D. K. SETH, J. On being appointed as a clerk by the Development Officer (Leather) Kanpur on 2-1-1956 the petitioner was promoted and appoin ted as Head Clerk-cum-Accountant by the Director of Industries, by an order dated 7-11-1959. By an order dated 16th May, 1977 the District Industries Officer, Etah, suspended the petitioner with effect from 19-5-1977. A charge-sheet was served on the petitioner on 19-7-1977 and pursuant to which an inquiry was held. By an order dated 13-4-1978, after the petitioner was found guilty of misconduct three penalties were imposed upon him namely : (a) pay for the period of suspension was limited to the extent of subsistence allowance. (b) Adverse entry in the character toll of the petitioner was entered. (c) Debarring the petitioner from promotion for three years. Against the said order of punishment dated 13-4-1978 the petitioner preferred an appeal before the Director of Industries on 13-7-1978. Though two years have passed after filing of the appeal, no decision was taken on the said appeal. Therefore, the petitioner preferred a claim petition being claim petition No. 472 (F)/iii of 1980 before the U. P. Public Services Tribunal, Lucknow. By an order dated 30th May 1986 the said claim petition was dismissed. The petitioner has impugned the said order dated 30thjmay, 1986 in the present writ petition and prayed for quashing of the said impugned order. 2. In the counter affidavit it has been asserted that inquiry into the charges were held in accordance with the rule and the petitioner was found guilty of various charges, against which he submitted a representation to the Director of Industries and before the same could be decided, he presented a claim petition, which has since been dismissed by the U. P. Public Services Tribunal, Lucknow. Since the petitioner has not exhausted the departmental remedies his claim petition was barred by Section 4 of the U. P. Public Services Tribunal Act, 1976, hereinafter referred to as the said Act. 3. In the rejoinder affidavit the petitioner has controverted the state ment in the counter affidavit and has pointed out that he had preferred an appeal which was not decided for a long period of two years. Therefore, he had presented the claim petition before the U. P. Public Services Tribunal, Lucknow. 4. 3. In the rejoinder affidavit the petitioner has controverted the state ment in the counter affidavit and has pointed out that he had preferred an appeal which was not decided for a long period of two years. Therefore, he had presented the claim petition before the U. P. Public Services Tribunal, Lucknow. 4. In support of the writ petition learned counsel for the petitioner drew my attention to Annexure 14 to the writ petition, being the impugned order dated 30th May, 1986 passed in Claim Petition No. 472 (F)/ii of 1980. Out of the four reliefs enumerated on page 2 of the said order the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that he would be pressing only relief No. 1 and he has not pressed reliefs No. 2, 3 and 4. 5. A perusal of the impugned order dated 30th May, 1986 indicates that so far as relief No. 2 relating to the quashing of adverse entries are concerned, the same was allowed by the impugned order, The relief No. 3 for payment of Rs. 285. 95 as Travelling allowance was disallowed. Whereas relief No. 4 was not pressed by the petitioner before the Tribunal. 6. Now turning to relief No. 1 for quashing the order of suspension and punishment, being Annexures 1 and 7 to the Claim petition I find that the said relief was denied by the U. P. Public Services Tribunal, Lucknow (hereinafter referred to as the tribunal) on the ground that the claim peti tion was barred under the provisions of Section 4 of the said Act. Since the petitioner did not exhaust the departmental remedies, he had recorded his reasons that as in Paras 10 and 24 of the counter affidavit before the Tribunal the respondents had pleaded to the above extent which was not specifically denied by the petitioner in his rejoinder affidavit, in paragraphs ? and u before the Tribunal. Therefore the contention of the respondent before the Tribunal were accepted and upheld by the Tribunal. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner then submitted that the peti tioner had exhausted all departmental remedies by filing appeal on 13-7-1978 before the Director of Industries. and u before the Tribunal. Therefore the contention of the respondent before the Tribunal were accepted and upheld by the Tribunal. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner then submitted that the peti tioner had exhausted all departmental remedies by filing appeal on 13-7-1978 before the Director of Industries. But in spite of lapse of long two years the same having not been decided it is implied that the appeal stood rejected inasmuch as according to the rules such appeal has to be disposed of within a period of three months from the date of its filing. Therefore the Tribunal could not have decided the claim petition on the ground of non-exhaustion of departmental remedies by the petitioner. 8. In Para 27 of the writ petition the petitioner has categorically stated that the appeal was filed on 13th July, 1978 and the said fact was pleaded in Para 10 of the Claim Petition which was quoted in Para 27 of the writ petition. It appears therefrom that the appeal preferred by the petitioner on 13-7-1978 before the Director of Industries, was still pending, though two long years have lapsed in between although the appeal ought to have been decided within three months and, therefore, the said appeal is deemed to have been rejected. While dealing with the said statement in Para 25 of the counter affidavit the respondents had contended "that the contents of Paragraphs 27 to 37 of the writ petition are matter of record and argumentative, which will suitably be met at the time of hearing of the case. " It further appears from Para 3 (b) of the counter affidavit that the petitioner had submitted a representation against the said order of punishment before Director of Industries. But before any order could be passed he presented the claim petition before the U. P. Public Service Tribunal, Lucknow. 9. In the Rejoinder Affidavit the petitioner had reiterated that since his appeal preferred on 13-7-1978 was not disposed of even within two years he had no alternative but to prefer a claim petition before the U. P. Public Services Tribunal, Lucknow, as has been pleaded in Paras 5 and 24 of the rejoinder affidavit and sought to repeat the statements made by him in Paragraphs 27 to 37 of the writ petition while dealing that Para 25 of the counter affidavit, as pleaded in Para 25 of the writ petition. 10. Thus it appears that the petitioner had preferred an appeal but the same was not disposed of even within two years. The respondents could have disposed of the said appeal within a reasonable period. It is unfortunate that without disposing of the said appeal the respondents had sought to urge that the claim petition is not maintainable because in view of Section 4" of the said Act the petitioner did not exhaust the departmental remedies. Even in the counter affidavit filed before this court it has not been pleaded that as to whether the said appeal has been decided in the meantime or not. The silence about the result of appeal leads me to hold that the appeal has not been decided until the date of filing of the counter affidavit. No information is forthcoming even during the course of hearing as to whether the said appeal has been decided or not, neither any documents have been produced nor any prayer has been made for seeking instruction in respect thereof. In the result the position is that the said appeal has not been decided. 11. As soon the appeal is filed under the rule it is the duty of the departmental authorities to dispose of the same within a reasonable time which can never be conceived by two years or even more. Even before the Tribunal it was not contended that the appeal was decided before the order passed by the Tribunal namely, on 30th May, 1986 Therefore, it cannot be said that the petitioner did not exhaust the departmental remedies. Admittedly, the petitioner had preferred an appeal on 13-7-1978 and he had waited for long two years, which fact has not been disputed by the respondents. The respondents cannot compel the petitioner to wait indefinitely nor the respon dents can sit upon the appeal, preferred by the petitioner for a long period even for two years without any cogent reasons. No reason for the delay is forthcoming, neither anything was explained even before the Tribunal. 12. The respondents cannot take the advantage of their own wrong by pleading that the petitioner had not exhausted departmental remedies, without deciding the appeal and thereafter frustrate the petitioners claim petition invoking Section 4 of the said Act. No reason for the delay is forthcoming, neither anything was explained even before the Tribunal. 12. The respondents cannot take the advantage of their own wrong by pleading that the petitioner had not exhausted departmental remedies, without deciding the appeal and thereafter frustrate the petitioners claim petition invoking Section 4 of the said Act. Section 4 of the said Act provides for lodging a claim before the Tribunal in respect of employment of an employee except claim arising out of transfer. Section 4 of the Act also contains proviso which reads as under : "provided further that no reference shall ordinarily be entertained by the Tribunal until the claimant has exhausted his departmental remedies under the rules applicable to him. Explanation.-For the purposes of this proviso, it shall not be necessary to require the claimant (in (he case of a Government servant) to avail also of the remedy claim to the Tribunal. " Therefore the Proviso does not comprehend absolute bar in preferring a claim before the Tribunal without exhausting departmental remedies. The proviso provides that such reference may not be entertained ordinarily unless depart mental remedies are exhausted. The expression "ordinarily makes an excep tion that if there are extraordinary circumstances then appeal/claim may be entertained even when the departmental remedies are not exhausted. The proviso does not operate as an absolute bar, it encompasses the discretion on the Tribunal with regard to entertainment of reference in cases which are not ordinary in nature. The discretion is to be exercised judiciously and the Tribunal has to apply its mind in the facts and circumstances of the case in order to decide whether the same is exception to the bar provided in the said proviso. 13. In the present case the petitioner having preferred the appeal he had on his part exhausted his departmental remedies under the rule. Non-disposal of appeal within a period of two years by the respondents is not an action within the control of the petitioner. Therefore, it cannot be said that he had any role to play in the inaction on the part of the respondents. Non-disposal of appeal within a period of two years by the respondents is not an action within the control of the petitioner. Therefore, it cannot be said that he had any role to play in the inaction on the part of the respondents. Preferring of appeal by the petitioner and waiting for its result for long two years, is sufficient to discharge his responsibility for exhausting his depart mental remedies for the purposes of referring the claim before the Tribunal under Section 4 of the said Act, within the exception as provided in the said proviso creating a bar on account of non- exhaustion of departmental reme dies. The situation in the present case cannot be termed as ordinary situation in which the said proviso can be attracted. On the other hand the situation clearly bring the present facts within the exception as contemplated under the said proviso. 14. A perusal of the impugned order shows that the Tribunal has not applied its mind to the said proviso. Therefore that part of the finding, with regard to relief No. 1, dismissing the claim petition on the ground of non-exhaustion of departmental remedies, cannot be sustained. 15. Therefore, the order dated 30th May, 1986 passed by the Tribunal, as contained in Annexure-14 to the writ petition, is quashed to the extent by which the relief No. 1 was denied on the ground of non- exhaustion of the departmental remedies. The Tribunal is directed to proceed afresh with the said Claim Petition No. 472 (F)/ii of 1980, preferred by the petitioner in respect of relief Mo. 1 as contained in Annexure-14 to the writ petition, being order dated 30th May, 1986 passed by the Tribunal, treating the same as maintainable within the exception provided in the aforesaid proviso to Section 4 of the said Act and decide the same on merits after giving respec tive parties proper notices and opportunity of hearing as expeditiously as possible preferably within a period of six months from the date a certified copy of this order or operative portion thereof, is produced before the Tri bunal. While deciding the said claim petition on merits the Tribunal shall not be influenced by any observations made in this order. 16. This court cannot but express its dismay and concern to the stand taken by the respondents, as has been observed above. While deciding the said claim petition on merits the Tribunal shall not be influenced by any observations made in this order. 16. This court cannot but express its dismay and concern to the stand taken by the respondents, as has been observed above. The respondents being Government authorities are expected to act fairly and not as private litigant and should not have resorted to technicalities without discharging to obliga tions cast upon them. It is really unfortunate that the authorities have taken such an irresponsible stand and attempted to take advantage of their own wrong. This observation should be brought to the notice of all concerned and this court hopes and trust that such situation may not be repeated in future. 17. In the result the writ petition succeeds and is allowed to the above extent. There will be, however, no order as to costs. Petition allowed. .