Honble DALELA, J. – On 11.4.83, the Food Inspector took the sample of milk from the petitioner and on analysis, the sample was found to be adulterated. On 20.4.83, a criminal complaint was filed against the petitioner in the court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sojat, where Criminal Original Case No. 949/83 was registered. After long trial, the accused was examined under Sec. 313 CrPC on 7.3.95 and the final arguments were concluded on 20.4.95 and the case was fixed for judgment on 24.4.95 but the learned Civil Judge (Sr.Div.) cum A.C.J.M. instead of pronouncing the judgment, vide his order dated 24.4.95 ordered for de-novo trial as summary case and on the same day, substance of the accusation was stated to the accused and the prosecution witnesses were ordered to be summoned on the next date. Being aggrieved-with this order, the petitioner has preferred this petition under Sec. 482 Cr.P.C. (2). I have heard the arguments of both the sides. (3). The incident relates to 1983 and this is after twelve years that a de novo trial as summary case has been ordered and now after the lapse of twelve years from the date of the incident, the accused is required to face the trial from the very start. (4). An accused person is entitled to a reasonably expeditious trial, which is an integral and essential part of fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India. If an accused is not tried expeditiously and his criminal trial remains pending before the trial court unnecessarily and for unreasonable time, this fundamental right of speedy trial is vitiated and if the trial is not held up on account of dilatory tactics adopted by accused, the prolonged and protracted trial would be liable to be quashed on the ground that it is in prejudice to his fundamental right. (5). In Hussainara Khatoon and Ors. vs. State of Bihar (1), the Honble Supreme Court has propounded that– ``We think that even under our Constitution, though speedy trial is not specifically enumerated as a fundamental right, it is implicit in the broad sweep and content of Article 21 as interpreted by this Court in Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India ( AIR 1978 SC 597 ). vs. State of Bihar (1), the Honble Supreme Court has propounded that– ``We think that even under our Constitution, though speedy trial is not specifically enumerated as a fundamental right, it is implicit in the broad sweep and content of Article 21 as interpreted by this Court in Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India ( AIR 1978 SC 597 ). We have held in that case that Article 21 confers a fundamental right on every person not to be deprived of his life or liberty except in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law and it is not enough to constitute compliance with the requirement of that Article that some semblance of a procedure should be prescribed by law, but that the procedure should be `reasonable, fair and just. If a person is deprived of his liberty under a procedure which is not `reasonable, fair or just, such deprivation would be violative of his fundamental right under Article 21 and he would be entitled to enforce such fundamental right and secure his release. Now obviously procedure prescribed by law for depriving a person of his liberty cannot be `reasonable, fair or just, unless that procedure ensures a speedy trial for determination of the guilt of such person. No procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial can be regarded as `reasonable, fair or just and it would fall foul of Article 21. There can, therefore, be no doubt that speedy trial, and by speedy trial, we mean reasonably expeditious trial, is an integral and essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21. (6). In Sheela Barse vs. Union of India (2), the Apex Court has held that ``the right to speedy trial is a fundamental right implicit in Art. 21 of the Constitution. If an accused is not tried speedily and his case remains pending before the Magistrate or the Sessions Court for an unreasonable length of time, it is clear that his fundamental right to speedy trial would be violated unless, of course, the trial is held up on account of some interim order passed by a superior court or the accused is responsible for the delay in the trial of the case. The consequence of trial of the fundamental right to speedy trial would be that the prosecution itself would be liable to be quashed on the ground that it is in breach of the fundamental right. (7). In Srinivas Pal vs. Union Territory of Arunachal Pradesh (3), the accused was facing trial for the offences punishable under Ss. 279, 304A and 338 IPC and the trial was delayed for about nine and half years. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that ``Having regard to the nature of offence there is enormous delay in proceeding with the criminal prosecution by the appellant 9 1/2 years for a trial for rash and negligent driving, is too long a time. Quick justice is a sine qua non of Art. 21 of the Constitution. Keeping a person in suspended animation for 9 1/2 years without any cause at all and none was indicated before the learned Magistrate or before the High Court or before us cannot be with the spirit of the procedure established by law. In that view of the matter, it is just and fair and in accordance with equity to direct that the trial or prosecution of the appellant to proceed no further. (8). In Prithvi Raj vs. State of Rajasthan (4), the trial for the offence u/s. 3/7, E.C. Act was pending for the last thirteen years. It was held by this court that it was not fair, just, reasonable and speedy trial and the same violated the accuseds liberty and fundamental right of speedy trial and hence proceedings were quashed under Sec. 482 Cr.P.C. (9). Similarly in Hemraj vs. State of Rajasthan (5), where the case for the offence u/s 7/16, Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, lasted for eleven years, this court held that it was a fit case to invoke powers under Sec. 482 Cr.P.C. and the proceedings were quashed. (10). In Darshan Lal vs. The State of Rajasthan (6), the accused was facing trial for the offence u/s 7/16, P.F.A. Act and there was a delay of seven years in the trial. This court quashed the proceeding and directed that criminal proceeding against the accused shall be deemed to be closed. (11). In the case in hand, the accused petitioner is facing trial for the last twelve years. This court quashed the proceeding and directed that criminal proceeding against the accused shall be deemed to be closed. (11). In the case in hand, the accused petitioner is facing trial for the last twelve years. It is admitted before me at the bar that for the prolonged and delayed trial, the accused petitioner has nothing to be blamed nor he is liable for any delay in the proceedings. In my opinion, it is not the duty of the accused to say or point-out as to how and in what manner, the trial should proceed. It is the duty of the court and the prosecution to see and ensure that the trial is conducted at the appropriate forum in the proper manner according to the provisions of the law. At the fag end of the trial after the conclusion of the final arguments when the case was fixed for judgment, the trial court instead of pronouncing the judgment, ordered de novo trial as summary case. Obviously, there is a violation of speedy trial and the accused petitioner is in no way at fault. Therefore, in my opinion, it is a fit case to invoke the inherent powers under Sec. 482 Cr.P.C. and quash the proceedings. (12). In the result, this petition is allowed and the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 71/1993 pending before the learned Civil Judge (Sr. Div.) cum A.C.J.M., Jaitaran, Pali, are hereby quashed.