Judgment : The first defendant, who succeeded in the trial court and failed in the appellate court, has preferred this appeal. The respondent has filed the suit for declaration of its title to the suit property and for delivery of possession besides mesne profits, past and future. Alternatively the respondent has prayed for a preliminary decree for partition of its half share in the suit property and delivery of possession of the same with mesne profits. 2. The suit property belonged admittedly to one Mariappa Nadar, who had no issues. On 24. 1952 he executed a will (Ex.A-1) bequeathing the suit property in favour of his wife Sornammal for her life and the vested reminder in favour of the appellant herein. He has referred to the appellant as his adopted daughter. Under the said will, two other items are bequeathed absolutely to Sornammal. The will refers to the fact that the appellant was at that time unmarried and that the testator would perform her marriage during his life time and in case he dies suddenly, his wife Sornammal should perform the marriage. The appellant’s marriage took place within a year thereafter. According to the plaintiff, the testator cancelled the will by a deed dated 111. 1954 (Ex.A-2). The testator died on 14. 1972. Sornammal was in enjoyment of the property and she executed a will on 25. 1972 (Ex.A-4) by which she has bequeathed the property to the plaintiff. She died on 110. 1992. According to the plaintiff, the first defendant agreed to deliver possession within two months after the death of Sornammal, but failed to do so. To a notice issued by the plaintiff, the first defendant has sent a reply claiming to be entitled to the entire property and disputing the title of the plaintiff. The second defendant, who is a tenant of a portion of the property, has refused to pay the rent to the plaintiff and notice sent to him has not been replied to by him. In such circumstances, the plaintiff has filed the suit for the reliefs stated already. 3. The first defendant has disputed the genuineness and validity of the cancellation deed dated 111. 1954 as well as the truth and validity of the will of Sornammal dated 25. 1972. In such circumstances, the plaintiff has filed the suit for the reliefs stated already. 3. The first defendant has disputed the genuineness and validity of the cancellation deed dated 111. 1954 as well as the truth and validity of the will of Sornammal dated 25. 1972. It is alleged by the first defendant that the suit has been engineered by persons inimically disposed towards her and who want to knock away the property. In the additional written statement she has raised a plea that taking advantage of her absence from the house, her uncle V.P.P.V. Shanmuga Nadar, brother of Sornammal, removed the original will dated 24. 1952 and other documents and attempted to exploit the situation by demanding a sum of Rs.10,000 from her. As she did not accede to his demand, he fabricated the document dated 111. 1954 and brought about the other documents by fabrication. The second defendant filed a written statement supporting the case of the first defendant. 4. The trial court held that Ex.A-2 is not true or valid and consequently, Ex.A-4 is not valid, though the execution of Ex.A-4 by Sornammal was satisfactorily established. On that basis, the trial Court dismissed the suit. On appeal, the Principal District Judge, Ramanathapuram has reversed the findings of the trial court and upheld the genuineness and validity of Ex.A-2 and the validity of Ex.A-4. Consequently, a decree has been passed for declaration of title of the plaintiff and recovery of possession. The appellate court has, however, negatived the prayer for mesne profits. 5. In this appeal, the learned Advocate General appearing for the appellant has submitted that there are several suspicious circumstances surrounding Ex.A-2 and the trial Judge has referred to all of them for disbelieving the said document. It is contended by him that the reasoning of the appellate Judge for reversing the conclusion of the trial court is erroneous. Reliance is placed upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ram Piari v.Bhagwant, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 1742. in which the concurrent finding of the three courts was interfered with by the Supreme Court under Art. 136 of the Constitution. 6. I have been taken through the judgments of the courts below and the relevant records including the depositions of the witnesses. No doubt the trial court has set out several suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of Ex.A-2. in which the concurrent finding of the three courts was interfered with by the Supreme Court under Art. 136 of the Constitution. 6. I have been taken through the judgments of the courts below and the relevant records including the depositions of the witnesses. No doubt the trial court has set out several suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of Ex.A-2. But the Appellate Court, being the final court of fact, has considered the relevant factors and come to the conclusion that Ex.A-2 is genuine and valid. The appellate court has pointed out that Mariappa Nadar did not intend to give importance to the will Ex.A-1 dated 24. 1952 as evidenced by the circumstance that he has sold items 2 and 3 dealt with therein during his life time. The appellate court has also taken note of the fact that the appellant herein was given in marriage within a year after Ex.A-1 P.W.2 has given clear evidence regarding the execution of Ex.A-2 and admittedly he had no motive to speak falsehood. He had no enmity with the appellant herein. The appellate court has found no reason to reject the deposition of P.W.2, one of the attestors in Ex.A-2. The evidence of P.W. 1 has been corroborated by that of P.W.2. and the appellate court has accepted the same. The appellate court has also considered the reasoning of the trial court based on the differences between the signature of Mariappa Nadar in Ex.A-2 and his signatures in Ex.A-1 and pointed out that even among the admitted signatures found in Ex.A-1, there are several differences, thus proving that he did not have a settled hand-writing. The appellate court has also considered the reasoning of the trial court based on Ex.B-1, a letter written by P.W.I, to the appellant herein before suit. The detailed discussion of the evidence on record by the appellate court is not defective in any manner. 7. There is, however, one clinching factor which goes against the case of the appellant and which has been overlooked by the trial court. Even though a plea was raised in the written statement against the genuineness of Ex. A-4, the trial court has found categorically that the execution of Ex.A-4 by Sornammal has been satisfactorily established by the witnesses on the side of the plaintiff. The will is dated 25. 1972. It was registered on 25. 1972. P.W.I is one of the attestors. Even though a plea was raised in the written statement against the genuineness of Ex. A-4, the trial court has found categorically that the execution of Ex.A-4 by Sornammal has been satisfactorily established by the witnesses on the side of the plaintiff. The will is dated 25. 1972. It was registered on 25. 1972. P.W.I is one of the attestors. P.W.4 is another attestor while P.W.3 is the scribe. Their evidence has been accepted by both the courts. Once the genuineness of Ex.A-4 is established, the recitals therein assume importance. The said document expressly refers to the cancellation deed dated . 111. 1954. It is to be remembered that Sornammal lived for more than 10 years after the execution of Ex.A-4. Hence, the theory that P.W.I got fabricated Ex.A-2 on account of the refusal of the appellant herein to pay a sum of Rs.10,000 demanded by him falls to the ground. The recital in Ex.A-4 by itself proves the genuineness of Ex.A-2. There is nothing in law to invalidate Ex.A-2. Just because Ex. A-1 is a registered will and Ex.A-2 is an unregistered document, the latter is not invalid. In view of the said clinching circumstances, there is no necessity to refer in detail to the other evidence on record in support of Ex.A-2 and which has been accepted by the lower appellate court. 8.I have also compared the signatures in Exs. A-1 and A-2.I find that the appellate court is right in observing that Mariappa Nadar did not have a settled hand- writing. The four signatures found in Ex.A-1 differ from one another. The signature in Ex.A-2 is quite similar to the signatures in Ex.A-1. The fact that no specific reason has been given in Ex.A-2 for cancelling Ex. A-1 excepting that the executant was in good health at that time, does not invalidate Ex.A-2.I do not find any justification to interfere with the finding of fact arrived at by the lower appellate court, as there is sufficient evidence on record to support the same. Sitting in second appeal, I cannot reappreciate the evidence on record once again. 9. The ruling in Ram Piari v. Bhagwant, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 1742, will not help the appellant in this case. Sitting in second appeal, I cannot reappreciate the evidence on record once again. 9. The ruling in Ram Piari v. Bhagwant, A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 1742, will not help the appellant in this case. The Supreme Court has pointed out that the three courts below in that case had failed to take note of the principle of law that the standard of scrutiny would differ when there was disinheritance among heirs of equal degree and no reason for exclusion was disclosed. I have no hesitation to affirm the findings of the lower appellate court in the present case. 10. The plaintiff has preferred a memorandum of cross-objections in so far as the prayer for mesne profits has been negatived. The lower appellate court has observed that there was no argument on that question before it. The lower appellate court has referred to the circumstance that the second defendant, who was the tenant, was depositing the rent in a bank after the death of Sornammal and later vacated the property. The lower appellate court has observed that there was no evidence to prove that the first defendant received rent from the second defendant and, therefore, she is not liable to pay mesne profits. That is clearly erroneous. The court has failed to note that ‘mesne profits’ are profits which the person in wrongful possession of the property actually received or might with ordinary diligence have received therefrom. Hence, the first defendant is liable to pay mesne profits. In any event, the plaintiff will be entitled to mesne profits, from the date of suit. The quantum can be determined under O.20, Rule 12 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 11. In the result, the appeal fails and it is dismissed without costs. The memorandum of cross-objections is partly allowed and the plaintiff is declared entitled to mesne profits from the date of suit. The quantum of mesne profits shall be fixed under O.20, Rule 12 of the Code of Civil Procedure. There will be no order as to costs in the memorandum of cross-objections.