Honble KHAN, J. – This is a tenants appeal U/s. 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as `The Ordinance of 1949) from the judgment dated December 1, 1993 of a learned Single Judge of this Court confirming the decree for eviction of the appellant on the ground of sub-letting/parting with possession as set out in Section 13(1)(e) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction_ Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as `The Act of 1950). (2). The premises in suit is a three room flat with a passage, a bath, a w.c. a store and open space in a building known as `Jaipuria Mansion situate at Mirza Ismail Road, Jaipur. This flat originally belonged to a Com- pany, M/S. Bharat Agencies Ltd. which later on stood amalgamated with another Company called M/s. Jaipur Stores Pvt. Ltd., which was subsequently changed to M/s. Jaipur stores Pvt. Ltd. the predecessor in title of the present respondent. This flat was on the tenancy of the appellant. Under a rent note executed on April 16, 1956 between M/S. Bharat Agencies Ltd. and the appellant the suit premises was continued in the possession of the appellant as tenant on a monthly rent of Rs. 125/- for a period of 11 months. Clause 10 of this rent note provided that the lessee shall not assign, sub-let or part with the possession of the leased premises without the consent of the lessor in writing. (3). The appellant allegedly violated certain conditions of the rent note. Therefore, M/S. Rajputana Stores Pvt. Ltd., the original plaintiff, filed a suit for eviction of the appellant on July 16, 1976 on the grounds of reasonable and bonafide personal necessity, material alteration in and substantial damage to the leased property, default in payment of rent and subletting/ parting with possession of the suit premises. The trial Court, the Adl. Distt. Judge No. 5 Jaipur City, Jaipur, vide his judgment and decree dated August 13, 1985 decreed plaintiffs suit for eviction on the grounds of reasonable and bonafide personal necessity of the landlord and subletting/parting with possession of the leased premises by the appellant to M/s. Traders and Miners Ltd. Jaipur and M/s. Aditya Mills Ltd. The appellant preferred an appeal to this Court u/S. 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The appeal was heard by the learned Single Judge, who by his impugned judgment dismissed the ground of personal necessity of the landlord which failed due to the transfer of the suit premises by the original plaintiff in favour of the present Respondent but confirmed the decree of the trial Court for eviction of the appellant on the ground of sub- letting/parting with possession. (4). Mr. Paras Kuhad, learned counsel for the appellant urged that the judgment under appeal was bad in law in as much as the factual matrix was not correctly appreciated by the learned Single Judge, in the light of the concept of sub-tenancy or parting with exclusive possession of the leased premises by the appellant in favour of the aforesaid two Companies. The learned counsel justified the maintainability of the appeal on the reasoning that this Appellate Bench would only be exercising its power in continuation and completion of the jurisdiction of this Court to hear an appeal and not for a second time. Reliance was placed on the case of Budge Municipality vs. Mongru Mia, 1953 AIR S.C. 433 in support of this contention. (5). We think we should examine Mr. Kuhads later submission first. (6). As stated above this appeal has been filed u/S. 18 (1) of the Ordinance of 1949. Section 18(1) reads as under– ``S. (18). Appeal to the High Court from Judges of the Court: (1) ``An appeal shall be to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintenden- ce of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under S. 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court. (7). It may be noted that S. 18(1) of the Ordinance of 1949 lays down a general rule that an appeal from judgment of one Judge of the Court shall, subject to certain exceptions, lie to the Court. (7). It may be noted that S. 18(1) of the Ordinance of 1949 lays down a general rule that an appeal from judgment of one Judge of the Court shall, subject to certain exceptions, lie to the Court. The exception as is relevant for our purpose, is that the judgment sought to be appealed against u/S. 18(1) should not have been passed in exercise of the appellate jurisdiction of the Court in respect of a decree or order made in exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of this Court. In the instant case, since the decree and judgment in respect of which the learned Single Judge, exercised his appellate jurisdiction was made in exercise of the original jurisdiction and not appellate jurisdiction by the learned Addl. Distt. Judge No. 5, Jaipur City, Jaipur, the excepting clause would not stand attracted. In that view of the matter, the present appeal would be maintainable provided it is not barred by any specific and express provision of the relevant special law. Let us examine the competency and maintainability of the appeal from that angle also. (8). The decree and judgment appealed against before the learned Single Judge was made by the learned trial Court u/S. 13(1) of the Act. Such decree and judgment was appealable under S. 22 of the Act to 1950. S. 22 of the Act of 1950 reads as under: S. 22. Appeals and Revisions. (1) ``From every decree or order passed by a Court under this Act an appeal shall lie to the Court to which appeals ordinarily lie from original decree and orders passed by such former Court. (2) No second appeal shall lie from any such decree or order: Provided that nothing herein contained shall affect the powers of the High Court (XXX) for Rajasthan in revision. (9). A bare reading of Section 22 of the Act of 1950 informs that a second appeal against a decree or order made under the Act has been barred by sub-Section (2). The act is a special enactment made by the legislature for a specific purpose and with definite object. The Ordinance is no doubt a creature of statute but its purpose is to erect and establish a High Court and to provide for regulation of its business. It is a general statute. The act is a special enactment made by the legislature for a specific purpose and with definite object. The Ordinance is no doubt a creature of statute but its purpose is to erect and establish a High Court and to provide for regulation of its business. It is a general statute. It is the well settled preposition of law that the provisions of special law would prevail over the provisions of general law. The right of appeal against a decree or order made under the Act has been given by the Act itself. The scope and extent of such right shall have to be judged under the Act which is a special law and not under the provisions of the Ordinance which provides for the mode and manner of exercising such a right. The express provision of Sub- Section (2) of Section 22 of the Act of 1950 clearly and in unambiguous language bars the remedy of a second appeal in respect of a decree or order made under the Act of 1950. In view of this express provision this appeal u/S. 18(1) of the Ordinance of 1949 is not maintainable. (10). We would like to observe that the term `Second Appeal occurring in the language of Section 22(2) of the Act of 1950 has been used in the sense in which it has been used in Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But it includes an appeal u/S. 18(1) of the Ordinance. The distinction is thin but fine and clear. A second appeal u/S. 100 of the CPC would not be on facts but on substantial question of law. Ordinarily re-appraisal of facts in a second appeal u/S. 100 is not permissible. But an appeal u/S. 18(1) of the Ordinance would permit reappraisal of facts as well as consideration of point of law. But for the provision contained in Sub-Section (2) of Section 22 of the Act of 1950 an appeal, which would-have been a second appeal in the facts of the case, was maintainable u/S. 18(1) of the Ordinance of 1949, though such an appeal would not be a second appeal within the meaning of the term u/S. 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The appeal before the learned Single Judge was an appeal u/S. 22(1) of the Act read with S. 19 of the Ordinance and Section, 96 of the CPC. The appeal before the learned Single Judge was an appeal u/S. 22(1) of the Act read with S. 19 of the Ordinance and Section, 96 of the CPC. A second appeal, had it not been barred by Section 22(2) of the Act, would have been an appeal u/S. 18(1) only and not u/S. 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. (11). The argument of Mr. Kuhad, learned counsel for the appellant, is that the present appeal is simply the continuation and completion of the exercise of the power which this Court legally has in the matters like the present one is not acceptable in the facts of the present case. It is true that as was held by the Special Bench of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Budge Budge Municipality vs. Mongru Mia (Supra) in the absence of any special direction in the Constitution as to how a power given to a High Court is to be exercised, it must be exercised by the High Court according to its own rules and to the provisions of its letters patent like any other power given to the High Court in general laws. If the High Court makes a rule that it would exercise its particular original jurisdiction in stages and not once for all an appeal against a judgment or order passed by a Single Judge in exercise of that jurisdiction may be a case of continuation and completion of the exercise of that power by the High Court only once and not a second time. For when the power was exercised by one Judge, it was exercised by the High Court in which that power vested and when the Appellate Bench exercised the power in that matter or case, as per rules of the High Court, it was again the same High Court. An appellate Bench is also the High Court for the purposes of exercising that power. Likewise, it may be true in the matters falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court. The High Court may make a rule that it would exercise its appellate jurisdiction in stages and not once for all. An appellate Bench is also the High Court for the purposes of exercising that power. Likewise, it may be true in the matters falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court. The High Court may make a rule that it would exercise its appellate jurisdiction in stages and not once for all. If that is so, an appeal from a judgment or order passed by one Judge in exercise of the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court in respect of a judgment or order passed in the exercise of the appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court would lie before the Appellate Bench (which situation is expressly accepted u/S. 18(1) of the Ordinance) and it would not be a case of exercising the same power for a second time but in continuation and com- pletion of the exercise of the same power. It is all a question of the manner or exercising the given power within the Court and not a question of the power itself. (12). In the case of Budge Budge Municipality vs. Mongru Mia (Supra) the legality and validity of a resolution passed by the said Municipality and a notice issued in pursuance of such resolution were challenged before a learned Judge of the Calcutta High Court in its writ jurisdiction. The learned Single Judge, in exercise of the power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, held both as invalid and cancelled them. It was against such an order of the learned Single Judge that an appeal under Clause 15 of the letters patent of that High Court, which is para materia to S. 18(1) of the Ordinance was filed and the Special Bench, which was the Appellate Bench, held that the appeal before it under Clause 15 was only a case of continuation and completion of the exercise of the power vested in the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. With respect, we agree with this proposition. S. 18(1) of the Ordinance permits appeal against a judgment or order passed u/S. 28 in exercise of the writ jurisdiction of this Court But that is not the factual and legal situation in the instant case. With respect, we agree with this proposition. S. 18(1) of the Ordinance permits appeal against a judgment or order passed u/S. 28 in exercise of the writ jurisdiction of this Court But that is not the factual and legal situation in the instant case. Herein, as stated above, the present appeal has been preferred against the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court passed under S. 19 of the Ordinance of 1949 in exercise of the civil appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree and order passed in the exercise of original civil jurisdiction by a Court subject of the superintendence of this Court. The power of this Appellate Bench to entertain an appeal from the judgment of the learned Single Judge which power is otherwise undoubtedly vested in this Bench u/S. 18(1) of the Ordinance, stands curtailed and restricted by the express provisions of Sub- Section (2) of Section 22 of the Special law wherefrom the power of this Court originates. The Calcutta High Courts case is thus clearly distinguishable on facts from the present case and the proposition of law laid down in that case cannot be applied to the facts of the case presently before us. (13). We are of the considered opinion that this appeal being expressly barred by S. 22 (2) of the Act, is not maintainable u/S. 18(1) of the Ordinance. (14). In view of the conclusions arrived at by us above it is not necessary for us to consider the appeal on merits. But with a view to avoid a re- mand of the appeal by the Apex Court in case of a different opinion over the point of maintainability of the appeal u/S. 18(1) of the Ordinance and also for the reason that the appeal was argued on merits before us at great length, we would like to record our findings on the merits of the appeal itself, also. (15). The main thrust of Mr. (15). The main thrust of Mr. Kuhads argument was that no specific case of either sub-letting or parting with possession was pleaded and proved, that parting with exclusive possession of whole or part of the leased premises by the appellant the in favour of a sub-letting or any other person was not proved, that burden to prove non- existence of sub-tenancy or parting with possession was wrongly placed on the appellant, that the learned Single Judge erred in basing his findings and conclusions on inferences wrongly drawn by him from certain fact and/or evidence on record and that the learned Judge recorded no clear finding either on the point of sub-tenancy or of parting with possession. In support of such contentions Mr. Kuhad, learned counsel for the appellant heavily relied upon a number of decisions of various High Courts and the Supreme Court to be referred to and discussed by us in the later part of this order. (16). In reply, Mr. S.M. Mehta, the learned counsel for the respondent, has not only supported the judgment under appeal but also strongly contended that the concurrent finding on an issue of fact was not required to be upset by this Court in the facts and circumstances of this case. Mr. Mehta, stressed for dismissal of the misconceived appeal with exemplary cost and in this behalf highlighted certain facts and relied upon a case also. (17). A study of the cases cited at Bar discloses that the question whether there is a tenancy or lease or parting with possession in a particular case must depend upon the quality of occupation given to the licensee or the transferee. Mere occupation is not sufficient to infer either sub-tenancy or parting with possession. Parting with the legal possession is necessary. And legal possession, in the case of sub-tenancy includes exclusive possession. Parting of the legal possession means possession with the right to include and also right to exclude others. Sub- tenancy, as stated above, means transfer of an exclusive right to enjoy the property in favour of third party. Mere user of the tenanted property by the third party with the consent of the tenant would not amount to parting with possession. There must be vesting of possession by the tenant in another person the by divesting himself not only of physical possession but also of the right to possession. Mere user of the tenanted property by the third party with the consent of the tenant would not amount to parting with possession. There must be vesting of possession by the tenant in another person the by divesting himself not only of physical possession but also of the right to possession. But exclusive possession itself is also not decisive in favour of a lease and against a mere license, for even the grant of exclusive possession might turn out to be only a license and not a lease where the granter himself has no power to grant the lease. Therefore, in the last analysis the question whether a transaction is a lease or license turns on the operative intention of the parties. There is no simple and single litmus test to distinguish one from the Other. The ultimate decision would depend upon the facts and circumstances of the given case. (18). The initial burden to prove sub-letting is on the landlord. If the landlord prima-facie shows that the tenant who was in exclusive possession of the premises, further let out the same for valuable consideration, it would then be for the tenant to rebut the evidence. If exclusive possession is established and the version of the tenant as to the particulars and the incident of the transaction is found unacceptable in the particular facts and circumstances of the case, it may not be impermissible for the court to draw an inference that the transaction was entered in to with monetary consideration in mind. It is open to the tenant to rebut this inference. It is required to be kept in mind that more often than not many transactions of sub-letting in the guise of license are in their very nature clandestine arrangement bet- ween the tenant and the sub-tenant and there cannot be direct evidence got. It is unoften a matter of legitimate inference. Though the burden of proof, as a matter of law, remains constant throughout a trial, the evidential burden which rests initially on a party bearing the legal burden, shifts according to the weight of evidence adduced by the party during the trial. (19). The above are the basic principles that emerge from the cases cited by the learned counsel for the parties. (19). The above are the basic principles that emerge from the cases cited by the learned counsel for the parties. In the application of the principles emerging from a decision, relied upon by a party, it needs to be remembered that way back in 1901 A.C. 495 in the case of Quinne vs. Heather, Earl of Halsbury L.C. (2), has observed that every judgment must be read as application to the aprticular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions, which may be found there, are not intended to be expression of the whole law governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such observations are to be found. A case is only an authority for what it actually decides. Quoting these famous words of the Lord Chancellor in the case of State of Orissa vs. Sudhansu Shekhar Misra (3), the Supreme Court observed that ``What is of essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what legally follows from the various observations made in it. It is not a profitable task to extract a suitable sentence here and there from a judg- ment and to build upon it. Elaborating the same principle in the case of Ambica Quarry Works vs. State of Gujrat (4), the Supreme Court further observed that ``the ratio of any decision must be understood in the back-ground of the facts of that case. Regarding the facts of a case the Supreme Court had already held in the case of Meenakshi Mills Madras vs. CIT Madras (5), that ``in the determination of a question of fact no application of any principle of law is required in finding either the basic facts or arriving at the ultimate conclusion; in a mixed question of law and facts the ultimate conclusion has to be drawn by applying principles of law to basic findings. (20). Judged in the light of the above principles the position that emer- ges in the instant case is that the trial court as well as the learned Single Judge, have concurrently held that the appellant had parted with the exclusive legal possession of the premises in favour of M/S. Traders and Miners Ltd. and M/S. Aditya Mills Ltd. with monetary consideration. This concurrent finding of the two learned Courts is essentially a finding of fact which is based on appreciation of the relevant facts and circumstances of the case and the evidence on record and therefore, should not be and cannot be lightly disturbed in this special appeal. (21). For the facts and circumstances of the case, we find that in para 9 of the plaint the respondent had specifically pleaded a case of sub-letting/ parting with possession of the leased premises by the appellant in favour of third parties. In reply to such everments in para 9 of the written statement, the appellant had stated that M/S. Traders and Miners Ltd. and M/S. Aditya Mills Ltd. were in temporary occupation of a part of the premises with its consent as licensees. The relevant terms and conditions of the alleged license regarding its commencement, duration and nature and extent were not disclosed. Later on, realising, perhaps that it was the written consent of the landlord-respondent and not of the tenant-appellant itself, which, may justify the occupation of part of the leased property of the afore-mentioned two strangers, the appellant by its application under O. 6, R. 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure tried to introduce the case that the aforementioned two persons were in occupation of a part of the premises and running their offices therein since long within the knowledge of the respondent and therefore, the respondent was estopped from raising the plea of want of its consent, but the learned trial Judge disallowed such an effort by his order dated 13th August, 1985. Then, during the pendency of the appeal before the learned Single Judge, vide its application dated Feb. 25, 1992 under O. 41 R. 27 CPC, the appointed M/S. Aditya Mills Ltd. as its Managing Agent and the said M/S. Aditya Mills Ltd. had, on 21st May, 1968, appointed M/S. Traders and Miners Ltd. as its Selling Agent and thus an interse relationship amongst the appellant and the aforementioned companies existed and those were not strangers to the case. In support of such a case permission of the Court to produce photostat copies of the agreement dated Feb. 20, 1962 and February 21, 1968 was sought. The agreement dated 20.2.62 showed that M/S. Aditya Mills Ltd. was appointed Managing Agent for a period of ten years w.e.f. 20th Feb., 1962. In support of such a case permission of the Court to produce photostat copies of the agreement dated Feb. 20, 1962 and February 21, 1968 was sought. The agreement dated 20.2.62 showed that M/S. Aditya Mills Ltd. was appointed Managing Agent for a period of ten years w.e.f. 20th Feb., 1962. Similarly M/S. Traders and Miners Ltd. was appointed by M/S. Aditya Mills Ltd. as their selling agent for a period of five years w.e.f. 21st May, 1968. The agencies of both the above-named Companies if at all created had ended long before the filing of the suit by the appe- llant in 1976 and therefore, no such case was pleaded in the written statement. Nor was there any evidence to show the renewal of their agencies. The learned Single Judge rightly rejected such a plea in his impugned order. (22). Now for the evidence on record, as adduced by the parties, we find that in oral evidence the respondent had examined four witnesses. P.W. 1, Chunnilal was the Director of the plaintiff- landlord Company. P.W.2 Jainath Agrawala was an occupant of a shop in the ground floor below the premises in suit. P.W. 3 Kishore Singh, was the Chowkidar of the plaintiff Company and P.W. 4, R.D. Mathur, was the Administrative Officer of the plaintiff Company. All these witnesses had unanimously deposed that the appellant had parted with possession of the leased premises in favour of M/S. Traders and Miners and M/S. Aditya Mills Ltd. who were having their officers with telephones and signboards threat and that the appellant was having no possession over the leased premises. This oral evidence got good corroborative support from the sign boards having on them the names and the registered addresses of the two Companies as shown in several photographs, proved at the trial and by delivery of registered letters on such addresses. The oral and the documentary evidence was considered by the two courts and rightly so, as sufficient to prima-facie prove the parting with the exclusive and legal possession by the appellant in favour of the aforementioned two companies. In rebuttal the appellant examined three witnesses. D.W. 1, Pep Singh was a servant with the appellant Company. He claimed himself to be the duly appointed and authorised power of attorney holder of the appellant Company. In rebuttal the appellant examined three witnesses. D.W. 1, Pep Singh was a servant with the appellant Company. He claimed himself to be the duly appointed and authorised power of attorney holder of the appellant Company. He stated that the two companies were occupying two rooms of the flat in question, ( the third room was in a dilapidated condition) having their own separate telephones and tables therein. He himself received rent from the Calcutta office of the appellant for making payment to the respondent but maintained no record of either receipts of the money from the appellant or payment of the same to the respondent. The order dated April 5, 1973 passed u/S. 13(3) by the trial Court determining the arrears of rent at Rs. 5,625/- after considering the plea of deposit of rent u/S. 19-A as against landlords claim for Rs. 7,238.75@ Rs. 125/- p.m. (per month) upto the date of institution of the suit on 16th July, 1976 belied the statement of the witness. D.W. 2, Sugan Singh and D.W.3, Madhu Sudan are, as told by D.W. 1, Pep Singh, the two peons of the said two Companies. Neither any Director nor any other responsible officer was examined by the appellant in support of its case. No tax returns assessment orders, account books, ledger etc. were produced to prove that the appe- llant was earning no income from the two Companies. Under such circumstances, it was open on the trial-court as well as the learned Single Judge to have come to the conclusion that had account books and ledger been produced, they would have shown that rent was received by the appellant from the two companies which would justify the finding of sub-letting. It is thus clear that looking to the worth and balue of the evidence led by the parties the concurrent finding of fact regarding sub-letting/parting with possession of the said premises by the appellant in favour of the two companies with monetary consideration was well founded and is not at all perverse, as claimed by Mr. Kuhad, learned counsel for the appellant. (23). Now for the several cases relied upon by Mr. Kuhad, learned counsel for the appellant. (23). Now for the several cases relied upon by Mr. Kuhad we may briefly point out that Associated Hotel of India vs. S. Ranjit Singh 6, was a case u/S. 13 (1) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Central Act, 1952, wherein the parting of exclusive possession by the tenant in favour of the occupant of a room in the hotel was proved by the landlord and the tenant could not rebut that evidence. Drawing of adverse inference against the tenant was approved by the Supreme Court. In the case of Smt. Jrishnawati vs. Sh. Hans Raj. (7), the principle laid-down in Associated Hotel of Indias case (Supra) and Meenakshi Mills case (supra) were discussed and re-integrated. In the case of Madras Banglore Transport Co. vs. Inder Singh and other (8), the sub-let- ting of the leased-premises by the tenant firm to a limited company of which the partners of the firm were directors was not considered to be sub-letting justifying tenants eviction. Such has not been found to be the position in the present case. (24). In the case of Jagannath vs. Chandra Bhan & Ors. (9), a father was carrying on joint family business in the leased property with the help of his sons and after retirement the sons had taken over the business as partners. The possession of the sons was protected. Obviously such are not the facts in the case on hand and ratio of this decision does not help the appellant. (25). In the case of Smt. Rajbir Kaur and another vs. M/s. S. Chokosin (10), it was discussed that once it is found that in spite of deficiency in the pleadings parties knew the case and they proceeded on trial on those issues by producing evidence, in that event it would not be open to a party to raise the question of absence of pleadings in appeal. The ratio of this decision helps the respondent rather then appellant. (26). In the case of Shah Phool Chand Lal Chand vs. Parvati Bai (11), adverse inference was drawn from the conduct and fault of the tenant firm and its sub- teanant firms in not producing their income tax returns, assess ment orders, account books and ledger. The ratio of this decision helps the respondent rather then appellant. (26). In the case of Shah Phool Chand Lal Chand vs. Parvati Bai (11), adverse inference was drawn from the conduct and fault of the tenant firm and its sub- teanant firms in not producing their income tax returns, assess ment orders, account books and ledger. The ratio of this decision supports the drawing of adverse inference by the learned single Judge against the appellant in the facts and circumstances of the present case. (27). In the case of Gopal Saran vs. Satya Narain (12), the display of hoarding boards of another company by the tenant who himself was carry- ing on advertisement business was not considered as amounting to sub-letting. The nature of the business of the tenant was such which get promoted by display of the hoarding boards of another company and thus this case is distinguishable on facts. (28). In the case of Delhi Stationers and Printers vs. Rajendra Kumar (13), the mere user of the tenant kitchen and latrine by the co-tenant while residing in the portion let-out to him by the landlord was not considered as transfer of the exclusive right to enjoy the kitchen and latrine or parting with the legal possession of the said part of the premises in favour of the co-tenant. In this Rajasthan case, the case of Roop Chand vs. Gopi Chand (14), another case under Rajasthan Act which was relied upon by Mr. Mehta was distinguished. In that case of a club it was held by the Supreme Court that even if a tenant parts with possession of whole or part of the premises without assigning or sub-letting the premises, he would still be liable to be evicted from the premises. Gopal Sarans case (Supra) was also referred to. It may be noted that the co-tenant in Delhi Stationers and Printers case (Supra) had merely used the kitchen and latrine of another co-tenant such user could have hardly amounted to parting with exclusive and legal possession by the later co-tenant in favour of the former. This case too is, therefore, distingushable on facts from the present case. (29). As against the above Mr. This case too is, therefore, distingushable on facts from the present case. (29). As against the above Mr. Mehta has rightly relled upon the cases of Roop Chand (supra) and Nihal Chand Rameshwari Dass and another vs. Vinod Rastogi and others (15), wherein on tenants parting with exclusive possession with right to include and exclude others in favour of third party without the landlords consent it was held that rebuttable inference arose that the third party was inducted by the tenant on monetary basis and on tenants having failed to rebut the inference by satisfactory explanation to the basis on which the third party was allowed to occupy the premises, ground of illegal sub-letting was established. Both these cases go a long way to support respondents case and the inferences drawn by the learned trial court and the learned Single Judge in the facts and circumstances of the present case. (30). The above discussion on the merits of the appeal and which discussion was necessitated for the reason that the appeal was argued before us at all possible length without directly referring to the barring provisions of Section 22(2) of the Act and justifying its maintainability with the help of an inapplicable case, leads us to the irresistible conclusion that there is absolutely no ground at all to interfere with the finding of fact recorded by the learned Trial Court as well as the leaned Single Judge. (31). And now the prayer of Mr. Mehta for awarding the exemplary costs in this case. Mr. Mehta urged that the suit was instituted in the year 1976 and the appellant registed the suit on false and frivolous grounds including the nevial of the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. It was urged by the learned counsel that the life of this avoidable litigation was prolonged by attempting to change the pleas and in support of such attempt false and forged documents were relied upon. Even the undertaking, which was required by the Court to carry out the beneficial stay order against execution proceedings for eviction was got filed by a Class IV servant, Pep Singh who was a mere old employee of 72 years of age and was not at all authorised to file such an undertaking on behalf of the appellant. In support of his prayer Mr. In support of his prayer Mr. Mehta relied upon the Supreme Court decision in the case of Shanti Devi and others vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (16), wherein a land acquisition case exemplary cost of Rs. 1 lac was awarded for abusing the process of the Court by the conduct of producing fabricated documents and raising new plea on that basis. Mr. Kuhad vehemently opposed the prayer. (32). Awarding of costs is a matter of the discretion of the Court. The general rule is that cost follows the result of the suit. Conduct of a party to the suit is certainly relevant for awarding the cost though an unfair conduct is not relevant to decide the merits of the suit itself. Non- awarding of exemplary cost in an exceptionally deserving case of abuse of the process of Court may not only encourage and prolong the avoidably legal life of a frivolous litigation but also may cause erosion in the very system of administration of justice in civil cases. Looking to the increasing situation that more often than not a litigant in civil matters leaves the legacy of litigation for his heirs and a cow is to be sold for getting a goat through courts it is all the more necessary that exemplary costs be awarded in exceptionally dese- rving cases. (33). In the instant case we find that even after admitting the fact of having parted with possession of the whole or part of leased premises in favour of two other companies without the written consent of the landlord, the tenant appellant justified their possession on the ground of license and then tried to prove the implied consent of the landlord in such possession of the two companies. The relationship of the landlord and tenant was also denied for no good reasons. At the appellate stage another plea of the two companies being sister concerns of the appellant was raised, though as discussed above, no such case was ever pleaded and proved in the trial court. Alongwith its application dated 25th February, 1992 seeking the permission of the court under O. 41 R. 27 CPC to file the agreement dated 20th February, 1962 by which M/S. Aditya Mills Ltd. was stated to have been appointed the Managing Agent by the appellant the photostat copy of the said agreement was filed. Alongwith its application dated 25th February, 1992 seeking the permission of the court under O. 41 R. 27 CPC to file the agreement dated 20th February, 1962 by which M/S. Aditya Mills Ltd. was stated to have been appointed the Managing Agent by the appellant the photostat copy of the said agreement was filed. A look at the back of the stamp paper shows that the stamps were purchased on 2nd March, 1962 at Calcutta though the agreement was purported to have been executed on 20th February, 1962 i.e. much prior to the purchase of the stamp paper. During the pendency of this appeal before this Bench the eviction of the appellant from suit premises in the course of execution proceedings was stayed on 22nd August, 1994 on appellants furnishing an undertaking before the Deputy Registrar (Judi) of this Court to the effect that in case the appeal failed the appellant would hand over vacant possession of the disputed premises. The appeal itself was directed to be fixed for final hearing in the first week of November, 1994. No undertaking was filed for sufficiently long time. The executing Court vide its order dated 15th December, 1994 directed the Sales Amin to execute the decree by handing over the possession of the suit premises to the respondent. The Sales Amin tried to execute the warrant on 24th Jan., 1995. The dis-possession was resisted by certain employees. On 25th January, 1995 the executing court ordered delivery of possession with police help. It was on that date i.e. 25th January, 1995 that an undertaking in terms of this Benchs order dated August 22, 1994 was filed at 7.55 p.m. at the residence of the Deputy Registrar and that too by P.W. 1, Pep Singh a 72 Years aged employee cum power of attorney holder of the appellant and not by any director or other responsible person or officer of the appellant company. All relevant documents including the order sheets of the proceedings of the executing court were pressed in service by Mr. Mehta, in support of his claim for award of exemplary cost. We fail to overlook these instances of relevant conduct of the appellant and have reasons to believe that the conduct of the appellant clearly shows not only the abuse of the process of the court but scant regard to its orders. Mehta, in support of his claim for award of exemplary cost. We fail to overlook these instances of relevant conduct of the appellant and have reasons to believe that the conduct of the appellant clearly shows not only the abuse of the process of the court but scant regard to its orders. Efforts to prolong the life of this litigation for about a quarter of a century were deliberately and consciously made and all that makes the present case as an exceptional case for award of exemplary cost which we fix at Rs. 25000/-. (34). In the result, this appeal fails not only on the ground of the bar under S. 22(2) of the Act but also on its own merits. The appellant shall pay cost of this appeal at Rs. 25,000/- to the respondent.