Mr. C. M. Nayar, J. ( 1 ) THE present revision petition has been filed against the order dated 16/11/1988, passed by Additional Senior Sub Judge, Delhi. The learned Judge dismissed the appeal of the petitioner against the order dated 15/10/1988, by which the Trial Court allowed the application of the respondent/plaintiff under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the petitioners were restrained from forcibly evicting respondent without due process of law. ( 2 ). The respondent/plaintiff filed a suit for permanent injunction against thepetitioners/defendants for restraining them and their agents from taking forciblepossession of the shop in his occupation situated at a piece of land forming part ofkhasra No. 112 in the revenue estate of village Civil Station in the area of Timarpur,delhi, and as shown in red colour in the site plan, which was filed with the plaint. Respondent also moved an application under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 Civil Procedure Code for adinterim injunction. The trial Judge considered the application as well as therespective contentions of the parties. The petitioners had contended that respondent was mere a licencee and, therefore, he was liable to beevicted. The trial Courtheld that the question whether the respondent is a licencee and there is a relationship of licensor and licencee between the parties or whether the respondent wasowner by adverse possession have to be decided at the stage of the trial. Therespondent was held to be in occupation of the premises and in this background therestraint order was passed on the petitioners. ( 3 ). The petitioners were aggrieved by the order of the Trial Court and filed anappeal in the Court of Additional Senior Sub Judge. The Appellate Court hasmentioned in the order that the respondent/plaintiff alleged that he was in possession in his own right and the petitioners had alleged that the said respondent wasa licencee whose licence had been revoked. The question whether the respondentwas in occupation of the premises in his own right or whether he was merely alicencee, whose licence had been revoked, is a question which was required to bedecided by the evidence which the parties had yet to lead. The learned Judgefurther held that there was nothing on the record to show at that stage that therespondent was a licencee under the petitioner. The learned Judgefurther held that there was nothing on the record to show at that stage that therespondent was a licencee under the petitioner. The respondent was in continuouspossession of the premises since 1984 and the learned Trial Court had rightlyexercised discretion in passing the restraint order from forcibly evicting therespondent from the shop in question. The petitioners were aggrieved by the orderof the Additional Senior Sub Judge and filed the present revision, petition. ( 4 ). The learned Counsel for the petitioners has contended that the plaint doesnot disclose any cause of action and on present facts it can be held that therespondent was a mere licencee whose licence had already been revoked. He hasfurther argued that a person who is given possession of a property as a licenceecannot claim status of a lessee even if he is given exclusive possession. He hasstrongly relied upon the Full Bench judgment of this Court: as reported in Chandulal Balkrishan, Madan Mohan, Mohan Lal v. M. C. D. 1978 R. L. R. 278. ( 5 ). The learned Counsel has next found fault with the order of the Trial Courtas well as of the Appellate Court on the ground that some amount of damages andlicence fee should have been fixed and the respondent should have been directedto deposit that money for use of the premises in question. This would havemaintained the balance between the parties and the petitioners who are legallyentitled to the premises, would not have suffered further on account of free use andoccupation of the same by the respondent. ( 6 ). There is no doubt that in case the respondent is held to be a licencee and he was given possession of the premises the rights accruing to him as a lessee will not arise and he is liable to be treated as a licencee and on the expiry of licence he can always be asked to vacate the premises. ( 7 ). The question, however, which arises in the present revision petition is as towhether the respondent has been held to be licencee. This point is not yetdetermined either by the Trial Court or by the Appellate Court. The said Courtshave only determined that there is a prima facie case and balance of convenienceis in favour of the respondent and protected his occupation. This point is not yetdetermined either by the Trial Court or by the Appellate Court. The said Courtshave only determined that there is a prima facie case and balance of convenienceis in favour of the respondent and protected his occupation. This, however, doesnot mean that the respondent has got the status of a lessee and is entitled toprotection under the law. The Trial Court has merely restrained the petitionersfrom forcibly evicting the respondent except by due process of law. The Appellatecourt has confirmed the order and protected the occupation of the respondentobviously during the pendency of the suit. The ultimate decision in the matter willbe dependent on the findings in respect of the issues framed in the suit. The learnedcounsel for the petitioner has stated that the issues have already been framed andthe matter is ripe for trial. The petitioner shall be at liberty to raise the plea, as towhether, the respondent is liable to pay any damages as an interim measure duringthe pendency of the suit and in case such a plea is raised, the Trial Court shall decideaccording to law. ( 8 ). The suit was filed as far back as 1988 and it will be in the interest of justicethat the same is disposed of as expeditiously as possible. There is no infirmity andillegality in the order of the Trial Court as well as the Appellate Court which callsfor interference in the present proceedings. This will, however, be subject to therespective contentions of the parties in the main suit. The revision petition isdisposed of. The parties are directed to appear before the Trial Court on 10thfebruary, 1995, for further proceedings in matter. There will be no order as to costs.