Devinder Gupta,j. (Oral) ( 1 ) THE petitioner has in this. writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India read with Article 227 challenged the act of respondent No. 1 in declining him permission to file a suit against United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (for short unhcr ) for payment of his share of rent for the premises, namely, 14 Jor Bagh, New Delhi. ( 2 ) THROUGH letter, annexure J, dated 30. 9. 1994 the petitioner was informed on his request by the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India that it regrets its inability to give requisite permission for filing suit against UNHCR. Petitioner was informed to submit a succession certificate to the United Nations High Commission for Refugees for his dues or alternatively the petitioner was asked to obtain consent/no Objection of the other lessors and forwarded it to the Ministry to enable the Ministry to resolve the matter amicably with UNHCR. Petitioner again represented. Through letter, annexure M, dated 9. 12. 1994 petitioner s request was turned down on the following ground: the matter has been examined in consultation with Legal Department of this Ministry and the Ministry is of the view that this appears to be a dispute after the death of the father of Shri Sahil Marwah, the applicant. The lease agreement pertaining to the demised premises was signed with five other co-owners including applicant s father. UNHCR have received a request from the remaining five co-owners not to release the 1/6th portion of the rent to any one claiming to be a heir of the deceased till the pending disputes on succession to the property of the deceased is resolved. ( 3 ) THE matter being subjudiced, it also apepars that UNHCR is ready to pay 1/6th portion of the rent to Shri Marwah, that has been withheld for want of identification of the successor. It is not a case of intentional or willful non-payment of rent. The UNHCR has intention to pay the rent to the holder of a succession certificate or till the legal dispute pending in court regarding the succession to the estate of the deceased has been resolved. ( 4 ) IN view of the above, it is regretted that permission to sue UNHCR cannot be granted to Shri Marwah under Section 86 of the Code. ( 4 ) IN view of the above, it is regretted that permission to sue UNHCR cannot be granted to Shri Marwah under Section 86 of the Code. " ( 5 ) PETITIONER s challenge to the two impugned letters, annexures J and M is on numerous grounds but we arc not enumerating the same in this order since we find that writ petition can he disposed of on one of the main grounds, namely, non-compliance of the provisions of natural justice. ( 6 ) IN its counter affidavit filed on behalf of respondent No. 1 on the affidavit of B. K. Gupta, Director/deputy Chief of Protocol (F), Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi. It is not dispuled that petitioner was not afforded any personal hearing before taking decision on the petitioner s request to sue UNHCR for which the petitioner had filed the requisite application under Section 86 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the counter affidavit it is stated: "as per our record, Shri Sahil Marwah, petitioner did not request this Ministry for a personal hearing. As he was not willing to give credence to the advise given bythis Ministry, it was not felt fruitful to hear him in person suo-moto. " ( 7 ) SECTION 86 of the Code of Civil Procedure creates a personal privilege for rulers of foreign States and their ambassadors and envoys. The object of the Section is to give effect to the principles of international law, one of which being that every sovereign State respects the independence of every other soverign State and as a consequence of this absolute independence and of the international comity which underlies the relations between sovereign States, each State declines to exercise by means of any of its court, jurisdiction over the person of any sovereign or ambassador or over the public property of any State. ( 8 ). Scope and ambit of Section 8u was duly considered by the Supreme Court in Harbhajan Singh Dhalla v. Union of India ( AIR 1987 SC 9 ). It was observed that there is no provision of any appeal from an order in either granting or refusing to grant sanction under Section 86 of the Code. ( 8 ). Scope and ambit of Section 8u was duly considered by the Supreme Court in Harbhajan Singh Dhalla v. Union of India ( AIR 1987 SC 9 ). It was observed that there is no provision of any appeal from an order in either granting or refusing to grant sanction under Section 86 of the Code. The sanction or refusal thereof may, however, be questioned in an appropriate proceedings in a Court, but inasmuch as there is no provision of appeal, it is necessary that there should be an objective evaluation and examination by the appropriate authority of relevant and material factors in exercising its jurisdiction under Section 86 by the Central Government. There is an implicit requirement of observance of the principles of natural justice and also the implicit requirement that decision must be expressed in such a manner that reasons can be spelled out from such decision. ( 9 ) IT is not disputed that in the instant case there has been violation of the principles of natural justice in as much as no hearing was afforded to the petitioner before turning down his prayer. . In the counter affidavit it is stated that since the petitioner has not thought it fit to give credence to the advice rendered by the Ministry it was not felt fruitful to hear him in person. It was necessary to have given hearing to the petitioner before taking any decision on his application. For this reason the impugned order deserves to be set aside. ( 10 ) PERUSAL of two letters in question would also show that the Central Government has travelled beyond its jurisdiction in probing into the merits of the petitioner s claim. In Maharaj Kumar Tokendra Bir Singh v. Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs and another ( AIR 1964 SC 1663 ) which was also relied upon in Harbhajan Singh Dhalla s case (supra) it ws held that it is not the function of the Central Government to attempt to adjudicate upon the merits of the claim intended to be made by the litigants in their proposed suits. That is the function of the civil courts of competent jurisdiction and so the Central Government should not attempt the jurisdiction of civil court and decide whether the claim is well founded or not before affording consent to the institution of the suit. That is the function of the civil courts of competent jurisdiction and so the Central Government should not attempt the jurisdiction of civil court and decide whether the claim is well founded or not before affording consent to the institution of the suit. We need not state the facts of the instant case here except to remark that the tenor of the two letters in question do show that the Central Government has gone beyond the scope of its authority and jurisdiction while considering the request for granting permission to sue by touching the merits of claim, which is the function of the Courts. ( 11 ) FUR the aforementioned reason the two impugned letters, Annexures J and M, are liable to be quashed and set set aside. We hereby allow the writ petition, quash and set aside the impugned letters, annexures J and M, and direct the first respondent to dispose of petitioner s request for grant of permission to sue UNHCR for his claim, in accordance with law after affording due hearing to. the petitioner. Decision will be taken in the light of the observations made in the lwo decisions of the Supreme Court, within a period of four weeks from today. ( 12 ) RULE is made. absolute.