JUDGMENT 1. The unsuccessful defendants have filed this appeal under section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure against the judgment and decree dated 16.8.1988 rendered by the Second Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Ratlam in C.O.S. No. 14-B/85, thereby awarding compensation of Rs. 20,100-00 with costs and interest @ 6% per annum from the date of decree till payment on Rs. 20,000/-. 2. Facts lie in a narrow compass. The respondent held the post of Upper Division Teacher. On 16.1.1984, he offered himself for Family Planning operation in the Primary Health Center, Sailana. The operation was conducted and the respondent was applauded for his submission to operation in national interest. The operation, however, did not prove beneficial and even after operation, a daughter was born to him on 16.4.1985. Irked, he issued notice under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure. As the demand was not met, he filed the aforesaid civil suit for a decree of damages quantified at Rs. 20,000-00 and notice charges of Rs. 100-00. He also claimed interest. The appellants opposed the claim. On evaluation of evidence, the learned trial Judge granted the decree as noted above. 3. Dissatisfied by the decree, the appellants have filed this appeal. 4. The appeal was filed beyond limitation. On 2.11.1989, the delay in presentation of the appeal was condoned. 5. The appellants have paid the decretal amount to the respondent. 6. The respondent admits receipt of the decretal amount. 7. I have heard Shri Anand Agrawal, learned Panel Lawyer for the appellants and Shri B.L. Pavecha, learned Senior Counsel with Shri Abdul Salim for the respondent. 8. Shri Agrawal submitted that the particulars of damages are not furnished and that the evidence is not properly appreciated. Shri Pavecha, on the other hand, doubed the aforesaid contention as non-meritorious and submitted that the quantification of damages rested on the basis of maintenance of the daughter @ Rs. 100-00 per month till her attaining the majority. According to Shri Pavecha, the damages claimed were on the low side because the respondent was not in a position to pay the Court fees for higher amount. 9. I proceed to examine the worth of rival contentions. 10. The Family Planning operation is not disputed. Failure of operation and frustration of object are also not disputed. According to Shri Pavecha, the damages claimed were on the low side because the respondent was not in a position to pay the Court fees for higher amount. 9. I proceed to examine the worth of rival contentions. 10. The Family Planning operation is not disputed. Failure of operation and frustration of object are also not disputed. What is contended is that (a) there was no actionable negligence; (b) the particulars of damage were not pleaded and proved; and (c) the appellants are erroneously held liable to pay the quantified amount by way of damages. 11. The learned trial judge concluded as under:- ^^'kklu&çfroknh dks okn çLrqr fd;s tkus ds iwoZ çn'kZ ih-8 ds çk:i dk lwpuk i= Hkh fn;k x;k FkkA ;g lwpuk i= çkIr gksuk oknksÙkrj dh nkafMd 8 esa Lohdkj fd;k x;k gSA bl lwpuki= esa 'kklu ls :- 20]000 dh ekax dh xbZ FkhA orZeku eagxkbZ ds ;qx esa 'kklu fdlh cPps ds ykyu ikyu ds :i esa 100½ :- çfrekg ns; gksuk lk/kkj.k lh ckr gS] vkSj bl eku ls çR;sd cPps ds fy;s 1200½ :- okf"kZd O;; LokHkkfod gSA o;Ld gksus rd rks 100½ :- çfrekg dh jkf'k Hkh de gksxhA 'kklu dh uhfr ds vuqlkj 18 o"kZ ls de vk;q dh ckfydk dk fookg ugha fd;k tk ldrk vkSj ;fn viuh larku] tksfd vkijs'ku ds Ik'pkr gqbZ dk ykyu ikyu vk'kkjke dks djuk gS rks mls fu'p; gh mls 18 o"kZ dh vk;q iw.kZ gksus rd mls 20 gtkj ls Hkh vf/kd O;; djuk gksxkA ,slh fLFkfr esa oknh vk'kkjke 20]000½ :- dh {kfriwfrZ ikus dk vf/kdkjh gS] vkSj og lwpuk i= O;; 100½ :- Hkh ikus dk vf/kdkjh gSA** 12. Negligence is the omission to do something which a prudent and reasonable man would do or doing something which such a man would not do. Negligence can be inferred from facts and circumstances. (1938) 2 All ER 621, (1918) 2KB 523 and ILR 1969 MP 631 (M.P.S.R.T.C. v. Sudhakar) are pertinent. Lord Brightman in Furniss v. Dawson (1984) 1 All ER 530 observed:- "The fact that the Court accepted that each step in a transaction was a genuine step producing its intended legal result did not confine the Court to considering each step in isolation for the purpose of assessing the fiscal results" It is thus legal and logical to consider facts and features properly and assess the fiscal result. 13. 13. Testing evidential material in the light of principles of law, I find that the conclusion is on firm foundation. PW-1 Dr. K.L. Yadav deposed that Dr. V.K. Saxena (DW-2) performed the operation in a camp and indicated the possibility of negligence in operation. PW-2 Sardar Singh proved the birth of baby child to PW-3 Asharam (respondent-plaintiff) and his wife Smt. Rambhabai (PW-6) on 16.4.1985 i.e. after about 15 months from the date of operation. PW-3 Asharam pledged his oath to say that operation, done to him, failed due to negligence of the doctor, an employee of appellant No. 1 (State of Madhya Pradesh) and consigned him to suffer mental agony and expenditure of maintenance and marriage, difficult to bear. He stated that this would be more than the sum of Rs. 20,000-00. PW-5 Dr. Mrs. Bina Mathur also proved the birth of baby child later named as Kum Shraddha. PW-4 Narendra Kumar and PW-6 Smt. Rambhabai supported the case as put forward. DW -1 Dr. Narendra Kumar did not state any thing of much relevance and consequence. DW-2 Dr. V.K. Saxena mainly deposed about procedure and possibility. This is no real rebuttal. The case of actionable negligence is cogently established. Estimate of damage, not excessive ex facie, is on the fulcrum of burden of maintenance and marriage. It is not contended that amount of Rs. 100-00 per month as maintenance is on the higher side. Even ignoring the mental agony and collapse of trust as a result of manifest negligence, the quantification is not arbitrary. It is not stated as to what more particulars were necessary and what prejudice is suffered. Hence, even second contention as noted above is meritless. 14. Law is not in tenebrosity. Appellants, as held in 1970 JLJ 142 = AIR 1971 MP 5 (FB) (Mangilal v. Parasram) cannot escape the liability by preferring hypothetical explanation. In 1962 JV SN 306 (SC) (State of Rajasthan v. Vidyawatz), it is laid down that the State is liable for the tortious acts of its employees. 15. The material issue stands probabilised. It seems that in camp, the State of Madhya Pradesh and operating surgeons threw the care and caution to the winds and focussed attention to perform as many operations as possible to build record and earn publicity. 15. The material issue stands probabilised. It seems that in camp, the State of Madhya Pradesh and operating surgeons threw the care and caution to the winds and focussed attention to perform as many operations as possible to build record and earn publicity. It is in such setting that a poor teacher, obsessed to plan his family, was negligently operated upon and treated and left in the lurch to suffer agony and burden, which he was made to believe was avoidable. 16. Respondent issued the statutory notice but heard nothing. The defence or hypothetical explanation seems to be an after thought and meretricious. 17. True it is that law imposes no obligation to reply the notice but silence, where one should normally speak, is not gold and tolls the tale adverse to such person or party. It gives the situation of adverse inference as well. AIR (35) 1948 Patna 406 (Kameshwar Lal v. The King) may be referred usefully. 18. I have briefly stated about the evidence. As I am in general agreement with the view taken by the trial Court, I find it unnecessary to state the effect of the evidence or document the narration in detail. In AIR 1967 SC 1124 (Girijanandini Devi and others v. Bijendra Narain Choudhary), it is held as under:- "It is not the duty of the appellate Court when it agrees with the view of the trial Court on the evidence or to reiterate the reasons given by the trial Court. Expression of general agreement with reasons given by the Court decision of which is under appeal would ordinarily suffice." 19. In 1948, Dinning J. in Roberston v. Minister of Pensions (1949) 1 KB 227 laid the foundation of promisory estoppel in public law. Prof. De Smith in his Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 4th Edition at Page 103 observed that: "the citizen is entitled to rely on their having the authority that they have asserted. Here the citizen (respondent) believed that the appellants had the authority to hold camps, perform operations and benefit individuals and the nation. Now if results are adverse, the appellants should take themselves as estopped from opposing the just claim. Law has a promise to keep to justice. Where is the scope for acrobates. 20. Nothing substantial is urged to justify interference in the judgment and decree under impugnment. Now if results are adverse, the appellants should take themselves as estopped from opposing the just claim. Law has a promise to keep to justice. Where is the scope for acrobates. 20. Nothing substantial is urged to justify interference in the judgment and decree under impugnment. The decretal amount has already been paid to the respondent. It is thus held that the appellants are rightly held liable to pay the small amount by way of damages. The prime anxiety, as gathered from the submission, is that if decree is sustained then it may bind like cases and expose the State to onerous liability. In my view, such an anxiety is misplaced because decree is being sustained not on point of law but on proof of relevant facts. At bottom, fate of case normally turns on its own peculiar facts. 21. In my view, what should really be on the agenda of the appellant No.1 and other appellants is to show concern to proper care and caution, to ensure evidence of omissions and commissions, as stated above, in such matters and to keep the citizens assured, not allured, of proper success. It is felt that such thinking will do immense good to the State as well as the nation. The case on hand should serve as a caution in this direction. Social service and national cause must call the tune and direct and dictate the course. 22. In the circumstances, I do not feel pursuaded to vacate the decree. The decree is without fault or flaw. There is no invalidity or illegality. Justice is done to the respondent and it is proper for the appellants to bear in mind that law and justice are not distant neighbours. Negligence is proved, damages are established and liability is properly adjudicated. This is beyond pale of controversy. The State, wedded to the concept of welfare to its citizens, should spurn litigative urges and feel the surge of an urge to undo the wrong done to a citizen. In the instant case, claim is small and liability is not excessive. 23. So viewed I hold that this appeal is devoid of substance and should, therefore, say monosyllabic 'no' to the prayer which appeared to be faint and feeble and which is inappropriate to foul and foin the verdict. The impugnment is found fit to be laid to rest. The finding of fact thus becomes concurrent. 23. So viewed I hold that this appeal is devoid of substance and should, therefore, say monosyllabic 'no' to the prayer which appeared to be faint and feeble and which is inappropriate to foul and foin the verdict. The impugnment is found fit to be laid to rest. The finding of fact thus becomes concurrent. 24. Accordingly, I uphold the decree and dismiss this appeal. However, looking to the nature of contest and controversy, I leave the parties to bear their own costs of this appeal. Counsel fee for each side is, however, fixed at Rs.500-00, if certified. 25. A decree be drawn up and record of the Court below be returned.