this Court has no hesitation in finding that there is no substance in the prosecution case to hold appellant-accused guilty for the offences punishable under Sec. 3 read with Sec. 4 of the Police Forces Act, 1966. Unfortunately, the learned trial Magistrate has not assigned any reason as to how and why accused is held guilty for the offence punishable under Sec. 3 read with Sec. 4 of the Police Forces Act, 1966. Therefore, the conviction of the accused for the offence punishable under Sec. 3 read with sec. 4 of the Police Forces Act cannot be sustained and it must, therefore, be reversed. ( 22 ) THE accused is also held guilty for the offence punishable under Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 145 of the B. P. Act. Conviction under Sec. 145 (2) of the B. P. Act is seriously challenged in this appeal. It would, therefore, be necessary to refer to relevant provision of Sec. 145 of the B. P. Act. This section provides penalty for making false statement and for misconduct of members of the Police Force. Section 145 reads as under :- penalty for making false statement, etc. It would, therefore, be necessary to refer to relevant provision of Sec. 145 of the B. P. Act. This section provides penalty for making false statement and for misconduct of members of the Police Force. Section 145 reads as under :- penalty for making false statement, etc. , and for misconduct of Police Officers :- (1) Any person who makes a false statement or uses a false document for the purpose of obtaining employment or release from employment as a Police Officer, or (2) Any Police Officer who- (a) is guilty of cowardice, or (b) resigns his office or withdraws himself from duties thereof in contravention of Sec. 29, or (c) is guilty of any wilful breach of neglect of any provision of law or of any rule or order which as such Police Officer, it is his duty to observe or obey, or (d) is guilty of any violation of duty for which no punishment is expressly provided by any other law in force, shall, on conviction, be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extent to three months, or with fine which may extend to one hundred rupees, or with both. " ( 23 ) ACCORDING to the prosecution case, the accused who was working as Police constable on duty on the date of incident, had withdrawn himself from the duties in contravention of the provision of Sec. 29 of the B. P. Act. The prosecution case is that the accused who was Police Constable attached with Dholka Police Station, had withdrawn himself from duties on and from 26th July 1988 and 27th July 1988, and thereafter, by joining strike of the Association of the members of the police Force. This allegation of the prosecution is upheld by the learned Additional sessions Judge, and accused is found guilty for the offence punishable under Sec. 145 (2) of the B. P. Act. ( 24 ) SECTION 29 of the Bombay Police Act, provides for conditions under which the Police Officer could resign or withdraw himself from duties. This allegation of the prosecution is upheld by the learned Additional sessions Judge, and accused is found guilty for the offence punishable under Sec. 145 (2) of the B. P. Act. ( 24 ) SECTION 29 of the Bombay Police Act, provides for conditions under which the Police Officer could resign or withdraw himself from duties. Section 29 reads as under :-" (1) No Police Officer of the grade of Inspector or of the subordinate ranks shall resign his office or withdraw himself from the duties, the except with the written permission of the Commissioner or the duty Inspector General Criminal investigation Department or of the Principal of a Police Training College or school, or of the District Superintendent or of some other Police Officer empowered by the Inspector General or the Commissioner to grant such permission : provided that subject to the provision of Sub-sec. (2) no such permission shall be granted to any Police Officer until he has fully discharged any debt by him as such Police Officer to Government or to any Police fund. (2) If any such Police Officer produces a certificate signed by the Police Surgeon or the Civil Surgeon declaring him to be unfit by reason of disease or mental or physical incapacity for further service in the Police, the necessary written permission to resign, shall forthwith be granted to him on his discharging satisfactory security for the payment of any debt by him as such Police Officer, to Government or to any Police fund. " ( 25 ) SECTION 145 (2) of Bombay Police Act, expressly makes an offence for any police Officer who resigns from his office or withdraws from duties in contravention of Sec. 29 or is guilty of any wilful breach of neglect of any provision of law or of any rule or order which as such Police Officer, it is his duty to observe or obey. Expression "police Officer" is mentioned in Sec. 145 (2), whereas, definition of "police Officer" is mentioned under clause (a) of Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 145 of the bombay Police Act. Definition of "police Constable" is two-fold which defines expression "constable". It means Police Officer to a lower cadre. Thus, it is very clear that Sec. 145 includes even Constable who is Police Officer in the lower rank in Police Force. (2) of Sec. 145 of the bombay Police Act. Definition of "police Constable" is two-fold which defines expression "constable". It means Police Officer to a lower cadre. Thus, it is very clear that Sec. 145 includes even Constable who is Police Officer in the lower rank in Police Force. If Police Officer including a Constable were, therefore, to withold himself his services or were to commit breach of the rules or discipline or any duty enjoined, upon him, it would be an offence punishable under Sec. 145 (2) if no punishment has been expressly provided for in any other statute or rule. ( 26 ) THE prosecution case is that the appellant who is the original accused and who was Police Constable at the relevant time, had withdrawn himself from the duties without the expressed permission of the prescribed authority or competent authority, and therefore, there was breach of provision of Sec. 29 punishable under sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 145 of the B. P. Act. This allegation of the prosecution is held proved by the trial Court. The views and the ultimate conclusion arrived at by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, are quite correct and justified and there is no any reason whatsoever to disturb such conclusions. Therefore, criticism against conviction of the accused for the offence under Sec. 145 (2) of the Act is meritless and is required to be rejected. ( 27 ) THAT there is no dispute about the fact that accused was Police Constable attached with Dholka Police Station at the relevant time and he was on strike pursuant to the call given by Police Association. There was strike call to observe strike in the State of Gujarat by the Police Association and the accused being one of the members of the Police Association had withdrawn from duties and had gone on strike without observing provisions of Sec. 145 (1 ). Therefore, there was misconduct and wrongful action on the part of the accused which is made punishable under Sec. 145 (2) of the Bombay Police Act, 1951. It is not the defence of the accused that he had remained or had withdrawn from duties on account of personal difficulties or illness. On the contrary, the defence of the accused is that he was on strike and for that he had not attended Police Station on the date of incident. It is not the defence of the accused that he had remained or had withdrawn from duties on account of personal difficulties or illness. On the contrary, the defence of the accused is that he was on strike and for that he had not attended Police Station on the date of incident. ( 28 ) THE Investigating Officer - Bharatsinh Mangalsinh had clearly stated in his evidence, at Ex. 15, that the accused had gone on strike pursuant to the call given by the Police Association to observe strike in the State of Gujarat as a whole by the members of the Police Forces. It is contended that the Investigating Officer has stated, inter alia in his cross-examination only and not in examination-in-Chief. Therefore, it is submitted that such an evidence cannot be considered. In fact, such a contention cannot be considered as valid and legal. The evidence as such constitutes of chief examination as well as cross-examination. There cannot be a different criteria for appreciation of the merits of alleged complicity depending on events of chief examination and cross-examination. ( 29 ) EVIDENCE is to be read as a whole. So, there is a clear evidence of the complainant Police Officer Bharatsinh Mangalsinh. There is no reason to discard his testimony. Merely because other witnesses have turned hostile, corroboration of evidence of the Investigating Officer may be necessary, if the case of the defence is that he had withdrawn from duties on any other ground beyond his control. On the contrary, it is an admitted fact that accused was on strike on the date of incident and thus there was a withdrawal from the duties by Police Constable. In reply to question under Sec. 313 of the Code, the accused has, specifically, stated that he was on strike. Thus, the statement under Sec. 313 of the Code also clearly goes to show that the accused was on strike. Such a statement is also relevant more so if it corroborates testimony of the Investigating Officer. Therefore, this part of sec. 145 (2) of the B. P. Act 1951 remains unimpeachable. This Court has no hesitation in holding that the learned Additional Sessions Judge has, rightly, found accused guilty for the offence punishable under Sec. 145 (2) of the B. P. Act and therefore, conviction is required to be confirmed. Therefore, this part of sec. 145 (2) of the B. P. Act 1951 remains unimpeachable. This Court has no hesitation in holding that the learned Additional Sessions Judge has, rightly, found accused guilty for the offence punishable under Sec. 145 (2) of the B. P. Act and therefore, conviction is required to be confirmed. ( 30 ) NEXT it leaves in the field the point of appreciation of quantum of sentence awarded under Sec. 145 (2) of the Bombay Police Act. Accused is ordered to undergo R. I. for three months and to pay a fine of Rs. 100. 00 and in default, to undergo simple Imprisonment for one week. The learned Additional Sessions judge, while passing the impugned order of conviction/sentence, has also directed that muddamal knife should be destroyed and muddamal telephone instrument should be returned to the officer of Prahlad Gate Police Chowky of Dholka Police station, under Sec. 145 of the Act. ( 31 ) SECTION 145 (2) provides punishment for imprisonment for a term which may extend to three months or with fine which may extend to Rs. 100. 00 or both. It is submitted by the learned Advocate appearing for the accused that there is no fit case warranting order of maximum penalty prescribed under Sec. 145 (2) of the bombay Police Act. The learned A. P. P. has supported the quantum of sentence contending that there are serious allegations against the accused who was a Police constable at the relevant time. ( 32 ) THE Court is obliged to consider various factors while examining quantum of sentence in a case like one hand under the mandate of the provision of Sec. 235 of Criminal Procedure Code. The offence under Sec. 145 (2) of the Bombay Police act is committed in the year 1988. It is really a serious offence by a Police, more than five years period has expired and accused has already been dismissed from service in view of his above misconduct. Thus, the accused is out of job since 1988. However, it is submitted that, no doubt, the Court should always take a serious view in such a matter when the offence is established against a person who instead of protecting the law and order, perpetrates the same and instead of fostering it, he is not festering it. Thus, the accused is out of job since 1988. However, it is submitted that, no doubt, the Court should always take a serious view in such a matter when the offence is established against a person who instead of protecting the law and order, perpetrates the same and instead of fostering it, he is not festering it. ( 33 ) COURT has to take into account various aspects and circumstances, while passing an order of sentence as mandated by Sec. 235 (2) of Cr. P. C. including following factors :-SEC. 235 (2) in consonance with the modern trends in penalogy and sentencing procedures. A proper sentence is the amalgam of various aspects such as : (a) Nature and circumstances of the offence extenuating or aggravating; (b) Prior criminal record of the offender, his age, employment, educational background, home life, sobriety; (c) His emotional and mental condition, social adjustment, prospects for rehabilitation and possibility of return to normal life soon and so forth. . . . . . It is, therefore, incumbent upon the Court to consider all the relevant aspects before passing quantum of sentence. It is contended that the accused had already been kept as under-trial prisoner for a long period and considering family responsibility an lapse of period of more than five years, it should be considered as sufficient. Having regard to the peculiar facts and special circumstances arising from the record of the present case, coupled with the fact that the accused is already dismissed from services since 1988 and lapse of period of more than five years, ends of justice will be satisfied, if the period already undergone by the accused is substituted in place of impugned order of sentence. Thus, instead of substantive sentence of three months imposed by the trial Court for the offence punishable under Sec. 145 (2), the period already undergone by the accused is considered to be sufficient in the light of the special facts of the present case. The sentence of fine of Rs. 100. 00 and in default, Simple Imprisonment for one week is maintained. Thus, instead of three months, period undergone by the accused is substituted. Accordingly, impugned order of sentence is modified. The amount of fine, if any paid, for the offence punishable under Secs. 3 and 7 of Police Forces act, shall be refunded to the accused, as he is held not guilty for the same. Thus, instead of three months, period undergone by the accused is substituted. Accordingly, impugned order of sentence is modified. The amount of fine, if any paid, for the offence punishable under Secs. 3 and 7 of Police Forces act, shall be refunded to the accused, as he is held not guilty for the same. ( 34 ) HAVING regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, conviction and sentence in so far as offence punishable under Sec. 3 read with Sec. 7 of the police Forces (Restriction of Rights) Act, 1966 is concerned, it is quashed and set aside. The amount of fine, if paid by the accused shall be refunded to him on due verification. However, the conviction for the offence punishable under Sec. 145 (2) of the Bombay Police Act, 1951 is confirmed. The order of substantive sentence of imprisonment for three months sentence imposed by the trial Court, it is reduced to punishment which the accused has already undergone. Sentence or fine imposed by the trial Court is confirmed. The appeal is partly allowed to the aforesaid extent only. .