Judgment : ARUNACHALAM, J. ( 1 ) IN Special Case No. 1 of 1984, on the file of the Special Judge and Chief Judicial Magistrate, West Thanjavur, appellant Selvarajan was convicted under Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years. He was further convicted under Section 5 (1) (d) read with Section 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and sentenced. to undergo rigorous imprisonment for four years as well pay Rs. 500/- as fine, in default to suffer rigorous imprisonment for three more months. The substantive sentences of imprisonment were directed to run concurrently. ( 2 ) AT the relevant time, which dates back to August, 1983, appellant was working as an Assistant in the Excise Office situate at Mayilduthurai. P. W. 1. Gunasekaran successfully bid in the auction held for conduct of toddy shop for the period 1982-83. The auction related to Sethi Village, where P. W. 1 was then residing. Before the auction was conducted, P. W. 1 paid a security deposit of Rs. 1000/- as well as another Rs. 1000/- for solvency. These payments were made at Taluk Office, Mayiladutharia. There is no dispute that he conducted trade in toddy till 15-7-1983, when the period of which he bid in the auction stood terminated. P. W. 1 did not choose to bid in the next auction for the year 1983-84. ( 3 ) P. W. 1 was anxious to obtain return of Rs. 1000/-paid by him as security deposit as well as Rs. 1000/- paid towards solvency, since he was no longer interested in conduct of the toddy shop. Once, he made an application on 11-7-1983 to the Excise Officer, Mayilduthurai. Ex. P-1 is the said application. The Excise Officer informed P. W. 1 that the earlier auction period would terminate only on 15-7-1983 and hence P. W. 1 should approach him for refund only after expiry of the licence period. On 15-7-1983, P. W. 1 went over to the Excise Office and found that the appellant was working as an Assistant in that particular seat. P. W. 1 claims to have enquired the appellant about his earlier application. On 1-8-1983, P. W. 1 forwarded Ex. P-2 a reminder to the Excise Officer. Mayilduthurai, pleading for return of the deposit earlier stated. Though he has mentioned in Ex. P. W. 1 claims to have enquired the appellant about his earlier application. On 1-8-1983, P. W. 1 forwarded Ex. P-2 a reminder to the Excise Officer. Mayilduthurai, pleading for return of the deposit earlier stated. Though he has mentioned in Ex. P-2 that an earlier petition was handed over by him on 15-7-1983, no such petition has been marked. P. W. 4, R. Navukarasu, then Excise Officer, Mayiladuthurai, had directed placing of Ex. P-1 before him for order after 15-7-1983. After Ex. P-2 was received, P. WA perused the note of the appellant that the security deposit paid by P. W. 1 could be returned and approving the same passed on order for return on 10-8-1983 through Ex. P-18. P. W. 4, after verifying the documents concerned, ordered on 17-8-1983 that Rs. 1000/-can be paid over to PW. 1. Accordingly, a draft was obtained from Mayiladuthurai Treasury, dated 23-8-1983 for the purpose of return to P. W. 1. ( 4 ) IT is the case of P. W. 1 that he met PW. 9, Ramachandran, Excise Inspector, on 10-8-1983 and enquired about return of the deposit made by him. He also met the appellant on the same day and sought his help for return of his security deposit. Appellant then directed him to produce the licence and accounts. P. W. 1 entrusted the licence and accounts to P. W. 9. P. W. 9 then directed P. W. 1 to come back to the Excise Office after some time so that steps could be taken for return of his deposit. In this background, it is the prosecution case that on 22-8-1983 at or about 2-PO p. m. , P. W. 1 went over to the Excise Office at Mayiladutharai and met the appellant and made enquiries. Appellant then informed P. W. 1 that he had prepared the bill and had already forwarded the same to the Treasury for payment and on the next day, he could come and collect the draft. While P. W. 1 was getting out of the Excise Office, a peon, not named or identified, told him that he had to pay Rs. 100/-to the Treasury for receiving the draft. P. W. 1 told the peon that he had no money with him then and on the next morning he would pay Rs. 100/-and then receive the draft. While P. W. 1 was getting out of the Excise Office, a peon, not named or identified, told him that he had to pay Rs. 100/-to the Treasury for receiving the draft. P. W. 1 told the peon that he had no money with him then and on the next morning he would pay Rs. 100/-and then receive the draft. Since P. W. 1 was approaching the Excise Office for return of his security deposit for about a month, he was aggrieved and was not willing to pay the bribe amount of Rs. 100/- demanded. He proceeded on 23-8-1983 to the Vigilance Office at Thanjavur, and met P. W. 13, Kalyanam, Inspector of Police he narrated details about the demand made, for handing over the draft to which he was legally entitled. P. W. 1 appears to have told P. W. 13 that 10 per cent of the money due was demanded as bribe. P. W. 1 presented a compliant, Ex. P-5, to P. W. 13, since P. W. 13 directed him to present a written complaint. On Ex. P-1s, P. W. 13 registered Crime NO. 2 of 1983 under Section 161, I. P. C. and prepared Ex. P-30, printed first information report. P. W. 13 then sent for P. W. 2, Durai, an employee in the Regional Transport Officers Office, Thanjavur and Abdul Rahman, not examined, an employee in the Department of Commerce, to be witnesses for the trap. P. W. 2 and another were made aware of the complaint of P. W. 1. P. W. 13, narrated the formalities trap to P. W. 1, P. W. 2 and another, and prepared entrustment mahazar, Ex. P-6. P. W. 1 was informed by P. W. 13 that in the event of the appellant demanding bribe, he must pay it and give a signal about such acceptance by the appellant, a folding and tying his dhoti. At or about 305 p. m. on the same day, P. W. 1, along with others, was escorted to Mayiladuthurai and dropped near Peerless Cinema Theater. P. W. 13 and others waited at a visible distance expecting the prearranged signal, from P. W. 1. ( 5 ) PW. 1 went over to the Excise Office and met the appellant. When P. W. 1 requested for the draft, appellant immediately handed over the draft, Ex. P. W. 13 and others waited at a visible distance expecting the prearranged signal, from P. W. 1. ( 5 ) PW. 1 went over to the Excise Office and met the appellant. When P. W. 1 requested for the draft, appellant immediately handed over the draft, Ex. P-9 and obtained the signature of P. W. 1 in a register, Ex. P-7. Thereafter, according to P. W. 1, he enquired the appellant as to where the peon was, to elicit a reply that he had gone out. It is the definite evidence of P. W. 1 that he handed over Rs. 100/- (M. O. I. series) to the appellant stating that the peon had informed him that Rs. 100/- should be paid and requested the appellant to hand it over to the peon on his arrival. P. W. 1 then left the Excise Office and gave the prearranged signal by tying his dhoti, which forthwith brought P. Ws. 2 and 3 to the Excise Office. P. W. 13 introduced himself and P. W. 2 to the appellant and arranged for production of phenolphthalein solution. When the right and left hands of the appellant were dipped in the solution, the solution turned pink. Appellant then produced M. O. 1. series from his shirt pocket. The shirt also reacted positively to the phenolphthalein test. When the appellant was questioned by P. W. 13, he allegedly stated that P. W. 1 had requested him to hand it over to the Treasury Clerk and he had committed a mistake by receiving it. Before the appellant was trapped, P. W. 13 requisitioned the services of P. W. 4, Excise Officer in Mayiladuthurai office. Offending currencies stood seized under a mahazar. The appellant was arrested and later released on bail. The other witnesses examined, speak about the procedure referable to return of security deposit applications, processing of the same and ordering of return of deposit by the Excise Officer concerned, P. W. 8, Lakshminarasimhan, an Assistant in the office of the District Revenue Officer, Thanjawr, has proved Ex. P-26, sanction, issued by the District Revenue Officer, to prosecute the appellant. After completion of investigation on 12-10-1984, final report was laid. ( 6 ) THE case of the appellant before the learned Special Judge was that P. W. 1 had handed over Rs. P-26, sanction, issued by the District Revenue Officer, to prosecute the appellant. After completion of investigation on 12-10-1984, final report was laid. ( 6 ) THE case of the appellant before the learned Special Judge was that P. W. 1 had handed over Rs. 100/- to him of his own accord for being passed on to Palanippan, a peon in the office. He stated so to P. W. 13 at the time of seizure of M. O. 1 and further requested the investigating officer to call in P. W. 1 and question him on that aspect. Even so, P. W. 13 did not accede to his request and enquire P. W. in his presence. However, no evidence in defence was adduced. ( 7 ) LEARNED trial Judge, on appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, accepted the prosecution case, in spite of hostility of P. W. 1, rejected the defence version and dealt with the appellant in the manner stated above. ( 8 ) APPELLANTS learned counsel urged two contentions to have the convictions quashed. The first submission was that the prosecution has not established the demand made by the appellant and added that there was no mutuality of intention between P. W. I and the appellant regarding giving and receiving of the bribe amount. He added, although the evidence of a hostile witness can be believed, some independent corroboration may be necessary in a case of this nature. The second submission was that Ex. P-26 does not satisfy the procedure contemplated in law regarding grant of sanction. He then expatiated by stating, that sanction through Ex. P-26 was granted mechanically without application of mind and the evidence of P. W. 8 cannot salvage the prosecution. ( 9 ) I have heard Mr. R. Raghupathi, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, on these two contentions. He pointed out that the evidence of P. W. 8 would clearly indicate about the nature of c documents perused by the sanctioning authority, before agreeing, to sanction to prosecute the appellant. Further, Ex. P-26 itself would indicate by its contents, application of mind on the part of sanctioning authority and hence it would be idle to contend that the sanction to prosecute suffered from any infirmity. As far as the demand aspect is concerned, learned Additional Public Prosecutor was fair enough in submitting that there is practically no corroboration for demand. Further, Ex. P-26 itself would indicate by its contents, application of mind on the part of sanctioning authority and hence it would be idle to contend that the sanction to prosecute suffered from any infirmity. As far as the demand aspect is concerned, learned Additional Public Prosecutor was fair enough in submitting that there is practically no corroboration for demand. In any event, he would add, that the acceptance of P. W. 1 in the witness-box that he had in fact authored Ex. P5, would alone suffice to hold in favour of the prosecution. ( 10 ) I have carefully audited the divergent submissions both made, emphatically. It will be better to dispose of the second contention initially. This contention relates to the validity of the sanction order, directing prosecution of the appellant. Ex. P-26 is the sanction order issued by the District Revenue Officer, Thanjavur, on 5-5-1984. In the column, Reference, Ex. P-26 mentions that Report No. Rc. 42/83 Rev. TH dated 16-3-1984 of the Directorate of vigilance and Anti-Corruption, Madras-6, was taken note of. Further, the sanction order states in paragraph 1 that the appellant, at the relevant time was working as an Assistant at the Excise Office, Mayiladutharai. The authority was also aware that at the time of sanctioning the prosecution the appellant was under suspension. Paragraph 2 of the sanction order refers to the factual details relating to receipt of Rs. 100/- by the appellant on 23-8-1983 from P. W. 1 at or about 3-30 p. m. , after handing over Ex. P-9, the draft. In the next paragraph, the sanctioning authority has stated that the appellant, a public servant, had abused his position as such public servant and obtained for himself Rs. 100/-as pecuniary advantage. In the next paragraph, the offence allegedly committed by the appellant stand stated. Thereafter, the sanctioning authority has, after affirming that he was the authority competent to remove the appellant from office has stated that after duly and carefully examining the materials before him in regard to the allegations and the circumstances of the case, he considered that the appellant should be prosecuted in a Court of law for the said offences. The last paragraph is the actual sanctioning portion. The last paragraph is the actual sanctioning portion. It is settled law that if the order of sanction contains particulars on the offences allegedly committed by the accused and also exhibits application of mind of the part of the sanctioning authority, then the order of sanction cannot be faulted. This, of course, will be a question of fact, which will vary from case to case. In this prosecution, we have the additional advantage of the evidence of P. W. 8, who has spoken about the nature of documents placed before the sanctioning authority as a prelude to Ex. P-26. It is not as though that Rc. 42/83 dated 16-3-84 received from the Directorate of Vigilance and Anti Corruption. Madras, was alone placed before the authority, for he is certain that the entire records relating to this prosecution had been placed for arrival of satisfaction by the sanctioning authority, before he issued Ex. P-26. In State of Tamil Nadu v. Damodaran, the Supreme Court, while reversing the judgment of acquittal passed by this Court rejecting a sanction, and restoring the conviction recorded by the trial Judge, observed that when all relevant material stood placed before the sanctioning authority and the authority accorded sanction after full application of mind, such sanction cannot be held to be invalid. The Supreme Court Supreme Court took note of the sanctioning authority having taken notice of statements recorded during investigation apart from the report. The law laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforestated case will attract the instant facts. ( 11 ) APPELLANTS learned counsel referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Mohd Iqbal Ahmed v. State of A. P. . The Supreme Court has clearly laid down therein, that a valid sanction can be proved either by producing the original sanction which itself contained the facts constituting the offence and the grounds of sanction or by adducing evidence aliunde to show the facts placed before the sanctioning authority and the satisfaction arrived at by it. The principle laid down by the Supreme Court, instead of helping the appellant, on the available facts, would rather go against him. In that case, the Supreme Court has clearly observed that no evidence stood let in, either primary or secondary, to prove as to what were the contents of the note mentioned in Ex. P16, which was placed before the sanctioning authority. In that case, the Supreme Court has clearly observed that no evidence stood let in, either primary or secondary, to prove as to what were the contents of the note mentioned in Ex. P16, which was placed before the sanctioning authority. There cannot be a second opinion that the grant of sanction is not an idle formality or an acrimonious exercise, but a solemn and sacrosanct act. Whether such a procedure had been followed in accordance with law, will be a question of fact and mechanical application of law, sans facts, can neither be pleaded nor upheld. ( 12 ) A decision of a learned single Judge of this Court in Charles Waker Devadas v. State by the Inspector of Police, etc. , was referred to by appellants learned counsel. Learned Judge, after extracting the order of sanction, which the appellants learned counsel stated is in pan materia with the instant sanction order, held that it was not known as to what are all the documents amounting to evidence aliunde leading to the facts involved in this instant case had been perused and examined carefully and fully by the sanctioning authority before according sanction under Ex. P-29. On the facts available before him, the learned Judge took such a view. As I have already stated, the validity or otherwise of a particular order of sanction will certainly depend upon the factual conspectus that may have to be traversed for appreciating that question, which apparently is one mixed with law and facts. On the nature of evidence let in this prosecution, I have no hesitation, whatever, in holding that Ex. P-26 is valid and was the outcome of proper application of mind not only to the facts of the case, but also to the nature of offences committed and the need to prosecute the appellant. This ground of challenge shall stand outright rejected. ( 13 ) THE next submission relates to non establishment of demand made by the appellant to PW. 1. Not in the far away past, when Courts were of the view, that corroboration for demand may most often be required, prosecuting agencies commenced examining witnesses who accompanied the bribe giver in an attempt to place before Courts corroboration for demands allegedly made by the accused concerned. 1. Not in the far away past, when Courts were of the view, that corroboration for demand may most often be required, prosecuting agencies commenced examining witnesses who accompanied the bribe giver in an attempt to place before Courts corroboration for demands allegedly made by the accused concerned. It is not known as to why such a procedure was not adopted in the present case, P. W. 1 is certainly an aggrieved person, for admittedly he had to visit the Excise Office on a few occasions in his attempt to obtain refund of Rs. 1000/ -. If one normally goes by the time usually taken in Government offices for refund of deposits, it does amaze me how within 23 days, P. W. 1 was able to obtain return of security deposit. It is a very rare phenomenon in Government offices. That P. W. 1 was very anxious to get back the security deposit is evident from his application made, even four days earlier to the expiry of the period of licence. Correctly, the officer concerned and directed him to take steps, to have the security deposit refunded after 15-7-1983, when his licence period would expire. It is in this context that P. W. 1 has claimed to have approached the appellant on 15-7-1983. It is not the case of P. W. 1, either in his complaint, Ex. P-5, or in his oral evidence, that the appellant had initially demanded any money for processing of his application. He had only directed P. W. 1 to produce his licence and accounts so that orders could be obtained from the higher officers for refund of his security deposit. Again, there is no dispute that orders were passed on the basis of the recommendations made by the appellant, by higher officers, only on 10-8-1983 and 17-8-1983 and a requisition made for issue of a draft on 19-8-1983 was complied with by the Treasury and the draft was made ready only on 23-8-1983. It is not the case of P. W. 1 either in his complaint or in his oral evidence that at any earlier point of time the appellant had made a demand for a bribe. The first occasion on which bribe was allegedly demanded, relates to 22-81983. It is not the case of P. W. 1 either in his complaint or in his oral evidence that at any earlier point of time the appellant had made a demand for a bribe. The first occasion on which bribe was allegedly demanded, relates to 22-81983. Even on that day, demand of a bribe did not proceed passing on of information, for P. W. 1 is clear that the appellant directed him to come and collect the draft on the next day, for by then the draft was expected to be received from the treasury. The evidence of P. W. 1 in the witness box is that when he was coming out of the office, a peon told him that he will be able to receive the draft on the next day only on payment of Rs. 100/ -. It is on this aspect, that the prosecution deemed it necessary to treat P. W. 1 hostile. It is an accepted principle of law that the evidence of a hostile witness need not have to be rejected lock, stock and barrel and if his version in parts get strengthened by other available evidence, even then, a conviction can be recorded. However, if the core of the prosecution case is based on the version of a hostile witness and further the other evidence on record falls quite short of minimum requirements, to safely establish the guilt of an accused, based on moral beliefs, surmises or conjectures, a conviction cannot be recorded. Keeping these tenets in view, let us now scrutinize the evidence of P. W. 1 and assess if sans his evidence, the other evidence available would suffice to bring home the guilt, or the present version of P. W. 1 gets support from the remaining evidence, leaving an indelible impression, that the whole truth had not been placed before Court by the prosecution, may be, for a variety of reasons. ( 14 ) EX. P-5, the complaint preferred by P. W. 1 on the morning of 23-8-1983, is the genesis for this prosecution. As to how exactly Ex. P-5 had its birth, has to necessarily fall back on the evidence of P. W. 1 and P. W. 13. P. W. 1 has stated when cross-examined by the defence that initially he complained to P. W. 13 orally, which was not reduced into writing by the latter. As to how exactly Ex. P-5 had its birth, has to necessarily fall back on the evidence of P. W. 1 and P. W. 13. P. W. 1 has stated when cross-examined by the defence that initially he complained to P. W. 13 orally, which was not reduced into writing by the latter. He has further affirmed that P. W. 13 interrogated him as to who were the persons in the Excise Office, who must hand over the draft to him and when he mentioned the name of the appellant, the investigating officer told him that the complaint must implicit the appellant. He is also clear in his version in the witness-box that he had told the investigating officer that the demand was made by a peon and not by the appellant. Only after a conversation of this nature had taken place between P. W. 1 and P. W. 13, Ex. P-5 was written by P. W. 1. That there must be some truth in this part of the version of P. W. 1 is abundantly clear from the deposition of P. W. 13, the investigating officer. He has admitted that initially he did not reduce into writing the details orally mentioned to him by P. W. 1. If that be so, it will be impossible to totally ignore the evidence of P. W. 1 about the manner in which he had scribed Ex. P-5. May be, for reasons beyond comprehension of the Court, P. W. 1 had attempted to give a go by to his story in Ex. P-5. But, if a doubt could be entertained that Ex. P-5 itself was the outcome of the conversation between the investigating officer and P. W. 1 then a little more care will have to betaken in assessing the credibility of the prosecution case. It is more so in this prosecution for two independent witnesses, P. Ws. 2 and 4, have mentioned about the reaction of the appellant, soon after seizure of incriminating currencies and the statement spontaneously made by him to the investigating officer. In Ex. P-5, P. W. 1 has stated that he was vexed by frequent trips to the Excise Office and most often the appellant had asked him to return a few days thereafter. In Ex. P-5, P. W. 1 has stated that he was vexed by frequent trips to the Excise Office and most often the appellant had asked him to return a few days thereafter. In the complaint, he has spoken about his having met the appellant on 8th August, 1983, about which there is not even a whisper in the oral evidence. It is true that he has stated in Ex. P-5 that the appellant demanded ten percent of the draft amount as bribe with a, condition that only in the event of payment of bribe demanded, the draft would be handed over to him. In other words, if the averments in the complaint have to be taken to be true, the appellant should have been more interested in getting the bribe amount before performing his duty of handing over the draft to P. W. 1. That does not appear to be the prosecution case. It is also the definite case of P. W. 1 in Ex. P-5, that the appellant asked him to go over on the next day, to receive the draft, if he did not have Rs. 100/-to be offered as bribe. From the averments in the complaint, it looks as though, that the draft was already available and the only impediment was receipt of the bribe. The evidence now discloses, that the draft itself was made ready only on 23-8-1993 and not earlier. It appears to be that P. W. 1 is an experienced witness, for even initially he had gone over to the vigilance office keeping ready Rs. 100/-to be used as trap money. It is also evident from Ex. P-5 that none else had accompanied him at the time when the alleged demand was made by the appellant on 23-8-1983. In the witness-box, P. W. 1 had a different story to offer. He is specific that the appellant had not made any demand and never accepted Rs. 100/-as bribe on the basis of such demand. He would have it that the demand was made by a peon. On the date of trap, the appellant, without demanding payment, handed over the draft, Ex. P-9, on the mere asking and obtained his signature as well in the register, only after receiving the draft, he would have it that he asked for the peon, who wanted some money and handed over Rs. On the date of trap, the appellant, without demanding payment, handed over the draft, Ex. P-9, on the mere asking and obtained his signature as well in the register, only after receiving the draft, he would have it that he asked for the peon, who wanted some money and handed over Rs. 100/-to the appellant with a request to pass it on to that peon. May be, PW. 1 is a liar. But, it is not possible to separate truth from falsehood. It will be hazardous to take parts of evidence of P. W. 1 and then try to seek corroboration, from the other evidence available. If the appellant was keen on receiving the bribe amount, it stands to reason that he would have demanded and accepted Rs. 100/-initially before handing over the draft and obtaining the signature of P. W. 1 in the register maintained for that purpose. At the risk of repetition, it must be stated that is not the prosecution case. It is quite true that acceptance of money as bribe on behalf of another employee, may also fall within the tour comers of the offence alleged, but so long as there is no demand, end acceptance does not follow that demand, it will not be fair to find a person guilty of dubious evidence, which does not make any impact, of credibility. No doubt, as pointed out by Mr. R. Raghupathi, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, when cross-examined by the State, P. W. 1 has accepted the truth of the contents of Ex. P-5. However, this Court cannot overlook that again when cross examined by the defence. P. W. 1 had a different story to offer. P. W. 1 can change colours like a chameleon, initially giving out a version in chief examination changing it partially in favour of prosecution in cross-examination by the prosecutor and opting to give a different version in favour of the defence, on cross-examination by the accused. As I have already stated, if the genesis of Ex. P-5 is open to doubt, then prudence would demand eschewing from consideration the entire evidence of P. W. 1, as totally devoid of merit. Not only there is no corroboration for the initial demand made on 22-8-1983, but also there is no evidence of demand at all an 23-8-1983, prior to receipt of Rs. 100/- by the appellant. P-5 is open to doubt, then prudence would demand eschewing from consideration the entire evidence of P. W. 1, as totally devoid of merit. Not only there is no corroboration for the initial demand made on 22-8-1983, but also there is no evidence of demand at all an 23-8-1983, prior to receipt of Rs. 100/- by the appellant. Of course, the investigating officer, P. W. 13, has deposed that P. W. 1 had stated during investigation about such demand made by the appellant, but for the reasons already stated by me, the evidence of P. W. 1 cannot even be touched on credibility with a pair of tongs. ( 15 ) LET us now have a quick look into the versions of P. Ws. 2 and4, who speak about the recovery of incriminating currency from the appellant soon after P. W. 1 gave them the prearranged signal. Apart from these two witnesses, P. W. 13 has also spoken about the said aspect; to which I will make a reference separately, P. W. 2 was a Superintendent in the Regional Transport Officers office at Thanjavur at the relevant time. He has admitted that when questioned by P. W. 13 during investigation, he had told him, that the appellant had informed P. W. 13 that P. W. 1 had handed over the currency with a request to hand it over to the concerned clerk. He is also clear in his evidence that the statement made by the accused soon after the trap, was not immediately recorded by the investigating officer and the mahazar was prepared only after the whole incident was over. From the evidence of P. W. 2 also, it is apparent that even at the initial stages, the appellant had spontaneously given out his case, that he had not demanded any bribe and P. W. 1 voluntarily had paid Rs. 100/-, to be passed on to a peon or a clerk, whomsoever it might be. The crux of the matter is that the money admittedly recovered from the appellant cannot be correlated with any demand made by him to P. W. 1 and accepted in pursuance of such demand. Quite often, the Supreme Court has observed that mere recovery of money, divorced from other circumstances, cannot form the basic for a conviction. The crux of the matter is that the money admittedly recovered from the appellant cannot be correlated with any demand made by him to P. W. 1 and accepted in pursuance of such demand. Quite often, the Supreme Court has observed that mere recovery of money, divorced from other circumstances, cannot form the basic for a conviction. ( 16 ) P. W. 4, who was then the Excise Officer, has admitted that he had not told during investigation, that the appellant stated to P. W. 13 while handing over currency that he obtained the same from P. W. 1. This is a very relevant circumstance, which cannot be lost sight of, for this fits in with the defence of the appellant, not taken for the first time in Court, but had come into existence even on the date of trap. I have already mentioned that the draft stood issued to the appellant within about 23 days and that should be taken to be, a rather fast service. On this aspect, P. W. 4, the Excise Officer. has admitted that in July and August, 1983, the work-load was so heavy and they were constrained to work day and night due to auctions to be concluded for arrack and toddy shops during that period. ( 17 ) THE only other evidence that let remains to be considered is that of the investigating officer. We have already seen that he had not done the elementary duty of reducing into writing the oral statement made by P. W. 1 soon after he approached him. This, in fairness, he ought to have done as contemplated under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is not as though, he cannot ask for a complaint in writing, from P. W. 1 but, on the facts available, a reasonable doubt does surface, as to whether there can be a possible divergence between the written complaint and the earlier oral complaint made by P. W. 1, before scribing Ex. P-5. Usually, before laying a trap, an enquiry is made about the reputation of the official concerned, though such enquiry may not be very detailed. P. W. 13 has admitted that he did not even attempt to learn about the antecedents of the accused before proceeding to lay a trap. P-5. Usually, before laying a trap, an enquiry is made about the reputation of the official concerned, though such enquiry may not be very detailed. P. W. 13 has admitted that he did not even attempt to learn about the antecedents of the accused before proceeding to lay a trap. This is only by the way for, in conglomeration with other facts, this facet also assumes importance in this particular prosecution. It is not as though in every prosecution, this aspect will enure in favour of the defence P. W 13 has also admitted that he had not conducted investigation as to whether refund order leading to handing over of draft was delayed in the Excise Office at Mayiladuthurai. This is a basic question, he must have addressed to himself during the course of investigation and thereafter attempted to gather material in support, of such delay, if any. The entire evidence, does not result, in fruitful impact, to safely convict the appellant of the charges framed against him. It may be that were is strong suspicion against him. But, suspicion cannot take the place of proof. ( 18 ) I have already stated that corroboration for demand will generally be necessary, though such corroboration can sometimes be technically based on other material available on record, or may be by direct evidence also. In the present prosecution, there is no corroboration either for the initial demand or any evidence of demand at all on the trap day. It will be necessary, to just mention, about the law available on the subject. In Poul Sathyaraj, in re4 Krishnaswamy Reddy, J. stated as hereunder; it is not safe to act upon the testimony of a decoy, who, in the nature of things, will be an aggrieved party, without corroboration in respect of demand of bribe by the public servant. There must be sufficient proof, that the accused had accepted the bribe in consequence of the demand. Mere suspicions cannot take the place of proof. In that case, the evidence of a decoy witness alone was available and he had supported the prosecutions case. The defence of the accused therein was that the currency had been planted. In that context, the learned Judge was of the opinion that the most important question to be considered was whether the appellant demanded Rs. 20/-before the trap. In that case, the evidence of a decoy witness alone was available and he had supported the prosecutions case. The defence of the accused therein was that the currency had been planted. In that context, the learned Judge was of the opinion that the most important question to be considered was whether the appellant demanded Rs. 20/-before the trap. Ultimately, the learned Judge found that it was possible to draw an inference in favour of the accused and the only mode suggested by the prosecution cannot be accepted as incontrovertible. ( 19 ) IN Panalal v. State of Maharshtra, dealing with the evidentiary value of a trap witness, the Supreme Court stated as hereunder: It will be seen that the version of the complainant that the appellant asked the complainant whether he had brought the money and that the complainant told him that he had and that the appellant asked him to pay the money to the second accused is not spoken to by the Panch witness P. W. 3. According to Panch witness on the complainant asking the appellant whether his work will be achieved, the appellant assured him in the affirmative and the appellant told the complainant what was to be given to the second accused. It is sufficient that P. W. 3 does not mention about the appellant asking the complainant whether he had brought the money and on the complainant replying in the affirmative asking the complainant to pay the money to the second accused. Omission of P. W. 3 to refer to any mention of money by the appellant would show that there is no corroboration of testimony of the complainant regarding the demand for the money by the appellant. On this crucial aspect, therefore, it has to be found that the version of the complainant is not corroborated and, therefore, the evidence of the complainant on this aspect cannot be relied on. Even in that case, before the Supreme Court, a conviction was sought for by the State on the basis of the version of Panch witness. Ultimately, the Supreme Court found the evidence of the complainant was not corroborated on material particulars. The same approach, I have made in this appeal, while assessing the available evidence. Even in that case, before the Supreme Court, a conviction was sought for by the State on the basis of the version of Panch witness. Ultimately, the Supreme Court found the evidence of the complainant was not corroborated on material particulars. The same approach, I have made in this appeal, while assessing the available evidence. ( 20 ) IN passing, I would like to quote the observations of the Himachal Pradesh High Court in State of H. P. v. Tej Ram, on amendemand and if it is contemplated under the Prevention of Corruption Act they read as hereunder: From the mere absence of word demand in Section 161, Penal Code or Sec. 5 (1) (d) of Corruption Act, it cannot be said that demand of illegal gratification on the part of the accused is not an essential element of the offence and therefore there is no requirement to prove the demand as and independent fact. If that be not so, the result would be catastropic and anyone may come forward to levy an allegation of corruption or bribery against a Government servant by just pushing money into his pocket or throwing the same at his table and without even telling him the cause of it. The word obtains, therefore, has been intentionally used by the Legislature and it has a definite meaning. Therefore, before anyone can be proceeded against under these provisions, it is necessary to prove that it was as a result of demand that money was passed on. ( 21 ) ON factual conspectus as well as on legal principles, appellant is certainly entitled to the benefit of doubt. Convictions and the sentences imposed on the appellant are set aside. The appellant is acquitted. Fine, if paid by him, shall be refunded. This appeal is allowed. Appeal allowed. Appeal acquitted.