ORDER D.M. Dhanmidhikari, J. -- 1 The learned Single Judge Hon'ble S.K. Dubey, J., in the course of deciding this revision preferred by the tenant under section 23-E of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, (for short, the 'Act') against the order of eviction dated 8.4.1993, passed by the Rent Controlling Authority under section 23-A (b) of the Act, noticed that there is a cleavage of opinion on the interpretation and procedural requirement contained in section 23-C of the Act and has referred the matter to a Larger Bench for resolving the conflict. 2. The provision under consideration for interpretation and determination of its scope is section 23-C, which reads as under:- "23-C. Tenant not entitled to contest except under certain circumstances:-(1) The tenant on whom the summons is served in the form specified in the Second Schedule shall not contest the prayer for eviction from the accommodation unless he files within fifteen days from the date" of service of the summons, an application supported by an affidavit stating the grounds on which he seeks to contest the application for eviction and obtains leave from the Rent Controlling Authority as hereinafter provided, and in default of his appearance in pursuance of the summons, or in default of his obtaining such leave, or if such leave is refused, the statement made by the landlord in the application for eviction shall be deemed to be admitted by the tenant The Rent Controlling Authority shall in such a case pass all order of eviction of the tenant from the accommodation: Provided that the Rent Controlling Authority may, for sufficient cause shown by the tenant, excuse the delay of the tenant in entering appearance or in applying for leave to defend the application for eviction and where "ex-parte" order has been passed, may set it aside. (2) The Rent Controlling Authority shall within one month of the date of receipt of application given to the tenant, if necessary, leave to contest the application, if the application supported by an affidavit filed by the tenant discloses such fact as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for the recovery of possession of the accommodation on the ground specified in section 23-A." 3. Learned Single Judge Dr. Learned Single Judge Dr. T.N. Singh, J., in Jyoti Swaroop v. Birja ( 1985 MPWN 566 ) and Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax v. Rajrrni Sahi and another ( 1987 JLJ 397 ), took the following view:- "The issue of' leave' and of 'eviction' are separate and distinct and have to be decided separately, distinctly and indeed independently. Only when such a procedure is adopted, it can be said that there is judicial determination of the dual lis, otherwise not. It would have to be noticed that section 23-C is a self-contained Code and an independent provision. It forestalls determination of the question of 'eviction' raised under section 23-A by creating a valuable right in the tenant to defend landlord's action for eviction. Legislature advisedly pre-empted clubing and trial of the issues of 'leave' and 'eviction' by providing separate procedures for determination of the two issues separately. Indeed, the question of 'eviction' becomes determinable only when no 'leave' is prayed or when it is refused, not before that." 4. The above view was approved and also followed by learned Single Judge S.K. Dubey, J., in Ram Chandra v. Mangilal (1988 MPRCJ N-23) and Ganesh Prasad v. Ratanlal (1989 MPRCJ NOC 22). The other two learned Judges in separate opinions, i.e., V.D. Gyani, J., in Rent Controlling Authority v. Babulal (1987 MPRCJ N-43) and K.L. Shrivastava, J., in Hiralal v. Vinayak (1987 (II) MPWN 139), took almost a similar view. According to learned Single Judge S.K. Dubey, J., under section 23-B a composite order of refusing leave and" an order of eviction cannot be passed without framing two separate issues for consideration in two stages. Learned Single Judge K.L. Shrivastava, J., in Hiralal's case (supra) relied on a decision in Jumma v. Birja (1986 MPRCJ 22) to hold that a composite order relating to 'leave' and 'eviction' is not contemplated under law. 5. The only facts relevant for the purpose of deciding the present reference are as under:- The tenant failed to apply for grant of leave to contest within 15 days of service of summons on him as required by first part of section 23-C of the Act. Heat a later stage of proceedings filed an application for grant of leave and sought condonation of delay by invoking proviso to section 23-C of the Act. Heat a later stage of proceedings filed an application for grant of leave and sought condonation of delay by invoking proviso to section 23-C of the Act. Rent Controlling Authority refused to condone the delay and by same order directed eviction of the tenant. The learned Single Judge S.K. Dubey, J., who'has made this reference, found a difference of opinion between the Judges of this Court sitting singly on the question of procedural requirement of section 23-C of the Act. One view as discussed above of Dr. T.N. singh, J., S.K. Dubey, J., V.D. Gyani, J. and K.L. Shrivastava,J., is that even though no leave to contest is sought within the prescribed time or it is refused, the Rent Controlling Authority has even then independently applied his mind to decide the issue of eviction at a subsequent stage of leave and after grant of due opportunity of hearing to the tenant on the question of eviction. In this set of view, non-obtaining of leave to contest or its refusal is not a complete walk over to the landlord. The Rent, Controlling Authority is not bound to order eviction unless the landlord has been able to make out a ground under section 23-A of the Act. 6. The learned counsel, who addressed us in support of the above view, went to the extent of submitting that the Rent Controlling Authority while proceeding under section 23-C of the Act is required to fix the case for ex-parte evidence of the landlord and the tenant will still have a limited right of cross-examination for showing that the basic requirements of the provision of section 23-A are absent to justify the order of eviction in favour of landlord. It is also urged that in the event of contingencies contemplated in section 23-C the Rent Controlling Authority is not obliged to pass an order of eviction without coming to a finding that a ground of eviction under section 23- A has been made out in favour of the landlord on the basis of the unrebutted pleadings and material on record. It is argued that to construe, section 23-C so as to infer an obligation on Rent Controlling Authority to pass an order of eviction simultaneously with non-appearance, non-obtaining of grant of leave to contest would be highly unjust and would defeat the object of the Act, which aims at affording protection to the tenant against the right of the landlord to re-enter the premises let to him. 7. The contention advanced on the other side for the landlord is that a dual procedure• for consideration of matter of 'leave' and 'eviction' is not contemplated by section 23-C. The very object of the provision is to make available accommodation to landlord under a similar procedure and expeditiously in a case where the tenant has not either leave to contest or is not found entitled to contest. It is argued that hearing on the question of eviction even where there is no right of contest available to the tenant would defeat the very object of the Act and would indirectly furnish a ground of contest to the tenant as also prolong the proceedings. 8. We have given thoughtful consideration to the contentions advanced by the learned counsel at the Bar and views expressed by learned Judges of this Court in various decisions discussed supra. 9. The settled rule of interpretation is that the provision in a statute should be construed in a manner .to carry out the object of enactment. The other rule is that the language of a provision in a statute is not to be unduly strained to read into it some-thing more, which is not warranted or is clearly conveyed by expressed words therein. We also derive some assistance in interpreting the provision contained in section 23-C of the Act from the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in B. Johnson Bernard v. C.S. Naidu ( 1985 JLJ 793 = 1985 MPLJ 675 ) and the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Precision Steel & Engineering Works' and another v. Prem Deva Niranjan Deva Tayal ( AIR 1982 SC 1518 ). 10. In B. Johnson's case (supra), the constitutional validity of section 23-C amongst other provisions in Chapter III-A of the Act came for consideration. 10. In B. Johnson's case (supra), the constitutional validity of section 23-C amongst other provisions in Chapter III-A of the Act came for consideration. It was urged therein that the power conferred on the Rent Controlling Authority under section 23-C of the Act to straightway order eviction of the tenant in the event of his non-appearance, non-obtaining of leave or refusal of leave is a highly arbitrary and unjust provision. The Division Bench placed a reasonable construction on the said provision to uphold it and held as under :- "It was argued that in this manner, the Rent Controlling Authority has been left with no option and he is bound to make an order of eviction, once there is default on the part of the tenant to obtain leave or if it is refused. In other words, it is suggested that the Rent Controlling Authority is bound to make an order of eviction, even when the statement made by the landlord in his application for eviction does not make out a prima facie case for eviction. The apprehension on which this argument is founded is baseless, as such a situation is not contemplated by this provision. Section 23-A requires an application to be made by the landlord signed and verified in the manner provided in the Code of Civil Procedure, as if it were a plaint on one or more of the grounds for eviction relating to the landlord's bona fide requirement. The application contemplated is clearly an application in which the statement made by the landlord makes out a prima facie case for eviction of the tenant in case the statement remains uncontroverted and is deemed to be admitted by the tenant. Obviously, in such a situation, the deemed admission of the tenant makes out a ground for eviction and nothing more being required to be done by the Rent Controlling Authority, he has to pass an order of eviction of the tenant on that ground. There is thus no basis to contend that sub-section (1) of section 23-C enables the Rent Controlling Authority to pass an order of eviction of the tenant even where the statement made by the landlord in his application does not make out a ground for eviction contained in section 23-A". 11. There is thus no basis to contend that sub-section (1) of section 23-C enables the Rent Controlling Authority to pass an order of eviction of the tenant even where the statement made by the landlord in his application does not make out a ground for eviction contained in section 23-A". 11. A similar provision in the Delhi Act came for consideration to determine the procedural requirement and its scope before the Supreme Court in Precision Steel's case (supra) and it was held in the majority view: "The question of leave is to be determined on the facts disclosed in the affidavit filed to obtain leave. It is not the stage of proof of facts, it is only the stage of disclosure of facts. The stage for considering the application for leave to contest the petition is enterior to the stage of hearing the substantive petition for eviction and the procedure for the disposal is prescribed in sub-section (10) of section 25-B (of the Delhi Act). After grant of leave to contest sub-section (10) of section 25-B comes into operation and it makes it abundantly clear that the procedure prescribed while holding an inquiry consequent upon the granting of leave to contest shall be the same as required to be followed by Controller." It may be mentioned that sections 25-B (7) and (10) of the Delhi Act are pari materia with section 23-D (1) and (2) of the Madhya Pradesh Act under consideration. Taking assistance from various views expressed on the piece of Legislation in question by the learned Judges of this Court sitting singly and respectfully following the Division Bench decision in B. Johnson's case (supra) and of the Supreme Court in Precision Steel's case (supra), we have made an endeavour to interpret the provision which best suits the object of the Act and the language employed in the concerned provision. In doing so at the same time we have to construe the provision in the manner so as to regulate in a just and reasonable manner the rights and relations of the landlord and tenant, which are paramount object of the enactment. 12. The apparent object of the provisions contained in Chapter III-A of the Act is to incorporate a special summary procedure for seeking eviction by landlords of categories specified in section 23-J and who are in bona fide need of the accommodation let to tenant. 12. The apparent object of the provisions contained in Chapter III-A of the Act is to incorporate a special summary procedure for seeking eviction by landlords of categories specified in section 23-J and who are in bona fide need of the accommodation let to tenant. With the above object in view, the right of tenant to contest is restricted to triable grounds and has to be exercised by him within a stipulated period subject to the satisfaction of the Rent Controlling Authority that there are substantial grounds worth grant of leave for the purpose. The provision contained in section 23-C is complete in itself for the contingencies contemplated therein, i.e., non-appearance of the tenant, his failure to obtain leave within time or refusal of leave. In our considered opinion, two expressions underlined below used in first part of sub-section (1) of section 23-C are a clear pointer to its meaning: "shall not contest the prayer for eviction" "the statement made by the landlord in the application for eviction shall be deemed to be admitted by the tenant. The Rent Controlling shall in such a case pass an order of eviction". The above expressions or language employed in the section clearly conveys that in the given contingencies no triable issues arise before the Rent Controlling Authority, who shall treat the statement made by the landlord in his application as having been admitted by the tenant. What remains for the Rent Controlling Authority thereafter is only to consider passing of the order of eviction. The use of the word "shall" in the last part of section 23-C prima facie appears to be imperative to convey that the Rent Controlling Authority in the given situations under section 23-C has no other option but to straightway pass an order of eviction regardless of any other consideration legally permissible. By the use of word "shall", can it be assumed that the Legislature intended that even in a case of no contest by the tenant the landlord must not be given an order of eviction although the application deemed to have been admitted does not prima facie disclose any ground of eviction under section 23-A and in fact is found to be false, frivolous or vexatious as to merit rejection and imposition of compensatory costs under section 23-J of the Act. Giving such an imperative meaning to the word "shall" would certainly be highly unjust and would frustrate the object of the Act which is to regulate the relations between landlord and tenant and to afford legal protection against eviction. In construing section 23-C, provisions of sections 23-A and 23-J which form part of the same Chapter III-A containing special procedure in favour of specified landlord, cannot be overlooked as they jointly provide summary procedure. The grounds available to the landlord for eviction are to be found in sections 23-A and order of eviction can be based only on that provision. The procedure for directing eviction indicated in section 23-C under specified contingencies cannot be read as completely absolving the Rent Controlling Authority of his statutory duty to consider the question of order of eviction on one of the grounds under Sec. 23-A of the Act. The power to order eviction conferred on the Rent Controlling Authority is quasi judicial, as he is a substitute for regular civil Court in relation to accommodation held and required bona fide by specified categories of landlords. Even while exercising power of order eviction in uncontested case in accordance with section 23-D of the Act, the Rent Controlling Authority has to apply his mind judiciously to the question of eviction in the light of provisions contained in section 23-A of the Act. Even in the absence of the contest by the tenant, the Rent Controlling Authority cannot be held to have blank power to direct eviction, although the uncontroverted statements in the application filed by the landlord do not make out any ground for eviction as contemplated by section 23-A of the Act. In considering question of eviction under section 23-C, the Rent Controlling Authority cannot overlook the provisions contained in sections 23-A and 23-J, which require him to find out whether the application of the landlord makes out a ground of eviction and application is neither false and frivolous nor vexatious. In our considered opinion, the word "shall" used in section 23-C can, therefore, be read to mean that in the given contingencies under section 23-C it shall be 'lawful' for the Rent Controlling Authority to pass an order of eviction. The imperative word "shall" keeping in view the object and context of the Act can be read as an enabling provision to read "may". The imperative word "shall" keeping in view the object and context of the Act can be read as an enabling provision to read "may". The Rent Controlling Authority is therefore not obliged to order eviction even though there is no contest by the tenant. It would be open to him to refuse the prayer of eviction and the landlord for non-existence of ground under Sec. 23-A for the reason that the application is false, frivolous and vexatious as mentioned in section 23-J. There are ample authorities in support of the view that the use of the word "shall" in a statute need not to be necessarily read as a mandatory provision to make it imperative on the authority conferred with the power to exercise that power in all eventualities. The word' 'shall" may be read as "may" or vice versa if the subject matter and context of the statute so permitted. See the Principles of Statutory Interpretation, Justice C.P. Singh, Fifth Edition 1992 at page 242 and particularly the following passage :- "The use of word "shall" raises a presumption that the particular provision is imperative, but this prima facie inference may be rebutted by other considerations such as object and scope of the enactment and the consequences flowing from such construction. There are numeroas cases where the word' 'shall" has, therefore, been construed as merely directory. The word "shall", observes HIDAYA TULLAR, J. is ordinarily mandatory but it is sometimes not so interpreted if the context or the intention otherwise demands." 13. It is difficult to accept the view as expressed in some of the Single Bench decisions (supra) of this Court that the Rent Controlling Authority while proceeding under section 23-C cannot pass a composite order of 'leave' and 'eviction'. Such interpretation is not permissible by the clear language employed in the provision and keeping in view the object of the Act It is one aspect of the provision to construe it that it requires Rent Controlling Authority to bestow dual consideration on the question of 'leave' under section 23-C and 'eviction' under section 23-A. It cannot however be held that such judicious consideration on the question of 'leave' and 'eviction' cannot be made by the same order. In fact, plain language of section 23-C warrants such a procedure on the part of the Rent Controlling Authority. In fact, plain language of section 23-C warrants such a procedure on the part of the Rent Controlling Authority. We cannot also read into the provision any requirement on the part of the Rent Controlling Authority to fix the case for ex parte evidence of landlord for deciding the question of eviction even though the tenant is either absent, has not obtained leave or the same is refused. As has been held by the Supreme Court in the case of Precision Steel (supra) arising under the provisions of Delhi Act, which are pari materia with the Madhya Pradesh Act that if the statements in the application for eviction are deemed to be admitted for want of contest by the tenant, the Rent Controlling Authority is left with no triable issue; the only requirement then left on his part is to examine whether on the uncontroverted contents of the application a ground under section 23-A is made out and the application is neither false, frivolous nor vexatious as to merit rejection and imposition of costs under section 23-J of the Act. The stage of deciding triable issues and raising of presumption of bona fide need in favour of landlord is reached where Rent Controlling Authority grants leave to contest to the tenant and proceeds to try the case by procedure indicated in section 23-D of the Act. 14. We are also of the view that in contingencies mentioned in section 23-C, Rent Controlling Authority is not required to afford separate opportunity of hearing to the tenant so as to allow him indirectly a right to oppose the prayer of eviction made by the landlord. The obligation to consider the question of grant or rejection of prayer of eviction in the light of the provisions contained in sections 23-A and 23-J is on the Rent Controlling Authority regardless of the fact of want of contest by the tenant. Any failure or error on the part of Rent Controlling Authority in exercise of his jurisdiction can be corrected only in a revision at the instance of the tenant to the High Court under section 23-E of the Act. The provisions of section 23-C however do not contemplate grant of separate opportunity of hearing to the tenant on the question of eviction where there is no contest on the part of the tenant as contemplated by section 23-C of the Act. The provisions of section 23-C however do not contemplate grant of separate opportunity of hearing to the tenant on the question of eviction where there is no contest on the part of the tenant as contemplated by section 23-C of the Act. We, therefore, do not approve of the view in that regard expressed by learned Single Judge S.K. Dubey, J., in the cases of Ganesh Prasad (supra) and Ramchandra (supra). We may also clarify that the proviso to section 23-C enabling the tenant to seek condonation of delay in his appearance and obtaining leave comes into play only where either for some reason the order of eviction has not been passed on the earlier date by the Rent Controlling Authority despite the tenant's non-appearance or want of obtaining leave or where ex parte order of eviction has been passed. The proviso cannot be read so as to curtain the effect of the main provision in the first part of section 23-C which confers unrestricted power on the Rent Controlling Authority to decide the question of eviction in the event of no contest by the tenant. The proviso has, therefore, to be independently read and applied to the situation contemplated therein. 15. As a result of the discussion aforesaid, the view expressed on the interpretation of section 23-C in the Single Bench decisions of Dr. T.N. Singh, J. in Jumma's case (supra), Civil Revision No. 189 of 1985 (G), decided on 1.11.1985; Jyoti Swaroop' s case (supra), and in Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax's case (supra), Civil Revision No. 232 of 1985, decided on 11.3.1986, to the extent that the issues of 'leave' and 'eviction' are separate and distinct and have to be decided separately, distinctly and independently the orders cannot be held to be laying down a good law. For the same reason we also hold that the Single Bench views of V.D. Gyani, J. in Shyamraov. Babulal, C.R. No. 1041 of 1984 (1); decided on 19.3.1986 [1987 (1) MPWN 195]; and, in Babulal's case (supra) (1987 MPRCJ N-43), C.R. No. 1041 of 1984 (1); Decided on 19.3.1986; also do not lay down good law. The views of Dr. For the same reason we also hold that the Single Bench views of V.D. Gyani, J. in Shyamraov. Babulal, C.R. No. 1041 of 1984 (1); decided on 19.3.1986 [1987 (1) MPWN 195]; and, in Babulal's case (supra) (1987 MPRCJ N-43), C.R. No. 1041 of 1984 (1); Decided on 19.3.1986; also do not lay down good law. The views of Dr. T.N. Singh, J. (supra), which have been followed by S.K Dubey, J. in Ganesh Prasad's case (supra) and Ramchandra' s case (supra), and of K.L. Shrivastava, J., in Hiralal' s case (supra) also do not find our approval and all of them are overruled. 16. On the interpretation of procedural requirement of first part of section 23-C and the scope of exercise of power by Rent Controlling Authority in directing eviction, we fully approve the observation of the learned Single Judge KL. Shrivastava, J., in paragraph 7 of the judgment reported in 1990 MPLJ 747 , Jain Transport Co. and others v. Sakinabai. We approve the other views of the learned Single Judge, which are in consonance with the views expressed by us in this reference. 17. Before concluding we record with satisfaction that Shri R.A. Roman, learned counsel appearing for the applicant-tenant, and Shri A.M. Naik, learned counsel appearing for the non-applicant-landlady, argued the matter in a fair and non-partisan manner to assist the Court to arrive at the just and proper conclusion on the subject of interpretation of an important provision of law. 18. We also thankfully acknowledge the valuable assistance rendered in deciding this case by the arguments advanced by the learned counsel Sarvashri R.D. Jain, H.D. Gupta and D.K Katare, who appeared as amicus curiae. 19. The case shall now be placed before the appropriate Single Bench for decision of the same on merits.