ORDER T.S. Doabia, J. 1. The petitioner submits that the observations made in order, annexure P/1, by the trial Court were not necessary for the proper disposal of the suit, and therefore, these remarks should be expunged. The remarks came to be recorded under following circumstances. 2. The counsel appearing in the Court below had raised an argument to the effect that if costs are being imposed then the Court cannot pass an order with a view to direct that last opportunity to do the needful would be given. It is to this argument which led the trial Court to demand a written apology from the counsel and this was taken on record and was accepted. 3. I am of the view that there arose no occasion to ask for a written apology. Merely because, the counsel had suggested to the Court that if costs are being imposed then last opportunity should not be given; it would furnish no basis for asking the counsel to tender a written apology. Even if there was some justification for an apology then there was no further necessity to ask for a written apology or to make the same a part of judicial file. There can be no dispute with the proposition that uncalled for remarks be not made in judicial proceedings. The judicial propriety require that only that much matter should be dealt with which is absolutely necessary for the disposal of the case. 4. The judicial view is that observations which are not necessary for the proper disposal of the case should not be made part of the judicial record. The decision given by the Supreme Court in the early 1960's be noticed in this regard. This decision is reported as the State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohammad Naim, AIR 1964 Sc 703 . It was held as under: . . . If there is one principle of cardinal importance in the administration of justice, it is this : the proper freedom and independence of Judges and Magistrates must be maintained and they must be allowed to perform their function freely and fearlessly and without undue interference by anybody, even by this Court. At the same time it is equally necessary that in expressing their opinions Judges and Magistrates must be guided by considerations of justice, fair - play and restraint. At the same time it is equally necessary that in expressing their opinions Judges and Magistrates must be guided by considerations of justice, fair - play and restraint. It is not infrequent that sweeping generalizations defeat the very purpose for which they are made. It is been judicially recognised that in the matter of making disparaging remarks against persons or authorities whose conduct comes into considerations before courts of law in cases to be decided by them, it is relevant to consider (a) whether the party whose conduct is in question is before the court or has an opportunity of explaining or defending hemself; (b) whether there is evidence on record bearing on that conduct justifying the remarks; and (c) whether it is necessary for the decision of the case, as in integral part thereof, to animadvert on that conduct. It has also been recognised that judicial pronouncements must be judicial in nature, and should not normally depart from sobriety, moderation and reserve. 5. Again, there can be no dispute with the proposition that strong language is not to be used while dealing with the conduct of the parties or their witnesses disparaging strictures should not be passed as these are likely to cause considerable damage to the person against whom these remarks are made. This aspect was noticed by the Supreme Court in the case of State of M.P. and others v. Nandlal Jaiswal and others, AIR 1987 SC 251 . In para 42 it was observed as under: We may observed in conclusion that Judges should not use the strong and carping language while criticizing the conduct of parties or their witnesses. They must act with sobriety, moderation and restraint. They must have the humility to recognised that they are not infallible and any harsh and disparaging strictures passed by them against any party may be mistaken and unjustified and if so, they may do considerable harm and mischief and result in injustice... 6. Again similar view has been expressed by the Supreme Court in A.M. Mathur v. Pramod Kumar Gupta, AIR 1990 SC 1717. In para 13, it was observed as under: Judicial restraint and discipline are as necessary to the orderly administration of justice as they are to the effectiveness of the army. The duty of restraint, this humility of function should be a constant theme of our Judges. In para 13, it was observed as under: Judicial restraint and discipline are as necessary to the orderly administration of justice as they are to the effectiveness of the army. The duty of restraint, this humility of function should be a constant theme of our Judges. This quality in decision making is as much necessary for Judges to command respect as to protect the independence of the judiciary. Judicial restraint in this regard might better be called judicial respect; that is, respect by the judiciary. Respect to those who come before the Court as well to other co-ordinate branches of the State, the Executive and Legislature. There must be mutual respect. When these qualities fail or when litigants and public believe that the judge has failed in these qualities, it will be neither good for the judge nor for the judicial process. 7. In view of the above, I am of the opinion that order, annexure P/1, by which the counsel, was asked to submit a written apology was not called for. The order is accordingly set aside.