This application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed with two fold prayers (1) to stay the further departmental proceeding with charges undercharge sheetNo.AGCC/E/67/90/13 dated 23rd/24th May, 1991 till the completion of the criminal proceeding; (2) to quash the suspension order dated 25.9.90 and to allow the petitioner to join in service, 2. The brief facts are as follows : The petitioner was at the relevant time working as Cashier and he was suspended on 25.9.90 by Annexure III to the writ application. That Annexure is quoted below : "Pending drawal of departmental proceedings and enquiry Shri Bimalendu Bhagabati, Senior Assistant Technical Branch, AGCC Ltd is placed under suspension with immediate effect." 3. On 1.10.90 vide Annexure V the following FIR was lodged before the Officer-in-charge of Pal tan Bazar Police Station, Paltan Bazar, Guwahati against the petitioner. That FIR is quoted below : xxxx  xxxxx xxxx 4. On 23.5.91 vide Annexure IV the following charges were levelled against the petitioner : xxxx  xxxxx xxxx 5. The admitted position is that the criminal proceeding is pending. The criminal proceeding and the charges in the departmental proceeding are on the same set of facts and accordingly it is urged by Mr. AK Phukan, learned counsel for the petitioner that the departmental proceeding should be stayed till the disposal of the criminal proceeding. In this connection, Mr. Phukan places reliance in the following decisions : (i) AIR 1988 SC 2118 (Kusheshwar Dubey vs. M/s Bharat Coking Coal Ltd) wherein Supreme Court in paras 6 and 7 has laid down the law as follows: "The view expressed in the three cases of this Court seem to support the position that while there could be no legal bar for simultaneous proceedings being taken, yet there may be cases where it would be appropriate to defer disciplinary proceedings awaiting disposal of the criminal case. In the latter class of cases it would be open to the delinquent employee to seek such an order of stay or injunction from the Court. Whether in the facts and circumstances of a particular case there should or should not be such simultaneity of the proceedings would then receive judicial consideration and the Court will decide in the given circumstances of a particular case as to whether the disciplinary proceedings should be interdicted pending criminal trial. Whether in the facts and circumstances of a particular case there should or should not be such simultaneity of the proceedings would then receive judicial consideration and the Court will decide in the given circumstances of a particular case as to whether the disciplinary proceedings should be interdicted pending criminal trial. As we have already stated that it is neither possible nor advisable to evolve a hard and fast, straight-jacket formula valid for all cases and of general application without regard to the particularities of the individual-situation. For the disposal of the present case, we do not think it necessary to say anything more, particularly when we do not intend to lay down any general guideline. In the instant case, the criminal action and the disciplinary proceedings are grounded upon the same set of facts. We are of the view that the disciplinary proceedings should have been stayed and the High Court was not right in interfering with the trial Court's order of injunction which had been affirmed in appeal." (ii) (1994) Supp (3) SCC 674 (Sulekh Chand & Salek Chand vs. Commissioner of Police & others) where the Supreme Court pointed out as follows: "Once the acquittal was on merits the necessary consequence would be that the delinquent is entitled to reinstatement as if there is no blot on his service and the need for the departmental enquiry is obviated. The materials on the basis of which his promotion was denied was the sole ground pf the prosecution under section 5 (2) and that ground when did not subsist, the same would not furnished the basis for DPC to overlook his promotion. Moreover, since the departmental enquiry was itself dropped the very foundation on which the DPC had proceeded is clearly illegal. The appellant is entitled to the promotion with effect from the date his immediate junior was promoted with all consequential benefits." 6. Mr. Phukan on the basis of the law laid down in these two decisions urged that the departmental proceedings against the petitioner should be stayed inasmuch as if the departmental proceeding is allowed, the petitioner will be prejudiced in the criminal trial. 7. On the other hand, Mr. Barthakur, learned counsel appearing for the respondents submits that the principle of natural justice does not require that an employer must wait for the decisions at least of the criminal Court before taking action against an employee. 7. On the other hand, Mr. Barthakur, learned counsel appearing for the respondents submits that the principle of natural justice does not require that an employer must wait for the decisions at least of the criminal Court before taking action against an employee. This aspect to the matter was considered by the Supreme Court in AIR 1965 SC 155 (in Tata Oil Mills Case) and relying on the earlier decisions in AIR 1960 SC 806 (Delhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd vs. Kushal Bhan). Both the cases are relied on the decision in AIR 1988 SC 2118 (supra) and the Supreme Court laid down the law as follows : "... If the case is of a grave nature or involves questions of fact or law, which are not simple, it would be advisable for the employer to await the decision of the trial Court, so that the defence of the employee in the criminal case may not be prejudiced...." 8. The reason behind this principle is that a man is not expected to be prejudiced by disclosing his defence before the domestic enquiry. 9. This being the position and as I find that the criminal case and the departmental enquiry are based on the same set of facts, I direct that the disciplinary proceeding as against the petitioner shall stand suspended till the completion of the criminal case. 10. The next question is whether the suspension order passed against the petitioner as far back as on 25.9.90 should be quashed. In this connection Mr. Phukan places before me the following decision : (i) AIR 1994 SC 2296 (State of Orissa vs. Bimal Kumar Mohanty) wherein the Supreme Court in para 12 considering its earlier decision laid down the law as follows : "Normally when an appointing authority or the disciplinary authority seeks to suspend an employee, pending inquiry or contemplated inquiry or pending investigation into grave charges of misconduct or defalcation of funds or serious acts of omission and commission, the order of suspension would be passed after taking into consideration the gravity of the misconduct sought to be enquired into or investigated and the nature of the evidence placed before the appointing authority and on application of the mind by discilinary authority. Appointing authority or disciplinary authority should consider the above aspects and decide whether it is expedient to keep an employee under suspension pending aforesaid action. Appointing authority or disciplinary authority should consider the above aspects and decide whether it is expedient to keep an employee under suspension pending aforesaid action. It would not be as an administrative routine or an automatic order to suspend an employee. It should be on consideration of the gravity of the alleged misconduct or the nature of the allegations imputed to the delinquent employee. The Court or the Tribunal must consider each case on its own facts and no general law could be laid down in that behalf. Suspension is not a punishment but is only on way of forbidding or disabling an employee to discharge the duties of office or post held by him. In other words it is to refrain him to avail further opportunity to perpetrate the alleged misconduct or to remove the impression among the members of service that dereliction of duty would pay fruits and the offending employee could get away even pending enquiry without any impediment or to prevent an opportunity to the delinquent having had the opportunity in office to impede the progress of the investigation or enquiry etc. Each case must be considered depending on the nature of the allegations, gravity of the situation and the indelible impact it creates on the service for the continuance of the delinquent employee in service pending enquiry or comtemplated enquiry or investigation. It would be another thing if the action is actuated by malafide, arbitrary or for ulterior purpose. The suspension must be a step in aid to the ultimate result of the investigation or enquiry. The authority also should keep in mind public interest of the impact of the delinquent's continuance in office while facing departmental enquiry or trial of the criminal charge." and on the facts of that case, the Supreme Court found that as serious allegations of misconduct were alleged against the respondents, the quashing of the order of suspension by the Tribunal was not justified. The next case relied on is (1993) 1 GLR 207 [1992 (2) GLJ438] (Jahirul Haque Crhoudhury vs. State of Assam & others) where in para 3 of the Single Judge of this Court laid down the law as follows : "Considering overall aspects of the matter, I am of the view that no official should ordinarily be kept under suspension for ^period of more than three months, barring exceptional cases, and that for quick disposal of such cases the charge sheet should be served on the official in case of departmental proceeding, or, investigation should be completed in the case of criminal prosecution, ordinarily within six months save in rare or unusual cases. In those rare or unusual cases, where there is no possibility to adhere to the above time limits as the cases are likely to be delayed, the comptetent authority should examine for revocation of suspension orders from time to time. On reinstatement of the Government Officer, if there is risk of evidence of the departmental case being tempeted with, a departmental proceeding being hampered, the officer should be transferred to any other place where no such risk exists." and in that particular case if was found that the petitioner was placed under suspension on 5.3.88 and no material was placed before this Court to sustantiate the continuation of the suspension order and accordingly the order of suspension was quashed. 11. Mr. Phukan submits that in this case the order of suspension against the petitioner was passed in a most mechanical manner without application of mind. He further submits that the order of suspension is malafide and it was passed in order to shield, protect somebody else and in this connection he points out to the audit observation that the officer numbering 4 (four) named in the audit report were responsible for misappropriation of Rs.3,93,836.20. 12. On the other hand, Mr. Barthakur submits that as in the Supreme Court in AIR 1994 SC 2296 (supra) in the instant case also the audit report had made serious allegations against the delinquent and the amount involved is a huge one, and in exercise of the power under Article 226 of the Constitution this order should not be quashed. On the other hand, Mr. Barthakur submits that as in the Supreme Court in AIR 1994 SC 2296 (supra) in the instant case also the audit report had made serious allegations against the delinquent and the amount involved is a huge one, and in exercise of the power under Article 226 of the Constitution this order should not be quashed. He further submits that if the order of suspension is quashed and the petitioner is allowed to continue in service it would create adverse impact on the other employees and shall demoralise them. He submits that the allegations of malafide are absolutely frivolous. Regarding allegations of malafide let us have a look at the writ application. The allegations of malafide are made out in paras 25, 29 and 30. They are quoted as follows : "It is a clear case of victimisation of the petitioner because the respondents wanted to shield some other officers involved in the said crime by making him a seape goat by fixing the liability on the petitioner on the hypothetical assumption that he is the drawing and disbursing officer of respondent No. l. The impugned order of suspension as well as charge and statements of allegations are liable to be quashed as being violative of the aforesaid circulars issued by the State Govt. That the respondents has issued the impugned charge sheet to the petitioner malafide and illegally just to cover up their laches and irregularity." 13. Bare perusal of these statements will show that the allegations of malafide as required to be established have not been established in this case and accordingly the allegations of malafide falls through that being the position, the question of quashing the order of suspension does not arise inasmuch as the Court can exercise this power only if the action is actuated by malafide, arbitrary or for ulterior purpose. I do not find that the order of suspension is actuated by malafide, arbitrary or for ulterior purpose. So, this prayer stands rejected. But in spite of that I give the liberty to the petitioner to approach again for an appropriate direction if the criminal case is not disposed of expeditiously. The authority shall also do the needful to expedite the criminal trial. 14. At the fag end of the case, Mr. Phukan submits that he has not been paid the subsistence allowance regularly. It is disputed by Mr. Barthakur. The authority shall also do the needful to expedite the criminal trial. 14. At the fag end of the case, Mr. Phukan submits that he has not been paid the subsistence allowance regularly. It is disputed by Mr. Barthakur. 15. Be that as it may, I direct the authority shall go on paying the subsistence allowance to the petitioner in accordance with law at the end of each month by way of crossed cheque/crossed demand draft of a Nationalised Bank drawn in the name of the petitioner and it shall be sent at his home address by the end of each month positively so that no complaint on this count may be made. This is necessary so that the petitioner may not face undue hardship as complained by him. It shall be the responsibility of respondent No.2 to comply with this direction. 16. Writ application accordingly stands disposed of as indicated above.