JUDGMENT A.R. Tiwari, J. 1. The applicant (Commissioner of Wealth-tax, Bhopal), has filed this application under Section 27(3) of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957 (for short, "the Act"), seeking a direction to the Tribunal to state the case and to refer the proposed question of law as extracted below : "Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal is justified in holding that Section 7(4) of the Wealth-tax Act, inserted by the Finance Act, 1976, is procedural in nature and is applicable to all the pending assessments including the assessments prior to the assessment year 1976-77 ?" 2. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that the assessee on the valuation date, i.e., March 31, 1973, was the owner of a house property with open land situated at 60, R.S. Bhandari Marg, Indore. The value of the property was shown in the return at Rs. 2,80,000 as per the report of an approved valuer. The Wealth-tax Officer referred the matter of valuation to the Valuation Officer under Section 16A of the Act. The valuation was made at Rs. 11,00,700. The assessee contended that as the property was under self-occupation, its value should be frozen under Section 7(4) of the Act. The Wealth-tax Officer rejected the contention and adopted the value at Rs. 11,00,700 as valued by the Valuation Officer. On appeal, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner held that the provisions of Section 7(4), though inserted by the Finance Act, 1976, with effect from April 1, 1976, were procedural in nature and were applicable to all cases pending on the date the above provision came into force. The officer, accordingly, fixed the value of the house property at Rs. 3,69,149 under Section 7(4) of the Act and directed the Wealth-tax Officer to adopt the above value for assessment. On adoption of such value, the value of urban immovable property owned by the assessee became less than Rs. 5 lakhs. It was, therefore, held that no additional wealth-tax was payable by the assessee. Aggrieved by the findings of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, recorded in favour of the assessee, the Department filed an appeal before the Tribunal. The Tribunal considered the question as regards the applicability of Section 7(4) of the Act and held that the provision could be applied to all pending assessments as held by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. Aggrieved by the findings of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, recorded in favour of the assessee, the Department filed an appeal before the Tribunal. The Tribunal considered the question as regards the applicability of Section 7(4) of the Act and held that the provision could be applied to all pending assessments as held by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. The Tribunal also held that the aforesaid provision was procedural in nature and, therefore, applicable to pending cases. The appeal was, therefore, dismissed. The Department then sought a statement of the case and reference of a question under Section 27(1) of the Act. The application was rejected. The applicant, therefore, filed this application under Section 27(3) of the Act. 3. We have heard Shri D.D. Vyas, learned counsel for the applicant/ Department, and Shri S.C. Bagdiya, learned counsel for the non-applicant/ assessee. 4. It is not in dispute that Section 7(4) was inserted in the Wealth-tax Act by the Finance Act, 1976, with effect from April 1, 1976. It provides as under : "(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-section (1), the value of a house belonging to the assessee and exclusively used by him for residential purposes throughout the period of twelve months immediately preceding the valuation date may, at the option of the assessee, be taken to be the price which, in the opinion of the Assessing Officer, it would fetch if sold in the open market on the valuation date next following the date on which he became the owner of the house, or on the valuation date relevant to the assessment year commencing on the 1st day of April, 1971, whichever valuation date is later :" (Proviso and Explanation are excluded from reproduction here). 5. The aforesaid provision laid down that the value of a house belonging to the assessee and exclusively used by him for residential purposes throughout the period of twelve months immediately preceding the valuation date may, at the option of the assessee, be taken to be the price which, in the opinion of the Assessing Officer, it would fetch if sold in the open market on the valuation date. The aforesaid provision clearly indicates the procedure for the purpose of ascertaining the price and the circumstances under which such ascertainment is permissible. That being so, it is manifestly procedural in nature. 6. The aforesaid provision clearly indicates the procedure for the purpose of ascertaining the price and the circumstances under which such ascertainment is permissible. That being so, it is manifestly procedural in nature. 6. In CWT v. Lachmandas Bhatia [1987] 163 ITR 586 (MP), it is held as under (at page 587) : "Having heard learned counsel for the parties, we have come to the conclusion that this reference has to be answered in the affirmative and against the Revenue. It is no doubt true that Rule 1BB of the Rules has come into force with effect from April 1, 1979, but as held by a Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court in CWT v. Vidyavathi Kapur [1984] 150 ITR 319, the rule is procedural. No decision to the contrary was brought to our notice. We respectfully agree with the view taken in Vidyavathi Kapur's case [1984] 150 ITR 319 (Kar). It is not disputed that the assessment proceedings were pending when the amended Rule 1BB came into force. The Tribunal was, therefore, justified in setting aside the order passed by the Wealth-tax Officer and in remanding the case to the Wealth-tax Officer to determine the value of the house in accordance with the provisions of Rule 1BB of the Rules." 7. Rule 1BB, concerning valuation of house, was inserted by the Wealth-tax (Amendment) Rules, 1979, with effect from April 1, 1979. Section 7(1) begins with expression as "Subject to any rules made in this behalf". 8. In CWT v. Shri Kasturbhai Mayabhai [1987] 164 ITR 107 (Guj), it is held that the provisions of Rule 1BB of the Wealth-tax Rules, 1957, dealing with the determination of the market value of the house on the valuation date are procedural in character and the provisions operate retrospectively. 9. Considering the law of limitation, the apex court in C. Beepathuma v. Velasari Shankaranarayana Kadambolithaya, AIR 1965 SC 241 held that the law of limitation is a procedural law and the provisions existing on the date of the suit apply to it. It was held as under (at page 245) : "There is no doubt that the law of limitation is a procedural law and the provisions existing on the date of the suit apply to it. This suit was filed in 1944 and the Act of 1877 governs it." 10. It was held as under (at page 245) : "There is no doubt that the law of limitation is a procedural law and the provisions existing on the date of the suit apply to it. This suit was filed in 1944 and the Act of 1877 governs it." 10. This court in Beharilal Tiwari v. Conservator of Forests [1966] JLJ 374 held that the law of limitation is a law of procedure. It held as under : "As the law of limitation is a law of procedure, its operation is retrospective. That law of limitation will govern a suit, appeal or application which is in force on the date on which such suit, appeal or application is instituted." 11. The High Court of Bombay in the case of Smt. Kusumben D. Mahadevia v. N.C. Upadhya [1980] 124 ITR 799 has held that Section 7 of the Wealth-tax Act is a machinery. As such Section 7(4) would automatically go to the field of procedural rather than substantive law. If law is procedural, then it can be applied retrospectively to pending matters. 12. It is thus clear that Section 7(4) of the Act inserted by the Finance Act, 1976, being in the nature of machinery is procedural in nature and is applicable to all the pending assessments including those prior to the assessment year 1976-77. The Tribunal was thus justified in adopting that course. No error is demonstrated. 13. The question stands concluded by decided cases, as referred to above and thus is no longer a referable question of law to this court. 14. We thus hold that the Tribunal was right in refusing to refer the question and further pursuit by the applicant under Section 27(3) is inutile. 15. Accordingly, we reject the reference application with no order as to costs. Counsel fee for each side shall, however, be Rs. 500, if certified.