ORDER 1. The petitioner, who is an elected member of Nisarpur Janpad Panchayat, has filed this Writ Petition for dismissal of the election petition filed before the Collector, Dhar, challenging his election in case No. 8/93-94/C-144, in the following circumstances. 2. According to the petitioner, besides him, Respondents Nos. 1 to 5 were the candidates for election to Nisarpur Janpad Panchayat. The election of the said Janpad Panchayat was held on 23.5.1994 and the petitioner was declared elected on 24.5.1994. The notification declaring his election was notified on 30.6.1994. His election was challenged by Respondent No.1 by filing Election Petition No. 8/93-94/C-144 before Respondent No.8, Collector, Dhar. On receipt of the notice on 19.8.1994 the petitioner appeared before the Collector, on the same day and stated that Respondents Nos. 4 and 5, who were the candidates in the election, have not been impleaded as parties, which was mandatory in view of Rule 4 of M.P. Panchayat (Election Petitions, Corrupt Practices and Disqualification of Membership) Rules, 1991 (hereinafter referred as 1991 Rules') and consequently prayed for dismissal of the election petition. It was further averred that in the election petition, Respondent No.1 has sought declaration that he be declared as elected and, therefore, all the candidates including Respondents Nos. 4 and 5 ought to have been added as a party and failure to do the same renders the election petition defective and the same was fit to be dismissed on this score alone. 3. It is relevant here to state that the election petition was filed on 20.7.1994 and Respondent No.1 on 16.9.1994 filed an application under Order 4 Rule 17 C.P.C. for joinder of Respondents Nos. 4 and 5 herein as parties. As stated earlier, the petitioner also filed an application on 19.8.1994 for dismissal of the election petition for failure to implead all the candidates and the prescribed authority by its order dated 7.10.94 allowed the application of Respondent No.1 for joinder of Respondents Nos. 4 and 5 as party in the election petition. 4. Shri C.L. Yadav, appearing on behalf of the petitioner submits that as Respondent No. 1 has sought for a declaration that he be declared as elected member to the Janpad Panchayat, it was incumbent upon him to implead all the candidates including the person who withdrew their nomination. It is relevant here to state that Respondents Nos. 4. Shri C.L. Yadav, appearing on behalf of the petitioner submits that as Respondent No. 1 has sought for a declaration that he be declared as elected member to the Janpad Panchayat, it was incumbent upon him to implead all the candidates including the person who withdrew their nomination. It is relevant here to state that Respondents Nos. 4 and 5 did file their nomination papers but withdrew the same on the date fixed for its withdrawal. Their names thus did not find place in the ballot papers which contained the list of contesting candidates. Notwithstanding the aforesaid fact that Respondent... Nos. 4 and 5 withdrew their nominations on the date fixed for its withdrawal, Shri Yadav submits that they continued to be the candidates for the purpose of election petition and, therefore, their non-joinder was fatal to the maintainability of the election-petition. He further submits that the election petition which was initially filed without joining all the candidates, the defect cannot be cured by seeking an amendment in the election petition at a later stage. 5. Section 122 of the M.P. Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') provides for presentation of the election petition and the authority to hear such application. Section 122 of the Act reads as follows ;- Section 122. Election Petition ;- (1) An election or co-option under this Act shall be called in question only by a petition presented in the prescribed manner ;- (i) in case of Gram Panchayat to the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue); (ii) in case of Janpad Panchayat to the Collector, and (iii) in case of Zila Panchayat to the Divisional Commissioner and not otherwise. (2) No such petition shall be admitted unless it presented within thirty days from the date on which the election or co-option in question was notified. 6. It is common ground that the election petition is to be decided in accordance with the provision of M.P. Panchayat (Election Petitions, Corrupt Practices and Disqualification for Membership) Rules, 1991 and Rule 4 of the Rules which is relevant for the purpose is as follows ; Rule 4: Parties to the petition – Where the petitioner in addition to claiming a declaration that the election or co-option of all or any of the returned candidate is void, claims a further declaration that he himself or any other candidate has been duly elected or co-opted. He shall join as respondents to his petition all other candidates who were nominated at the election or co-option. The effect of non-compliance of the provisions of Rule 4 - is provided in Rule 8 of the Rules, which reads as follows ; Section 8: Procedure for receiving petition – If the provisions of Rule 3 or rule 4 or rule 7 have not been complied with, the prescribed authority shall dismiss the petition. 7. Shri Yadav submits that as Respondent Nos. 4 and 5 were not impleaded as parties as mandatorily required under Rule 4 of the Rules, the petition deserves dismissal on this ground alone in view of Rule 8 of the Rules, 1991. In his submission although respondents Nos. 4 and 5 have withdrawn their nomination on the date fixed for the same, nontheless they continued to be the candidates for the purpose of Rule 4 of the Rules and admittedly they being not joined as party, was a fatal defect which cannot be cured by amendment. The election petition, in his submission, deserves dismissal on this ground alone. According to his submission Rules 4 and 8 of the Rules, 1991 have the same meaning and effect as provided under sections 82 and 86 of the Representation of the People Act, 1961, which reads as follows;-- Section 82 : Parties of the petition – A petitioner shall join as respondents in his petition – (a) Whether the petitioner, in addition to claiming declaration that the election of all or any of the returned candidates is void, claims a further declaration that he himself or any other candidate has been duly elected, all the contesting candidates other than the petitioner, and where no such further declaration is claimed, all the returned candidates; and (b) any other candidate against whom allegations of any corrupt practice are made in the petition. Section 86 : Trial of election petitions – (1) The High Court shall dismiss an election petition which does not comply with the provisions of section 81 or section 82 or section 117. Explanation -- An order of the High Court dismissing an election petition under this sub-section shall be deemed to be an order made under clause (a) of section 98. Explanation -- An order of the High Court dismissing an election petition under this sub-section shall be deemed to be an order made under clause (a) of section 98. (2) As soon as may be after an election petition has been presented to the High Court, it shall be referred to the Judge or one of the Judges who has or have been assigned by the Chief Justice for the trial of election petitions under sub-section (2) of section 80A. (3) Where more election petition than one are presented to the High Court in respect of the same election, all of them shall be referred for trial to the same Judge who may, in his discretion try them separately or in one or more grounds; (4) Any candidate not already a respondent shall, upon application made by him to the High Court within fourteen days from the date of commencement of the trial and subject to any order as to security for costs which may be made by the High Court, be entitled to be joined as a respondent. Explanation -- For the purposes of this sub-section and of section 97, the trial of a petition shall be deemed to commence on the date fixed for the respondents to appear before the High Court and answer the claim or claims made in the petition. (5) The High Court may, upon such terms as to costs and otherwise as it may deem fit, allow the particulars of any corrupt practice alleged in the petition be amended or amplified in such manner as may be in its opinion be necessary for ensuring a fair and effective trial of the petition, but shall not allow any amendment of the petition which will have the effect of introducing particulars of a corrupt practice not previously alleged in the petition. (6) The trial of an election petition shall, so far as is practicable consistently with the interests of justice in respect the trial, be continued from the day to day until its conclusion, unless the High Court finds the adjournment of the trial beyond the following day to be necessary for the reasons to be recorded. (7) Every election petition shall be tried as expeditiously as possible and endeavour shall be made to conclude the trial within six months from the date on which the election petition is presented to the High Court for trial. (7) Every election petition shall be tried as expeditiously as possible and endeavour shall be made to conclude the trial within six months from the date on which the election petition is presented to the High Court for trial. The word 'candidate' has been defined under Sec. 79 (b) of the Act, which reads as follows :- 79. Definitions- xx xx xx xx xx (b) 'Candidate' means a person who has been or claims to have been duly nominated as a candidate at any election. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his submission placed reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Mohan Singh v. Bhanwarlal ( AIR 1964 SC 1366 ). Reliance has been placed on para 10 of the judgment which reads as follows :- "Himmat Singh had filed his nomination paper, and on that account by virtue of the definition of Sec. 79 he was a candidate for the purposes of Parts VI, VII and VIII, and did not cease to be candidate merely because he withdrew his candidature. If therefore the petition contained any imputation of corrupt practice made against Himmat Singh, it could not be regarded as properly constituted unless he was impleaded as a respondent, for, by the definition of 'candidate' in S. 79 (b), the expression 'any other candidate' in S. 82 (b) must include a candidate who had withdrawn the candidature. But in our judgment in para 11 (b) there is no allegation of corrupt practice against Himmat Singh. What is alleged is that Mohan Singh had offered to help Himmat Singh in procuring a job in Dalauda Sugar Factory or elsewhere' and that as a consequence of that offer Himmat Singh had withdrawn his candidature from the election. There is no express averment in the petition about the acceptance of the offer of Himmat Singh, but it would border upon supererogation to insist that even if offer to help to procure a job amounted to offer of gratification, an allgation that in consequence of this offer Himmat Singh had withdrawn his candidature from the election did not amount to a plea of acceptance of that offer unless it was so expressly averred. However, in our view a mere offer of help to secure employment without more is not offer of gratification within the meaning of S. 123 (1) of the Act. (Emphasis supplied) 9. However, in our view a mere offer of help to secure employment without more is not offer of gratification within the meaning of S. 123 (1) of the Act. (Emphasis supplied) 9. Mohan Singh's case (supra) prima facie seems to support the contention of the petitioner but on close reading it instead of supporting the petitioner goes against him. A reading of Paragraph 2 of the aforesaid judgment makes it clear that besides declaring the result of the returned candidate to be void further prayer was made for declaring the applicant elected. Further reading of paragraph 10 of the judgment shows that one Himmat Singh, who filed his nomination paper but withdrew his candidate was not impleaded as party. The Apex Court in the paragraph, under reference, held that there is no allegation of corrupt practice against Himmat Singh, and consequently in paragraph 11 held that 'it was in circumstances not necessary on the allegation made in para 11 (a) of the petition to implead Himmat Singh as respondent to the petition. 10. Having gone through the judgment closely, I am of the view that Mohan Singh's case (supra) instead of supporting the case of the petitioner goes against him. In the present case, I do not find that any allegation of corrupt practice has been levelled against respondents Nos. 4 and 5 and as such I am of the considered view that they were not required to be impleaded as parties in the election petition. 10. Shri Yadav has brought to my notice the Constitution Bench Judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Amin Lal v. Hunna Mal ( AIR 1965 SC 1243 ) and according to his submission the aforesaid judgment squarely covers the case of the petitioner. My attention has been drawn to paragraph 5 of the aforesaid judgment which reads as follows :" Suraj Bhan was a duly nominated candidate and though he withdrew his candidature within the time permitted by the rules he must for the purpose of S. 82, still be regarded as a candidate. As pointed out by this Court in Mohan Singh v. Bhawarlal, AIR 1964 SC 1366 a person who was duly nominated as a candidate for election would not cease to be a candidate for the purpose of parts VI, VII and VIII of the Act merely because he withdrew his candidature. As pointed out by this Court in Mohan Singh v. Bhawarlal, AIR 1964 SC 1366 a person who was duly nominated as a candidate for election would not cease to be a candidate for the purpose of parts VI, VII and VIII of the Act merely because he withdrew his candidature. Therefore, according to this Court where a petition contained any imputation of corrupt practice against such a person it could not be regarded as properly constituted unless he was impleaded as a respondent. Aminlal's case (supra) has placed reliance in Mohan Singh's case (supra) and as I have pointed out earlier the Apex Court has held that a duly nominated candidate though he with drew his candidature still be regarded as a candidate. However, for impleading such a person as party in the election petition, as in Mohan Singh's case (supra), in Amin Lal's case (supra) also the Apex Court categorically held that 'where a petition contained any allegation of corrupt practice against such a person' meaning thereby a duly nominated candidate and who has withdrawn his candidature, it could not be regarded as properly constituted petition. Thus, Aminlal's case (supra) in no way supports the case of the petitioner and is clearly distinguishable. 11. In support of his submission learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has further placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Udhav Singh v. Madhav Rao Scindia ( AIR 1976 SC 744 ), particular emphasis has been laid on paragraph 15 of the judgment, which reads as follows : "It is common ground that Shiv Pratap Singh was one of the candidates who had withdrawn his nomination papers for election from this Constituency after the same had been found in order by the Returning Officer. There was thus no doubt that he was a 'candidate' for the purpose of the relevant provisions of the Act. If therefore, the allegations made in cl. (iv) of para 11 of the petition relate to him and amount to a charge of corrupt practice against him, his non-joinder as a respondent would be fatal, to the election petition'. In the aforesaid case also one Pratap Singh filed his nomination but he has withdrawn the same. If therefore, the allegations made in cl. (iv) of para 11 of the petition relate to him and amount to a charge of corrupt practice against him, his non-joinder as a respondent would be fatal, to the election petition'. In the aforesaid case also one Pratap Singh filed his nomination but he has withdrawn the same. In Udhav Singh's case (supra), not Withstanding his withdrawal, the Apex Court found that the ought to have been joined as a respondent in the election petition and failure to do the same was fatal. However, before holding that aforesaid Shri Pratap Singh was one of the candidate necessarily to be impleaded as a party the Apex Court found that allegation of corrupt practice was made against him, in the following words : "That on or before 22.2.71, Shri Mohan Prasad Ojha a Congress Worker of Village Umri (Tehsil Guna) was threatened at pistol point by the worker~ of the respondent with his consent. Shri Pratap Singh and others of Umn threatened him not to vote and canvass in favour of the Congress candidate; Deorao Krishnarao Jadhav and others threatening him with dire consequences' . 12. The aforesaid allegations smade against Shripratap Singh was taken into consideration and in the back ground of the aforesaid allegation the Apex Court in the paragraph relied on by the petitioner himself, found non-joinder to be fatal. The Apex Court made it clear that 'if the allegation made in Clause 4 of paragraph 11 of the petition related to him and amount to charge of corrupt practices, his non-joinder as a respondent would be fatal to the election petition'. It is relevant here to state that there is no allegation of corrupt practice against respondents Nos. 4 and 5 and in that view of the matter it was not necessary that they may be impleaded as respondents and the authority relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner is thus clearly distinguishable. 13. It is relevant here to state that there is no allegation of corrupt practice against respondents Nos. 4 and 5 and in that view of the matter it was not necessary that they may be impleaded as respondents and the authority relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner is thus clearly distinguishable. 13. Shri Yadav in support of his submission has placed reliance on yet another judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of U.S. Sasidharan v. Karunakaran and another ( AIR 1990 SC 924 ) and my attention has been drawn• to paragraph 13 of the judgment which reads as follows :- "As has been held in Satya Narain v. Dhuja Ram, (1974) 3 SCR 20 : ( AIR 1974 SC 1185 ) the right to challenge an election is not a common law right, but a special right as conferred by the Act. The provision for setting aside the election on the grounds mentioned in section 100 of the Act including the ground of corrupt practice has been made for the purpose of maintaining purity of elections. An election is the democratic method for selecting the representatives of the people in Parliament or in the Legislative Assembly. When a candidate gets himself elected by adopting or committing any corrupt practice, his election must be set aside on proof of such corrupt practice. At the same time, the procedure prescribed by the Act for challenging an election must be strictly followed. So, if there be any deviation from or non-compliance with the provision of section 81 (3) the Court will have no other alternative than to dismiss the election petition'. 14. Further reliance has been placed by Shri Yadav on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Azar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi (AIR 1986 SC 1253). My attention has been drawn to paragraph 11 of the judgment which reads as follows : 'In view of this pronouncement there is no escape from the conclusion that an election petition can be summarily dismissed if it does not furnish cause of action in exercise of the papers under the Code of Civil Procedure. My attention has been drawn to paragraph 11 of the judgment which reads as follows : 'In view of this pronouncement there is no escape from the conclusion that an election petition can be summarily dismissed if it does not furnish cause of action in exercise of the papers under the Code of Civil Procedure. So also it emerges from the aforesaid decision that appropriate orders in exercise of powers under the Code of Civil Procedure can be passed if the mandatory 'requirements enjoined by section 83 of the Act to incorporate the material facts in the election petition are not complied with. This Court in Samant's case (1969) 3 SCC 238 : ( AIR 1969 SC 1201 ) has expressed itself in no unclear terms that the omission of a single material fact would lead to an incomplete cause of action and that an election petition without the material facts relating to a corrupt practice is not an election petition at all. So also in Udhav Singh's case (1977) 1 SCC 511 : (AIR 1977 SC 744) the law has been enunciated that all the primary facts which must be proved by a party to establish a cause of action or his defence are material facts. In the context of a charge of corrupt practice it would mean that the basic facts which constitute the ingredients of the particular corrupt practice alleged by the petitioner must be specified in order to succeed on the charge. Whether in an election petition a particular fact is material or not and as such required to be pleaded is dependent on the nature of the charge levelled and the circumstances of the case. All the facts which are essential to clothe the petition with complete cause of action must be pleaded and failure to plead even a single material fact would amount to disobedience of the mandate of section 83 (1) (a). An election petition thereafter can be and must be dismissed if it suffers from such vice.' 15. Authorities relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the judgments of the Apex Court in the cases of U.S. Sasidharan (supra) and Azhar Hussain (supra) put beyond any pale of controversy that in case of non-compliance of the mandatory provision of law the Court shall have no option than to dismiss the election petition. Authorities relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the judgments of the Apex Court in the cases of U.S. Sasidharan (supra) and Azhar Hussain (supra) put beyond any pale of controversy that in case of non-compliance of the mandatory provision of law the Court shall have no option than to dismiss the election petition. However, in the present case, as I have held earlier that respondents Nos. 4 and 5 were not necessary to be impleaded as party, election petition did not suffer from any legal defect and as such it did not deserve, summary dismissal. 16. All the aforesaid authorities relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner pertains to a case filed under the Representative of People Act, I may not be misunderstood to have stated that the decisions rendered by the Apex Court in such circumstances shall have no-bearing but I find different expression used in Rule 4 of the Rules. Rule 4 of the Rules provides that the candidates at the election" are required to be impleaded. Respondents Nos. 4 and 5 were not candidates at the election as they withdrew their candidature on the date of withdrawal of the nomination and as such they did not come within the ambit of rule 4 of the Rules. It is well settled that every word of the statute is required to be given meaning and keeping in view the aforesaid dictum, in my opinion, the candidate at the election will mean and include only those candidates, who remained in Held at the time of election. 17. The result of the aforesaid discussion is that there is no merit in the writ-application and as such it deserves dismissal at my hand. The Writ Application is dismissed accordingly. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs.