TAJ MOHAMAD SHEIKH v. UNION OF INDIA — 1995 DIGILAW 920 (DEL)

R. C. LAHOTI ( 1 ) THE petitioner, an officer in the Indian Army (Army Medical Corps) has been tried by a General Court Martial (hereinafter referred to as the GCM, for short) on a charge under Section 64 (e) of the Army Act. 1950. He has been found guilty and sentenced to be cashiered and to suffer rigorous imprisonment for six months by the GCM. The sentence and the finding are yet to be confirmed. This petition under article 226 of the Constitution has been filed seeking the quashing of the finding and sentence of the GCM. On behalf of the respondents, a preliminary objection has been raised to the maintainability of the petition on the ground of availability of an efficacious remedy by was petition under section 164 of the Army Act, 1950. The learned counsel for the parties have been heard on the preliminary objection. ( 2 ) A perusal of Chapter X of the Army Act, 1950 shows that it contemplates four types of court martial, namely, general courts- martial, district courts-martial, summary general courts- martial and summary court martial. Different authorities are empowered for convening different types of courts martial. Provisions have been made in the Act for the constitution of courts martial and procedure thereof. ( 3 ) SECTION 153 provides-no finding or sentence of any court- martial shall be valid except so far as it may be confirmed as provided by the Act. Power to revise any finding or sentence of a court martial is vested in the confirming authority who may also direct taking additional evidence. It is clear that the finding and sentence of a court martial remain on paper unless confirmed as provided by the Act. Section 165 authorises the Central Govt. the Chief of the Army Staffer any prescribed officer to annul the proceedings of any court martial on the ground that they are illegal or unjust. ( 4 ) SECTION 164 of the Act makes the provision for pre-confirmation and post- confirmation pet it ion by t he person feeling aggrieved by any order finding or sentence of a court martial. It reads as under: "164. ( 4 ) SECTION 164 of the Act makes the provision for pre-confirmation and post- confirmation pet it ion by t he person feeling aggrieved by any order finding or sentence of a court martial. It reads as under: "164. Remedy against order, finding or sentence of court-martial.- Any person subject to this Act who considers himself aggrieved by any order passed by any court martial may present a petition to the officer or authority empowered to confirm any finding or sentence of such court- martial and the confirming authority may take such steps as may be considered necessary to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of the order passed or as to the regularity of any proceeding to which the order relates. (2) Any person subject to this Act who considers himself aggrieved by a finding or sentence of any court-martial which has been confirmed, may present a petition to the Central Government, the Chief of the Army Staff or prescribed officer superior in command to the one who confirmed such finding or sentence and the Central Government, the Chief of the Army Staff or other officer, as the case may be, may pass such orders thereon as it or he thinks fit. " ( 5 ) PLACING reliance on the Law laid down by the Supreme Court in S. N. Mukherjee vs. Union of India AIR 1990 SC 1984 the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that in so far as the present case is concerned, appropriate stage has not yet arrived and the remedy of pre-confirmation petition would not be an efficacious alternate remedy available to the petitioner. The submission is devoid of merit. The law provides an efficacious remedy to the petitioner and the same can be availed of at the final stage. Merely because the remedy is not available at this stage the remedy otherwise available to him does not cease to be efficacious. To be an alternate efficacious one it is not necessary that the remedy must be available at every stage of the proceedings. Only because the alternative remedy ofpre-confirmation and post confirmation petitions would be available to him at the end of the proceedings showing an indulgence because that stage was yet to arrive would be contrary to the settled rules or practice governing the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. Only because the alternative remedy ofpre-confirmation and post confirmation petitions would be available to him at the end of the proceedings showing an indulgence because that stage was yet to arrive would be contrary to the settled rules or practice governing the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. ( 6 ) IN S. N. Mukherjee s case (supra, vide para 52) their Lordships have clearly laid down the law as under: 1. Rule 147 of the BSF Rules envisages that the copies of the proceedings of a court martial are to be supplied only after confirmation of the finding and sentence and that there is no right to obtain the copies of the proceedings till the findings and sentence have been confirmed. No grievance about the non supply of the copies of the proceedings of the court martial and consequent denial of his right to make a representation to the confirming authority against the finding and sentence of the court martial at pre-confirmation stage can be made; 2. Pre-confirmation petition cannot be made as of right yet incase such a representation is made, it is expected that the confirming authority shall give due consideration to the same; 3. In so far as the finding and sentence of trie court-martial is concerned, the only remedy that is available to a person aggrieved by the same is under sub-section (2) and the said remedy can be invoked only after the finding or I sentence has been confirmed by the confirming authority and not before the confirmation of the same. 4. The use of the expression "order" in sub-section (1) and the expression "finding of sentence" in sub-section (2) indicates that the scope of sub-section (1) arid sub-section (2) is not the same and expression "order" in sub-section (1) cannot be construed to include a "finding or sentence". ( 7 ) DETAILED procedure is prescribed by the Army Act and the Rules framed thereunder for conducting the proceedings of a court martial. During the course of the proceedings several orders may be passed. The person proceeded against may have a complaint to make against the correctness, legality or propriety of any such order passed or as to the regularity of any proceedings to which the order relates. It would be an interlocutory stage before the conclusion of a court martial. During the course of the proceedings several orders may be passed. The person proceeded against may have a complaint to make against the correctness, legality or propriety of any such order passed or as to the regularity of any proceedings to which the order relates. It would be an interlocutory stage before the conclusion of a court martial. The remedy provided is by presenting a petition under sub section (1) of Section 164 of the Act. When the court martial is concluded then only there would be an occasion for recording the finding and sentence. No order much less a detailed or reasoned order is required to be passed by the court martial at the end of the proceedings. (See- UOI vs J. S. Brar, air 1993 SC 773 Pr. 9 and Som Datt vs UOI, AIR 1969 S. C. 414, para 9) Only finding and sentence are required to be recorded and they are required to be confirmed whereupon alone they become valid and acquire legal efficacy. The remedy of a petition by a person aggrieved is provided against such confirmed finding and sentence by sub-section (2) of Section 164. Their Lordships have very clearly laid down in S. N. Mukherjee s case (supra) that in so far as the finding and sentence are, concerned that is the only remedy available to the person aggrieved. So long as that stage has not arrived the writ jurisdiction of the High Court at any interlocutory stage that is at any point of time prior to the confirmation of the proceedings, cannot be invoked. ( 8 ) THE distinction between the scope of pre-confirmation and of post-confirmation petitions has been brought out by the Supreme Court in S. N. MUKHERJEE V. UOI. AIR 1990 SC 1984 . ( 8 ) THE distinction between the scope of pre-confirmation and of post-confirmation petitions has been brought out by the Supreme Court in S. N. MUKHERJEE V. UOI. AIR 1990 SC 1984 . Their Lordships have held : ( "in sub-section (1) reference is made to order passed by a court-martial and enables a person aggrieved by an order to present a petition against the same The said petition has to be presented to the officer or the authority empowered to confirm any finding or sentence of such court- martial and the said authority may take such steps as may be considered necessary to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of the order or as to the regularity of any proceedings to which the order relates Sub-section (2), on the other hand, makes specific reference to finding or sentence of a court-martial and confers a right on any person feeling aggrieved by a finding or sentence of any court martial which has been confirmed, to present a petition to the Central Government, Chief of the Army Staff or any prescribed officer The use of the expression"order" in sub-section (1) and the expression "finding or sentence" in sub-section (2) indicates that the scope of sub section (1) and sub section (2) is not the same and expression "order" in sub section (1) cannot be construed to include a "finding or sentence" In other words in so far as the finding and sentence of the court martial is concerned the only remedy that is available to a person aggrieved by the same is under Section (2) and the said remedy can be invoked only after the finding or sentence has been confirmed by the confirming authority and not before the confirmation of the same, Rule 147 of the Rules also lends support to this view In the said rule it is laid down that every person tried by a court martial shall be entitled on demand, at any time after the confirmation of the finding and sentence, when such confirmation is required, and before the proceedings are destroyed, to obtain from the officer or person having the custody of the proceeding a copy thereof including the proceedings upon revision, if any This Rule envisages that the copies of proceedings of a court- martial are to be supplied only after confirmation of the finding and sentence and that there is no right to obtain the copies of the proceedings till the finding and sentence have been confirmed This means that the appellant cannot make a grievance about non-supply of the copies of the proceedings of the court- martial and consequent denial of his right to make a representation to the confirming authority against the findings and sentence of the court- martial before the confirmation of the said finding and sentence Though a person aggrieved by the finding or sentence of a court-martial has no right to make a representation before the confirmation of the same by the confirming authority, but in case such a representation is made by a person aggrieved by the finding or sentence of a court martial it is expected that the confirming authority shall give due consideration to the same while confirming the finding and sentence of the court-martial" ) ( 9 ) THE distinction is as under:the abovesaid distinction will be of some significance as will be noticed hereinafter to meet an argument emphasising non-efficacy of S 164 as a remedy. ( 10 ) THE scope of powers conferred by Sections 160, 164 and 165 of the Act may now be seen. The order can be revised. Additional evidence can be directed to be taken. Interference can be made if the authority may not be satisfied of the correctness or legality or propriety of the order passed by the court martial or of the regularity of any proceedings culminating into an order by the court martial. Under Section 165, the entire proceedings culminating into an order by the court-martial can be annulled - if they be Illegal or even unjust. Needless to say the scope of power conferred on the confirming authority is much wider then the Jurisdiction which can be exercised by a writ court which may in exercise of its jurisdiction cannot interfere with the order, finding, sentence or proceedings of the court martial unless the case may fall within the well settled parameters of judicial review. ( 11 ) WE may now proceed to examine the available decided cases laying down law as to the exercise of jurisdiction by writ court in entertaining the prayer for issuance of writ of mandamus, certiorari or prohibition against court martial- the proceedings relating thereto and orders passed therein. ( 12 ) WE may first notice the decision of our own High Court. 12. 1. In Cap. Ashok Kumar Rana vs UOI 1982 Cr. L. J. NOC 120, the Division Bench of Delhi High Court has held that the finding or sentence passed by a court martial remain inchoate unless confirmed and hence writ petition challenging the same is premature. 12. 2 Learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on an unreported decision by a learned single Judge of this Court (M. L. Jain. J) in Trilochan Joshi vs UOI (Crl Wr. 109/ 82 decided on 21. 3. 83 ). It was observed therein. "but I decline to throw out the petition because the petitioners have not presented a petition to the Central Govt or the Chief of Army Staff either under Section 164 (2) or Section 165 of the Army Act, 1950 and have thus not exhausted the alternative remedies. The reason for my doing so is that those remedies are discretionary and the petitioners are not entitled to a personal hearing under those Sections: Lt Col KNS Sidhu vs The Union of India. The reason for my doing so is that those remedies are discretionary and the petitioners are not entitled to a personal hearing under those Sections: Lt Col KNS Sidhu vs The Union of India. 1977 (2) SLR 479, and as held in Vellaswamy vs Inspector General of Police, Tamil Nadu and Others AIR 1982 SC 82 , It is a serious question whether a right of petition, under those sections would provide such an alternative efficacious remedy as to disentitle the petitioners to move the High Court under Article 226; it would be rather harsh to do so. I think so specially because there is no provision of appeal for which there is much need and clamour already. Justice and discipline are not enemies of each other and can very well go hand in hand. Besides as will presently appear the order of the court martial is based upon a totally erroneous view of law as respects confessions which have largely affected its verdict. Such fine questions of law were most likely not to receive appropriate examination in the petitions under Sections 164 and 165 of the Army Act. "12. 2. It is clear from a bare reading of the abovesaid judgment that the learned Judge was inclined to entertain the petition and dispose it of on merits as in the facts and circumstances of that case he was convinced of the court martial having acted upon a total erroneous view of law as respects confessions which view had largely affected its verdict and the question of law raised was so fine as was not likely to receive appropriate examination in petitions under Sections 164 and 165 of the Army Act. The decision in Trilochan Joshi s case (supra) is clearly distinguishable, confined in its application to its own facts and cannot be taken to be laying down a proposition that jurisdiction of High Court under Article 226 can always be invoked by-passing the remedy provided under Section 164 of the Army Act. 12. 3 In Capt S. K. Khanna vs Commanding Officer and Others (CWP 610/93 decided on 4. 2. 93) the petitioner was issued a show cause notice under Section 19 of the Army Act. He filed a petition alleging violation of rules 22 and 23 of the Army Act. 12. 3 In Capt S. K. Khanna vs Commanding Officer and Others (CWP 610/93 decided on 4. 2. 93) the petitioner was issued a show cause notice under Section 19 of the Army Act. He filed a petition alleging violation of rules 22 and 23 of the Army Act. A Division Bench of this Court (BN Kirpal, J. as his Lordship then was and AB Saharya, J.) dismissed the petition holding: "it is open to the petitioner to take all legal objections if and when court as bis martial proceedings are conducted. It is not in the interest of justice and military discipline that a writ court can stay the holding of court martial proceedings against a serving officer. In our opinion, this writ petition is pre-mature and is accordingly dismissed. 12. 4 In Col N. K. Tandan vs Union of India CW 1011/92 decided on 21. 7. 93 by another Division Bench of this Court Sunanda Bhandare and Arun Kumarjj), the petition was filed at an interlocutory stage by the petitioner complaining of his right to cross examine on the copies of documents having been denied. The DB observed : "the case is still at the preliminary stage of recording of summary of evidence. We are not inclined to interfere at this stage. Dismissed. "12. 5 In Col. N. K. Tandon vs UOI ( CW 2490/94) decided on 23. 8. 95) yet another Division Bench of this court (to which one of us- R. C. Lahoti, J. was a party) has held :- "under Section 153 no finding or sentence of a General, District or Summary General Court Martial shall be valid except so far as it may be confirmed as provided by the Army Act, 1950. It is well settled that prior to their confirmation if any petition is made by the person adversely effected, the same shall have to be considered by the confirming authority. Even after confirmation of the order, finding or sentence of court martial, the person aggrieved has a right to make a post-confirmation petition under Sect ion 164 (2) o fl he Act. The confirming authority has the jurisdiction to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of the order passed or as to the regularity of any proceedings to which the order relates. The confirming authority has the jurisdiction to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of the order passed or as to the regularity of any proceedings to which the order relates. The proceedings of any court martial may be annulled on the ground that they were illegal and unjust. The petitioner has raised a number of contentions in his writ petition. All 1 he contentions so raised are capable of being raised before the confirming authority. That being so, we see no reason to entertain the writ petition when the findings of the court martial are yet to be pronounced. The petition is dismissed on the ground of availability of efficacious alternative remedy to the petitioner. Needless to say, the petitioner shall have the remedy of filing a writ petition available to him but only at an appropriate stage. " ( 13 ) SUBASH Chandra Sarkar vs UOI. AIR 1973 MP 191 is a case where the two learned judges constituting a Division Bench in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh had a difference of opinion. Tare, J. (as his Lordship then was) held : ( "the existence of an alternative remedy and its non-exercise by a petitioner cannot be a bar to the granting of a Writ of Certiorari for quashing the decision of the Special Tribunal in exercise of prerogative powers under Art, 226 of the Constitution, although as per Art 227 (4) of the Constitution, that Tribunal may not be considered to be subordinate to the High Court" ) 13. 1 G. L. Oza, J (as his Lordship then was) did not agree with Tare, J. and held as under "the Act provides remedies for an officer against whom the court-martial inflicts punishment. Under Section 164 of the Act, any person aggrieved by a finding or sentence of any court-martial can present a petition to a superior officer including the Central Government. In the present case, the petitioner had that remedy open to him. His attitude, as indicated by the allegations made by him in the petition, appears to be that he expected no redress, and it was this that was put forth by the petitioner s counsel as a ground for not pursuing the remedies available under the statute. It is no doubt true that an alternative remedy is not a bar to the issue of writ of certiorari in every case. It is no doubt true that an alternative remedy is not a bar to the issue of writ of certiorari in every case. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have repeatedly held this, specifying the cases where the alternative remedy would not be a bar. In AIR 1969 SC 556 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court held two well established exceptions where alternative remedy will not be a bar to the issue of a writ of certiorari. An extract from this judgment has already been quoted by my learned brother and I need not repeat the same. But it is clear from the observations of their Lordships that the present case is not one which can fall within any of the two exceptions stated by their Lordships in that case. But apart from this, where a statute specifically provides a remedy and there is nothing to prevent the petitioner from pursuing it, a petition for certiorari cannot be entertained merely because the petitioner apprehends that he may not get redress by following that remedy. There is nothing else to indicate that the petitioner could not have the relief he seeks before the authorities where a remedy was available to him. It is also significant that Section 165 of the Act provides that the jurisdiction of the authorities hearing a representation under Section 164 is wide enough to consider the findings of the Court- Martial in all its aspects even if they are unjust. In these circumstances therefore in my opinion the petition deserves to be dismissed on this ground also. "13. 2 In view of the difference of opinion the case was referred to a third Judge. Krishnan, J. expressed his agreement with the view taken by G. L. Oza, J and held (vide para 46) : "thus, left to myself agreeing with Oza, J. I would have refused to go into the merits of the petition on the simple ground that statute has provided some means of relief to the petitioner and he had failed to avail of it. In fact, as one looks back on the course of events, it would have been better for the petitioner if he had sought the remedies provided in Section 164. We can never be sure what the confirming authority or the Chief Army Staff would have done if and when approached. In fact, as one looks back on the course of events, it would have been better for the petitioner if he had sought the remedies provided in Section 164. We can never be sure what the confirming authority or the Chief Army Staff would have done if and when approached. But certainly the chances were brighter for their softening the punishment awarded to the petitioner. On the one hand. we as a High Court cannot interfere unless the petitioner succeeds in establishing the patent illegality in the order which he took upon himself to disobey; on the other hand, those authorities could have taken a humane view of the matter. However his Lordship proceeded to examine the merits of the case also in view of the petition having been admitted and the Division Bench having recorded the judgment on merits, it was held vide para 52 : "in the result, agreeing with my learned Brother Oza, J. on both the grounds of the petitioner s non-availing of the statutory remedy and the fact of the order being legal and agreeing on the same grounds with my learned Brother Tare, J. I would dismiss this petition. "13. 3 Another Division Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh has also taken the same view in AK Handa vs UOI, 1988 Cr. L. J. 597. Vide para 8 the Division Bench has held : "regarding the findings recorded by the GCM, the petitioner has a remedy of filing a petition under Section 164of the Act and such a petition is in fact, pending with GOC, Central Command, Lucknow. The findings and sentence have not yet been confirmed as required under S. 154 and the punishments imposed have not yet been promulgated. Besides the petitioner can further make a petition under Section 179 for pardon or remission. "13. 4 Madhya Pradesh Full Bench decision in the case of Suresh Chand (Supra) was not placed before the Division Bench which has decided the case of A. K. Handa supra) ( 14 ) IN Kishan vs UOI 1978 Lab. I. C. NOC 181 the Division Bench has take a similar view though carved out an exception where bias is alleged on the part of the authority seized of the matter. It has been held : the Army Act, confers adequate and efficacious remedy against the findings of the General Court Martial. I. C. NOC 181 the Division Bench has take a similar view though carved out an exception where bias is alleged on the part of the authority seized of the matter. It has been held : the Army Act, confers adequate and efficacious remedy against the findings of the General Court Martial. Ordinarily, it would not be sound exercise of discretion under Art. 226 of the Constitution to interfere with the finding and sentence of the General Court Martial which have not been considered or confirmed as yet by Competent Authority as contemplated by S. 153 and S. 154 of the Act. The findings recorded by the General Court Martial are in the nature of recommendations which may or may not be accepted by the authority empowered to confirm the findings and sentence. But where the order of a Tribunal or Court is challenged on the ground of want of jurisdiction or where the proceedings taken before a Tribunal are ultra vires It is open to a party to invoke the jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution without exhausting the alternative remedy provided under the Act. The rule of exhaustion of statutory remedy is not applicable to a case where the proceedings before a Tribunal are taken in violation of the principles of natural justice. Hence even where the recommendations of the Court Martial have not been acted upon and the Confirming Authority has not considered the same and passed any orders the petition cannot be rejected unless the plea of bias as raised by the petitioner is considered and determined. " ( 15 ) BEFORE a Division Bench of Gujrat High Court the Madhya Pradesh view in Subash Chand s case was cited. In Maj P. C. Suri vs UOI 1987 (2) 28 Gujarat law Reporter 1043 (39), the Division Bench has held : " It is true that the rule of refusing relief on the ground of alternative remedy does not apply to certiorari to the same extent as it does in the case of mandamus. But that fact may be taken into consideration by the High Court for considering the exercise of its discretion to issue writ of certiorari to quash me order of the General Court Martial/tribunal. But that fact may be taken into consideration by the High Court for considering the exercise of its discretion to issue writ of certiorari to quash me order of the General Court Martial/tribunal. Such a relief should normally be not refused on the ground of availability of alternative remedy if it appears on the face of the proceedings or on undisputed facts that the Tribunal has acted without jurisdiction or has acted in excess of jurisdiction or has acted contrary to the fundamental principles of justice, or fundamental rights are affected. In the instant case, there are no such exceptional circumstances and,therefore, we are not inclined to interfere with the orders of the General Court Martial. The appellant should have exhausted the available remedy under Section 164 Army Act. " ( 16 ) THE Army Act is a self contained Act on the law of court martial. It deals with the constitution and procedure of court martial. It also provides for remedy for the person feeling aggrieved by the proceedings and any order finding and sentencerecorded in the court martial. The scheme of the provisions does not contemplate two time attack on matters connected with court martial : One, while they are going on, by invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution; and two after they have been completed. ( 17 ) NO doubt the courts-marl ial are amenable to writ Jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution the High Court cannot exercise any power of superintendence over the courts martials in view ofthe provisions contained in Article 227 (4) of the Constitution. ( 18 ) IN Babu Ram Parkash Chand Maheshwari vs Interim Zile Perishad, AIR 1969 SC 56, their Lordships have held : " When an alternative and equally efficacious remedy is open to a litigant he should be required to pursue that remedy and not to invoke the special Jurisdiction ofthe High Court to issue a prerogative writ. It is true that the existence of a statutory remedy does not affect the jurisdiction ofthe High Court to issue a writ. It is true that the existence of a statutory remedy does not affect the jurisdiction ofthe High Court to issue a writ. But, the existence of an adequate legal remedy is a thing to be taken into consideration in the matter of granting writs and where such a remedy exists it will be a sound exercise of discretion to refuse to interfere in a writ petition unless there are good grounds therefor. But it should be remembered that the rule of exhaustion of statutory remedies before a writ is granted is a rule of self imposed limitation, a rule of policy, and discretion rather than a rule of law and the Court may therefore in exceptional cases issue a writ such as a writ of certiorari, not withstanding the fact that the statutory remedies have not been exhausted. There are at least two sell-recognised exceptions to the doctrine with regard to the exhaustion of statutory remedies. In the first place, it is well settled that where proceedings are taken before a Tribunal under a provision of law, which is ultra vires it is open to a party aggrieved thereby to move the High Court under Art 226 for issuing appropriate writ for quashing them on the ground that they are incompetent, without his being obliged to wait until those proceedings run their full course. In the second place, the doctrine has no application in a case where the impugned order has been made in violation of the principles of natural justice. " ( 19 ) TO sum up the finding and sentence recorded by a court- martial (any one of the four contemplated by Chapter X of the Army Act; 1950) remain inchoate unless confirmed as provided by the Act. Pre-confirmation and post-confirmation petitions contemplated by S. 164 of the Act provide adequate and efficacious alternative remedy available to the person aggrieved and exclude maintainability of writ petition before a High Court. This is a well settled practice and a rule of discretion, to be followed ordinarily. Pre-confirmation and post-confirmation petitions contemplated by S. 164 of the Act provide adequate and efficacious alternative remedy available to the person aggrieved and exclude maintainability of writ petition before a High Court. This is a well settled practice and a rule of discretion, to be followed ordinarily. Jurisdiction of High Court to entertain writ petition in appropriate case without insisting on the filing and disposal of pre-confirmation and post-confirmation petitions is not taken away in appropriate cases, such as (i) where there is a patent lack of jurisdiction in constitution of a court-mart ial or any proceeding thereof, (ii) where rights of natural justice are violated and where a case of bias on the part of the authority hearing or likely to heart he pre-confirmation or post-confirmation petition is made out. Let it be borne in mind that alleging breach of safeguards provided by the Act or the Rules does not amount to alleging violation of principles of natural justice. The two are different. If a grievance is capable of being raised before and heard by an officer or authority empowered to hear and dispose of a pre-confirmation or post-confirmation petition, the same would ordinarily be refused to be directly entertained in exercise of writ jurisdiction by High Court. ( 20 ) COMING back to the facts of the case at hand we have carefully perused the contents of the petition as filed. We are of the opinion that none of the contentions raised in the petition is such as may not be capable of being heard and disposed of by a confirming authority or by the authority competent to hear the post-confirmation petition. The petition does not fall within any of the well recognised exceptions and hence we see no reason to make a departure from the well recognised rule of practice insisting on the petitioner to exhaust the alternative remedy before invoking the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. ( 21 ) THE petition is dismissed as not maintainable in view of the availability of an alternative efficacious remedy to the petitioner. No order as to costs.