Honble YADAV, J. — The instant revision petition arises out of the order dated 21.7.1995 passed by the learned District Judge, Jaisalmer in Civil Misc. Appeal No. 4/95 whereby the appeal filed against the order of learned Civil Judge (Junior Division)-cum-Judicial Magistrate, Jaisalmer dated 18.4.95 was set aside and appeal was allowed by granting temporary injunction against the revisionist to the effect that Panchayat Bhawan under construction would not be constructed till disposal of the Original Civil Suit pending in the court of learned Civil Judge (Jr. Division)-cum-Judicial Magistrate, Jaisalmer. (2) I have heard learned counsel for the parties and critically gone through the orders passed by both the courts-below. (3). It is apparent from perusal of the order dated 18.4.95 passed by the learned trial court that the trial court has recorded positive finding to the effect that the plaintiff- opposite-parties No.l to 7 failed to establish a prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss in their favour, therefore, the temporary injunction under 0.39 rr. 1 and 2 CPC was refused. (4). Aggrieved against the order dated 18.4.95, a Miscellaneous Appeal was preferred before the learned Appellate Court, which has set aside the aforesaid finding recorded by the learned trial court and held that the plaintiff-opposite-parties have established a prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury, therefore, it has granted temporary injunction under 0.39 rr. 1 and 2 CPC. (5). It must be remembered that discretion exercised by the learned trial court in granting or refusing temporary injunction, cannot be substituted by the learned appellate court or revisional court lightly unless it is established before the learned appellate court or revisional court that the trial court has either granted or refused temporary injunction capriciously, per versely and against the sound principle of law. In my considered opinion, in the present case, none of the grounds stated above had been made out by the plaintiff-opposite-parties before the learned appellate court yet the learned appellate court has set aside the discretionary order passed by the learned trial court and substituted by its own discretion granting temporary injunction under 0.39 rr. 1 and 2 CPC in favour of the plaintiff- opposite parties No.l to 7. (6). A close scrutiny of the order dated 21.7.95 passed by the learned appellate court granting temporary injunction under 0.39 rr. 1 and 2 CPC in favour of the plaintiff- opposite parties No.l to 7. (6). A close scrutiny of the order dated 21.7.95 passed by the learned appellate court granting temporary injunction under 0.39 rr. 1 and 2 CPC to the plaintiff-opposite parties reveals that the learned appellate court has substituted his own discretion in place of discretion exercised by the learned trial court while it was legally incumbent upon it only to consider whether the view taken by the learned trial court is a possible view on the evidence on record. (7). Since grant of temporary injunction is in the nature of equitable relief, therefore, existence of prima facie case alone is not sufficient but other two conditions precedent evolved by the courts about the balance of convenience and irreparable injury are also required to be established before setting aside the order passed by the learned trial court. In my considered opinion, although the learned appellate court meticulously recorded a finding about existence of prima facie case but it has not properly address itself giving cogent and convincing plausible reasons about balance of convenience and irreparable injury. (8). The learned appellate court in the present case without meeting the reasons given by the learned trial court on the points of balance of convenience and irreparable injury was substituted its discretion in place of discretion exercised by the learned trial court which is legally not sustainable. Whenever and wherever the appellate court considers it proper to set aside a discretion exercised by the learned trial court either granting or refusing temporary injunction, it is obligatory to meet the reasons given by the learned trial court. It is true where the appellate court considers it legally proper to maintain the discretion exercised by the learned trial court either granting or refusing temporary injunction in such cases meeting of reasons in thread-bare is not necessary and over-all discussion indicating its application of mind would be sufficient. (9). In my humble opinion, before granting temporary injunction under Q.39 rr. 1 and 2 CPC, learned appellate court was required to be satisfied about comparative mischief, hardship or inconvenience likely to occur from refusing the relief must be greater than that, which would be likely to arise from granting it. (9). In my humble opinion, before granting temporary injunction under Q.39 rr. 1 and 2 CPC, learned appellate court was required to be satisfied about comparative mischief, hardship or inconvenience likely to occur from refusing the relief must be greater than that, which would be likely to arise from granting it. Learned District Judge while granting temporary injunction under 0.39 rr.l and 2, CPC substituting the discretion of the learned trial court was expected to weigh conflicting probabilities and to exercise discretion judicially and judiciaous-ly. In my considered opinion, learned appellate court has failed to weigh the need of the plaintiff-opposite parties against the need of the defendant-revisionist while determining where the balance of convenience lies. I am not satisfied with the finding of the balance of convenience in favour of the plaintiff-opposite-parties recorded by the learned appellate court as well as finding about threatened irreparable injury about to be caused to the plaintiff-opposite-parties. (10). Since in the instant case, the plaintiff-opposite-parties miserably failed to establish the balance of convenience and irreparable injury in their favour, therefore, the learned appellate court was not justified to substitute its discretion exercised by the learned trial court. It is established principle of law evolved by the courts from time immemorable that for granting temporary injunction under O.30 rr.l and 2, CPC, all the three conditions mentioned above, are required to co-exist and if any one of them is missing, the plaintiff-opposite-parties are not entitled to obtain temporary injunction under 0.39, rr.l and 2 CPC. (11). For the reasons stated above, I am of the opinion, that the learned appellate court in the present case has committed jurisdictional error in setting aside the discretion exercised by the learned trial court in refusing temporary injunction to the plaintiff-opposite-parties and by substituting its own discretion by way of granting temporary injunction to the plaintiff-opposite-parties. I am further of the opinion that if the order impugned passed by the learned appellate court is allowed to stand it would occasion a failure of justice to the defendant revisionist. (12). Mere allegation of the plaintiff-opposite-parties about the suitability of place where Panchayat Bhawan is being constructed is not sufficient but there must be proof of actual and reasonable apprehended danger of waste or damage. The question as to what constitute sufficient proof of danger of waste or damage depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. (12). Mere allegation of the plaintiff-opposite-parties about the suitability of place where Panchayat Bhawan is being constructed is not sufficient but there must be proof of actual and reasonable apprehended danger of waste or damage. The question as to what constitute sufficient proof of danger of waste or damage depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. In the present case, there is no proof of tangible and definable character of apprehended danger of such waste of public fund. (13). Recently, establishment of Gram Panchayats in the State under the Rajasthan Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 are elected democratic institutions and as such institutions including Gram Panchayat Chhatrail are at liberty to take decisions for welfare of the members of the Gram Sabha. In the present case, Gram Panchayat, Chhatrail has taken decision on its collective wisdom to construct the Panchayat Bhawan at a particular place, which cannot be allowed to be hood-winked by the plaintiff-opposite- parties by way of obtaining a temporary injunction. In the Rajasthan Panchayat Raj Act, 1994, there are sufficient effective provisions to take drastic action against a member or office- bearer of Gram Panchayat. Aggrieved parties are at liberty if so advised to invoke those provisions about waste of Gram Panchayat fund to the appropriate authorities. (14). In the present case, learned counsel for the revisionist has placed before me in-numerable documents including some photographs of the disputed construction of the Panchayat Bhawan which lead towards an irresistible conclusion that construction of the Panchayat Bhawan has, been completed, therefore, no useful purpose would be served in remanding the case back to the learned District Judge for deciding the case afresh. (15). Learned counsel for the revisionist as well as learned counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff-opposite-parties invited my attention towards various provisions of the Rajasthan Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 about maintainability of the suit itself. I do not propose to dwell upon the various provisions of the Rajasthan Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 touching the maintainability of the suit at this stage. It is left open to be decided in the suit itself, inasmuch as, any observation made by this Court about the interpretation of the various provisions of the Rajasthan Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 as well as maintainability of the suit would cause prejudice to the contesting parties. (16). As a result of the afore-mentioned discussion, the instant revision petition is allowed. (16). As a result of the afore-mentioned discussion, the instant revision petition is allowed. The order dated 21.7.95 passed by the learned District Judge is hereby set aside and the order dated 18.4.95 passed by the learned trial court is restored. Both the parties are directed to bear their own costs. (17). Before parting with the judgment, it is made clear that the observations made by the learned appellate court in its impugned order dated 21.7.95 will not come in the way of the learned trial court while deciding the suit on merits.