JUDGMENT S.C. Pandey, J. 1. This is employer's appeal under Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') against the order dated 23.4.1987, passed by Workmen's Compensation Commissioner, Jabalpur, in Case No. 8 of 1984. 2. The respondent No. 1 Mangloo filed an application claiming that he was employed as a Dresser in the coal mines of the appellant. He claimed that he became permanently disabled because he had contracted pneumoconiosis as he was working as an underground worker in the coal mines of the appellant. It was alleged by him that his services were terminated on account of the disease, but no compensation was given to him by the appellant. It was specifically alleged by respondent No. 1 that on 25.7.1983 his services were dispensed with and he also claimed that he was entitled to compensation on account of permanent disability because his emoluments were between Rs. 900/- to Rs. 1,000 per month. The application of the respondent No. 1 was opposed by the appellant and it denied the allegations in the application including that the respondent's wages were between Rs. 900/- to Rs. 1,000/-. It was asserted that respondent No. 1 earned more than Rs. 1,000/- by way of wages received from the appellant. Here it may be noted that the appellant did not mention the amount of wages specifically. It was also denied that the respondent No. 1 was suffering from the disease known as pneumoconiosis. It was further alleged in reply that respondent No. 1 had completed his service without any difficulty and had retired on 25.7.1983. All other allegations regarding clinical examination by the Medical Board etc. were denied by the appellant. 3. It appears that this case was consolidated with other cases and were tried together with Case Nos. 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 44, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 91, 94, 95, 96, 97 and 98 of 1984, 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 14 and 21 of 1985 and 8, 9 and 12 of 1986 and the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner passed a common order in respect of all those cases. So far as respondent No. 1 was concerned, it was found that be was getting less than Rs. 1,000/-per month and he was suffering from the disease known as pneumoconiosis. So far as respondent No. 1 was concerned, it was found that be was getting less than Rs. 1,000/-per month and he was suffering from the disease known as pneumoconiosis. It was also held that in view of the evidence on record, the respondent was entitled to Rs. 42,000/- plus Rs. 3,000/- by way of penalty and interest upon the amount at the rate of 6 per cent per annum, if the appellant did not deposit the amount within sixty days. In doing so, the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner has relied on the evidence of Dr. Surange. In view of the evidence on record, the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner recorded a finding of fact that respondent No. 1 Mangloo suffered the aforesaid disease and he was permanently disabled. The learned Workmen's Compensation Commissioner also observed that it was not disputed before him that the respondent No. 1 was not in service. 4. In this appeal, the learned Counsel for the appellant has argued that so far as Mangloo was concerned, it was specifically disputed by the appellant in his reply to the application for grant of compensation that the respondent No. 1 had retired after full service and, therefore, he did not suffer any disablement. He got full salary during the period of his employment and thereafter he had retired. His services were not terminated on account of the disease known as pneumoconiosis as alleged by respondent No. 1. According to learned Counsel for the appellant, in view of this situation, the learned Workmen's Compensation Commissioner should have held that respondent No. 1 was not able to prove that he was entitled to any compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act for contracting the occupational disease known as pneumoconiosis. Nobody appeared for the respondent No.1. 5. It is true that in reply to the application for grant of compensation, the appellant took several pleas of denial including that the services of respondent No. 1 were terminated. However, after consolidation of the case, it appears that the respondent No. 1 did not press this point because the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner has not framed any specific issue on the point. The issues framed are shown in the impugned order and they are as follow: (1) Whether the applicant can be classified as a workman? (2) Whether the decision of the Medical Board is unjustified and illegal? The issues framed are shown in the impugned order and they are as follow: (1) Whether the applicant can be classified as a workman? (2) Whether the decision of the Medical Board is unjustified and illegal? (3) Whether the applicant is permanently disabled to the extent of 100 per cent? (4) Relief and cost. These four issues were claimed in all the cases except Case No. 8 of 1985 for which separate issues were framed. Even in Case No. 8 of 1985, no such issue regarding the retirement of the applicant was framed. In absence of such an issue, it appears that the appellant did not press the case that the respondent No. 1 has retired. Otherwise, the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner would have surely framed an issue on this point. It is, therefore, too late in the day to revive the claim that respondent No. 1 had retired. The plea raised by the appellant was clearly abandoned and, therefore, the respondent No. 1 is estopped from challenging the order of Workmen's Compensation Commissioner on the ground that there is no finding recorded by him regarding the continuance of service of respondent No. 1. It is clear from the record that neither side had led any evidence in this regard and no issue was framed on this point. The question of giving any finding on this issue did not arise. The principles of estoppel will surely apply in this case because the appellant failed in his duty of specifically raising the point at the time of the trial so that a proper finding could be recorded by the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner on the evidence led by the parties. Neither party went to the trial with this issue in mind. On the other hand, it appears to this Court that the appellant by its own conduct gave up his plea regarding retirement of the respondent No. 1. This conclusion is further fortified because it appears to this Court that in each case the plea of the appellant was that every workman was earning more than Rs. 1,000/-. This point was also not seriously pressed before the learned Workmen's Compensation Commissioner. Now at this late stage, if the appellant is permitted to take this plea then respondent No. 1 will be seriously prejudiced because the case will have to be remanded for fresh recording of evidence after framing a new issue. 1,000/-. This point was also not seriously pressed before the learned Workmen's Compensation Commissioner. Now at this late stage, if the appellant is permitted to take this plea then respondent No. 1 will be seriously prejudiced because the case will have to be remanded for fresh recording of evidence after framing a new issue. This court cannot countenance such a plea at the very late stage after an order in favour of respondent No. 1 has already been passed. 6. Moreover, this Court is exercising its jurisdiction under Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. The appeal can be entertained only on the point of substantial question of law and not otherwise. The question whether respondent No. 1 has retired after obtaining full wages and was also getting pensionary benefit is essentially a question of fact. This cannot be allowed to be raised when it was not pressed before the learned Workmen's Compensation Commissioner. A question of law without there being any evidence to support it on either side cannot be raised under Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. The emphasis here is on a substantial question of law. A substantial question of law is one which is of some importance to the parties. If we take the most liberal view in interpreting the word substantial question of law found in Section 30 of the Act. Here the appellant has not taken care to apprise the importance of this question to the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner and, therefore, presumption is that it was not a substantial question to the appellant. In view of this matter, this Court is powerless to come to the aid of the appellant in reversing the order of the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner dated 23.4.1987. 7. The result of the aforesaid discussion is that this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.