Judgment S.R. Singh, J. (1) This writ petition is directed against the judgment and order dated 16-5-1995 rendered by the Joint Director of Consolidation, Saharanpur in a revision under Section 48 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953, between Ram Singh and another on one hand and Ram Lai and others on the other. The land in dispute comprises of basic Khatauni Khata Nos. 54 and 39 situate in village Chakram Wadi, pargana and tehsil Deoband, district Saharanpur. (2) PETITIONERS are the sons of Ram Lai. In the basis year Smt. Nihali widow of Nakli, Hardva, Ram Singh and Ram Lai sons of Nakli were jointly recorded as bhumidhars of the land in dispute. Smt. Nihali w/o Nakli had died before the commencement of the dispute giving rise to this petition. Hardva, Ram Singh and Ram Lai were reported to be her heirs. On publication of statement of principle in H. Form 5-B, first set of objection n. ed under Section 9 (2) of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 (in short the Act') was on behalf of the petitioners. They claimed succession to Smt. Nihali on the basis of a Will said to have been executed by her in their favour on 7-5-1981. That Smt. Nihali died on 22-2-1987 is not in dispute. In their objection the petitioners claimed that Smt. Nihali had 1/4 share in the entire land in dispute and after her death they had been in possession over l/4th share of the entire land in dispute on the basis of a registered Will dated 7-5-1981. Accordingly they challenged the correctness of entry in C. H. Form 5-B which showed sons of Nihali to be her heirs. Second set of objection was the one filed by respondent Ram Singh and Hardeva in respect of the land comprising of basic Khatauni Khata No. 39. According to them the name of their mother Smt. Nihali was wrongly entered as cotenureholder of Khatauni Khata No. 39 which was exclusively acquired by them by means of a sale-deed executed in their favour by one Multan Singh son of Sahi Ram. They also contested the objection filed by petitioners and denied the execution of any Will by Smt. Nihali in favour of petitioners. They also contested the objection filed by petitioners and denied the execution of any Will by Smt. Nihali in favour of petitioners. They also alleged in their written statement that Smt. Nihali had no transferable right in the land in dispute and as such she was incompetent to execute the Will being relied on by petitioner. According to them Smt. Nihali had a limited interest in respect of a part of the land in dispute under a deed of gift dated 4-2-1935 admittedly executed in her favour by her father Mai Dayal who was admittedly the last male tenant of the lands covered by the deed of gift dated 4-2-1935. The Consolidation Officer, Deoband held by his order dated 18-9-1992 that execution of the Will by Smt. Nihali could not be proved as none of the two attesting witnesses Ami Singh and Padam Sen, though alive, were examined and further that Smt. Nihali being a limited owner had no right to execute the Will. Petitioners' objection was accordingly rejected and the entire land in dispute was divided equally amongst Hardeva, Ram Singh and Ram Lai sons of Smt. Nihali. The petitioners challenged the above order in appeal before the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, Saharanpur. The respondents Ram Singh and Hardeva too preferred an appeal against the said order of the Consolidation Officer in that they felt aggrieved by division of the entire land in dispute into three equal shares. Their grievance was that shares of all the three sons of Smt. Nihali ought to have been determined in accordance with the orders passed in the previous consolidation proceedings. The Settlement Officer, Consolidation allowed the appeals vide judgment and order dated 17-6-1993, set aside the order dated 18-9-1992 passed by the Consolidation Officer and remanded the matter to the Consolidation Officer with a view to giving an opportunity to the petitioners afresh to prove due execution and attestation of Will by examining the attesting witnesses and also to examining the evidence led by Ram Singh and Hardeva in justification of their claim. Aggrieved by the order of remand both the parties went up in revision. Aggrieved by the order of remand both the parties went up in revision. The Deputy Director of Consolidation allowed the revision preferred by respondents Ram Singh and Hardeva and dismissed the one filed by petitioners and set aside the order of remand passed by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation and restored the one passed by the Consolidation Officer, with a slight modification, vide judgment and order dated 18-5-1995. The Deputy Director of Consolidation held Ram Singh to be exclusive tenure-holder of plot No. 2125 admeasuring 2 Bighas and 9 Biswa of basic Khatauni Khatta No. 65. The lends comprising of basic Khatauni Nos. 39 and 54 were divided equally amongst three brothers, viz. Ram Singh, Hardeva and Ram Lai. The property other than plot No. 2129 are 2 bigha 9 biswa of Khata No. 65 comprised of the plots of land originally held by Mai Dayal as also the lands acquired subsequently by Ram Singh, Hardeva and Ram Lai but merged and amalgamated in the lands which originally belonged to Mai Dayal. As regards claim of the petitioners based on Will executed in their favour by Smt. Nihali, the Deputy Director of Consolidation held that she did not have a transferable right in the property in dispute and as such the Will executed by her was void ab initio. It was also held that since the petitioners had failed to prove the due execution and attestation of the Will before the Consolidation Officer, the Settlement Officer Consolidation was not justified in remanding the matter to the Consolidation Officer merely on the strength of the affidavits by the attesting witnesses filed for the time in appeal. (3) WITH a view to completing the chain of facts it may be stated that Smt. Nihali had executed a deed of gift dated 18-2- 1935 in favour of one Hardeva son of Mohan-the nephew of Mai Dayal. After the death of Mai Dayal, a suit being Suit No. 355 of 1941 was filed by Hardeva, Ram Singh and Ram Lai against Hardeva son of Mohan and Mst. Nihali for cancelling the gift deed dated 18-2-1935, inter alia, the ground that Mst. Nihali had only a limited interest in the suit property as per deed of gift dated 04-2- 1935 and as such the deed of gift dated 18-2-1935 executed by her was liable to be cancelled. Nihali for cancelling the gift deed dated 18-2-1935, inter alia, the ground that Mst. Nihali had only a limited interest in the suit property as per deed of gift dated 04-2- 1935 and as such the deed of gift dated 18-2-1935 executed by her was liable to be cancelled. Another suit, it being Suit No. 369 of 1941, was filed for possession by Hardeva son of Mohan alleging himself to be the adopted son of Mai Dayal. Both the suit were consolidated. Suit No. 355 of 1941 for cancellation of gift deed dated 18-2-1935 was decreed while Suit No. 369 of 1941 dismissed vide judgment and decree dated 30-5-1942 holding that adoption of Hardeva son of Mohan by Mai Dayal was not proved and further that Smt. Nihali was "a limited owner of the property and she had no absolute interest in the property. " Hardeva son of Mohan is now not in picture. (4) IT appears front the record that Mai Dayal, the father of Smt. Nihali had died around 1935 that is to say while Agra Tenancy Act, 1926 was in force. According to Section 22 of the Agra Tenancy Act the interest of a permanent tenure-holder and of a fixed-rate tenant was both heritable and transferable. Succession to these tenancies was governed by Personal Law. While succession to ex-proprietary, occupancy, statutory and non-occupancy tenancies was governed by Section 24 of the said Act. Interests in these tenancies, according to Section 23 of the said Act, were heritable but not transferable. That Mai Dayal executed a deed of gift is indicative of the fact that he was either a permanent tenure-holder or a fixed rate tenant of the land which was the subject-matter of the gift-deed dated 4-2-1935. Though there is no material on record of the writ petition on the basis of which it could be ascertained as to what was the nature of the land covered by the deed of gift dated 4-2-1935, but it was admitted that the interest of Mai Dayal in the lands covered by the deed of gift was both heritable and transferable. Sri G. N. Verma, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners urged, relying on Section 6 of the U. P. Act No. 1 of 1951, that not withstanding anything to the contrary contained in the deed of gift dated 4- 2-1935 Smt. Nihali acquired bhumindhari rights under Section 18 of the U. P. Act No. 1 of 1951 with effect from the date of vesting. It was also urged by the learned counsel that the order of remand being an interlocutory order was not revisable under Section 48 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, Sri B. P. Singh, learned counsel appearing for the contesting respondents submitted that the plea as to maintainability of the revision having not been raised before the revisional court cannot be allowed to be raised for the first time in writ jurisdiction and that too during the course of arguments. Sri B. P. Singh further urged that Smt. Nihali did not acquire, under the deed of gift, the status and interest possessed of by her father Mai Dayal and she never became a tenant of the category specified in Section 18 of the U. P. Act No. 1 of 1951 and, therefore, she could not have acquired bhumidhari right to be entitled to execute a Will. According to him the view taken by the Deputy Director of Consolidation does not suffer from any manifest error of law warranting interference under Article 226 of the Constitution. (5) THE question to be determined by this Court is as to what was the nature and extent of status and interest conferred on Smt. Nihali under the deed of gift dated 4-2-1935. If she had acquired the status and interest possessed of by Mai Dayal and entitlement to represent the estate then nothing could preclude her from acquiring bhumidhari right under Section 18 of the U. P. Act No. 1 of 1951 even if it be held that her status and interest were limited to cease on her death and hedged in with restrictions on inheritance after death and alienation during life-time as per terms and conditions if any in the deed of gift. THE reason is that all pre-existing limitations and encumbrances ceased to be operative by operation of law after the date of vesting and new rights free from all pre-existing limitations and encumbrances were conferred on the holder of the estate/tenancy lands by virtue of Section 6 and other related provisions of U. P. Act No. 1 of 1951. On the other hand if she had, under the deed of gift, only a right to remain in possession and enjoy the fruits of the property during her life-time and the estate had vested in the heir-at-law, then it cannot be said that she was holding the land as a tenant on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting so as to be entitled to acquire bhumidhari right under Section 18 of the U. P. Act No. 1 of 1951. It is not a matter of presumption to be drawn one way or the other merely from the fact that the gift was in favour of a female relation of the donor for there is no rule-of Hindu Law that disposition of property in favour of a female can carry with it only a limited estate, viz. right to remain in possession and enjoy the fruits of the property. THE extent of grant has to be ascertained objectively in each case. It would be worthwhile to refer to a decision of the Supreme Court in Ram Gopal v. Nand Lal, AIR 1951 SC 139 , wherein it has been held by the Apex Court as under : "it may be taken to be quite settled that there is no warrant for the proposition of law that when a grant of an immovable property is made to a Hindu female, she does not get an absolute or alienable interest in such property, unless such power is expressly conferred upon her. THE reasoning adopted by Mitter, J. of the Calcutta High Court in Mt. Kollani Koer v. Luchmee Prasad, 24 W. P. . 395, which was approved of and accepted by the Judicial Committee in a number of decisions, seems to me to be unassailable. It was held by P. C. as early as in the case of Tagore v. Tagore I. A. Sup. Vol. 47 at p. 65 : [9 Beng. Kollani Koer v. Luchmee Prasad, 24 W. P. . 395, which was approved of and accepted by the Judicial Committee in a number of decisions, seems to me to be unassailable. It was held by P. C. as early as in the case of Tagore v. Tagore I. A. Sup. Vol. 47 at p. 65 : [9 Beng. L. R. 377 (P. C.), that if an estate were given to a man without express words of inheritance, it would, in the absence of a conflicting context, carry by Hindu Law, an estate of inheritance. This is the general principle of law which is recognised and embodied in Section 8, T. P. Act and unless it is shown that under Hindu Law a gift to a female means a limited gift or carries with it the restrictions or disabilities similar to those that exist in a 'widow's estate' there is no justification for departing from this principle. There is certainly no such provision in Hindu Law and no text could be supplied in support of the same. THE position, therefore, is that to convey an absolute estate to a Hindu female, no express power of alienation need be given ; it is enough if words used are of such amplitude as would convey full rights of ownership. " "i do not think that the mere fact that the gift of property is made for the support and maintenance of a female relation could be taken to be prima facie indication of the intention of the donor that the donee was to enjoy the property only during her life-time. THE extent of interest, which the donee is to take, depends upon the intention of the donor as expressed by the language used and if the dispositive words employed in the document are clear and unambiguous and import absolute ownership, the purpose of the grant would not, by itself, restrict or cut down the interest. THE desire to provide maintenance or residence for the donees would only show that motive which promoted the donor to make the gift, but it could not be read as a measure of the extent of gift. . . . . . THE desire to provide maintenance or residence for the donees would only show that motive which promoted the donor to make the gift, but it could not be read as a measure of the extent of gift. . . . . . " (6) THE question whether ownership limited for life with or without restrictions on alienation akin to Hindu Widow's estate or a mere right to remain in possession of the property without any ownership therein was transferred to Smt. Nahali, would depend upon the intention of the donor which could be best ascertained with the aid of the language employed in the deed and surrounding circumstances. It is a question of fact ascertainable on appraisal of material on record. It may be pointed out that there is distinction, quite thin no doubt, between holder of 'life estate' and holder of a 'limited interest', as the term is understood in English Law. In the former, 'estate' is fully represented by its holder but the ownership is not hereditable and is subject to such limitations as may be embodied in the deed of transfer or Will by which such ownership has been created. Creation of a life estate if not hit by rule of perpetuity or any other provisions of law would be a valid transfer of interest for the life-time of the donee. In the latter case a limited interest such as mere right to remain in possession and enjoy the fruits of the property during life-time that is to say a fraction out of the whole estate is conferred upon the holder of the limited interest. It would be worthwhile to point out that an 'estate' in land is a degree, quality, nature or extent of the interest which a person has in it and as applied to land, it does not necessarily import a free hold, but merely a quantity of capacity a person has, from absolute ownership to naked possession. THE term 'limited interest' signifies duration or extent of property less than that of absolute property. An 'estate for life' or 'life estate' is defined to be a free hold interest in the land, duration of which is confined to the life or lives of some particular person or persons. 'estate for life' arises either by act of party or by operation of law. An 'estate for life' or 'life estate' is defined to be a free hold interest in the land, duration of which is confined to the life or lives of some particular person or persons. 'estate for life' arises either by act of party or by operation of law. One that arises by act of party is an estate created expressly by deed or Will and given to the donee to hold for own life and/or life of another person. 'absolute estate' on the other hand means a full and complete estate and an absolute owner is the owner capable of disposing, deed or Will, of the whole interest in the land, although the land or his interest therein is burdened, charged or encumbered. (Law Lexicon ). In Jaisri v. Raj Dewan, AIR 1962 SC 83 , the Supreme Court has held : "where a Hindu widow succeeds as heir to her husband, the ownership in the properties, both legal, and beneficial, vests in her. She fully represents the estate, the interest of reversioners therein being only succession is. The widow is entitled to the full beneficial enjoyment of the estate and is not accountable to any one. It is true that she cannot alienate the properties unless it be for necessity or for benefit to the estate, but this restriction on her powers is not one imposed for the benefit of reversioners but is an incident of the estate known to Hindu Law. " (7) CONFERRAL of a similar ownership in favour of any female relation by act of party say by gift or Will is not unknown to Hindu Law nor is it inhibited by rule of perpetuity or any text or principle of law. At least none was brought to my notice. To put it differently the estate which a Hindu widow could inherit under Hindu Law or a widow under Agra Tenancy Act, 1926 from her husband, can be created by act of party in favour of any other relation. In principle there is no distinction between the two. At least none was brought to my notice. To put it differently the estate which a Hindu widow could inherit under Hindu Law or a widow under Agra Tenancy Act, 1926 from her husband, can be created by act of party in favour of any other relation. In principle there is no distinction between the two. So far as a female acquiring limited ownership/tenancy by succession from the last male holder before the date of vesting is concerned, it is no longer res Integra that after abolition of Zamindari she acquired absolute rights under the provisions of Section 18 of U. P. Act No. 1 of 1951 [see Ram Jee Dixit and others v. Bhrigunath and others, 1967 (2) SCR 767 ; Amar Singh v. Assistant Director of Consolidation, AIR 1988 SC 2020 ; and Ram Prasad v. Assistant Director of Consolidation, J. T. 1994 (3) SC 519]. It would not be logical and sequacious to hold that while a female holding a life estate on the basis of inheritance from the last male holder acquired bhumidhari right under Section 18 of U. P. Act No. 1 of 1951, the holder of similar estate under a deed or Will would not. In fact all pre-existing limitations on ownership ceased to be operative by operation of Section 6 of the said Act. (8) IN the Munsiff's judgment dated 30-5-1942, it was no doubt held that Smt. Nihali was a 'limited owner' and that 'she had no absolute interest in the property. ' But all that the findings aforestated signify is that ownership of Nihali was limited to cease on her death and she had no right to transfer the property during her life-time. These limitations to her ownership, in my opinion, could cease to be operative after abolition of the Zamindari and she could acquire bhumidhari right under Section 18, unless the language used in the deed and other surrounding circumstances lead to the conclusion that she had a mere right to remain in possession and enjoy the fruits of the property and the estate therein had, as per deed of gift, vested in any person. The decision in Balbhadra v. Board of Revenue, 1981 ALJ 781 which has been approved of by the Supreme Court in Amar Singh v. Assistant Director of Consolidation and others, AIR 1958 SC 2020 will have no application unless it is found, as a fact, the Smt. Nihali was, "only permitted to remain in possession and enjoy the property" and "no ownership or title was created in her favour" under the deed of gift executed by Mai Dayal. The Deputy Director of Consolidation has failed to advert himself to this aspect of the matter and has applied the decision in Balbhadra (supra) without determining the facts on which the law laid down in Balbhadra (supra) could be pressed into service. Amar Singh (supra) was a case where a bhumidhar had executed a Will in favour of a female relation. Section 6 of U. P. Act No. 1 of 1951 could not, therefore, be pressed into service in that case. It is well settled that the decision by Court or Tribunal gets vitiated and becomes amenable to certiorari jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, if it is rendered on misconception of fact and/or law without proper self-direction to the relevant issues involved in the case. If tested on this touch stone, the order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation cannot be sustained. (9) IT is next to be seen whether the order of remand passed by Settlement Officer Consolidation was not open to revision it being an 'interlocutory order' within the meaning of Section 48 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act which excludes, in no uncertain terms, an 'interlocutory order' from the purview of revisional jurisdiction. In Satya Dhayan Ghosal v Smt. Deo Rajan Devi, AIR 1960 S. C. 941 an order of remand has been held to be 'an interlocutory judgment' in that it does not terminate the proceeding and its correctness can be challenged in appeal from the final order. In coming to the aforesaid conclusion the Apex Court has relied on its earlier decision rendered in Keshar Deo Chamaria v. Radhey Kissen Chamaria, AIR 1954 S. C. 23 and the proposition laid down therein has been reiterated in Kshistish Chandra v. Commissioner of Ranchi, A. I. R. 1981 S. C. (sic ). In coming to the aforesaid conclusion the Apex Court has relied on its earlier decision rendered in Keshar Deo Chamaria v. Radhey Kissen Chamaria, AIR 1954 S. C. 23 and the proposition laid down therein has been reiterated in Kshistish Chandra v. Commissioner of Ranchi, A. I. R. 1981 S. C. (sic ). In view of these authorities, I am of the considered view that the order of remand passed by Settlement Officer, Consolidation was an interlocutory order' within the meaning of Section 48 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act and, therefore, not open to revision. Its legality can, however, be examined in revision against the final judgments and orders rendered pursuant to the order of remand and if at that stage the Deputy Director of Consolidation finds that the order of remand was legally erroneous, all subsequent proceedings, viz. the order passed by the Consolidation Officer pursuant to the order of remand as also the appellate order passed in appeal preferred against such order of the Consolidation Officer would become non est. Since the order of remand is neither appealable nor revisable, its correctness is open to examination at subsequent stage when the matter comes up finally in revision. The impugned order is therefore, liable to be quashed on this ground as well. The decision in Bhawat and others v. Deputy Director of Consolidation and others, 1990 R. D. 162, has no application to the facts of this case and in any case it cannot be accepted in view of the Apex Court's direct decision on the point. 15. The order of remand, it may be observed, may lead to an exercise in futility if Smt. Nihali is found to have had, under the deed of gift, a mere right to remain in possession and enjoy the property for her )life-time a right distinct from ownership limited to her life-time. In other words the question of proof of due execution and attestation of the Will may arise only if it is found that Smt. Nihali held, on the date immediately preceding the date of vesting, the estate owned by Mai Dayal for it is in that event only that she can be held to have acquired bhumidhari right under Section 18 read with Section 6 of the said Act so as to be entitled to make. a bequest in respect thereof. a bequest in respect thereof. The Settlement Officer, Consolidation did not advert himself to this aspect of the matter nor did he advert himself to the question whether an order of remand could, in the fact and circumstances of the case, be passed merely on the basis of the affidavits filed by the attesting witnesses in appeal. Affidavit, it may be observed, in no evidence unless it is admitted under the orders of the court as comprehended by Order XIX of the Code of Civil Procedure. The order of remand passed by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation is no doubt not under challenge before this Court, but its invalidity was set up during the course of argument, by Sri B. P. Singh in support of his submission that the High Court ought not to interfere, under Article 226 of the Constitution, if interference is to lead to restoration of another illegal order. In the circumstances of the case and in order to secure the ends of justice, the Court is of the view that the appellate order of remand ought to be quashed as well. 16. In the result the judgments and orders, dated 18-5-1995 and 17-6-1993 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation and Settlement Officer, Consolidation respectively are quashed. The Settlement Officer, Consolidation is directed to re-admit the appeal and decide it afresh in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made in this judgment. The petition stands disposed of accordingly. Petition disposed of.