JUDGMENT 1. - This so called revision petition is directed against the order dated 23.8.85 passed by the learned Additional Session Judge, Sri Ganganagar, in Criminal Appeal No.88/1981, whereby the Original Criminal Case No.25/79 of the court of Munsif Magistrate, Sri Ganganagar was remanded to the court of C.J.M. for passing separate orders of sentence for the offence under Section 3/7, Essential Commodities Act, hereinafter referred-to as 'the Act'. 2. It has been prayed in the petition that the accused petitioner be acquitted of all the charges by setting aside the judgments, given by the lower courts. In the arguments, the learned counsel for the petitioner has pressed and submitted that in this case, the inherent powers of this court need be invoked for quashing the proceedings in view of the Article 21 of the Constitution of India. On 24.12.75, the shop of the petitioner was inspected by the Enforcement Inspector, who found that the petitioner was not holding the licence and thereby contravened the Rajasthan Wheat (Regulation of Trade) Order, 1973 and that he had not displayed the list of price and the stock of the articles and thereby also contravened the Rajasthan (Display of List of Prices and Stock Shop) Essential Commodities Order, 1975. After necessary formalities, a complaint was Sled against the petitioner. After trial, the learned Magistrate convicted the petitioner for both the charges under Section 3/7 of the Act and sentenced him for three months' R.I. and a fine of Rs. One thousand on 5.5.80. The matter was carried in appeal before the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Sri Ganganagar, who, without going into the merits of the appeal, decided it on the preliminary point that as the petitioner was convicted for two separate charges, sentence should be passed on two separate counts and remanded the matter to the court of CJ.M. The learned Addl. Sessions Judge also held that the learned trial Magistrate was not competent to try the case under the Essential Commodities Act and therefore in view of Section 12 A of the Act, he remanded the case to the court of C J.M. Against this order dated 23.3.85 the petition has been preferred. 3. 1 have heard the arguments of both the sides. 4. 3. 1 have heard the arguments of both the sides. 4. Obviously when the trial Magistrate had no jurisdiction to try the matter in view of Section 12A of the Act, the entire trial, held by him, is bad in law and the learned C.J.M., to whom the case has been remanded by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, shall have to conduct a de novo summary trial as per the provisions of Section 12A of the Act. The incident relates to the year 1975 and now after nineteen years therefrom, the accused petitioner will have to face do novo trial from the very start. 5. An accused person is entitled to a reasonable expeditious trial, which is an, integral and essential part of fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India. If an accused is not tried expeditiously and his criminal trial remains pending before the trial court unnecessarily and for unreasonable time, this fundamental right of speedy trial is vitiated and if the trial is not held up on account of dilatory tactics adopted by accused the prolonged and protracted trial would be liable to be quashed on the ground that it is in prejudice to his fundamental right. 6. In Hussainara Khatoon and others v. State of Bihar ( AIR 1979 SC 1360 ) , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has propounded that "We think that even under our Constitution, though speedy trial is not specifically enumerated as a fundamental right, it is implicit in the broad sweep and content of Article 21 as interpreted by this Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India ( AIR 1978 SC 597 ) . We have held in that case that Article 21 confers a fundamental right on every person not to be deprived of his life or liberty except in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law and it is not enough to constitute compliance with the requirement of the Article that some semblance of a procedure should be prescribed by law, but that the procedure should be 'reasonable, fair and just'. If a person is deprived of his liberty under a procedure which is not 'reasonable, fair or just', such deprivation would be violative of his fundamental right under Article 21 and he would be entitled to enforce such fundamental right and secure his release. If a person is deprived of his liberty under a procedure which is not 'reasonable, fair or just', such deprivation would be violative of his fundamental right under Article 21 and he would be entitled to enforce such fundamental right and secure his release. Now obviously procedure prescribed by law for depriving a person of his liberty cannot be 'reasonable, fair or just' unless that procedure ensures a speedy trial for determination of the guilt of such person. No procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial can be regarded as 'reasonable, fair or just' and it would fall foul of Article 21. There can, therefore, be no doubt that speedy trial, and by speedy trial, we mean reasonably expeditious trial, is an integral and essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21." 7. In Sheela Barse v. Union of India ( AIR 1986 SC 1773 ) , the Apex Court has held that "the right to speedy trial is a fundamental right implicit in Art 21 of the Constitution. If an accused is not tried speedily and his case remains pending before the Magistrate or the Sessions Court for an unreasonable length of time it is clear that his fundamental right to speedy trial would be violated unless, of course the trial is held up on account of some interim order passed by a superior court or the accused is responsible for the delay in the trial of the case. The consequence of trial of the fundamental right to speedy trial would be that the prosecution itself would be liable to be quashed on the ground that it is in breach of the fundamental right." 8. In Srinivas Pal v. Union Territory of Arunachal Pradesh ( AIR 1988 SC 1729 ) , the accused was facing trial for the offence punishable under Sections 279,304A and 338 IPC and the trial was delayed for about nine and half years. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that "Having regard to the nature of offence there is enormous delay in proceeding with the criminal prosecution by the appellant 91/2 years for a trial for rash and negligent driving, is too long a time. Quick justice is a sine qua non of Art. 21 of the Constitution. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that "Having regard to the nature of offence there is enormous delay in proceeding with the criminal prosecution by the appellant 91/2 years for a trial for rash and negligent driving, is too long a time. Quick justice is a sine qua non of Art. 21 of the Constitution. Keeping a person in suspended animation for 91/2 years without any cause at all and none was indicated before the learned Magistrate or before the High Court or before us cannot be with the spirit of the procedure established by law. In that view of the matter, it is just and fair and in accordance with equity to direct that the trial or prosecution of the appellant to proceed no further." 9. In Prithvi Raj v. State of Rajasthan reported in 1992 (1) RLW 94 , the trial for the offence under section 3/7, E.C. Act was pending for the last thirteen years. It was held by this court that it was not fair, just, reasonable and speedy trial and the same violated the accused's liberty and fundamental right of speedy trial and hence proceedings were quashed under Section 482 Cr.PC. 10. Similarly in Hemraj v. State of Rajasthan reported in 1995 Cr.LR (Raj.) 24 , where the case for the offence under section 7/16, Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, lasted for eleven years, this court held that it was a fit case to invoke power under Section 482 Cr.PC and the proceedings were quashed. 11. In Darshan Lal v. The State of Rajasthan reported in 1990 Cr.LR (Raj.) 247 , the accused was facing trial for the offence under section 7/16, P.F.A. Act and there was a delay of seven years in the trial. This Court quashed the proceeding and directed that criminal proceeding against the accused shall be deemed to be closed. 12. In the case in hand, after facing prolonged and delayed trial, in appeal the case was remanded to the learned C.J.M., who would have no alternative but to proceed-with de novo summary trial in view of Sec.l2A of the Act and thus, after nineteen years of the incident, the accused will have to face the trial from the very start for which there is no fault on the part of the accused petitioner. It has been admitted before me by the learned Public Prosecutor at the bar that in the delayed and prolonged trial, there is nothing to blame the accused petitioner. It is the duty of the court and the prosecution to see and ensure that the proper trial is conducted in the proper court according to the provisions of law and if it is not observed by the court and the prosecution, the accused petitioner cannot be blamed or held responsible. In my opinion, it is not the duty of the accused petitioner to point-out that in what manner and in what forum, the trial should proceed. Therefore, it cannot be said that the conduct of the accused has been such which may disentitle him to any relief under Section 482 Cr.PC. 13. Having regard to the above principles of law, laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and this court, I am of the opinion that there has been a violation of speedy trial and it is a fit case to invoke the inherent powers of this court under Section 482 Cr.PC and to quash the proceedings for preventing abuse of the process of the court and also to secure the ends of justice. 14. In the result, the revision petition is allowed and invoking the inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.PC, the judgment 23.8.85 passed by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Sri Ganganager, and the proceedings in Criminal Appeal No.88/81 are set aside & quashed. *******