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Rajasthan High Court · body

1995 DIGILAW 934 (RAJ)

C. P. Pandey v. State of Rajasthan

1995-10-12

P.K.PALLI

body1995
Honble PALLI, J. – Since the facts and points raised in both the writ petitions are common, they are being disposed of by this common order. The facts are being taken from S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 4404/1994. (2). The petitioner applied for a mining lease in the year, 1991. An application was also filed for the grant of No Objection Certificate from the Devasthan Commi- ssioner. The petitioner also deposited the fees alongwith the application, site plan showing the demarcation of the area and other details as were desired. Some communications went on between the petitioner and the respondents. The admitted position is that No Objection Certificate was not granted and, therefore, the respondents did not grant the mining lease, under the Rules in case the application for the grant of mining lease is not disposed of within nine months, it is deemed to have been refused. As the application was not disposed of within the prescribed limit and the petitioner took it as refused, a revision was filed before the State Government, which was allowed and the Mining Engineer was asked to dispose of the matter within 100 days. This order was passed on 10th of April, 1992 and the same is placed as Annex. 10. No Objection Certificate was not granted by the Department and a representation was submitted which is Annex. 11 and the application was also not decided by the Mining Engineer and second application was consequently moved. The application was rejected vide order dated 8th November, 1992 (Annex.12). According to the petitioner, he was the sole applicant and the Mining Engineer was left with no option, but to consider the application of the petitioner on merits and lease could be granted only in his favour. (3). On 9th March, 1993, No Objection Certificate was granted in favour of the Rajasthan State Mines and Minerals and directions were issued for handing over of the possession. It is said that the respondent No.3 did not file any application for allotment of mines in question, till the State Government allowed the revision petition and the application for grant of mining lease was filed on 6th August, 1992 and has been granted on preferential basis under the provisions of Rule 7(1) of the 1986 Rules. The argument is that the application was not made within reasonable time. (4). The argument is that the application was not made within reasonable time. (4). A writ petition bearing No. 1806/93 was filed, which was decided by this Court on 21st January, 1994 and the matter was directed to be disposed of by the Mining Engineer in accordance with law within two months from the date of the order. (5). On 24th February, 1994 the petitioner was directed to complete three formalities, but these were not completed. Ultimately, on 30th March, 1994, the Mining Engineer rejected the application of the petitioner for the non-production of N.O.C. and N.O.C. having been granted in favour of the respondent no. 3 by the State on 23rd March, 1994. This order is placed as Annex.p/19. (6). Again, a writ petition was filed bearing No. 1986/94 which was dismissed on May 9, 1994 for availing the alternative remedy of appeal and revision. Special appeal was filed bearing No. 258/94 and the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge was upheld and now the present writ petition has been filed laying challenge to Rule 7(1) of the Rajasthan Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1986 which reads as under:– ``7 Preferential right of certain persons.:– (1) Where two or more persons have applied for a mining lease in respect of some land, applicant whose application was received on an earlier date shall have a preferential right for the grant of lease over an applicant whose application was received later: Provided that the competent authority may prefer an application received later from a government company or corporation owned by the Government or any other application received earlier for the same area. (7). Challenge has been laid to the aforesaid provision on the ground that there are no guidelines provided for giving a preferential treatment to a Government Company or Corporation. No time limit has been specified. It is a case of excessive delegation and the proviso gives unlimited powers to the Mining Engineer as well as to the State Government for the grant of mining lease and the provision is liable to be declared ultra vires of the Constitution. (8). Mr. D.S. Shishodia, Sr. Advocate appearing for the respondent No 3. It is a case of excessive delegation and the proviso gives unlimited powers to the Mining Engineer as well as to the State Government for the grant of mining lease and the provision is liable to be declared ultra vires of the Constitution. (8). Mr. D.S. Shishodia, Sr. Advocate appearing for the respondent No 3. submits in reply that the writ petition having been dismissed to enable the peti- tioner to avail the alternative remedy and so also the special appeal having been dismissed, the petitioner cannot now again be permitted to challenge the impugned order Annex. P/19 by way of this writ petition under the garb of laying challenge to Rule 7(1) which is reproduced above. The learned counsel further submits that the petitioner is estopped from laying challenge on the principles of constructive res-judicata as these questions could have been raised in the earlier writ petition, but were not raised although there were open at that time. The grant of N.O.C. was also not challenged in the earlier writ petition. It is said that the State Government in exercise of powers conferred by Rule 65-A of the Rajasthan Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1986 has issued a Notification on 6th October, 1994 declaring its Marble policy and totally a different procedure has been laid down. Clause 9 prescribes that all the applications not disposed of till the date of the Notification shall be rejected. The application has been rejected on 31st October, 1994 (Annex. R/3/2). A lease of 20 years in favour of the respondent No.3 has been granted vide order dated 18th March, 1995 and the possession has been handed over in its favour. A copy of the mining lease has been placed as Annex.R/3/4 and mining operations in sequence thereof are said to have been started. No challenge has been laid to the No Objection Certificate having been granted in favour of the respondent No.3. (9). After hearing the learned counsel appearing for the parties and on perusal of the pleadings and other relevant material placed on record, I find that it is no longer open for the petitioner to lay challenge to the impugned order in view of the two orders passed by this Court one by the learned Single Judge and other by the Honble Division Bench in the special appeal. Instead of availing the alternative remedy as ordered by this Court, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition under the garb of laying challenge to Rule 7(1) referred to above. I find from the reading of the Rule that the same does not suffer from any vires. A New Policy has been laid down and the competent authority has been given the discretion to prefer an application if the same is received from the Government company or Corpora- tion owned by the Government. This appears to be quite in consonance with the policy decision towards the development of mines and minerals. No doubt in case there are two persons who have applied for the mining lease, it is the application of that person which is to be given preferential treatment who has applied on an earlier date, but it is the proviso that governs the rule and make an exception to it. (10). I have also carefully gone through the decision of the Honble Supreme Court in State of T.N. vs. M.P.P. Kavery Chetty (1), where the Tamil Nadu Minor Mineral Concession Rules having an identical provision came up for consideration before their Lordships. It was held that valid differentia exists between State Government company/Corporation and private miners and the classification has a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the Act. The provision, therefore, does not appear to be either arbitrary or unguided in giving preference to the class mentioned therein. (11). There is another decision of the Honble Supreme Court in Premium Granites vs/ State of Tamil Nadu (2) again on the validity of the Rule 39 of the T.N. Minor Mineral Concession Rules, which gives power to the State for grant of leases otherwise than in accordance with Rules in public interest. The said Rule was held to be not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Their Lordships further proceeded to hold that the guide lines need not to be expressly found in the impugned provisions, but such guidelines can be gathered from the setting up of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder. (12). Coming to the question of reasonable time as urged by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, the answer can be found in the observations made by the Honble Supreme Court in State of T.N. vs/ M/s Hind Stone (3). (12). Coming to the question of reasonable time as urged by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, the answer can be found in the observations made by the Honble Supreme Court in State of T.N. vs/ M/s Hind Stone (3). Again, it is a case dealing with the T.N. Minor Mineral Concession Rules and at page 721 of the decision, it has been observed by the Honble Supreme Court that no doubt the applications should be dealt with within a reasonable time, it cannot on that account be said that the right to have an application disposed of in a reasonable time clothes an applicant for a lease with a right to have the application disposed of on the basis of the rules in force at the time of the making of the application. No one has a vested right to have an application for the grant or renewal of a lease dealt with in a particular way, by applying particular provision. It was further held that in the absence of any vested rights in any one, the application for lease has to be dealt with according to the rules in force on the date of the disposal of the application despite the fact that there is long delay since the making of the application. (15). After having given my thoughtful consideration to the whole matter, I do not find that the Rule 7(1) under challenge suffers from any vires. Both the writ petitions call for no interference. (16). Accordingly both the writ petitions are dismissed with the aforesaid observations at the admission stage.