Judgment : Having failed in both the Courts below, the defendants 10 to 13 in O.S. No.35 of 1987 on the file of Sub Court, Ramanathapuram have preferred this second appeal against the concurrent decree for possession of the suit properties granted against defendants 1 to 8 by the Courts below. 2. Against the very same Judgment of the trial Court in the abovesaid O.S. No.35 of 1987 there were two first appeals viz., A.S. No.40 of 1992 filed by the abovesaid defendants 10 to 13 and A.S. No.137 of 1991 filed by the 4th defendant in the said suit. Both the said first appeals were heard together and a common judgment was delivered by the lower appellate court, dismissing both the said first appeals. While the present appellants have filed this second appeal against the judgment and decree in A.S. No.40 of 1992, the 4th defendant has filed a separate second appeal, viz., S.A. No.841 of 1995. The said S.A. No.841 of 1995 came up before me for admission on 17. 1995 and after considering the argument, made mainly based of factual aspects of the case, I choose not to admit it and hence dismissed it. The S.A. No.686 of 1995 came up before me for admission no doubt earlier on 26. 1995 and 30.6.1995, after considering certain other legal submissions. I ordered notice of motion returnable by two weeks and after the respondents entered appearance, I heard the second appeal on different dates, the last of which was 210. 1995. It was only during the said hearing the abovesaid disposal of S.A. No.841 of 1995 by the above referred to judgment dated 17. 1995 was brought to my notice. But, it must also be stated that when S.A. No.841 of 1995 was heard and disposed of as stated above, there was no reference to this S.A. No.686 of 1995 or the notice of motion ordered therein on 30.6.1995. 3. However, I must state that what was argued in S.A. No.841 of 1995 was different from the argument advanced in this second appeal. While in S.A. No.841 of 1995, the argument was mainly on the factual merits of the case, viz., whether the suit properties were trust properties, or, there was only a charge over the said properties for the performance of certain charities, and whether the suit trust was a public or a private trust. While in S.A. No.841 of 1995, the argument was mainly on the factual merits of the case, viz., whether the suit properties were trust properties, or, there was only a charge over the said properties for the performance of certain charities, and whether the suit trust was a public or a private trust. After upholding the findings of the courts below that the suit properties were dedicated to the suit public trust and that it was not correct to say that only a charge was created over the said properties for the performance of certain charities. I dismissed the said S.A. No.841 of 1995. 4. But different submissions were made by learned counsel for the appellant in this S.A. No.686 of 1995. One such submission is that it having been held that the suit properties belong to a public trust and the relief prayed for is not only for possession, but also for permitting a scheme in relation to the said trust, the suit is not maintainable, sanction under Sec.92, C.P.C. Having not been obtained. But, learned counsel for the respondents points out that Sec.92, C.P.C. is not applicable in the present case in view of Sec.5(e) of the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act, 1959, which says that the said section shall not apply to Hindu "Religious Institutions." 5. I also find that according to Sec.2(18) of the said Act, a "specific endowment" would come under the definition of the term "religious institution". Further, according to Sec.2 ( 19), specific endowment’ means any property endowed for the performance of any specific service charity in a temple. Further, I find that on going through the recitals of Ex.A-1, dated 9. 1971, the relevant partition deed, under which the suit endowment would come under the abovesaid definition of "specific endowment in relation to the temples mentioned in Ex.A-1. Therefore, the suit endowment would be a religious institution, within Sec.2(18) of the Act. Consequently, the said Sec.5(e) is attracted and therefore, Sec.92, C.P.C. would not apply to the present case. Learned counsel for the appellants could not argue anything contra in this regard. 6. Therefore, the suit endowment would be a religious institution, within Sec.2(18) of the Act. Consequently, the said Sec.5(e) is attracted and therefore, Sec.92, C.P.C. would not apply to the present case. Learned counsel for the appellants could not argue anything contra in this regard. 6. But, he submits that if the said Act is applicable, the suit itself is not maintainable in view of Sec.108 of the said Act, which says that no suit in respect of administration or management of a religious institution or any other matter or dispute, for determining or deciding which, provision is made under the said Act, shall be instituted in any court of law except under and in conformity with the provisions of the said Act. But, this ground was not originally taken in the second appeal and on myself pointing out the same, Learned counsel for the appellants subsequently filed C.M.P. No. 15032 of 1995 to permit the appellants to raise the said ground as additional •ground and the said C.M.P. was allowed as prayed for. 7. Learned counsel for respondents submits that the said Sec.108 will not apply to this suit, particularly against defendants 10 to 13, the appellants, since they are only purchasers of the suit properties from the vendees of the vendees of the trustees of the suit trust, even though in the suit the prayer is also for framing a scheme after removing defendants 1 to 8, the trustees. 8.I have considered the rival submissions in relation to the abovesaid Sec. 108. It is clear to me, at least in so far as defendants 10 to 13, are concerned, who are appellants in this second appeal, that the suit cannot be held to be not maintainable in view of the abovesaid Sec.108. They are only alienees from alienees of the trust property and the suit against them is for possession of the property alienated to them, on the footing that the original alienation and the subsequent alienation in favour of them are void. Such a possession relief against alienees cannot be claimed before any of the authorities under any of the provisions of the abovesaid Act. Such a relief can be had only in a civil court. Such a possession relief against alienees cannot be claimed before any of the authorities under any of the provisions of the abovesaid Act. Such a relief can be had only in a civil court. When such possession is sought for from the alienees, by a suit, that suit cannot be termed as a suit “in respect of administration or management of religious institution” of “in respect of any other matter or dispute for determining or deciding which provision is made” in the abovesaid Act. In Venkatacharyulu v. Harihara Prasad, A.I.R. 1935 Mad. 1964: 158 I.C. 883: 1935 M.W.N. 963, it has been held in relation to a similar provision under the old Madras Religious Endowments Act that such a suit will lie. The relevant observation therein is: “The bar is only in respect of suits relating to the administration or management of the trust, i.e., proceedings against the trustee and not proceedings against the person who is wrongfully in possession of the property in which the trust is interested.” Further, in Sri Venkataramanasamy Deity v. Vadugammal, (1974)1 M.L.J. 431 , relied on by learned counsel for the respondents also it has been held that the preponderance of Judicial authority in the Madras High Court is that a civil suit is not barred in respect of a relief which cannot be granted by the Deputy Commissioner for Endowments and that in such a suit, the civil court has jurisdiction to decide incidental issues which are within the jurisdiction of the Deputy Commissioner. Therefore, there is no merit in the abovesaid contention of learned counsel for the appellants. 9. He also submits that the appellant’s vendor and his predecessor have not been impleaded and hence the suit is not maintainable. But, this contention has no merit since those persons are not necessary parties, though they may be proper parties. 10. Learned counsel for the appellants also relies on Sec.41 of the Transfer of Property Act. But, that section has no application to the present facts. 11. No doubt, learned counsel for the respondents also submits that in this second appeal, the suit cannot be held to be held to be not maintainable since already the decree given in the very same suit has been upheld in the other connected second appeal, viz., S.A.No.841 of 1995 in which the present appellants, among others, figure as respondents. 11. No doubt, learned counsel for the respondents also submits that in this second appeal, the suit cannot be held to be held to be not maintainable since already the decree given in the very same suit has been upheld in the other connected second appeal, viz., S.A.No.841 of 1995 in which the present appellants, among others, figure as respondents. But, there is no necessity to go into the correctness of this submission since I have already held in this second appeal that the suit is maintainable. 12. The net result, is, there is no merit in this second appeal and hence it is not admitted but dismissed. C.M.P. No.7479 of 1995 for stay is consequently dismissed.