Judgment : K. A. SWAMI C.J. At the stage of admission, the learned Additional Government Pleader for Taxes has been directed to take notice. Accordingly, she has taken notice on behalf of the respondents, received instructions and secured records also. As the matter lies in a narrow compass, the appeal is admitted and it is heard for final disposal. 2. In the writ petitions, the appellant-petitioner sought for quashing the orders dated October 28, 1993, passed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner (C.T.), Kancheepuram, in Appeal Nos. 38/90/CST and 39/90/CST, dismissing them for default. The last date on which the appeals were posted for hearing was October 28, 1993. Before that date, the appeals were adjourned for a number of times. The orders dismissing the appeals for default state all those dates. Even on October 28, 1993, the appellant-petitioner did not turn up. Hence, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner took the view that there was no alternative but to dismiss the appeals. Thus, he did not go into the merits of the appeals and dismissed them on the ground that neither the appellant nor its counsel was present. The learned single Judge has rejected the writ petitions on the ground that the appellant-petitioner was well aware of the posting of the appeals for hearing as it was served with notices. Further, there was a delay in filing the writ petitions inasmuch as the appeals were dismissed on October 28, 1993, whereas the writ petitions were filed only on June 30, 1994. 3. Further, there was a delay in filing the writ petitions inasmuch as the appeals were dismissed on October 28, 1993, whereas the writ petitions were filed only on June 30, 1994. 3. Before us, the only contention urged by the learned counsel for the appellant is that even assuming that the petitioner-appellant in spite of service of notice remained absent on October 28, 1993, nevertheless having regard to the provisions contained in section31(3) of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") and rule 27(5) of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Rules (hereinafter referred to as "the Rules") it was not open to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner to dismiss the appeals for default, inasmuch as he was bound to decide the appeal on merits even in the absence of the appellant.Section 31(3) of the Act provides the powers of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the manner of disposal of the appeals and it reads thus : "In disposing of an appeal, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner may, after giving the appellant a reasonable opportunity of being heard, and for the sufficient reasons to be recorded in writing, .(a) in the case of an order of assessment - .(i) confirm, reduce, enhance or annul the assessment or the penalty or both; .(ii) set aside the assessment and direct the assessing authority to make a fresh assessment after such further inquiry as may be directed; or (iii) pass such other ordersas he may think fit; or (b) in the case of any other order, confirm, cancel or vary such order : Provided that at the hearing of any appeal against an order of the assessing authority, the assessing authority shall have the right to be heard either in person or by a representative." * Thus, according to the aforesaid provisions, it is open to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner to confirm, reduce, enhance or annul the assessment or the penalty or either to set aside the assessment and direct the assessing authority to make a fresh assessment after such further inquiry as may be directed or pass such other orders as he may think fit or in the case of any other order confirm, cancel or vary such order after hearing the assessee either in person or by a representative. Rule 27(5) specifically provides thus : "The appellate authority shall, after giving the appellant reasonable opportunity of being heard, pass such orders on the appeal as such authority thinks fit subject to the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 31 or sub-section (3) of section 31-A, as the case may be." * The instant cases fall under section31(3) of the Act. Learned Additional Government Pleader (Taxes) submits that the words "pass such other orders as he may think fit" occurring in clause (iii) of sub-section(3) of section31 of the Act empowers the Appellate Assistant Commissioner even to dismiss the appeal for default of appearance; whereas the learned counsel for the appellant submits that those words are to be read in conjunction with clauses (i) and (ii) and as a result of such reading it would follow that the words "such other orders as he may think fit" only relate to the merits of the appeal and not dismissing it for default because sub-section (3) relates to the exercise of power to confirm, reduce, enhance or annul the assessment or the penalty or both or to remit the matter. Added to that the Rules also do not enable the Appellate Assistant Commissioner to dismiss the appeal for default. 4. We are of the view that neither the Act nor the Rules specifically provide for dismissing the appeal for default in the event of non-appearance of the assessee either in person or through the representative. The power conferred under sub-section(3) of section31 of the Act upon the Appellate Assistant Commissioner is to decide the appeal on merits and in so deciding the appeal, he can confirm, reduce, enhance or annul the assessment or the penalty or both or remit the matter for fresh disposal. Sub-rule (5) of rule 27 of the Rules also does not enable the Appellate Assistant Commissioner to dismiss the appeal for default, but it only says that he shall after affording the appellant reasonable opportunity of being heard pass such order as he thinks fit. In our view, the matter is no more res integra. Sub-rule (5) of rule 27 of the Rules also does not enable the Appellate Assistant Commissioner to dismiss the appeal for default, but it only says that he shall after affording the appellant reasonable opportunity of being heard pass such order as he thinks fit. In our view, the matter is no more res integra. The Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. S. Chenniappa Mudaliar considered the provisions contained in sub-section(4) of section33 of the Income-tax Act, 1922, as it stood then, and held, that the said provision did not provide for dismissal of the appeal for default and it only provided that the Appellate Tribunal may, after giving an opportunity of being heard, pass such order as it thinks fit and shall communicate any such orders to the assessee and to the Commissioner. This sub-section (4) of section33 of the Income-tax Act is similar to sub-rule (5) of rule 27 of the Rules. The Rules framed under the Income-tax Act, namely, Appellate Tribunal Rules, 1946, enabled the Tribunal to dismiss the appeal for default. The Supreme Court in Chenniappa Mudaliars case held that the said rule was ultra vires of the provisions contained in sub-section(4) of section33 of the Act and the Appellate Tribunal could not dismiss the appeal for default. The relevant portion of the judgment is as follows : "The scheme of the provisions of the Act relating to the Appellate Tribunal apparently is that it has to dispose of an appeal by making such orders as it thinks fit on the merits. It follows from the language of section 33(4) and in particular the use of the word thereon that the Tribunal has to go into the correctness or otherwise of the points decided by the departmental authorities in the light of the submissions made by the appellant. This can only be done by giving a decision on the merits on questions of fact and law and not by merely disposing of the appeal on the ground that the party concerned has failed to appear. This can only be done by giving a decision on the merits on questions of fact and law and not by merely disposing of the appeal on the ground that the party concerned has failed to appear. As observed in Hukumchand Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax the word thereon in section 33(4) restricts the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to the subject-matter of the appeal and the words pass such orders as the Tribunal thinks fit include all the powers (except possibly the power of enhancement) which are conferred upon the Appellate Assistant Commissioner by section31 of the Act. The provisions contained in section 66 about making a reference on questions of law to the High Court will be rendered nugatory if any such power is attributed to the Appellate Tribunal by which it can dismiss an appeal, which has otherwise been properly filed, for default, without making any order thereon in accordance with section 33(4). The position becomes quite simple when it is remembered that the assessee or the Commissioner of Income-tax, if aggrieved by the orders of the Appellate Tribunal, can have resort only to the provisions of section 66. So far as the questions of fact are concerned the decision of the Tribunal is final and reference can be sought to the High Court only on questions of law. The High Court exercises purely advisory jurisdiction and has no appellate or revisional powers. The advisory jurisdiction can be exercised on a proper reference being made and that cannot be done unless the Tribunal itself has passed proper order under section 33(4). It follows from all this that the Appellate Tribunal is bound to give a proper decision on questions of fact as well as law which can only be done if the appeal is disposed of on the merits and not dismissed owing to the absence of the appellant. It was laid down as far back as the year 1953 by S. R. Das J. (as he then was) in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Arunachalam Chettiar that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and of the High Court is conditional on there being an order by the Appellate Tribunal which may be said to be one under section 33(4) and a question of law arising out of such an order. The Special Bench, in the present case, while examining this aspect, quite appositely referred to the observations of Venkatarama Aiyar, J., in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Scindia Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. indicating the necessity of the disposal of the appeal on the merits by the Appellate Tribunal. This is how the learned Judge had put the matter in the form of interrogation :How can it be said that the Tribunal should seek for advice on a question which it was not called upon to consider and in respect of which it had no opportunity of deciding whether the decision of the court should be sought ? Thus looking at the substantive provisions of the Act there is no escape from the conclusion that under section 33(4) the Appellate Tribunal has to dispose of the appeal on the merits and cannot short-circuit the same by dismissing it for default of appearance." * That being so, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner had no jurisdiction to dismiss the appeal for default, even though the appellant was guilty of being absent on several dates of hearing. 5. We also notice a decision of a learned single Judge of this Court in Southern Steel Industries v. Appellate Assistant Commissioner (C.T.) (printed at page 273 supra); (1995) 8 MTCR 137. We approve of the said decision of the learned single Judge in the aforesaid case, as it confirms to the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court in Chenniappa Mudaliars which has also been followed therein. 6. Thus we hold that as per the provisions contained in sub-section(3) of section31 of the Act and sub-rule (5) of rule 27 of the Rules, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner had no jurisdiction to dismiss the appeals for default. He should have decided the appeals on merits even in the absence of the appellant. Accordingly, these appeals are allowed and the order dated July 21, 1994, passed by the learned single Judge in W.P. Nos. 11475 of 1994 and 11199 of 1994 is set aside. The aforesaid writ petitions are allowed and the impugned orders dated October 28, 1993, in A.P. No. 38/90/CST and A.P. No. 39/90/CST passed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, Kancheepuram, are quashed. The said appeals are remitted back to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, Kancheepuram, with a direction to decide the appeals on merits and in accordance with law. The aforesaid writ petitions are allowed and the impugned orders dated October 28, 1993, in A.P. No. 38/90/CST and A.P. No. 39/90/CST passed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, Kancheepuram, are quashed. The said appeals are remitted back to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, Kancheepuram, with a direction to decide the appeals on merits and in accordance with law. To avoid any further delay in these matters the appellant herein is directed to appear before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, Kancheepuram, on the 2nd day of January, 1996, without awaiting any further notice. If the appellant fails to appear on the said date, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner shall proceed to decide the appeals on merits and in accordance with law. There will be no order as to costs.