Judgment Judgment 1. The Court: This is an application for stay of operation of the order dated 9th November, 1994 passed by the learned trial Judge in C.O.No. 4740 (W) of 1994 staying the order dated 31st May, 1993 passed by the Industrial Tribunal. By the said order the tribunal decided the preliminary issue and held that the domestic enquiry held in this case by the management was fair and proper and that the same was not perverse. By that order the tribunal fixed 18th June, 1993 for hearing of the case on merit and the workman was directed to lead evidence first. 2. The issue pending before the tribunal was whether the dismissal of the employee was valid or not. Against the said order passed by the Industrial Tribunal on 31st May 1993 the respondent workman filed a writ application on 9th November, 1994 i.e. after lapse of 18 months keeping the hands of the tribunal tied. 3. Mr. Partha Sarathi Sengupta, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant submitted before us that in view of the determination made by the Supreme Court of India in the case of The Cooper Engineering Ltd. vs. P.P. Mundhe reported in F.L.R. 1975 (31), page 188 as well as the Division Bench Judgment ofthis Court following the decision of the Supreme Court in Cooper Engineering's case as well as D.P. Maheswari's case and in the case of Peerless Employees' Union vs. Peerless General Insurance and Investment Co. Ltd. reported in F.L.R. 1991 (62) page 596 that it is not proper on the part of the writ court to entertain a writ application on the question of preliminary issue. In the Division Bench Judgment in Peerless case G.N. Ray, J (As His Lordship then was) observed that "After considering the respective contentions of the learned Counsels appearing for the parties, it appears to us that the High Court should be extremely reluctant to entertain the writ petition for challenging the decision of the Tribunal on preliminary issue. Such challenge cannot but delay final adjudication in the reference case to serious prejudice of the workmen. Interim relief cannot be a substitute for a final award and culmination of the dispute involved in the reference case. Such challenge cannot but delay final adjudication in the reference case to serious prejudice of the workmen. Interim relief cannot be a substitute for a final award and culmination of the dispute involved in the reference case. It is always expedient to resolve the dispute by passing a final award in the reference case even at the risk of erroneous award resulting from the erroneous decision on the preliminary issue. In our view, the learned trial Judge should not have entertained the writ petition and dismissed the same on the ground that interference at that stage was not called for." Mr. Sengupta submitted that in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Cooper Engineering's case as well as D.P. Maheswari's case it was not proper on the part of the learned trial Judge to entertain the writ application and stay the order passed by the Industrial Tribunal after lapse of 18 months from the date of passing of the order in view of the fact the decision on such preliminary issue could be adjudicated and gone into by the High Court or by the Supreme Court after the final award is passed in the matter. Mr. Sengupta further submitted that it is premature to hold that the case would go against the respondent writ petitioner. Even after holding that the enquiry was properly held and was not perverse the tribunal was not powerless to hold that the punishment was not proper and valid in view of the provisions of s. 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act. 4. Mr. Sen, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the writ petitioner respondent submitted that the Supreme Court in the aforesaid two cases has not laid down the law that the High Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the writ application against any determination made on the preliminary issue but it was more or less a self-imposed restriction upon the courts and that the High Court in appropriate cases has jurisdiction to entertain a writ application and upset the decision on preliminary issue. In this connection reference was made to a decision of a learned single Judge in the case of Motor Industries Co. Ltd. vs. D. P. Maheswari & Anr. In this connection reference was made to a decision of a learned single Judge in the case of Motor Industries Co. Ltd. vs. D. P. Maheswari & Anr. reported in 1 LLJ page 443 as well as the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Coromondal Fertilisers Limited vs. Labour Court, Hyderabad reported in 1975 (II) LLJ page 386. In our view when the Division Bench of this Court has decided identical issue in Peerless case we do not find any reason not to follow the same principle in the facts and circumstances of this case and we are not inclined to ignor the determination made by the Division Bench of this Court by any observation made by the learned Single Judge, one of Karnataka High Court and another of Andhra Pradesh High Court in the facts and circumstances of this case. 5. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case we are of the view that the scope of preliminary issue is quite limited. It is not necessary to consider the correctness of the decision made in the domestic enquiry on merits at that stage. The tribunal is required to decide the dispute and ultimately give his award. For deciding the preliminary issue the correctness of the ultimate decision made by the tribunal is not required to be considered at this stage. Whatever may be the merits of the case, in our view, this is not an appropriate stage where the writ court should interfere and/or entertain the writ application when all the questions that are decided by the tribunal in the preliminary form or in the final form can be adjudicated after the award is passed and the aggrieved party comes up to the High Court. We are unable to appreciate the arguments made by Mr. Sen that the decisions of the Cooper Engineering's case as well as of the Maheswari's case are only confined to the management and management only and the principles laid down therein have no application whatsoever in case the writ application is filed by the workman. One reason for which the Supreme Court had laid down the law was that such course of action would result delay in disposing of the industrial disputes. One reason for which the Supreme Court had laid down the law was that such course of action would result delay in disposing of the industrial disputes. Delay may be caused by the management or by the workman and that in order to avoid delay and multiplicity of proceedings the matter should not be entertained at this stage but after the final award is made. In the facts of this case after the preliminary issue was decided the workman took 18 months to move the writ application without any rhyme or reason and that the initial delay of 18 months is also a delay in disposing of the matter by the tribunal by tieing the hands of the tribunal. The tribunal decided the matter on 31st May, 1993 and we .are now at the end of March 1995. 6. Accordingly, considering the facts and circumstances of the case and without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties we are of the view that this is not an appropriate stage to entertain the writ application and to decide the matter on its merits after the preliminary issue has been decided in view of the fact that the determination made on the preliminary issue is upon to challenge after the final award is given against the workman. Accordingly, we are of the view that the tribunal should be allowed to proceed with the matter under the Industrial Disputes Act in accordance with law and we do not find any reason to stay the operation of the order dated 31st May, 1993 passed by the tribunal. We make it clear that we have not adjudicated any of the points which are left open to be decided in appropriate stages. The application for stay is thus allowed. 7. No useful purpose will be served keeping the appeal pending after the view we have taken. Accordingly, the appeal is treated as on day's list and is disposed of in terms of this order. 8. There will be no order as to costs. Appeal disposed of.