OM PRAKASH, J. In these writ petitions validity of a notification dated 5-1-1991 issued under Section 4 (1) and of the declaration dated 7-1-1992 issued under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (briefly the Act), (Annexures-3 and 4 to writ petition No. 9735 of 1992 respectively) by which the lands belonging to the petitioners, inter alia, are sought to be acquired, has been challenged. 2. Since the fascicle of those writ petitions relate to the aforesaid notification and declaration, issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act respectively the same is decided by a common judgment. 3. Total area sought to be acquired under this notification for the planned industrial development by the New Okhla Industrial Development Authority (for short the NOIDA), aggregates to 790 Bighas 16 Biswas and 9 Bigwansis, that is, 494. 26 acres. Notification under Section 4 (1) of the Act dated 5-1-1991 (Annexure-4 to writ petition No. 9733 of 1992) was published in the official Gazette on 2-2-1991 in two daily newspapers, namely, "dainik Hint and Dainik athah on 30-3-1991 and 24-3-1991 respectively which were shown to us at the time of hearing by the Standing Counsel but have not been filed. A public notice dated 13-2-1991 containing the substance of the said notification (Annexure-1 to model caunter affidavit filed in Writ Petition No. 9520 of 1992) was caused to be published in central locality (See Annexure-2 to the model counter affidavit in writ petition No. 9520 of 1992. Declaration under Section 6 of the Act was published in the Gazette dated 7-3-1992 and in two newspapers on 1-2-1992 in uzinik Jagran and Rashtriya Sahara, which too were shown to us at the time of hearing. 4. The common plea of ail the petitioners is that the need of acquisi tion of lands covered by the impugned notification and the declaration was not so urgent as to impel the State Government to give a direction that the provisions of Section 5-A shall not apply. 5. 4. The common plea of ail the petitioners is that the need of acquisi tion of lands covered by the impugned notification and the declaration was not so urgent as to impel the State Government to give a direction that the provisions of Section 5-A shall not apply. 5. Upon a conjoint reading of sub-sections (1) and (4) of Section 17, it is seen that in the cases of urgency, the Government may direct that provi sions of Section 5-A shall not apply and if it does so direct, a declaration may be made under Section 6 in respect of the land at any time after the date of publication of notification under Section 4 (1) of the Act. The notification under Section 4 (1) had been issued in all these cases invoking sub-section (4) of Section 17 and thus, inquiry envisaged by Section 5-A was dispensed with. The common contention of the petitioners is that there was no urgency of acquisition of their lands and, therefore, inquiry contemplated by Section 5-A was illegally dispensed with by the State Government and hence, the notifica tion issued under Section 4 (1), read with Section 17 (4) and the declaration issued under Section 6 of the Act are null and void. 6. The question for consideration is whether the need for acquisition of the lands of the petitioners was urgent and if so, whether the State Govern ment was right in giving a direction that provisions of Section 5-A shall not apply. Such a question arises very often in the land acquisition proceedings and, therefore, there is no dearth of guideline. However, it is, no doubt, a difficult task for the courts to apply the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in several cases to the facts of a given case. 7. In Raja Anand Brahma Shah v. State of U. P. and others, AIR 1967 SC 1081 , the Supreme Court ruled down : (paragraph 8 at page 1085 ). "it is true that the opinion of the State Government which is a condi tion for the exercise of the power under Section 17 (4) of the Act, is subjective and a Court cannot normally enquire whether there were sufficient grounds or justification of the opinion formed by the State Government under Section 17 (4 ). . . . . . . . . . . But even though the power of the State Government has been formulated under Sec tion 17 (4) of the Act in subjective terms the expression of opinion of the State Government can be challenged as ultra vires in a court of law if it could be shown that the State Government never applied its mind to the matter or that the action of the State Government is mala fide. " 8. From the aforesaid rule it is manifest that opinion of the State Government whether there is urgency or not, is subjective and the sufficiency of grounds cannot be gone into by the court. An opinion formed by the Govern ment can be challenged only on two grounds namely : (1) mala fide and/or (2) non- application of mind. Thus the task of the court is very limited. When an opinion formed by the State Government is challenged, the court will have to restrict its inquiry only to the two questions whether the opinion formed was mala fide, and/or whether there was non-application of mind. If both or either of the grounds is established, then only a notification issued under Sec tion 6 can be quashed. 9. In most of the cases in hand, no plea has been taken by the peti tioners that the opinion was formed by the Government without applying its mind or that the opinion formed was mala fide. In a few cases a plea has been raised that without applying the mind, the opinion as to the urgency was formed. To buttress this plea, it is stated that there is Abadi all over the land covered by the impugned notification and the declaration and that there was a State Policy not to acquire the Abadi land and yet lands belonging to the petitioners are sought to be acquired. The submission is that from such action an inference can be drawn that proper mind was not applied and, there fore, land of the petitioner is sought to be acquired contrary to the State policy. 10. This submission raises a question whether there is Abadi all over the land belonging to the petitioners. 11. The submission is that from such action an inference can be drawn that proper mind was not applied and, there fore, land of the petitioner is sought to be acquired contrary to the State policy. 10. This submission raises a question whether there is Abadi all over the land belonging to the petitioners. 11. In Writ Petition No. 9735 of 1992, Sri S. P. Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently relied on a decision of learned Second Additional Civil Judge, Ghaziabad, Annexure-1 to that writ petition rendered by the civil court between the petitioner (plaintiff) and the NOIDA (defendant ). The case of the plaintiff was that his Abadi is situated on plot No. 582 and that his possession is illegally interferred with by the NOIDA. The defendant denied this plea of the plaintiff and averred that the said plot had been acquired. The Court came to the conclusion that NOIDA could not interfere with the possession of the plaintiff except in accordance with law. The Court pointed out that as there was no declaration under Section 6 and, therefore, no right vested in NOIDA to interfere with the possession of the plaintiff over plot No. 582, The judgment of the Civil Court is dated 5-3-1991 and the declara tion under Section 6 was published in the official Gazette on 7-3-1992. It is therefore, clear that when the civil court gave its decision, declaration under Section 6 of the Act was not there and that came to be issued in the next following year. The conclusion of the civil court would have been different had there been a declaration under Section 6 of the Act at that stags: There is no clear finding about the extent and nature of the coast ructions, if any, existed on plot No. 582. 12. Besides Writ Petition No. 9732 of 1992 Sri Gupta who argued in Writ Petition No. 9732 of 1992 as well, relied on a report of the Naib Tehsildar dated 20-3-1991 (Annexure-I to that writ petition) from which it appears that the petitioner made an application under Section 143 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. The Naib Tehsildar in the said report stated that there was boundary wail and some rooms on spot and nobody lived there. The Naib Tehsildar in the said report stated that there was boundary wail and some rooms on spot and nobody lived there. This report is of no use as that is subsequent to the Notification under Section 4 (1) which was published on 2-2-1991. Moreover, the Naib Tehsildar clearly observed that no one lived on the spot and that agricultural operation was carried on in the land. 13. Writ Petition No. 9520 of 1992 is filed by as many as 56 defence personnels stating that they invested a considerable amount in the construc tions, situate on the entire land. Reliance is placed on the Khasra entries. No evidence showing the extent of constructions, has been brought on record to substantiate their contention. On the other band, there is a 17 point report by the Tehsildar, Dadri, which is Annexure-7 to the model counter affidavit filed by the State in which, he clearly pointed out that the land sought to be acquired is agricultural and that only boundary wail has been constructed in 11 plots. There is an official presumption that the said report has been given by the Tehsildar in due discharge of his duties and that is correct. No evidence to rebut such presumption has been brought on record by the peti tioners and, therefore, the contention of the petitioners in this writ petition that their houses are situate all over the land sought to acquired, does not commend to be accepted. 14. In Writ Petition No. 13275 of 1992 acquisition proceedings relate to plots No. 288 and 289 on which a school buildings is said to have been situat ed. Khasra entries are relied on to prove to averment of Abadi on these plots. In Writ Petition No. 9734 of 1992 a declaration dated 1-11-1994 is said to have been obtained under Section 143 of the U. P. Z A. & L. R. Act (Annexure-2 to the rejoinder affidavit ). It is much subsequent to the date of notification and, hence cannot be pressed into service. 15. The question is what is the evidentiary value of those Khasra entries referred to hereinbefore which are posterior to the year 1976. It is much subsequent to the date of notification and, hence cannot be pressed into service. 15. The question is what is the evidentiary value of those Khasra entries referred to hereinbefore which are posterior to the year 1976. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the State in Writ Petition No. 13275 of 1992 it is averred that in view of notification dated April 17, 1976 published in U. P. Gazette (Extraordinary) under the provisions of the U. P. Industrial Area Development Act, 1976 (the Act of 1976 in short) restriction was imposed in respect of the Industrial Development Area and no change in the use of that land could have been made. The Act of 1976 was enacted to provide for the constitution of an authority development of certain areas in the State into industrial, and urban township and for the matters connected therewith. The NOIDA was constituted under Section 3 of that Act. One of the object of NOIDA as stated in Section 6 (2) (c) is to demarcate and develop sites for industrial commercial and residential purposes according to the plan Indus-tial development area under Section 2 (d) means an area declared as such by the State Government by notification. Section 10 of the Act of 1976 enables the authority to take or maintain the industrial development area if it appears to it that the condition or use of any site is prejudicially affecting or is likely to affect proper planning of the industrial development area. In exercise of the powers under clause (4) of Section 2 read with Section 3 of this Act, a notification of April 17, 1976 was published to declare the area comprising the villages mentioned in the schedule annexed thereto, to be called the New Okhla Industrial Development Area. The village Chhalera Bangar, land of which is shown in Khasra entries, is one of the villages comprised io the schedule. The submission of the learned Standing Counsel is that this area was already declared as industrial development area and after the notification of 1976 having been issued, such area could not have been converted into Abadi. The village Chhalera Bangar, land of which is shown in Khasra entries, is one of the villages comprised io the schedule. The submission of the learned Standing Counsel is that this area was already declared as industrial development area and after the notification of 1976 having been issued, such area could not have been converted into Abadi. Such submission is fully borne out from the provisions of the Act of 1976 and, therefore, at least those Khasra entries vehemently relied on by the petitioners which are posterior to April 17, 1976 when notification was issued under the Act of 1976, are of no avail to them. 16. From such factual and legal position, no inference can be drawn that the authorities proceeded with acquisition without applying their mind. 17. Then remains a legal question to be considered that is, when an area as big as about 500 acres is sought to be acquired and if constructions ire assumed to have situated here and there on such large area, whether inquiry envisaged by Section 5-A can be dispensed with invoking the provi sions of Section 17 (4) of the Act. Precisely same question came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in State of U. P. v. Smt. Pista Devi and others, AIR 1986 SC 2025 . In that case, the State Government acquired about 412 acres of land on the outskirts of Meerut City for building residential colony. There were super-structures here and there on that area. The peti tioners pleaded that there being buildings over the area, the land was not waste or arable in nature and, therefore, hearing under Section 5-A should not have been dispensed with. On this, the Supreme Court illuminated the legal position thus : ". . . . . . . . . . It may be true that here and there were a few super structures. In a case of this nature where a large extent of land is being acquired for planned development of the urban area, it would not be proper to leave the small portions over which some super-structures have been constructed out of the develop ment scheme. . . It may be true that here and there were a few super structures. In a case of this nature where a large extent of land is being acquired for planned development of the urban area, it would not be proper to leave the small portions over which some super-structures have been constructed out of the develop ment scheme. In such a situation where there is real urgency it would be difficult to apply Section 5-A of the Act in the case of few bits of land on which some structures are standing and to exempt the rest of the property from its application. Whether the land in question is waste or arable land has to be judged by looking at the general nature and condition of the land. . . . . . . . . . " 18. The principle that may be deduced from Plata Devis case (supra) is that when a large area sought to be acquired and if on that area constructions situate hare and there, it is. not possible to apply Section 5-A only for a few bits of land where the super-structures are situated and not to apply that in respect of rest of the area. If a substantial area required for a scheme is waste or arable, then the smaller area having superstructures here and there which is integral part of the bigger portion of the waste or arable land will not inhibit the authorities from dispensing with the hearing under Section 5-A if urgency is established. Such legal position has been reiterated in Raj as than Housing Board and others etc. , etc, v. Shri Kishan and others etc. , etc. If 1993 (1) SC 298. Affirming the view reproduced above from paragraph 7 of Smt. Pista Devis case (supra), the Supreme Courts said (paragraph 9 at page 302) "we are of the opinion that the principle enunciated in the said paragraph is the correct one. . . . . . . . . . " 19. It has already been pointed out that the total area covered by the impugned notification is 494 acres belonging to myriad tenure holders. A few persons have filed writ petitions for quashing the same. . . . . . . . . . " 19. It has already been pointed out that the total area covered by the impugned notification is 494 acres belonging to myriad tenure holders. A few persons have filed writ petitions for quashing the same. From the facts of these cases it is established that general nature of the land is waste or arable and that being so, it will not be appropriate to apply Section 5-A only in respect of the smaller area having superstructures over it and exclude its appli cability to rest bigger area. 20. Then it is submitted that not only urgency but the respondents are required to establish that the urgency was such as to brook no delay to dispense with hearing under Section 5-A of the Act. Sub- section (1) of Section 17 of the Act simply states that in cases of urgency, whenever the Government so directs, the Collector, though no such award has been made, may, on the expiration of fifteen days from the publication of the notice mentioned in Section 9, sub-section (1), take possession of any land needed for public purpose. Sub-section (4) of the Section 17 states that in the case of any land to which, in the opinion of the Government, the provisions of the sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) are applicable, the Government may direct that the provisions of Section 5-A shall not apply. Section 17 (1) refers to urgency only and it does not refer to an urgency of a higher degree. What is urgent, that cannot be deferred and what can be deferred that cannot be urgent. Urgent situation requires to be attended to immediately and any delay may frustrate the urgent purpose. Looking to the urgency, the State of U. P. has inserted sub-section (1-A) in Section 17 stating that the power to take possession under sub-section (1) may also be exercised in the case of other than waste or arable land, where the land is acquired for or in connec tion with sanitary improvements of any kind or planned development. Acqui sition for sanitary improvement is considered so urgent as to empower the State Government to take possession of the land without award having been made. Acqui sition for sanitary improvement is considered so urgent as to empower the State Government to take possession of the land without award having been made. When acquisition for sanitary improvement may be so urgent as to take possession of the land under sub-section (1) of Section 17 without awaiting the award, why acquisition for planned industrial development cannot be considered so urgent within the meaning of Section 17 (1) of the Act. 21. In Laxmichand and others v. State of U. P. , AIR 1983 All 136 , a Division Bench of this Court held the construction of godown for scientific storage of foodgrains as inherent urgency warranting prompt action. In Pista Devi (supra) the land was acquired for a housing scheme in the city of Meerut, dispensing with the hearing under Section 5-A of Act. The provision of housing accommodation was held to be a national urgency by the Supreme Court in that case. When construction of housing accommodation can be a national urgency, then the planned industrial development would be fortiorari national urgency because without planned industrial development the country as a whole cannot grow. If our nation wish to match with the developed nations of the world, utmost priority to the planned industrial development shall have to be given. Before the Supreme Court, it was contended relying on the case of Narayan Govind Gavate etc. v. State of Maharashtra and others, AIR 1977 SC 180, that there should not only be urgency but to dispense with the hearing under Section 5-A, the authorities will have to establish that the urgency was of such a nature as to not even bear the delay caused by inquiry under Section 5-A. In Narayan Govind Gavate (supra) the land was acquired for industrial development and residential purposes. In paragraph 38 on page 194 of that case the Supreme Court took a view that it is not just the existence of an urgency but the need to dispense with an inquiry under Section 5-A which has to be considered. This observation has been vehe mently relied on before us by the counsel for the petitioners and, therefore, they urge that not only urgency but the authorities should establish the need to dispense with an inquiry under Section 5-A. Dispensing with the inquiry under Section 5-A is the result of establishment of urgency. This observation has been vehe mently relied on before us by the counsel for the petitioners and, therefore, they urge that not only urgency but the authorities should establish the need to dispense with an inquiry under Section 5-A. Dispensing with the inquiry under Section 5-A is the result of establishment of urgency. If urgency under Section 17 (1) is established then inquiry will be dispensed with. Distinguish ing the Narayan Govind Gavates case (supra) the Supreme Court in Pista Devi (supra) stated, (para 5 at page 2028): "the acquisition proceedings which had been challenged in that case related to the year 1963. During this period of nearly 23 years since then the population of India has gone up by hundreds of millions and it is no longer possible for the court to take the view that the scheme of development of residential areas do not appear to demand such emergent action as to eliminate summary inquiries under Section 5-A of the Act. " 22. Whatever be the position in the case of Narayan Govind Gavate, it is clear that the whole perspective has changed in Pista Devis case and urgency of planned industrial development by NOIDA has to be considered in the light of that changed perspective. 23. NOIDA is not only an Authority constituted under the Act of 1976 but a well developed locality which is situate in close proximity to Delhi and the entire concentration of the State of Uttar Pradesh is to develop it in such a fashion as to attract the biggest industrial entrepreneurs from India and abroad. NOIDA is the only jewel in the industrial crown of the State of U. P. and, therefore, acquisition of land for planned industrial development in NOIDA is nothing but emergent. 24. If land is acquired for recreational purposes or for like purpose then it may be said that the purpose is not very urgent and looking to the priority of the State of U. P. , recreational schemes may await. But planned industrial development has to be seat) entirely in different perspective. Land for recreational purpose also is not always without urgency. If Olympic Games are decided to take place in India for which a deadline is fixed then acquisition for that purpose will be very urgent and exception can be taken in that situation to dispense with hearing under Section 5-A. 25. Land for recreational purpose also is not always without urgency. If Olympic Games are decided to take place in India for which a deadline is fixed then acquisition for that purpose will be very urgent and exception can be taken in that situation to dispense with hearing under Section 5-A. 25. This Court in Ram Narain Rai and others v. State of U. P. and others, AIR 1991 All 330 , held that the purpose of acquisition of land for establishing a training centre for giving training to sugarcane growers and personnel of sugarcane development department, was urgent and rejecting the submission of the petitioner that not only urgency but need to dispense with the inquiry under Section 5-A should be established, the court opined that the language of the Section does not indicate that the appropriate Government should besides forming an opinion about the urgency also form an additional opinion of the need to dispense with the inquiry under Section 5-A of the Act. 26. It is then urged for the petitioners that subjective satisfaction of the authorities in regard to urgency is without any material. From a letter dated 21-4-1995 (Annaxure-3 to the model counter affidavit) addressed by the District Magistrate Ghaziabad to the State Government, it is seen that the District Magistrate satisfied himself that there was urgency to acquits land of village Chhalera Bangar for planned industrial development by NOIDA and he therefore, urged that the State Government to invoke Section 17 of the Act while issuing notification under Section 4 (1) and to issue the notifica tion and declaration under Section 6 at the earliest. Another letter to the District Magistrate, Ghaziabad addressed to the State Government is dated 12-6-1990 (Annexure 4 to the model counter affidavit) from which it appears that the State Government raised certain queries which had been replied by this letter by the District Magistrate, stating that about 378 agriculturists would be affected by the proposal of acquisition of land and that except one all of them are non-scheduled castes. The District Magistrate further urged the State Government to issue notification and declaration under Sections 4 and 6 invoking Section 17 of the Act without delay. The District Magistrate further urged the State Government to issue notification and declaration under Sections 4 and 6 invoking Section 17 of the Act without delay. Before these letters a communication dated 14-12-1986 (Annexure S to the model counter affidavit) had been sent by the NOIDA to the Land Acquisition Officer stating that land of village Chhelora Bangar is urgently required and that if that is not done, then the development would be adversely affected by the possible encroachments. From this correspondence it is amply clear that subjective satisfaction of the State Government regarding urgency was not without material. 27. The next submission is that if there were a real urgency then the declaration under Section 6 of the Act would not have been so much delayed. Whereas notification under Section 4 (1), read with Section 17 (4), was published in Gazette of 2-2-1991, the declaration under Section 6 was published on 7-3-1993 in the Gazette and in the newspapers on 1-2-1993, that is, after about a year. The question is whether an inference can be drawn from the gap of about one year between the publication of the notification under Section 4 (1) and of the declaration under Section 6 that there was no urgency. Similar inference on account of delay was urged in Pista Devis case (supra), but the contention of the petitioner was repelled saying that post-notification delay of nearly one year was not by itself sufficient to render the decision taken by the State Government under Section 17 (1) and (4) at the time of issue of noti fication under Section 4 (1) either improper or illegal Publications are delayed because the officials entrusted with the task of taking further action in the matter are some times negligent or tardy in discharging of their duties and no inference can be drawn from that that publication was delayed because there was no urgency. 28. Then the submission is that substance of the notification was not duly published in a central locality and, therefore, the date of publication cannot be properly determined. It is urged that under sub- section (1) of Section 4, the last of the dates of the publications made by three modes will be the date of publication and that public notice of the substance of the notification having not been given in accordance with law, the date of publi cation cannot be determined. It is urged that under sub- section (1) of Section 4, the last of the dates of the publications made by three modes will be the date of publication and that public notice of the substance of the notification having not been given in accordance with law, the date of publi cation cannot be determined. This submission is misconceived inasmuch as, the State of U. P. by Land Acquisition (U. P. Amendment and Validation) Act VIII of 1974 instersed the following words "except in the case of any land to which by virtue of a direction of the State Government under sub-section (4) of Section 17, the provisions of Section 5-A shall not apply" between the words "and" and the "collector" occurring in sub-section (1) of Section 4. The effect of such amendment is that when Section 17 (4) is invoked then public notice need not be given. In the instant bunch, Section 17 (4) has been invoked and, therefore, public notice was not necessary. However, from annexures 1 and 2 to the modal counter affidavit, it appears that a public notice dated 13-2-1991 was affixed on the notice board of Tehsildar-Dadri and on a School building. This submission, therefore, fails and is rejected. 29. The next submission is that the acquisition is for industrial, commercial and residential purposes. It is not controverted by the counsel for NOIDA. He, however, submits that development of residential area is only for those who shall have their industrial establishments in NOIDA and not for others. Industrial Establishment is not merely an establishment of plant but a residential complex is also necessary for the people who work in the industrial establishment and for them development of residential area is essen tial. Sri Madhyan submits that in the garb of development of residential area for industrial purposes, the NOIDA may allot residential plots to the public making a profit out of it. If that is so, such malpractices on the part of the NOIDA can always be challenged, because the land is sought to be acquired for planned industrial development which can be used for industrial purposes or for the residences of the people connected with the industrial establishment. 30. A supplementaly affidavit annexing a letter dated March 7, 1995 was filed in Writ Petition No. 9734 of 1992 by petitioners on 20th July, 1995 when the case was taken up for hearing. 30. A supplementaly affidavit annexing a letter dated March 7, 1995 was filed in Writ Petition No. 9734 of 1992 by petitioners on 20th July, 1995 when the case was taken up for hearing. No good reason has been shown as to why the letter of March 7, 1995 was not filed earlier. This being so, it is nothing but appropriate to step such supplementary affidavit which we decline to entertain. 31. Before parting with the case we make it clear that acquisition for planned development may not be always urgent and that it will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case when there may be urgency for acquisi tion for such purpose. On the facts and circumstances of the instant cases, we are of the considered view that the opinion as to urgency for acquisition of the area for planned industrial development by NOIDA, was rightly formed. 32. In the result, all the petitions fail and are dismissed. Interim orders passed in all the cases are vacated. Petitions dismissed. .