Research › Browse › Judgment

Allahabad High Court · body

1995 DIGILAW 979 (ALL)

Harshudin Diwedi v. State of U. P.

1995-09-11

PARITOSH K.MUKHERJEE

body1995
JUDGMENT : Paritosh K. Mukherjee, J. By means of the present writ petition, the Petitioner, Harshudin Diwedi, has challenged the order of repatriation, dated 21.8.1995, passed by Superintendent of Police, Vigilance, Uttar Pradesh State Electricity Board, Lucknow (Annexure 4 to the writ petition). 2. A perusal of order dated 21.8.1995 reveals that by order dated 19.7.1995, passed by Uttar Pradesh Police Headquarters, the Petitioner was reverted in pursuance of the aforesaid order, the Petitioner was repatriated and posted to his parent office at Kanpur. 3. Sri Surendra Kumar Mishra, learned Counsel for the Petitioner drew my attention to Annexure-2 to the writ petition, which is an order placing the Petitioner, along with other Constables, "On deputation" to the Uttar Pradesh State Electricity Board, Lucknow for three years. During deputation period, it has been clearly specified in the aforesaid letter, that the lien of the Petitioner will be retained in the parent office, in the original district of appointment. The name of the Petitioner appears at serial Number 12 and the district of appointment is Kanpur. Thus, prima facie, there does not appear any illegality in the order of repatriation since the Petitioner has been repatriated to his original district of appointment, i.e., Kanpur. 4. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner next contended that the Petitioner has been reverted/repatriated on the basis of some complaints. Though the order of repatriation apparently appears to be an order of repatriation simpliciter, but in fact, it is by way of punishment and it casts stigma. 5. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner drew my attention to the averments made in paragraph 15 of the writ petition, which is being quoted below: 15. That the Petitioner has come across the fact that after the relieve of the Petitioner from the Sales Tax Department, the Deputy Sales Tax Commissioner. Kanpur Nagar vide his letter No. ST-P-F Harshudin Dwivedi 1995-96 dated 7.8.1995 made a complaint against the Petitioner to the Inspector General of Police (Vigilance) U.P., State Electricity Board.... Thus, in view of aforesaid fact, the contention of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner is that repatriation of Petitioner before expiry of his term of deputation of three years, on the basis of some complaint, is illegal and the impugned order cannot be sustained in law. Thus, in view of aforesaid fact, the contention of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner is that repatriation of Petitioner before expiry of his term of deputation of three years, on the basis of some complaint, is illegal and the impugned order cannot be sustained in law. in support of this contention, he placed reliance in K.H. Phadnis v. State of Maharashtra 1971 SLR 345 , wherein a Full Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court, consisting of Hon'ble Mr. S.M. Sikri, C.J.; and Hon'ble Mr. J.M. Shelat, C.A. Vaidalingam, A.N. Graver, A.N. Ray, JJ. (as their Lordships then were), held that order of reversion entails punishment when it is neither due to abolition of post nor due to unsuitability nor due to demand made by the parent department. 6. In the case of K.H. Phadnis (supra), Hon'ble Mr. Justice A.N. Ray, speaking for the Bench, cited the decision in Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India, which laid down three propositions, viz. Article 311 makes no distinction between permanent and temporary members of the service or between persons holding permanent or temporary posts and affords protection to both classes of servants; if a Government servant has no right to the particular rank his reduction from an officiating higher rank to his substantive lower rank will not by itself be a punishment, and, the mere fact that the servant has no title to the post or the rank and the Government has, by contract, express or implied or under the rules governing the conditions of his service, the right to reduce him to a lower post does not mean that the order of reduction of a servant to a lower post or rank cannot in any circumstance be a punishment. 7. I have carefully gone through the judgment of Apex Court in K.H. Phadni's (supra), and, in my view, the facts of that case are distinguishable to the facts of the case in hand. Thus, the ratio laid down in K.H. Phadnis (supra) cannot be applied, with full force, to the facts of the present case. I have come to the aforesaid conclusion because of the fact that a careful scrutiny of the impugned order makes it crystal clear that the are simply repatriates the Petitioner to his parent office, and, it does not c. din any stigma. Thus, the Impugned order does not entail any civil or evil consequences. 8. I have come to the aforesaid conclusion because of the fact that a careful scrutiny of the impugned order makes it crystal clear that the are simply repatriates the Petitioner to his parent office, and, it does not c. din any stigma. Thus, the Impugned order does not entail any civil or evil consequences. 8. In view of what has been discussed above, the writ petition fails, and is accordingly dismissed.