JUDGMENT 1. - Petitioners are challenging the validity of the demand notice dated 6.6.1995; for a sum of Rs. 17,84,006 (Rupees seventeen lac eighty four thousand and six only). It was issued by the Respondent in pursuance of the Circular dated 16.12.1991 (Annex. 20) exercising the powers under Section 173-A of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act. 2. The back drop of the case in short is that the properties bearing No. AMC 171/12, 171-A/12 and 172/12 situated at 'kacheri road', Ajmer belonged to Balwant Singh Rathore, Daulat Singh Rathore and Sajjan Singh Rathore. They executed sale deeds in the year 1991, in favour of the petitioners. 3. On the date of the sale deeds, these properties constituted one unit. There were number of shops standing on it. They were occupied by tenants. Different kinds of commercial activities were being carried from-these shops. 4. As many as eleven separate sale deeds were executed in favour of petitioners. In some sale deeds the properties were shown as commercial, in some it was shown as residential whereas in remaining it was shown as commercial-cum-residential. However, the primary use of property was commercial. 5. The Sub Registrar (Registration) collected stamps duties on the sale deeds treating the properties to be commercial in nature. After purchasing the properties, petitioners entered into partnership and a deed was executed. The object of the partnership was to develop the property as a commercial complex. 6. The plan of the proposed building was submitted to the respondent for approval as a commercial complex. 7. The Town Planning Department examined the matter thoroughly. The Dy. Town Planner submitted his report stating that the land in question was a commercial land. The plan was then sanctioned on 17.8.1993 and was released. The copy of the sanctioned plan along with the conditions imposed therein has been filed as Annexure No. 12. 8. After the respondent had sanctioned the plan for commercial building the construction work was commenced and the major portion of the construction was completed in 1994. In spite of the fact that the construction up to third floor was sanctioned by the respondent, but on 3rd December, 1994 a notice was served on the petitioners by the respondent to stop the construction of the third floor. Similar notices were issued on 25.2.95, 4.3.95, 7.5.95 and 6.6.95. 9. In spite of the fact that the construction up to third floor was sanctioned by the respondent, but on 3rd December, 1994 a notice was served on the petitioners by the respondent to stop the construction of the third floor. Similar notices were issued on 25.2.95, 4.3.95, 7.5.95 and 6.6.95. 9. On 6.6.1995 a separate notice of demand was also issued asking the petitioner to deposit a sum of Rs. 17,84,006 within seven days. This notice was issued in pursuance of the Circular issued by the Rajasthan Government on 16.12.1991 demanding the conversion charges from residential to non-residential. 10. Shri Paras Kuhad appearing on behalf of the petitioners contended that the entire property, at all relevant time was commercial in nature and was used only for commercial purposes. Even the master plan has shown it as commercial land. The Dy. Town Planner on examination found the property to be of commercial in nature. The Revenue Authorities have also treated this property as commercial. The respondent has all the time treated this property to be commercial in nature. The respondent is now estopped from demanding any amount in the form of conversion charge treating it to be a non-commercial one. Before assessing the amount it was mandatory on the part of the respondent to have given an opportunity of hearing. 11. Shri C. K. Garg appearing on behalf of the respondent has contested the writ petition mainly on the ground that Section 173-A of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act empowers the respondent to make the recovery in the form of conversion charge. Apart from this, he has also relied upon the circular dated 16.12.1991 (Annex. 20) issued by the Rajasthan Government. Though, according to him, the recommendation has already been made to the Government for framing the Rules as far back as in 1991 but no Rules have been framed as yet. In the absence of any Rule, the Municipal Council was justified in issuing the notice of demand in accordance of the Circular of 1991. 12. Though, according to him, the recommendation has already been made to the Government for framing the Rules as far back as in 1991 but no Rules have been framed as yet. In the absence of any Rule, the Municipal Council was justified in issuing the notice of demand in accordance of the Circular of 1991. 12. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties at length, I am of the view that the entire case hinges upon the interpretation of Section 173-A of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, which runs as follows : "173-A (Power of State Government to allow change in the use of land) - (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, where any land has been allotted or sold to any person by a Municipality or the State Government subject to the condition of restraining its use for a particular purpose, the State Government may, if it is satisfied so to do in public interest, allow the owner or holder of such land to use it for any other purpose other than the purpose for which it was originally allotted or sold, on payment of such conversion charges, as may be prescribed : Provided that the rates of conversion charges may be different for different areas and for different purposes. (2) The conversion charges so realised shall be credited to the Consolidated Fund of the State or to the fund of the municipality as may be determined by the State Government. (3) Such charges may be the first charge on the interest of the person liable in the land the use of which has been changed and shall be recoverable as arrears of land revenue." 13. A careful reading of this Section shows that the provisions will apply only with regard to that property which has been allotted or sold to any person by a Municipality or the State Government. Unless these ingredients are attracted the provision of Section 173-A will not apply. 14. The property purchased by the petitioners neither belonged to the municipality nor to the State Government. It was the private property of Rathores who sold it in 1991. The question is, on the admitted facts of this case can the Municipal Council recover conversion charges under the provisions of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act? The correct answer would be-"No, not at all". The provisions of Section 173-A are not attracted. It was the private property of Rathores who sold it in 1991. The question is, on the admitted facts of this case can the Municipal Council recover conversion charges under the provisions of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act? The correct answer would be-"No, not at all". The provisions of Section 173-A are not attracted. Consequently, under the notification of 1991 no conversion charges can be recovered. 15. The language of Section 173-A of the Act is absolutely clear and no ambiguity could be pointed out by the respondent's counsel. The elementary Rule of interpretation of statute is that it has to be read as it is without adding to or substracting record from it, keeping in mind the intention of the legislature. If the language of the statute is clear, plain and unambiguous, the Court is bound to give effect in accordance with the language. 16. Shri C. K. Garg appearing on behalf of the respondent was fair enough in not raising frivolous objection that Section 173-A of the Act covers even those properties which have not been sold by the municipality or by the State Government. 17. Equally important aspect of the case to be considered is the principle of promissory estoppel. Petitioners purchased the land in 1991. Their plans for the proposed commercial building was sanctioned in the year 1993. They proceeded with the construction. The building has almost been completed according to the sanctioned plan in 1994. If the respondent was of the opinion that the petitioners had to pay this huge amount of money as conversion charges, they should have demanded the same before sanctioning the plan in 1993. The respondent permitted the petitioners to continue with the construction. They invested substantial amount of money over it. All of a sudden on 6th June 1995 they have been served with a notice of demand. In may opinion, the respondent is estopped from making any demand at this stage. Had the petitioners known about this fact before starting the construction that they will have to pay Rs. 17,84,006 as conversion charge, there was a possibility that they might not have started the construction unless the matter was finally settled. 18. Every action of the State and its instrumentalities is expected to be fair. It will always have to meet the test of reasonableness. 17,84,006 as conversion charge, there was a possibility that they might not have started the construction unless the matter was finally settled. 18. Every action of the State and its instrumentalities is expected to be fair. It will always have to meet the test of reasonableness. Where is the reasonableness and fairness in the action of the respondent in demanding this amount without giving any opportunity to the petitioners to satisfy the respondent that this amount could not be assessed and demanded? The doctrine of fairness is equally applicable to the public bodies like Municipal Council. They have also to maintain the Rule of law and act within the framework of the statute as observed by the Supreme Court in the cases reported in 1994 (2) JT 140 (Assistant Excise Commissioner and Others v. Issac Pittar and Others) and in (1993) 3 SCC 634 (Hansraj H. Jain v. State of Maharashtra) . 19. The doctrine of Equitable Estoppel has been evolved for promoting honesty and good faith in public bodies. The object of this doctrine is to protect a promisee who acts on the faith of promise/representation made by a promisor. 20. The respondent could recover the conversion charges in pursuance of the notification 1991 only if the case was covered of Section 173-A of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act. Since I have already expressed my views in the preceding paragraphs that the provisions of Section 173-A are not attracted. In my opinion, the notice of demand dated 6.6.95 is wholly illegal and without jurisdiction. No conversion charges can be recovered from the petitioners. The notice is hereby quashed. 21. No other point survives for consideration. 22. Consequently, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed with costs. *******