R. Saravanamuthu v. The School Committee of Sengunthar Higher Secondary School, represented by its Secretary, Thuraiyur, Tiruchi District and Another
1995-11-14
K.A.SWAMI, RAJU
body1995
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment :- K.A. Swami, C.J. This appeal is preferred against the Order dated 29. 1995 passed by the learned single Judge in W.P. No. 13404 of 1995. Learned single Judge has rejected the writ petition in which the petitioner/ appellant sought for issue of a writ of prohibition prohibiting the Educational Tribunal (Principal Sub Court), Tiruchirapalli, from entertaining the appeal preferred under Sec.24 of the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulation) Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) and under the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulation) Rules, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Rules’). 2. Learned single Judge has declined to consider this request of the petitioner/appellant on the ground that it is open to the petitioner/ appellant to put forth all the contentions before the Educational Tribunal which can decide the question as to whether it has jurisdiction to entertain the appeal or not. No doubt, the statutory authority or the Tribunal exercising the quasi-judicial function is entitled to decide the question to whether it has jurisdiction to entertain the appeal preferred before it or the appeal before it is maintainable. In such case, it would be open to this Court to decline to entertain the jurisdiction and direct the petitioner to urge all the contentions before the very same authority before which the appeal is preferred. But, in a case where the facts are not in dispute and on reading the relevant provisions of the enactment, if it is found that the Tribunal before which the appeal is preferred is not competent to entertain the appeal or when such an appeal could not be entertained, the petitioner cannot be denied the relief. In the case of writ of prohibition, the relief could be granted, but, no doubt, in the case of writ of prohibition, subsequent to the decision of the Tribunal, if it is found that the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction, the party need not be made to undergo the proceedings before the Tribunal which lacks jurisdiction, in the instant case, the facts necessary to decide the question whether the appeal preferred before the Educational Tribunal under Sec.24 of the Act is maintainable or not are not at all in dispute. The first respondent school committee has preferred the appeal before the second respondent under Sec.24 of the Act against the order dated 16.
The first respondent school committee has preferred the appeal before the second respondent under Sec.24 of the Act against the order dated 16. 1995 passed by the Joint Director of School Education (Higher Secondary) confirming the order passed by the Chief Educational Officer dated 30.9.1994. 3. The appellant was working as Headmaster under the first respondent school. His services came to be terminated by the school as per Sec.22(l) of the Act. Termination of service of a teacher can be made only with the prior approval of the competent authority. In the instant case, the competent authority, the Chief Educational Officer by order dated 30.9.1994 refused to accord approval to the order of termination of the petitioner passed by the first respondent. Aggrieved by that order, an appeal was preferred before the Joint Director of School Education (Higher Secondary), according to the first respondent, under Sec.23 of the Act and the same was dismissed. Now, the present appeal is preferred under Sec.24 of the Act. Therefore, the question that arises for consideration is whether under Sec.23 of the Act, the first respondent could have preferred an appeal or whether the appeal preferred by the first respondent could be construed as the one filed under Sec.23 of the Act and not under Sec.41 of the Act. Sec.23 of the Act reads thus: “Appeal against orders of punishment imposed on teachers and other persons employed in private schools. Any teacher or other person employed in any private school. (a) Who is dismissed, removed or reduced in rank or whose appointment is otherwise terminated; or (b) Whose pay or allowances or any of whose conditions of service are altered or interpreted to his disadvantage, by any order, may prefer an appeal against such order to such authority or officer as may be prescribed; and different such authorities or officer as may be prescribed for different classes of private Schools.
Explanation: In this section, the expression ‘order’ includes any order made on or after the date of the commencement of this Act in any disciplinary proceeding which was pending on that date.” Thus, from the aforesaid provisions contained in Sec.23 of the Act, it is clear that an appeal can be preferred only by a teacher or other person, as the case may be, employed in any private school whose services were either terminated or who was dismissed, removed or reduced in rank or whose payor allowances or any of whose conditions of service are altered or interpreted to his disadvantage. Therefore, it is clear that the management/ first respondent which had terminated the services of the petitioner/ appellant could not have preferred an appeal under Sec.23 of the Act as against the order passed by the competent authority, refusing to accord approval to the order of termination passed by the first respondent. 4. Sec.24 of the Act only deals with appeals filed under Sec.23 of the Act. This is clear from the very opening words contained in that section. The said section reads thus; “Second appeal in case of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank or termination of appointment of teachers or other persons employed in private schools. If the appeal under Sec.23 was against the dismissal, removal or reduction in rank or the termination otherwise of the appointment of any teacher or other person employed in any private school, such teacher or other person or the educational agency aggrieved by any order made in any such appeal, may prefer an appeal against that appellate order to the Tribunal.” As the appeal preferred by the first respondent was not the one preferred under Sec.23 of the Act or at any rate could not have been the one legally preferred under Sec.23 of the Act. Thus, a second appeal could not be maintained against the order passed in such an appeal. However, learned counsel for the first respondent is not right in contending that the appeal preferred by the first respondent before the Joint Director of School Education (Higher Secondary) was the one filed under Sec.23 of the Act, whereas such an appeal could have been preferred only under Sec.41 of the Act which specifically provides for such appeals.
However, learned counsel for the first respondent is not right in contending that the appeal preferred by the first respondent before the Joint Director of School Education (Higher Secondary) was the one filed under Sec.23 of the Act, whereas such an appeal could have been preferred only under Sec.41 of the Act which specifically provides for such appeals. Sec.41 of the Act reads thus: “Appeal against orders of competent authority: (1) Any person aggrieved by any order, decision or direction of the competent authority under sections (Sec.29 or under any other provision) (other than Sec.34) of this Act may prefer an appeal against such order, decision or direction, to such authority or officer as may be prescribed; and different such authority or officers may be prescribed for different classes of private Schools.” 5. Therefore, it is clear from the aforesaid provision contained in Sec.41 of the Act that as the order passed by the Chief Educational Officer refusing to accord approval for the termination of the service of the petitioner/ appellant did not fall under Sec.23 of the Act for the purpose of the appeal, it could only be filed under Sec.41 of the Act which uses the expression that any person aggrieved by an order, decision or direction of the competent authority under Sec.29 or under any other provision other than Sec.34 of the Act may prefer an appeal against such an order, decision or direction. In addition to that Rule 29 of the Rules prescribes the competent authority to whom an appeal can be preferred according to the category of staff and under the different provisions of the Act, which reads thus: “Appeal against orders of competent authority. Any person aggrieved by any order, decision or direction of the competent authority, under any provisions (other than Sec.34) of the Act, may prefer an appeal, under Sec.41 of the Act, against such order, decision or direction to the following authorities, namely: Section under the Act Category of Schools Competent Authority passing orders Appellate Authority ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... Section 22 Higher Seconday Schools (In respect of Headmasters, Post-graduate Assistants (both academic and languages and Physical Directors. Chief Educational Officer Joint Director of School Education (Higher Secondary) Therefore, according to Rule 29 of the Rules, the competent authority was the Chief Educational Officer and the Appellant Authority was the Joint Director of School Education (Higher Secondary).
... ... ... Section 22 Higher Seconday Schools (In respect of Headmasters, Post-graduate Assistants (both academic and languages and Physical Directors. Chief Educational Officer Joint Director of School Education (Higher Secondary) Therefore, according to Rule 29 of the Rules, the competent authority was the Chief Educational Officer and the Appellant Authority was the Joint Director of School Education (Higher Secondary). In the instant case the first order refusing to accord approval passed by the Chief Educational Officer and the appeal preferred against that before the Joint Director of School Education (Higher Secondary) was rejected, As against the order passed in an appeal preferred under Sec.41 of the Act, there is no second appeal provided under the Act. However, there is a revision provided under the Act and that revision under Sec.45 of the Act lies to the State Government which reads thus: ”Revision: (1) The Government may call for and examine the record of any authority of officer prescribed for the purpose of Sec.41 in respect of any proceedings to satisfy themselves as to the regularity of such proceeding, or the correctness, legality or propriety of any order made, decision taken or direction issued therein and, if, in any case, it appears to the Government that any such order, decision or direction should be modified, annulled, reversed or remitted for reconsideration, they may pass orders accordingly. .(2) No order prejudicial to any person shall be passed under Sub-sec.(1) unless such person has been given an opportunity of making his representations. .(3) The Government may, pending the exercise of their power under Sub-sec.(1), pass such interlocutory orders as they deem fit." 6. Therefore, the contention of learned counsel for the first respondent that the first appeal preferred was the one under Sec.23 of the Act and therefore, the second appeal is maintainable as it falls under Sec.24 of the Act is untenable. Consequently, on the undisputed facts of the case and on reading of Secs.23,24, 41 and 45 of the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulation) Act read with Rule 29 of the Rules, we come to the conclusion that the second appeal preferred before the Educational Tribunal against the Order passed by the Joint Director of School Education (Higher Secondary) refusing to accord approval for termination of the services of the petitioner/ appellant passed by the first respondent is not maintainable.
Further, the Educational Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain such an appeal. Thus, it is acase in which the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction. As such, it cannot be permitted to proceed to hear and decide the appeal. 7. The writ appeal is allowed. The order dated 29. 1995 passed in W.P. No. 13404 of 1995 is set aside. The writ petition is allowed. A writ of prohibition is issued to the Educational Tribunal refraining it from considering the appeal preferred by the first respondent under Sec.24 of the Act and the Tribunal is directed to return the memorandum of appeal to the first respondent to enable the first respondent to avail the remedy of revision or any other remedy as is open to it in law. No costs.