M. R. CALLA, J. ( 1 ) HEARD learned Counsel. ( 2 ) THE petitioner-Company is said to be running in the name of The Gujarat iron and Steel Co. Ltd. , Ahmedabad and the petitioner No. 2 is its Director. The petitioners have come with the case that the Company purchased the lands bearing s. No. 219 admeasuring 73957 Sq. Mts. , S. No. 242/1 admeasuring 7689. 06 Sq. Mts. , and S. No. 242/2 admeasuring 7486. 75 Sq. Mts. in the year 1962 for the purpose of putting up plants and machinery. It is also the case of the petitioners that the prant Officer vide order dated 15-4-1975 granted permission for non-agricultural use in respect of S. Nos. 395/1 and 395/2 and accordingly residential staff quarters were constructed for the workmen of the Company. It is alleged that the petitioner- company submitted an application on 14-9-1976 giving all the details and the documentary evidence while seeking exemption under Sec. 20 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") in respect of land bearing S. Nos. 219, 220, 241, 242/1, 242/2, 395/1 and 395/2 of village thaltej, Taluka Dascroi, Ahmedabad. The petitioners grievance is that no orders were passed on this application and it was in the year 1982 that the petitioner- company was required to move an application in a prescribed form and, therefore, the application in prescribed form seeking exemption under Sec. 20 was filed by the petitioners in the year 1982. Thereafter, lot of correspondence transpired between the Department and the petitioner-Company and now the application under Sec. 20 filed by the petitioners has been rejected vide order dated 7-12-1994. Against this order dated 7-12-1994 passed by the Industries Commissioner, Government of gujarat, the petitioners preferred the application dated 29-12-1994 in the nature of request for setting aside the order dated 7-12-1994 and for review of the same. This application dated 29-12-1994 was addressed to the Secretary and Commissioner (Land Reform), Revenue Department, Government of Gujarat. With this application dated 29-12-1994, several documents were enclosed by the petitioners, but this application has also been rejected now vide order dated 25-1-1995 as conveyed to the petitioners by the Revenue Department of the Government of Gujarat. ( 3 ) ON behalf of the petitioners, the learned Counsel Mr. With this application dated 29-12-1994, several documents were enclosed by the petitioners, but this application has also been rejected now vide order dated 25-1-1995 as conveyed to the petitioners by the Revenue Department of the Government of Gujarat. ( 3 ) ON behalf of the petitioners, the learned Counsel Mr. Hawa has urged that the application was kept pending since 1976 and now all of a sudden without affording any opportunity of hearing to the petitioners, the application has been rejected on 7-12-1994 on grounds which are not relevant and the application for review has also been rejected in a mechanical manner, without application of mind and, therefore, orders dated 7-12-1994 and 25-1-1995 deserve to be set aside. It is argued by Mr. Hawa that the Company is running and yet it has been observed in the impugned order dated 7-12-1994 that it is not working and the orders have been passed without considering the materials placed on record by the petitioners. According to Mr. Hawa it is a case of lack of application of mind. ( 4 ) DURING the course of the arguments, I called upon Mr. Hawa to show as to when the land in question was converted to industrial land from the agricultural land and in this regard he has rendered an order dated 15-4-1975, which has been taken on record, issued by Prant Adhikari, Viramgam Prant, Ahmedabad. This order dated 15-4-1975 relates to S. Nos. 242/1 and 242/2 only and this document only shows that the permission was granted for construction of the staff quarters on this land for the residence of the workmen and this document cannot be read as the conversion order of the agricultural land to that of industrial land. This is a limited permission for use of a part of the land for the purpose of the staff quarters of the workmen of the Company. ( 5 ) SEC. 20 of the Act is reproduced as under :"20. This is a limited permission for use of a part of the land for the purpose of the staff quarters of the workmen of the Company. ( 5 ) SEC. 20 of the Act is reproduced as under :"20. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any of the foregoing provisions of this Chapter- (a) where any person holds vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit and the state Government is satisfied, either on its own motion or otherwise, that, having regard to the location of such land, the purpose for which such land is being or is proposed to be used and such other relevant factors as the circumstances of the case may require, it is necessary or expedient in the public interest so to do, that government may, by order, exempt, subject to such conditions, if any, as may be specified in the order, such vacant land from the provisions of this Chapter ; (b) where any person holds vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit and the state Government, either on its own motion or otherwise, is satisfied that the application of the provisions of this Chapter would cause undue hardship to such person, that Government may by order, exempt, subject to such conditions, if any, as may be specified in the order, such vacant land from the provisions of this Chapter : provided that no order under this clause shall be made unless the reasons for doing so are recorded in writing. (2) If at any time the State Goverment is satisfied that any of the conditions subject to which any exemption under clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-sec. (1) is granted is not complied with by any person, it shall be competent for the State government to withdraw, by order, such exemption after giving a reasonable opportunity to such person for making a representation against the proposed withdrawal and thereupon the provisions of this Chapter shall apply accordingly. "under Sec. 20, which deals with the question of granting or not granting the exemption, it is not provided for any opportunity of hearing. Nor it provides for recording of reasons at the time of rejecting an application for exemption. On the contrary, the reading of Sec. 20 (1) (b) and the proviso thereunder show that if at all the Government decides to exempt the land, it has to record reasons. Therefore, under sec. Nor it provides for recording of reasons at the time of rejecting an application for exemption. On the contrary, the reading of Sec. 20 (1) (b) and the proviso thereunder show that if at all the Government decides to exempt the land, it has to record reasons. Therefore, under sec. 20 (1) the reasons are required to be recorded when an application for exemption is allowed, but there is no requirement of recording of reasons at the time of denying the exemption sought for under Sec. 20. In sub-sec. (2) of the very same Sec. 20 it is provided that the opportunity is to be given in case exemption granted is to be withdrawn. Thus, in the same Section, the provisions on both these aspects are there; the opportunity is to be given if the exemption is sought to be withdrawn after the same has been granted and the requirement of recording of reasons has been provided in case of granting the exemption. Thus, the plain reading of Sec. 20 shows that there is no specific requirement with regard to recording of reasons or with regard to affording an opportunity while rejecting an application seeking exemption under Sec. 20. Mr. Hawa placed reliance on a Full Bench decision of this Court reported in [1989 (1)] XXX (1) GLR 586 (Avanti Organisation v. Competent Authority ). I fail to understand as to how this judgment can be of any help to the petitioners case to support the argument of recording reasons or on the question of reasonable opportunity. In para 8 and following paragraphs thereafter, the question has been considered as to whether the State Government is under an obligation to grant an audience or personal hearing before passing an order under Sec. 20 (1) of the act, which is adverse to the party seeking exemption. It has been held in para 13 after considering several decisions that even quasi-judicial tribunals are not under an obligation to give a person hearing, much less administrative authorities, which are not essentially dealing with a lis while exercising power such as the one conferred by Sec. 20 (1) of the Act. It has been held in para 13 after considering several decisions that even quasi-judicial tribunals are not under an obligation to give a person hearing, much less administrative authorities, which are not essentially dealing with a lis while exercising power such as the one conferred by Sec. 20 (1) of the Act. While making reference to the decision in the case of Nandkishore v. State of M. P. , reported in AIR 1982 MP 33 it has been noted that as per the decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, the power to exempt carries with it an obligation to exercise that power in a fair manner, that is, by affording a hearing to the party claiming exemption before the same is refused, but it did not go so far as to state that the party has a right of audience, that is, to be heard personally before the rejection of the application. In para 14, the Full Bench has expressed its opinion in the following words (at page No. 600 of GLR):"14. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . we are clearly of the opinion that it is for the State government while dealing with an application under Sec. 20 (1) of the Act to decide, having regard to the facts and circumstances of each case, whether a personal hearing or an opportunity to file a written representation to the matters likely to be used against the applicant should be given before disposing of the exemption application on merits against the concerned party, unless the application is ex facie not maintainable in law. We do not subscribe to the argument that in each case the party seeking exemption is entitled to an audience or personal hearing before his application is decided against him. We do not read the observations in Nirmalabens case to lay down a rule of universal application that in all cases arising under Sec. 20 (1) of the Act regardless of the nature of the dispute, the State Government is bound to give a personal hearing to the applicant before rejecting his application. We do not read the observations in Nirmalabens case to lay down a rule of universal application that in all cases arising under Sec. 20 (1) of the Act regardless of the nature of the dispute, the State Government is bound to give a personal hearing to the applicant before rejecting his application. A careful reading of the observations made by the Court in paragraph 3 of the judgment would show that the emphasis of the Court was on the complex nature of the issues to be tackled by the Government while exercising power or performing duty under Sec. 20 (1) of the Act. "in this very decision the words "ordinarily hear the applicant" have been incorporated and it has been held that these words go to show that the Court did not intend to lay down any hard and fast rule of universal application that in all cases for exemption under Sec. 20 (1), the State Government was under an obligation to give audience to the concerned party before rejecting the application. Not only this, while considering the observations in Nirmalaben M. Doshi v. State of Gujarat, reported in 1984 (1) GLR 322 , it has been clarified that in the opinion of the Full Bench nirmalabens case did not lay down any rule of general application that in all cases arising under Sec. 20 (1) of the Act, personal hearing must be afforded regardless of the nature of the case and further that, if that was the intention of the Court, the Full Bench respectfully disagreed and it has been further held that it must be left to the discretion of the authority, that is the State Government, to decide for itself in each case having regard to the facts and circumstances and the complexity or otherwise of the issues arising therein, whether or not to give a personal hearing to the concerned applicant before refusing exemption claimed by him. In the case at hand, after the presentation of the application in a prescribed form in the year 1982, it is evident that lot of correspondence traspired. The contents of the impugned order dated 7-12-1994 makes reference to 13 letters sent to the petitioners including 2 letters dated 13-11-1992 and 8-2-1983 with regard to personal hearing. In the case at hand, after the presentation of the application in a prescribed form in the year 1982, it is evident that lot of correspondence traspired. The contents of the impugned order dated 7-12-1994 makes reference to 13 letters sent to the petitioners including 2 letters dated 13-11-1992 and 8-2-1983 with regard to personal hearing. Thus, the requirements of giving reasonable opportunity has been in fact complied with in the facts of this case and the argument that the principles of natural justice were not followed or that no opportunity whatsoever was given to the petitioners before rejecting the application under Sec. 20 is not even available to the petitioners, besides the fact that such an opportunity is not necessary in each and every case. Thus, in the facts of this case, I find that the requirements of the reasonable opportunity including the opportunity of personal hearing have been fully complied with, although the Government was not under any statutory obligation or compulsion otherwise under any law of precedent so as to extend such an opportunity before rejection of the application under Sec. 20. ( 6 ) THE reading of the relevant Section shows that the recording of reasons is necessary when exemption is granted. This piece of legislation is for the purpose of securing excess vacant land in public interest and it is to meet such a wholesome object that the entire scheme of Act was conceived and legislated. After all, it is a case in which the exemption is sought in respect of the excess vacant land held by the land owner and the Government had to take its own decision on the basis of the location of the land, purpose for which such land is being used or is proposed to be used and other relevant factors. The impugned order dated 7-12-1994 only shows that after a long drawn correspondence, seeking the production of certain documents from the petitioners and calling upon the petitioners for personal hearing, the industries Commissioner has found that the industry was not functioning and, therefore, the land cannot be put to proper use for industry. The impugned order dated 7-12-1994 only shows that after a long drawn correspondence, seeking the production of certain documents from the petitioners and calling upon the petitioners for personal hearing, the industries Commissioner has found that the industry was not functioning and, therefore, the land cannot be put to proper use for industry. The learned Counsel for the petitioners has argued that this reasoning, which has been given in the impugned order passed by the Industires Commissioner, is factually incorrect and according to him the Unit is functioning and that the reason, which has been given in this order, that the industry is not functioning is irrelevant and the authority could not address itself to the subsequent development after 1976 because the application had been moved in 1976. It will be sufficient to say that this argument is an argument in despair for the simple reason that the fact situation with regard to the functioning of the industry at the relevant time when the order is passed, cannot be disregarded. May be that the petitioner-Company had moved an application in the year 1976, but it cannot be gainfully argued that even for the purpose of granting exemption under Sec. 20, the fact situation is to be seen as it was in 1976 and the authority should ignore all subsequent developments, which have taken place and the factual position with regard to the petitioners claim at the time when the application under sec. 20 is decided. Consideration of such subsequent developments cannot be said to be irrelevant for the purpose of deciding application under Sec. 20 of the Act. In this regard, the learned Counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance on an unreported decision of this Court in Special Civil Application No. 1364 of 1987 dated 16-12-1994. I have gone through the photostat copy of this decision passed on by Mr. Hawa and find that in this case the application for exemption was rejected on the ground that the land in question remained fallow and uncultivated from 1975 to 1979 and according to the affidavits made by the neighbouring land owners, lands in question did not remain uncultivated despite the contrary entries made in the pahani Patraks. Hawa and find that in this case the application for exemption was rejected on the ground that the land in question remained fallow and uncultivated from 1975 to 1979 and according to the affidavits made by the neighbouring land owners, lands in question did not remain uncultivated despite the contrary entries made in the pahani Patraks. According to this decision it is not necessary for the Court to enter into the disputed questions of fact in that regard as it would be sufficient to observe that the application for exemption was made in 1984 and the Pahani Patraks did and do show that the lands in question have been cultivated at least since 1979-80 and further that the lands in question might have remained uncultivated for thousand one reason for some years prior thereto. What was, however, required to be seen was whether or not during three preceding years from the date of the application for exemption the lands in question were cultivated. Thus, the subsequent development, which took place in the years 1979-80 and onwards, were taken into consideration. The land had remained unclutivated from 1975 to 1979. Pahani Patraks showed that the land was cultivated at least since 1979-80. It is obvious that the facts of the year 1979-80 and onwards are subsequent to 1975 to 1979 and, therefore, the court held that the application for exemption could not be rejected merely because the land had remained uncultivated in past. Therefore, in my opinion, this decision is of no help to the petitioners. On the contrary, this decision permits the consideration of the subsequent development after the land remained uncultivated and it is in this context that the Court has held that whether or not during three preceding years from the date of the application for exemption the lands in question were being cultivated or not. Now so far as the facts of the present case at hand are concerned, the documents placed on record by the petitioners does go to show that in the year 1993- 94 the Company was not functioning on account of the financial crisis and deflation in the industry, which was faced not only by the petitioners Unit but by many other iron Industries. That may be so, but it cannot be said that the reasons given in the order are irrelevant. That may be so, but it cannot be said that the reasons given in the order are irrelevant. The petitioner sought exemption under Sec. 20 on the ground of development, diversification and expansion. The Government is charged with the power to grant exemption and under Sec. 20, on the basis of the location of the land and the purpose for which it is proposed to be used and other relevant considerations, the Government has to decide whether the exemption is to be granted or not. The government has, after considering all the aspects and entering into a long drawn correspondence with the petitioners calling upon them to provide the documents and material, passed the order rejecting the application under Sec. 20 and in doing so, it has also given reasons and there is no basis for the contention that these reasons are irrelevant, more particularly when the documents produced on record by the petitioners themselves show that the Unit was not working and even the copies of the balance-sheet filed by the petitioners do not espouse the petitioners case for the years immediately before the passing of the order. In this view of the matter, I do not find any ground to interfere with the order dated 7-12-1994 passed by the industries Commissioner or the order dated 25-1-1995 passed by the Revenue department of the Government of Gujarat. ( 7 ) THIS Special Civil Application has no merits and the same is hereby dismissed. .