Judgment Satyabrata Sinha, J. 1. The petitioner in this application, has inter alia, prayed fur issuance of a writ of or in the nature of Mandamus directing the respondents and particularly the respondent No.3, Superintendent of Presidency Jail, not to retain the petitioner any further in custody. 2. The basic fact of the matter is not in dispute. The petitioner was initially taken in the judicial custody on 15.10.80 and was lodged in the Presidency Jail having Registration No. 4524A. The petitioner was sentenced to death by a judgment and order dated 13.5.81 passed by the 7th Bench City Civil Court, Calcutta in Sessions Trial No. 1 of 1981 under Ss. 302, 394, 397 of the Indian Penal Code. The petitioner preferred an appeal against the said judgment and conviction. Ultimately, the matter went up to Supreme Court and by reason of a judgment dated 22.4.85 the Supreme Court modified the death sentence to rigorous imprisonment for life. 3. The contention of the petitioner is that he has been in custody for a total period of more than 18 years including the remission in terms of the relevant provisions and of the West Bengal Jail Manual and thus he should be directed to be set free. 4. The records of the case have been produced by the State. The contention of the State is that the petitioner was convicted in a case under s. 307 of the Indian Penal Code in Sessions Case No. 5 of 1982 by a judgment and order dated 30.3.83 passed by the Sessions Judge, 7th Bench, City Civil Court, Calcutta. It is contended that the petitioner had committed a second offence and that although the jail authority had recommended the premature release of the petitioner from the custody, but the police report is otherwise. It appears that the matter was taken up by the Human Rights Commission and in reply to its querry it was stated that the convict developed a propensity to commit gradually greater offence. The petitioner, as per the report and as per the judgment of the Trial Court, was convicted for receipt of stolen property under s. 411 of the Indian Penal Code whereafter he committed theft and was convicted under s. 379 of the Indian Penal Code. The petitioner again committed robbery and was convicted under s. 392/452/34 IPC. The petitioner, as per the report and as per the judgment of the Trial Court, was convicted for receipt of stolen property under s. 411 of the Indian Penal Code whereafter he committed theft and was convicted under s. 379 of the Indian Penal Code. The petitioner again committed robbery and was convicted under s. 392/452/34 IPC. He, thereafter, committed offence of bank dacoity in broad day light using lethal weapons and causing grievious hurt. It is also stated that the petitioner had produced a fake order of the Supreme Court for his released and the matter is still pending before the Supreme Court of India. It is stated that the State Government had rejected the petitioner's representation by an order dated 20.8.94. However, from the records, it appears that the said order has been passed by the Government of West Bengal on an application filed by the wife of the petitioner praying for his premature release. 5. Mr. D. K. Sen, Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the descriptive roll of the petitioner at the Presidency Jail, which would appear from Annexure 'B' at P. 21 of the petition, is as follows :- Y. M. D. "U.T. period from 15.10.80 to 12.05.81 00 06 28days Conviction period from 13.05.81 to 08.06.94 12 02 25days Remission earned upto 1st Ort. '94 03 04 02days Total . . . 17 02 05days 6. The Learned Counsel submits that a proposal for premature release of the petitioner was sent by the Superintendent of the Presidency Jail on 19.8.84 under Memo No. 5751 as he had already undergone imprisonment of 14 years. The I.G. of Prison also by his letter dated 17.7.91, the Learned Counsel contends, recommended the case of premature release of the petitioner in terms of the judgment of the Supreme Court. 7. The Supreme Court in R. M. Tewari vs. The Home Secretary State of U.P. & Ors., being writ petition (Cri.) No. 755 of 1990, has held as follows ; "Those lifers who have been convicted after December 18, 1978 shall be considered for release in accordance with the provisions of the V.P. Prisoners release on Probation Act, 1938 or under the relevant provisions of the Jail Manual prescribing conditions for premature release as the case may be, within a period of nine months from this order. The above direction will stand modified in the case of lifers whose cases were considered and rejected after 1st January, 1989 to the extent that their cases will be reconsidered after the time stipulated for such reconsideration has expired. However, those lifers whose cases were considered prior to 31st December, 1988 shall be covered by the above direction and their cases will be reconsidered for premature release within the time allowed by the direction. " 8. The aforementioned decision was rendered in a particular fact situation and no declaration of law has been made by the Supreme Court of India. 9. Sections 432, 433 and 433A of the Code of Criminal Procedure read thus: "432(1). When any person has been sentenced to punishment for an offence, the appropriate Government may at any time without conditions or upon any conditions which the person sentenced accepts, suspend the execution of his sentence or remit the whole or any part of the punishment to which he has been sentenced. (2) Whenever an application is made to the appropriate Government for the suspension or remission of a sentence, the appropriate Government may require the presiding Judge of the Court before or by which the conviction was held or confirmed, to state his opinion as to whether the application should be granted or refused, together with his reasons for such opinion and also to forward with the statement of such opinion a certified copy of the record of the trial or of such record thereof as exists. (3) If any condition on which a sentence has been suspended or remitted is, in the opinion of the appropriate Government, not fulfilled, the appropriate Government may cancel the suspension or remission, and thereupon the person in whose favour the sentence has been suspended or remitted may, if at large, be arrested by any police officer, without warrant and remanded to undergo the unexpired portion of the sentence. (4) The condition on which a sentence is suspended or remitted under this section may be one to be fulfilled by the person in whose favour the sentence is suspended or remitted, or one independent of his will. (5) The appropriate Government may, by general rules or special orders, give directions as to the suspension of sentences and the conditions on which petitions should be presented and dealt with. (5) The appropriate Government may, by general rules or special orders, give directions as to the suspension of sentences and the conditions on which petitions should be presented and dealt with. Provided that in the cases of any sentence (other than a sentence of fine) passed on a male person above the age of eighteen years, no such petition by the person sentence or by any other person on his behalf shall be entertained unless the person sentenced is in jail, and- (a) Where such petition is made by the person sentenced, it is presented through the officer in charge of the jail; or (b) where such petition is made by any other person, it contains a declaration that the person sentenced is in jail. (6) The provisions of the above sub-sections shall also apply to any order passed by a Criminal Court under any section of the Code or of any other law which restricts the liberty of any person or imposes any liability upon him or his property. (7) In this section and in s. 433, the expression "appropriate Government" means (a) in cases where the sentence is for an offence against, or the order referred to in subsection (6) is passed under, any law relating to a matter to which the executive power of the Union extends, the Central Government; (b) in other cases, the Government of the State within which the offender is sentenced or the said order is passed. 433. The appropriate Government may, without the consent of the person sentenced, commute- (a) a sentence of death, for any other punishment provided by the Indian Penal Code; (b) a sentence of imprisonment for life, for imprisonment for a term not exceeding fourteen years or for fine; (c) a sentence of rigorous imprisonment, for simple imprisonment for any term to which that person might have been sentenced, or for fine ; (d) a sentence of simple imprisonment, for fine. 433A. 433A. Notwithstanding anything contained in s. 432 where a sentence of imprisonment for life is imposed on conviction of a person for an offence for which death is one of the punishments provided by law, or where a sentence of death imposed on a person has been commuted under s. 433 into one of imprisonment for life, such person shall not be released from prison unless he had served at least fourteen years of imprisonment." The relevant provision in the West Bengal Jail Manual is Rule 591 thereof which reads thus : "591. The following rules govern the shortening of sentences and premature release of prisioners, namely : 1. Release under 14 years' Rule. (1) Every case in which a convict has undergone in a Jailor Jails a period of continued detention amounting together with remission earned, if any, to fourteen years shall be submitted within a month of completion of such period by the Superintendent of the jail in which the convict is for the time being detained, through the Inspector-General for the orders of the State Government for his release. 10. In Sri Niwas and Others vs. Delhi Administration, reported AIR 1982 SC 1391 the Supreme Court of India directed the State to consider the question of remission of the concerned petitioner in the light of the facts of that case. 11. In Dinesh Chandra Samnadas Gandhi vs. State of Gujarat, reported in AIR 1989 SC 1011 the Supreme Court observed in the facts and circumstances of that case that the State should exercise its jurisdiction for remission of sentence. 12. In Maru Ram vs. Union of India, reported in AIR 1980 SC 2147 the Supreme Court clearly held that the provision of s. 433A of the Code of Criminal Procedure is a valid piece of legislation. 13. In Ashok Kumar vs. Union of India, reported in AIR 1991 SC 1792 the Supreme Court reiterated the said position. 14. In Mithu vs. State of Punjab, reported in 1993(2) SCC 277 the Supreme Court was considering the constitutionality of the provision of s. 303 of the Indian Penal Code and it was held that as the said provision specifies a savage sentence, the same was unconstitutional. 15. The aforesaid decisions, therefore, are not applicable to the facts of the present case. 16. 15. The aforesaid decisions, therefore, are not applicable to the facts of the present case. 16. In Surja Ram vs. The State reported in 1963(2) Cr.L.J. page 396, upon which reliance has been placed upon by the learned Counsel, the accused was sentenced to death, which was later on commuted to life imprisonment and to undergo 10 years 9 months rigorous imprisonment in other cases in the same trial it was held that the sentence would run concurrently and not consecutively. 17. The aforesaid decision, therefore, has no application to the facts of the present case. 18. My attention was drawn to s. 31 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and in particular the proviso appended thereto for the purpose of contending that no person can be sentenced to imprisonment for a longer period than 14 years. Section 31 of the Code, in my opinion, does not have any application in the instant case as the same applies to a case where the sentence is to be imposed in cases of conviction of several offences at one trial. 19. It is admitted that the petitioner was initially sentenced to death which was later on modified by the Supreme Court to a sentence for life. It is also admitted that subsequently the petitioner was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of 10 years. 20. The relevant provision, therefore, in my opinion is s. 427 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The said section reads thus : 427 (1) When a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment or imprisonment for life, such imprisonment or imprisonment for life shall commence at the expiration of the imprisonment to which he has been previously sentenced, unless the Court directs that the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such previous sentence; Provided that where a person who has been sentenced to imprisonment by an order under s. 122 in default of furnishing security is, whilst undergoing such sentence, sentenced to imprisonment for an offence committed prior to the making of such order, the latter sentence shall commence immediately. (2) When a person already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment for life is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment for a term or imprisonment for life, the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with such previous sentence." Sub-section (1) of s. 427 evidently has no application in this case. Subs. (2) of s. 427 provides for an offender "already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment for life who is sentenced on a subsequent conviction to imprisonment for a term or imprisonment for life". As the petitioner had earlier been sentenced to imprisonment for life, he was to serve the sentence for remainder of life in prison unless the said sentence was commuted or remitted by appropriate authority. As a person having only one life span, the sentence on a subsequent conviction of imprisonment for a term or imprisonment for life can only be superimposed to earlier life sentence and the same could not have been added to it. Sub-section (2) of s. 427 of the Code was enacted keeping in view the aforementioned object inasmuch as in the aforementioned case the question of directing the sentence to run concurrently or consecutively would not arise. In a case falling within sub-s. (2) of S. 427 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the question of any direction as required under sub-section (1) of S. 427 would be redundant. It is evident that sub-section (2) of S. 427 Cr.P.C. is by way of exception to sub-so (1) thereof. 21. Reference to Ss. 55 and 57 of the Indian Penal Code by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is also misplaced. It is evident that sub-section (2) of S. 427 Cr.P.C. is by way of exception to sub-so (1) thereof. 21. Reference to Ss. 55 and 57 of the Indian Penal Code by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is also misplaced. In Ranjit Singh vs. Union Territory of Chandiganh and Anr., reported in 1991 Cr.L.J. 3354 the Supreme Court relying upon its earlier decision in Gopal Vinayak Godse vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in 1961 (1) Cr.L.J. 736 as also the decision of the Constitution Bench in Maru Ram vs. Union of India, reported in 1980 Cr.L.J. 1440 held: "The Constitution Bench in Maru Ram summarised one of its conclusion as under (Para 72, at P. 1467 of Cri.L.J.) : "We follow Godse's case [(1961) (1) Cr.L.J. 763] (supra) to hold that imprisonment for life lasts until the last breath, and what ever the length of remission earned, the prisoner can claim release only if the remaining sentence is remitted by Government." "Another conclusion in Maru Ram was that the mandatory minimum of 14 years' actual imprisonment prescribed by S. 433A which has the supremacy over the Remission Rules and short-sentencing statutes made by the various States will not operate against those whose cases were decided by the trial Court before the 18th December, 1978 when S. 433A came into force but s. 433A would apply to those sentenced by the trial Court after 18.12.1978 even though the offence was committed prior to that date. From these decision it is obvious that the mandatory minimum of 14 years' actual imprisonment prescribed by s. 433A is applicable to petitioner in respect of both sentences of life imprisonment since the conviction by the trial Court even for the first murder was after 18.12.1978, the second offence itself being committed after 18.12.1978. There is no dispute that the mandatory minimum of 14 years' actual imprisonment, as required by S. 433A even for the first sentence of life imprisonment, has not been served out by the petitioner and, therefore, irrespective of the points raised in this petition on the basis of s. 427 (2), Cr.P.C. the petitioner cannot claim relief much less a writ under Article 32 of the Constitution in the absence of the remaining sentence being remitted by the Government." 22. Yet again in Ashok Kumar alias Golu VS. Yet again in Ashok Kumar alias Golu VS. Union of India & Ors., reported in 1991 Cri.L.J. 2483 : AIR 1991 SC 1792 the Supreme Court following its earlier decision in Maru Ram as also Gopal Vinayak Godse (supra) held: "It will thus be seen from the ratio laid down in the aforesaid two cases that where a person has been sentenced to imprisonment for life the remissions earned by him during his internment in prison under the relevant remission rules have a limited scope and must be confined to the scope and ambit of the said rules and do not acquire significance until the sentence is remitted under s. 432 in which case the remission would be subject to limitation of s. 433A of the Code, or Constitutional power has been exercised under Arts. 72/161 of the Constitution. " Supreme Court repealed the contention that its decision in Bhagirath's case (1985 Cri.L.J. 1179) runs counter to its decision in the case of Godse or Maru Ram and held : "We fail to see any departure from the ratio of Godse's case: on the contrary the aforequoted passage clearly shows approval of that ratio and this becomes further clear from the final order passed by the Court while allowing the appeal/Writ petition. The Court directed that the period of detention undergone by the two accused as under/trial prisoners would be set off against the sentence of life imprisonment imposed upon them, subject to the provisions contained in s. 433A, and, 'provided that orders have been passed by the appropriate authority under s. 433 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. These directions made it clear beyond any manner of doubt that just as in the case of remissions so also in the case of set off the period of detention as under-trial would enure to the benefit of the convict provided the appropriate Government has chosen to pass an order under s. 432/433 of the Code. The ratio of Bhagirathi's case, therefore, does not run counter to the ratio of this Court in the case of Godse or Maru Ram." 23. Section 433A of the Code of Criminal Procedure not only excludes s. 472 but also subject operation of s. 433(a) to serious restriction and also excludes all contrary prison rules. 24. The ratio of Bhagirathi's case, therefore, does not run counter to the ratio of this Court in the case of Godse or Maru Ram." 23. Section 433A of the Code of Criminal Procedure not only excludes s. 472 but also subject operation of s. 433(a) to serious restriction and also excludes all contrary prison rules. 24. In view of the aforementioned authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that unless and until the sentence of the petitioner is remitted or commuted either in terms of Ss. 432 and 433 of the Cr.P.Code the petitioner does not have any existing legal right to obtain a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to set him at liberty. 25. It however, appears from the records that an application filed by the petitioner's wife for his premature release was rejected by the Governor. The said order was evidently passed in terms of Article 161 of the Constitution of India. From the records it appears that at least on two occasions the Jail Authorities have referred the matter to the Judicial Secretary for commutation of his sentence in terms of the Jail Manual. The learned P.P. appearing on behalf of the State very fairly states that the said recommendations are pending consideration and no final order bas been passed thereupon. It is stated that reports have been called for from the Jail Authorities in certain matters and an appropriate order shall be passed as soon as the said reports are received. 26. Keeping in view the fact that the concerned authority of the State of West Bengal is statutorily obliged to pass an appropriate order in terms of s. 433 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on the basis of the letters of request sent by the Jail Authorities, in my opinion, interest of justice will be sub-served if the Judicial Secretary, who admittedly is the competent authority, is directed to consider the matter in accordance with law at an early date and preferably within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. The Jail Authorities are also hereby directed to send reports to the Judicial Secretary forthwith. 27. This application is thus disposed of with the aforementioned observations and directions. 28. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. 29. The Jail Authorities are also hereby directed to send reports to the Judicial Secretary forthwith. 27. This application is thus disposed of with the aforementioned observations and directions. 28. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs. 29. All parties are to act on a signed copy of the operative part of this Judgment on the usual undertaking. Application disposed of.